JUDGMENT : S.G. Shah, J. 1. Both these petitions are arising out of the same issue though filed by different petitioners and, therefore, they are heard together and disposed of by this common judgment. Petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 18836 of 2016 is District Milk Producers Union Limited having its activities in Mahesana District of the State. Whereas petitioners in Special Civil Application No. 18837 of 2016 are claiming themselves as Indian National citizens and challenging the show cause notice dated 27.10.2016 issued by the Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Gujarat State, whereby such respondent No. 1 Mahesana District Milk Producers Union Ltd. being petitioner in Special Civil Application No. 18836 of 2016 so also petitioners of Special Civil Application No. 18837 of 2016 being directors of the said co-operative society were called upon to show cause that why administration of the co-operative society should not be handed over to the administrator, because of financial irregularities and several other irregularities, which result into illegality in the administration of such co-operative society by its Managing committee. Same show cause notice dated 27.10.2016 is under challenge in both the petitions. 1.1 Considering the common issue raised in both the petitions, only one set of arguments has been advanced by learned Senior Counsel Mr. Mihir Joshi appearing with learned advocate Mr. Dipen Desai for the petitioners in both the petitions and, therefore, learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Prakash Jani has also advanced one set of arguments and, hence, we have to deal with only one set of arguments for both the petitions. As already recorded herein above, the only difference between two petitions is the capacity of petitioners, whereby in one petition, the cooperative society itself is the petitioner through its Director and in another petition, all its directors are petitioners in their capacity as such. 2. At the outset, it cannot be ignored that there are number of litigations by or against the co-operative society under reference and it cannot be ignored that there are several serious allegations regarding serious financial irregularities including misappropriation and scam committed during the administration of the co-operative society by its Chairman and some of the directors. It cannot be ignored that because of such irregularities and because of several steps/actions taken by the competent authority including respondent No. 1 being Registrar of co-operative societies, there are several litigations initiated by the co-operative society and its Chairman. It cannot be ignored that because of such irregularities and because of several steps/actions taken by the competent authority including respondent No. 1 being Registrar of co-operative societies, there are several litigations initiated by the co-operative society and its Chairman. It is also undisputed fact that, at every stage, the issue has been raised before the High Court and few matters have been dragged upto the Honourable Supreme Court of India. However, only because of multiplicity of litigations or separate actions taken as per law by the competent authority, it cannot be said that actions taken by the competent authority are mala-fide or to secure political revenge. Such action was termed as mala-fide by the petitioners in most of the petitions which has been dealt with in detail in Special Civil Application No. 6089 of 2017 whereby by an order dated 31.03.2017 this Court has taken care of detailed submissions regarding mala-fide on the part of the State Authorities in following manner: "56. In background of above referred basic information, now let us consider the rival submissions and discussion of merits on such submissions. 57. When petitioner is complaining about the malafide attitude of the respondents, it would be appropriate to recall some basic principles of such co-operative societies. 58. Co-operative means living, thinking, and working together to accomplish a common goal through cooperative principles. Consequently, any organisation formed by people to work together to achieve the objects for which it is formed through the co-operative principles is called a co-operative society. The concept of co-operation envisages a group of persons having one or more common economic needs, who voluntarily agree to pool their resources both human and material and use them for mutual benefit, through an enterprise managed by them in democratic lines, guided by the principle of 'Each for all and all for each'. The essentials of co-operative societies are that (1) a co-operative is a voluntary form of organization (2) it is an association of human beings organized based on equality (3) its objective is the economic interests of its members. The essentials of co-operative societies are thus (1) a co-operative is an enterprise (2) it is an association of users (3) it applies the rules of democracy and (4) it is intended to serve both (a) its own members and (b) the community as a whole. 59. The essentials of co-operative societies are thus (1) a co-operative is an enterprise (2) it is an association of users (3) it applies the rules of democracy and (4) it is intended to serve both (a) its own members and (b) the community as a whole. 59. It is undisputed fact that petitioner is union of co-operative milk producers society and is governed by the Act, which is enacted with a view to provide for the orderly development of the Co-operative sector in the State, by organizing the Cooperative societies as self-governing democratic institutions, to achieve objects of equity, social justice and economic development, as envisaged in the directive principles of State Policy of the Constitution of India. 60. It is also undisputed fact that petitioner is a Union and not an individual personality though it is a legal entity and is being managed by the elected body, which has to act for the benefit of its members and not for any individual or for the interest of any group or individuals. It is also undisputed fact that for the purpose to safe guard such interest of such cooperative societies, the Act is providing several restrictions and check on elected body and since such provisions are not unconstitutional, the authorities created by such Act has ample powers to Act in accordance with Law and Rules to see that basic concept and purpose of the Co-Operative activities are neither frustrated nor being misused by group of persons based only upon some majority of supporters, because ultimately society is for the benefit of members and not for the benefit of some group. 61. In light of above background, if we peruse pleadings in para 2.2 to 2.28, it is nothing but history of previous litigation by and against the petitioner. Even if petitioner has succeeded in all or any of such litigation, it cannot be said that it would give a rise or cause to the petitioner to get the impugned order quashed irrespective of their misdeeds, which are listed with impugned order. Though petitioner is blaming the respondents for not holding the election in time, its own admission in para 2.2 on page 3 confirms that elections were not held in time because the issue regarding delimitation was pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Though petitioner is blaming the respondents for not holding the election in time, its own admission in para 2.2 on page 3 confirms that elections were not held in time because the issue regarding delimitation was pending before the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Thus, it is very easy to start a blame game, but it needs to be proved with malafide intention, otherwise everyone has a right to agitate their grievances in appropriate manner and delay thereafter in particular activity was mainly result of the general attitude of litigants to delay the judicial proceedings and to get disadvantage of delay in judicial system, because of huge pendency. However, in such scenario, it cannot be said that respondents intention is malafide, when they have passed several orders to safeguard the interest of the members of the Society and Union. Therefore, I do not see any reason to discuss all those details of previous litigation so as to conclude that, it amounts to malafide on the part of the respondent. 62. Suffice to refer the litigations preferred by the petitioner and its pendency, being Special Civil Application No. 18836 of 2016 and petition filed by erstwhile members of the petitioner being Special Civil Application No. 9017 of 2015, which was challenging the same impugned order and stay was operative against impugned order till it was withdrawn on 14/3/2017, i.e. after couple of years though such members were not entitled to raise and continue such issue. Can it be said that it was malafide intention of those petitioners, and more particularly when it was disclosed at the time of active hearing that they have no locus standi, present petitioner has come forward with a Civil Application No. 3847 of 2017 to implement it as a party so as to get the order of injunction against impugned order continue. Therefore, only because respondents have passed several orders against the petitioner and only because petitioner could succeed in litigation against such orders, it cannot be said that the respondent has malafide intention. Therefore on such ground, there cannot be any interim relief in favour of the petitioner. 63. In Indian Railway Construction Company Limited v. Ajay Kumar [ (2003) 4 SCC 579 ], the Apex Court observed that burden of establishment of malafides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. Therefore on such ground, there cannot be any interim relief in favour of the petitioner. 63. In Indian Railway Construction Company Limited v. Ajay Kumar [ (2003) 4 SCC 579 ], the Apex Court observed that burden of establishment of malafides is very heavy on the person who alleges it. The allegations of malafides are often mode easily made, than proved, and the very seriousness of such allegations demands proof of a higher order of credibility, observed the Supreme Court. The principle was stated that the Court should be slow to draw dubious inferences from incompetent facts placed before it by a party, particularly when such grave imputations are made against the order of an office who has high responsibility in the administration. 64. In Mutha Associates v. State of Maharashtra [ (2013) 14 SCC 304 ], the writ petition was filed by APMC in which the charge of malafides was leveled against the then Minister, but the Court found that the same was without specific particulars or details of how the decision taken by the Minister was influenced by the developer or any other person. The High Court held that the Minister's action was under the influence of the builder, attributing malafides simply because the order was found to be untenable in law. The Apex Court observed that no matter the circumstances enumerated by the High Court may have given a rise to strong suspicion that the Minister acted out of extraneous consideration, but the suspicion, however strong cannot be proof of the charge of malafides. 65. The Supreme Court made following observations by endorsing to the contention of the Counsel that mere fact that an order passed by constitutional authority was found to be legally unsustainable, did not ipso facto mean that the order was malafide, by holding "The law regarding pleading and proof "malice in fact" or malafides as it is in common parlance described is indeed settled by a long line of decisions of this Court. The decisions broadly recognize the requirement of allegations suggesting "malice in fact" to be specific and supported by necessary particulars. Vague and general averments to the effect that the action under review was taken malafide would not therefore suffice. The decisions broadly recognize the requirement of allegations suggesting "malice in fact" to be specific and supported by necessary particulars. Vague and general averments to the effect that the action under review was taken malafide would not therefore suffice. Equally well settled is the principle that the burden to establish that the action under challenge was indeed malafide rests heavily upon the person making the charge; which is taken as quasi-criminal in nature and can lead to adverse consequence for the person who is proved to have acted malafide. There is in fact a presumption that the public authority acted bona fide and in good faith." (Para 42) 7.3 When the pleadings and ground of malafide are examined in light of the aforesaid principles, the case on this count is not only put forth in a cryptic way but falls far short of the facts and the averments on the basis of which malice could be shown in respect of the impugned action. Merely stating that "there has been a shift in political scenario and the ruling party pressurising to remove the petitioner as Vice Chairman and wants to regaining the power of the Market Committee" is not sufficient allegation to constitute and to conclude that the exercise undertaken is mala fide. Nor the averments in paragraph 3.10 that officer had been given inquiry with regard to employment of staff and he gave ex-parte report against the office bearers, by itself is not indicative of the action being malafide. 66. An action to be considered or treated as malafide has a definite parameters of law as could be noticed above. The vague and bald assertions of the petitioner cannot establish malafide or malice in fact and the said contention has to miserably fall flat. 67. The political pressure or political motive may not be a good argument at all without anything else legally sustainable. Nor does it add to a plea of malafide by itself. The corridors of power always hum with political activities, for; they are the corridors of power. Every hummer and every political move therefrom do not become subject matter of interference by the Court of law and the writ court, of course, unless the action, decision or conduct is in contravention of some statutory provision, is to defeat the law or the interference is necessary to secure and protect some higher legal principle or Constitutional enforcement. Every hummer and every political move therefrom do not become subject matter of interference by the Court of law and the writ court, of course, unless the action, decision or conduct is in contravention of some statutory provision, is to defeat the law or the interference is necessary to secure and protect some higher legal principle or Constitutional enforcement. Every political maneuvering, unless amounts to violation of law, is no ground in a court of law. 68. As against the above facts and circumstances and submissions with discussion of merits on the point and issue raised by the petitioner, the learned Addl. Advocate General has submitted that:- 1. Truth should come out in all such cases and therefore, when there is no violation of fundamental rights, but in fact there is violation of rights of poor farmers/milk producers in not getting proper price of the milk, special audit cannot be stayed or restricted. 2. There is no reason to exercise equitable discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the Union/Committee, which has to act for the benefit of its members, rather than to try to hide the misdeeds of its members. 3. It is to be realized that why the petition is filed and who will be benefited, if interim relief is granted as prayed for. 4. As far as qualification of Officers of the team disclosed in the impugned order is concerned, as already discussed herein above, when Rule 38 is clear and permitted different class of people to be appointed as such, there is no substance in such submission by the petitioner. 5. Rest of the submissions by the Addl. Advocate General are taken care of in above discussion and hence, not reproduced. Whereas, there is substance in submission herein above made by learned Addl. Advocate General, and when those submissions are accepted, no further discussion is required." 2.1 Therefore, I do not wish to elaborate issue of mala-fide any further, since it was argued and discussed at length, as above in Special Civil Application No. 6089 of 2017 just before couple of months and negativated by this Court as reproduced herein above. Thus there is no substance in submission regarding mala-fide by respondents. 3. Thus there is no substance in submission regarding mala-fide by respondents. 3. It seems that considering the different decisions, now petitioner society has realized that there is no scope or substance in merits when there is prima-facie evidence regarding several financial and other irregularities, therefore, now they have concentrated their submissions purely on technical issues including interpretation of statute and scope of competent authority in passing impugned orders under particular provisions of law. Though the basic principle of jurisprudence certainly confirms that the authorities should not travel beyond their jurisdiction in taking action against anybody including litigants like present petitioners against whom there is prima-facie evidence regarding huge scam, it cannot be ignored that it is the duty of the Court to find out the truth and nothing but the truth, so as to attained the goal of justice. However, there is difference between the criminal jurisprudence and civil jurisprudence, in as much as, in criminal jurisprudence, we generally follow the rule that there must be cogent and reliable evidence beyond reasonable doubt before awarding any sentence or punishment to any accused wherein generally punishment is subject to physical restraint like imprisonment and, thereby, it affects the constitutional right of freedom whereas, though there is penal action in some civil jurisprudence like debarring a person from being Director of co-operative society or company in a given case, the same principle cannot be applied more particularly at the stage of investigation and show cause notice, when practically such so called culprit/wrongdoer has only been called upon to explain that why proceedings should not be initiated against him for his mis-deeds. There are catena of decisions of the Honourable Supreme Court in confirming that in such case, i.e., at the stage of show cause notice, the High Court should not interfere in the proceedings initiated by the competent authority under its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It is undisputed fact that in present petitions, the petitioners are challenging the show cause notice dated 27.10.2016 and the issue of respondent No. 1 and, therefore, they have a chance to explain before the competent authority that they have not committed any irregularities or illegalities and to that extent, there is no need to interfere with any show cause notice, at this stage. 3.1 For the purpose reference of following cases are material; "(1) 2006 (12) SCC 28 between Union of India and Kunisetty Satyanarayana. It would be appropriate to recollect the following paragraphs; 12. In our opinion, the High Court was not justified in allowing the Writ Petition. 13. It is well settled by a series of decisions of this Court that ordinarily no writ lies against a charge sheet or show-cause notice vide Executive Engineer, Bihar State Housing Board v. Ramdesh Kumar Singh and others JT 1995 (8) SC 331, Special Director and another v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse and another AIR 2004 SC 1467 , Ulagappa and others v. Divisional Commissioner, Mysore and others 2001(10) SCC 639 , State of U.P. v. Brahm Datt Sharma and another AIR 1987 SC 943 etc. 14. The reason why ordinarily a writ petition should not be entertained against a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet is that at that stage the writ petition may be held to be premature. A mere charge-sheet or show-cause notice does not give rise to any cause of action, because it does not amount to an adverse order which affects the rights of any party unless the same has been issued by a person having no jurisdiction to do so. It is quite possible that after considering the reply to the show-cause notice or after holding an enquiry the authority concerned may drop the proceedings and/or hold that the charges are not established. It is well settled that a writ lies when some right of any party is infringed. A mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of any one. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment or otherwise adversely affecting a party is passed, that the said party can be said to have any grievance. 15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet." (2) 2004 (3) SCC 440 between Special Director and Mhd. Ghulam Ghouse. Para 5 from this case is relevant, which is as under - "5. 15. Writ jurisdiction is discretionary jurisdiction and hence such discretion under Article 226 should not ordinarily be exercised by quashing a show-cause notice or charge sheet." (2) 2004 (3) SCC 440 between Special Director and Mhd. Ghulam Ghouse. Para 5 from this case is relevant, which is as under - "5. This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the parties. Unless, the High Court is satisfied that the show cause notice was totally non est in the eye of law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show cause notice was founded on any legal premises is a jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues also can be adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice initially, before the aggrieved could approach the Court. Further, when the Court passes an interim order it should be careful to see that the statutory functionaries specially and specifically constituted for the purpose are not denuded of powers and authority to initially decide the matter and ensure that ultimate relief which may or may not be finally granted in the writ petition is accorded to the writ petitioner even at the threshold by the interim protection, granted." (3) 2007 (13) SCC 270 between Union of India and Vicco Laboratories para 30 of such judgment is relevant, wherein it is stated that; "30. Normally, the writ court should not interfere at the stage of issuance of show cause notice by the authorities. In such a case, the parties get ample opportunity to put forth their contentions before the concerned authorities and to satisfy the concerned authorities about the absence of case for proceeding against the person against whom the show cause notices have been issued. In such a case, the parties get ample opportunity to put forth their contentions before the concerned authorities and to satisfy the concerned authorities about the absence of case for proceeding against the person against whom the show cause notices have been issued. Abstinence from interference at the stage of issuance of show cause notice in order to relegate the parties to the proceedings before the concerned authorities is the normal rule. However, the said rule is not without exceptions. Where a show cause notice is issued either without jurisdiction or in an abuse of process of law, certainly in that case, the writ Court would not hesitate to interfere even at the stage of issuance of show cause notice. The interference at the show cause notice stage should be rare and not in a routine manner. Mere assertion by the writ petitioner that notice was without jurisdiction and/or abuse of process of law would not suffice. It should be prima facie established to be so. Where factual adjudication would be necessary, interference is ruled out." (4) SCA No. 2063 of 2015 between Vipulbhai Mansinhbhai Chaudhary and State of Gujarat, which is challenged in LPA No. 132 of 2015 with Civil Application No. 1197 of 2015. Para 14 of such judgment reads as under; "14. It goes without saying that such litigations have now become order of the day. These proceedings are initiated at the cost of Society and for such frivolous litigations considerable amount of judicial time is wasted and therefore such litigations call for serious consideration and in such cases high costs are required to be imposed personally on the litigants and not from the Society. We are of the opinion that at this juncture, if not high costs, a token cost of Rs. 7500/- is required to be imposed upon the appellant as a deterrent. Accordingly, cost of Rs. We are of the opinion that at this juncture, if not high costs, a token cost of Rs. 7500/- is required to be imposed upon the appellant as a deterrent. Accordingly, cost of Rs. 7500/- is imposed upon the appellant." When above judgment in Letter Patent Appeal was challenged before the Honourable Supreme Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 4668 of 2015 even the Honourable Supreme Court has without entering into merits of the case and even without perusing the order under challenge, directed the petitioner to approach the appropriate forum for challenging the validity of impugned order and, thereby, it becomes clear that when alternative remedy is available, High Court should not interfere at the stage of show cause notice. 4. As against such settled legal position, petitioners are relying upon a trace judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court between Siements Ltd. And State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (2006) 12 SCC 33 , wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has observed and held that when statutory authority has already applied its mind and has formed an opinion as regards the liability or otherwise of the appellant before it and, thereby, in absence of impugned order, when respondent authority has already determined the liability of the appellant and, thereby, only question which remains for consideration was quantification of such liability, it is held that the same does not remain in realm of show cause notice and, therefore, writ petition was held to be maintainable. 5. However, it is not the case before us, in as much as, by impugned show cause notice nothing has been decided against present petitioners and on the contrary, show cause notice specifically discloses in last paragraph that pursuant to the details, respondents are called upon, as provided under Section 81 of the Act and for the purpose to submit their defence either personally or through advocate and either by oral submissions or even in writing on or before 3:00 p.m. on 10.11.2016 i.e. after two weeks of issuance of show cause notice. The factual details, which are discussed herein after, make it clear that, in fact, petitioners have approached the respondent authority by their written submissions and, therefore, pursuant to the decision in Special Leave to Appeal (Civil) No. 4668 of 2015 between Vipulbhai M. Chaudhari v. State of Gujarat & Ors., now it is for the competent authority to take decision, till then there is no substance or reason to interfere with, at such stage. 5.1 However, to avoid an agitation that this Court has not dealt with any of the submissions, I have no option but to make this order lengthy by dealing with all the rival submissions. 6. For the purpose, issues raised by the petitioners are dealt with as under; 6.1 It is contended that, powers under Section 81 of the Gujarat Co - Operative Societies Act, 1961 (For short "the Act") cannot be exercised by the respondent No. 1 pursuant to the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in case of Vipulbhai M. Chaudhari v. Gujarat Cooperative Milk Marketing Federation Ltd. and Anr. reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 . There are several judgments with same nomenclature, hence herein after it is referred with citation of SCC. Such issue has been raised pursuant to the judgment by the division bench of this Court in case of Rajendra N. Shah v. Union of India reported in 2013 (2) GLR 1698 , whereby amendment of the Constitution of India and its 7th schedule by the Constitution of India (97th Amendment) Act, 2011 has been held ultra-vires in not taking recourse of Article 368(2) of the Constitution of India. Such judgment is challenged in Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 25266-25267 of 2013. However, it has been submitted that pursuant to the decision in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 , the decision by the division bench of this High Court in case of Rajendra (supra) is impliedly over-ruled and, thereby, amendment in constitution is deemed to be in force and, therefore, Article 243ZH to 243ZT is operational, which restricts the powers of the State Government, more particularly respondent No. 1 to take any action against petitioners under Section 81 of the Act. However, I do not find any substance in such submission for the simple reason that in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 there was no issue with reference to either powers of the respondent No. 1 under Section 81 of the Act or constitutional validity of the amendment of the constitution under reference, which was held ultra-vires by the division bench of this court in case of Rajendra (supra). If we peruse the judgment of the Honourable Supreme Court reported in (2015) 8 SCC 1 , it becomes clear that practically after discussing all the issues, the Honourable Supreme Court has dismissed the appeal by the Chairman of the petitioner society. When it is endorsed that the Honourable Supreme Court agrees with the view taken by the High Court of Gujarat and that contrary view expressed by the High Courts of Andhra Pradesh, Bombay, Kerala and Punjab and Haryana are no more good law though for such conclusion the Honourable Supreme Court has relied upon the 97th amendment of the constitution. If we peruse the details of the dispute raised before the Honourable Supreme Court, it becomes clear that the reference of the 97th the constitutional amendment is made so as to make it clear that co-operative society shall be based and work on co-operative principles of democracy, equality and solidarity whereas with reference to the provisions of the Act the Honourable Supreme Court has practically dealt with Section 43B of the Act and not with the Section 81 of the Act. Though the judgment in case of Rajendra Shah(supra) was dated 22.04.2013, it was not referred before the Honourable Supreme Court in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 and, therefore, if at all petitioners want to contend that judgment of Rajendra Shah (supra) has been over-ruled by judgment in such case, then he should have referred such judgment before the Honourable Supreme Court, so as to make it clear that such judgment is now over-ruled by the Honourable Supreme Court and, therefore, it is to be held as un-operational and, thereby, held that respondents have no powers under Section 81 of the Act. Though facts are very much clear as discussed herein, unfortunately petitioners have raised all such technical issues and argued in detail by referring several paragraphs from several different judgments, so as to make the judicial process clumsy, in as much as, once certain issues are raised in the previous petition and argued at length, it does not require to be dealt with in detail in other cases between same parties and more particularly when such issues are not much relevant to the subject matter of the dispute, which is raised in the previous petition. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners as referred para 12, 14, 27, 42, 44, 46 and 51 of the 2015 (8) SCC 1 , emphasizing that while deciding the case when the Honourable Supreme Court has relied upon the 97th amendment in constitution, it is to be considered that decision in case of Rajendra Shah (supra) which declared such constitutional amendment as unconstitutional has been over-ruled by the Honourable Supreme Court. Petitioner has emphasized on few lines from such paragraphs wherein it is observed by the Honourable Supreme Court that the main object for such amendment was also to ensure democratic functioning of cooperative society and that if there is no democracy in co-operative society as envisaged by the constitutional 97th amendment. However, the core issue raised before the Honourable Supreme Court and thereby dealt with, answered and decided by the Honourable Supreme Court is with reference to the motion of no confidence against Chair person/elected office bearers of the cooperative society, which is recorded in para 1 of the judgment which reads thus: "Whether in the absence of a specific provision on removal by no confidence in the Act, Rules or even bye-laws of a cooperative society, the Chairperson/elected office-bearer can be removed by a motion of no-confidence, is the short but complex question." It is undisputed fact that petitioner before the Honourable Supreme Court being Chairman of the society was removed from the office through no confidence motion and when he challenged the action before the High Court, the High Court has decided that such action is permissible and the Honourable Supreme Court has endorsed such decision which is recorded herein above, though challenge was to the effect that there is no provision in the Act to move no confidence motion. Therefore, what is discussed by the Honourable Supreme Court is with reference to the issue raised before it and, therefore, such discussion is to be read and considered with such reference and not in general terms as submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that it amounts to over ruling the decision in case of Rajendra Shah (supra). In para 46 the Honourable Supreme Court has recollected the different details and, therefore, those details cannot be considered as determination by the Honourable Supreme Court, so as to conclude that such discussion would amount to over ruling the decision in case of Rajendra Shah (supra). The determination of the Honourable Supreme Court in para 46 may be recollected here which reads as under; "46. In the background of the constitutional mandate, the question is not what the statute does say but what the statute must say. If the Act or the Rules or the Bye-laws do not say what they should say in terms of the Constitution, it is the duty of the court to read the constitutional spirit and concept into the Acts. ... "In so far as in its Act Parliament does not convey its intention clearly, expressly and completely, it is taken to require the enforcement agencies who are charged with the duty of applying legislation to spell out the detail of its legal meaning. This may be done either-(a) by finding and declaring implications in the words used by the legislator, or (b) by regarding the breadth or other obscurity of the express language as conferring a delegated legislative power to elaborate its meaning in accordance with public policy (including legal policy) and the purpose of the legislation". 6.2 Even at the cost of making this order lengthy, I would reproduce the following paras of the same judgment in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 , which makes it clear the cited judgment is in fact dealing with the only issue with reference to the motion of no confidence and nothing more than 97th amendment of the Constitution of India has been referred. It is quite clear and obvious that to negativate any decision of the competent authority in case of Rajendra Shah (supra), same must be challenged before the higher authority and it should be declared as over-ruled by the higher authority. It is quite clear and obvious that to negativate any decision of the competent authority in case of Rajendra Shah (supra), same must be challenged before the higher authority and it should be declared as over-ruled by the higher authority. In absence of such exercise, the judgment remains in force and it cannot be considered as deemed to be overruled as submitted by the petitioners, though there may be some such instances which results into deem over-ruling of any prior decisions by the higher authority. But in absence of specific facts and details and observation, a judgment of division bench in case of Rajendra Shah (supra) cannot be declared as over ruled. If it is so, the provisions of Section 81 of the Act would be applicable in the present case and to that extent, there is no substance in the petition, so as to challenge the show cause notice without approaching the competent authority to explain their case. For ready reference, the relevant portion in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 is reproduced herein below; "12. The first legislation on co-operative movement in India was the Co-operative Credit Societies Act, 1904 and, thereafter, the co-operative societies emerged in India as State sponsored/promoted institutions. The main objective was only credit intended to relieve the poor agriculturists from the clutches of money-lenders. The first urban co-operative credit society under the Act of 1904 was registered in Kanjivaram in erstwhile Madras province. The traits of democracy were present in the very first legislation through the principle "one man, one vote". Since the first legislation was limited to the credit societies, a new legislation was introduced 8 years later as "Co-operative Societies Act, 1912". The restriction regarding registration limited to credit societies was taken away and any society established with the object of promoting the economic interests of its members in accordance with the cooperative principles, or a society established with the object of facilitating the operations of such a society, could be registered. 14. The co-operative societies having been conferred a constitutional status by the Ninety Seventh Amendment, the whole concept of co-operatives has undergone a major change. In 1993, the local self-governments, viz., panchayats and municipalities were also given constitutional status under Parts IX and IXA of the Constitution of India by the 73rd and 74th Amendments. 14. The co-operative societies having been conferred a constitutional status by the Ninety Seventh Amendment, the whole concept of co-operatives has undergone a major change. In 1993, the local self-governments, viz., panchayats and municipalities were also given constitutional status under Parts IX and IXA of the Constitution of India by the 73rd and 74th Amendments. The Statement of Objects and Reasons would show that the Constitution wanted the local bodies to function as vibrant democratic units of self-government. After two decades, co-operative societies were given the constitutional status by including them under Part IXB. The main object for the said amendment was also to ensure "their autonomy, democratic functioning and professional management". 27. Article 243ZT of the Constitution requires the laws relating to co-operative societies in force in States prior to the commencement of the Amendment Act to be in tune with and in terms of the constitutional concept and set up of co-operative societies. In fact, a period of one year has been provided in the Constitution from the commencement of the amendment for the required amendment or repeal by the competent legislature or by the competent authority, of laws which are inconsistent with Part IXB. As a corollary, the Constitution enables the competent legislature or authority to suitably amend the existing provisions in their laws in tune with the constitutional mandate. Thereafter, in case there continues to be silence in the Act or Bye-laws, the court will have to read the constitutional requirements into the existing provisions. It is essentially a process of purposive construction of the available provisions as held by this Court in Pratap Chandra Mehta case (AIR 2011 SC (Civ) 2045 : 2011 AIR SCW 4817) (supra). 42. It may be seen that all these decisions dealt with the pre-Ninety Seventh Amendment status of the cooperative societies. The amendment providing constitutional status to the societies has brought out radical changes in the concept of co-operative societies. Democratic functioning and autonomy have now become the core constitutional values of a co-operative society. Such societies are to be registered only if they are founded on co-operative principles of democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. 44. The provision simply deals with removal for misconduct or persistent default/non-performance. A person with good conduct may still not earn the confidence of the people who selected him to the office. Such societies are to be registered only if they are founded on co-operative principles of democracy, equality, equity and solidarity. 44. The provision simply deals with removal for misconduct or persistent default/non-performance. A person with good conduct may still not earn the confidence of the people who selected him to the office. The very concept of co-operation is to work jointly towards the same end. Unless there is co-operativeness among the elected co-operators who constitute the Governing Body for achieving the object for which the society is constituted and for which those representatives are elected by the members entrusting them with the management of affairs of the society, there will be total chaos. Co-operation among the co-operators is the essence of democratic functioning of a co-operative society. If there is no democracy in a cooperative society, it ceases to be a co-operative society as conceived by the Constitution of India under the Ninety Seventh Amendment. 46. In the background of the constitutional mandate, the question is not what the statute does say but what the statute must say. If the Act or the Rules or the Bye-laws do not say what they should say in terms of the Constitution, it is the duty of the court to read the constitutional spirit and concept into the Acts.... "In so far as in its Act Parliament does not convey its intention clearly, expressly and completely, it is taken to require the enforcement agencies who are charged with the duty of applying legislation to spell out the detail of its legal meaning. This may be done either-(a) by finding and declaring implications in the words used by the legislator, or (b) by regarding the breadth or other obscurity of the express language as conferring a delegated legislative power to elaborate its meaning in accordance with public policy (including legal policy) and the purpose of the legislation". 51. The co-operative society registered under the Central or the State Act is bound to function as a democratic institution and conduct its affairs based on democratic principles. Democratic functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts or Rules or Bye-laws both on the principle and procedure. If not, it is for the court to read the democratic principles into the Act or Rules or Bye-laws. Democratic functioning on democratic principles is to be reflected in the respective Acts or Rules or Bye-laws both on the principle and procedure. If not, it is for the court to read the democratic principles into the Act or Rules or Bye-laws. If a procedure is prescribed in any Act or Rule or Bye-law regarding election of an office bearer by the Board, as defined under Article 243ZH(b) of the Constitution of India, and for removal thereof, by way of a motion of no confidence, the same procedure has to be followed. In case there is no express provision under the Act or Rules or Bye-laws for removal of an office bearer, such office bearer is liable to be removed in the event of loss of confidence by following the same procedure by which he was elected to office." 6.3 In background of above discussion if we now peruse Section 81 of the Act, it becomes clear that such provision is amended with effect from 10.04.2015, such date is relevant and material so as to realize that in case of Rajendra Shah (supra) when the division bench of this Court as back as on 22.04.2013 stated that the provisions relating to Co-operative Societies can be amended by the State Act only, after the decision in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 dated 19.03.2015, the State Government has substituted the text of Section 81 of the Act with effect from 10.04.2015 i.e. after the date of judgment in both the cases under reference. Therefore, in general, the above referred two decisions i.e. Rajendra (supra) and (2015) 8 SCC 1 are irrelevant when show cause notice is after the amended provisions of the Act 1961 with effect from 10.04.2015. 6.4 However, an attempt was also made to show that even amended provisions of Section 81 would not be applicable to issuance of show cause notice dated 27.10.2016. For the purpose, reference of Section 81 of the Act, since it is a recent amendment, would be necessary, which reads as under; "81. 6.4 However, an attempt was also made to show that even amended provisions of Section 81 would not be applicable to issuance of show cause notice dated 27.10.2016. For the purpose, reference of Section 81 of the Act, since it is a recent amendment, would be necessary, which reads as under; "81. Suppression of a committee and appointment of a Committee or Administrator: - (1) If, in respect of a committee of a society having the Registrar as its member, the State Government and in respect of a committee of a society of a society which does not have the Registrar as its member, the Registrar, is of the opinion that- (I) the committee persistently makes default; of (II) the committee is negligent in the performance of its duties imposed on it by or under this Act or the rules made thereunder or they bye-laws; or (III) the committee has committed any act prejudicial to the interest of the society or its members; the State Government or, as the case may be, the Registrar, after giving the committee an opportunity of being heard, within fifteen days from the date of issue if notice, by an order in writing, supersede the Committee and appoint - (a) a Committee, consisting of one or more members of the society, not being the members of the committee superseded under this sub-section, or (b) an Administrator from amongst the officers of the Co-operation Department of the State Government to manage the affairs of the society for a period not exceeding one year as may be specified in the order, which period may, at the discretion of the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, be extended from time to time, so, however, the term of the Committee or the Administrator shall be, the remaining term of the committee in whose place he is appointed or two years in aggregate, whichever is less. (2) Before passing an order under Sub-Section (1), the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall consult the co-operative financing institution if such society is indebted to it. (2) Before passing an order under Sub-Section (1), the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, shall consult the co-operative financing institution if such society is indebted to it. (3) The Committee or Administrator so appointed shall, subject to such instructions and control of the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be have power to exercise all or any of the functions or the committee or of any officer or the society, and take all such action as may be required in the interests of the, society. (4) The Committee or the Administrator appointed under sub-section (1)shall arrange to hold the election of the committee of the society at such time as directed by the State Government or the Registrar, as the case may be, but not later than the period as specified in sub - section(1); Provided that the Committee or the Administrator shall arrange to hold elections for constitution of a new committee or a society in the co-operative credit structure within a period of six months from the date of the order of suppression of the said Committee. (5) All acts done or purported to be done by the Committee or Administrator during the period during which the affairs of the society are carried on by the Committee or Administrator appointed under Sub-Section (1) shall be such as may be prescribed and the same shall be paid from the fund of the society. (6) The remuneration of members of the Committee or the Administrator appointed under sub-section (1) shall be such as may be prescribed and the same shall be paid from the fund of the society. (7) The members of the committee which has been superseded under sub-section (1), shall not be eligible to become a member of the committee of the same society for a period of six years from the date of suppression of such committee." 6.5 Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners has submitted that there is no prima facie evidence to show that the administration of the society or the committee has (1) persistently made any default or (2) negligent in performing duties or (3) committed any prejudice to the interest of the society. 6.6 To decide that whether action under Section 81 of the Act is proper or not factual details are required to be considered which would be done herein after. 6.6 To decide that whether action under Section 81 of the Act is proper or not factual details are required to be considered which would be done herein after. However, the bare reading of Section 81 of the Act makes it clear that the competent authority has wide powers to supersede a committee, in as much as, it can be for any of the three contingencies, which makes it clear that financial irregularity so also administrative irregularity and prejudicial act to the interest of the members of the society is sufficient for taking actions under Section 81 of the Act. Discussion herein after would make it clear that there is prima facie evidence regarding financial irregularity and prejudicial activities to the members of the society which empowers the respondent to initiate proceedings as contemplated under the Act. Therefore, there is no substance in the submission that respondents are not entitled to initiate activities and actions under Section 81 of the Act. 6.7 Therefore, when Section 81 of the Act is introduced only with effect from 10.04.2015 i.e. after both the decisions under reference and more particularly when none of the affected parties including present petitioners and respondents in case of Rajendra Shah (supra) has ever challenged the decision of the division bench in Rajendra Shah (supra), when amendment in the Constitution of India has been held ultra-vires, only because of its reference in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 , it cannot be said that Section 81 of the Act is impliedly repealed. Even at the cost of repetition, it is to be recollected here that Section 81 of the Act was introduced only after judgment in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 . 6.8 Such type of litigation and submission by the political and well to do litigants is nothing but taking chance to get favourable orders. Even at the cost of repetition, it is to be recollected here that Section 81 of the Act was introduced only after judgment in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 . 6.8 Such type of litigation and submission by the political and well to do litigants is nothing but taking chance to get favourable orders. Such type of activities needs to be condemned and in general, heavy cost may be imposed upon such litigants when settled legal position is clear that the Court should not interfere at the stage of show cause notice and when Section 81 of the Act cannot be considered as impliedly repealed by the decision in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 , when it was introduced only after such judgment and, therefore, if at all, petitioners want to argue and allege that Section 81 of the Act is repealed then they should have challenged such amendment in appropriate proceedings seeking declaration of such amendment as ultra-vires, in which case, matter would be listed before the division bench. However, it is crystal clear that petitioner has not challenged the constitutional validity of Section 81 of the Act, but tried to convince the Court that Section 81 of the Act is impliedly repealed though it is introduced only from 10.04.2015 i.e. after the judgment in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 which is prior to such amendment i.e. 19.03.2015. 6.9 Though facts and material discussed herein above now clearly confirm that there is no substance in the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that powers of respondent under Section 81 of the Act and show cause notice is not proper because of decision in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 and, thereby, it cannot be held that judgment in case of Rajendra Shah (supra) has been impliedly over-ruled by the Honourable Supreme Court. Petitioners are relying upon few judgments on the issue which are dealt with as under; "(1) Ram Murti v. Bhola Nath and Anr. Reported in (1984) 3 SCC 111 , wherein while dealing with the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 it was observed in para 16 that decision in case of Hem Chand v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Reported in (1984) 3 SCC 111 , wherein while dealing with the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 it was observed in para 16 that decision in case of Hem Chand v. Delhi Cloth & General Mills Co. Ltd. reported in (1977) 3 SCC 483 , interpreting Section 15(7) and Section 14(2) in the context of Section 15(1) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, although not expressly overruled, cannot stand with the subsequent decision in case of Shyamcharan Sharma v. Dharamdas reported in (1980) 2 SCC 151 interpreting the analogous provisions of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 as it is by a larger bench. I failed to understand that how this judgment would help the petitioner in concluding that provisions of Section 81 of the Act which is introduced after the decision in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 can be considered as ineffective by considering the decision in case of Rajendra Shah (supra) as impliedly over-ruled. As already recorded herein above, if petitioner wants to plead and contend that judgment in case of Rajendra Shah (supra) has been over ruled by the judgment in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 then petitioner should have initiated appropriate proceedings before appropriate Court for such declaration. (2) Ham Shakar Pandey v. Uttar Pradesh Police Station Officer reported in 1995 AIHC 2926 by the Single Judge of Allahabad High Court, wherein petitioner is relying upon para 17 to 19 when Singe Judge of the High Court has held that judgment of the full bench of the same Court is no longer good law in view of subsequent decision of the Honourable Supreme Court. There cannot be an issue or question to such proposition that if there is decision by the higher authority - the Honourable Supreme Court on same issue decision by the lower authority even if, it is of larger bench then Court which is dealing with the issue, subsequently then decision of the Honourable Supreme Court is to be followed. However such general proposition would not help the petitioners to consider that judgment in case of Rajendra Shah (Supra) has been impliedly over ruled by decision in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 in view of the discussion as above. (3) The State of Madhya Pradesh v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. However such general proposition would not help the petitioners to consider that judgment in case of Rajendra Shah (Supra) has been impliedly over ruled by decision in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 in view of the discussion as above. (3) The State of Madhya Pradesh v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors. reported in (1977) 2 SCC 288 wherein petitioner is relying upon para 23 of the judgment wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has observed that the earlier decision of the Federal Court though not overruled must be deemed to have been overruled by the decision of the judicial committee in subsequent case. However it cannot be ignored that such decision was taken at the relevant time relying upon the provisions of Section 208 of the Government of India Act, 1935 which provides that the law declared by the judgment of Privy Counsel had to be followed by all the Courts including the Federal Court and, therefore, if earlier decision of the Federal Court was not expressly overruled by the judicial committee, it was considered as deemed to have been overruled by implication of the decision of the judicial committee. However, as already discussed herein above the issue in case of Rajendra Shah (supra) and decision in case of (2015) 8 SCC 1 are altogether different and more particularly impugned order in the present case is based upon the amendment after the decision in (2015) 8 SCC 1 and, therefore, there is no question of implied overruling of any judgment, so as to hold that impugned show cause notice is bad in law. Therefore, this judgment would not help the petitioner, in any manner, whatsoever." 6.10 An issue is also raised that general body of the society is supreme authority so far as activities of co-operative society are concerned and thereby whether or not provisions of the Act can be made applicable to such co-operative society. With reference to Section 81 of the Act so also 97th Constitutional amendment. In second breath i.e. as alternative arguments, it is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioners that even if Section 81 of the Act is in statute book, it would not entitle the respondents to initiate any action against society because as per Section 73 of the same Act, the general body of the co-operative society is a supreme and final authority. However, petitioner has failed to appreciate the provisions of Section 73 which makes it clear in the starting of section itself that subject to the provisions of this Act and Rules, the final authority of every society shall vest in the general body of the members in general meeting, summoned in such a manner as may be specified in the bye - laws. It is further provided that whether bye laws of a society provided for the election of delegates of such members, the final authority may vest in the delegates of such members elected in the prescribed manner and assembled in general meeting. Therefore, it is quite clear that subject to the provisions in the Act and the Rules the final authority of every society shall vest in the general body of members in general meeting, summoned in such a manner as may be specified in the bye-laws. Even reference to Article 43(B) of the Constitution is of no avail when it is submitted that it restricts the State's interference because of provisions of Article 43(B), which simply confirms that the State shall endeavor to promote voluntary formation, autonomous functioning, democratic control and professional management of co-operative societies, but it nowhere restricts the provisions of the Act or any such State legislature, which is in accordance with constitutional authority by competent body like State assembly. If at all petitioner wants to say that pursuant to Article 43(B) provisions of Section 81 of the Act is unconstitutional, then it is for such petitioner to come forward by challenging the provisions itself. However, it is clear that petitioner has not challenged the constitutional validity of Section 81 of the Act and, therefore, such submission would not help the petitioner in getting the relief claimed in the present petition. 6.11 It is also submitted that the show cause notice does not disclose the compliance of provisions of Section 81 of the Act, in as much as, there is no cause for removal of elected body and its conduct cannot fall in any issues listed in Sub Section (1) of the Section 81 of the Act. 6.11 It is also submitted that the show cause notice does not disclose the compliance of provisions of Section 81 of the Act, in as much as, there is no cause for removal of elected body and its conduct cannot fall in any issues listed in Sub Section (1) of the Section 81 of the Act. 6.12 It is further submitted that the show cause notice is vague and in general terms and does not confirm that committee is persistently making default or committee is negligent in performing the duties under the Act or Rules or has committed any prejudice to the society or members of the society. In support of such submission impugned show cause notice dated 27.10.2016 at annexure A has been referred to emphasizing that none of the allegations in the notice has ever been approved or supported by any evidence and, therefore, there is no cause or reason for the respondents to issue such show cause notice. However, petitioners have failed to realize that, in fact, show cause notice runs in 10 pages and as many as three major issues are discussed in detail in such notice to show that there is breach of provisions of Section 77, Rule 34(3) and provisions of Section 24(34) and 29 of the bye-laws, in addition to not forwarding the agenda to the nominated members by the government and final instances and not forwarding the minutes to the competent authority as per Rules. So far as statutory irregularities are concerned as many as 4 different irregularities are listed in detail in the impugned show cause notice. 6.13 If we peruse the show cause notice dated 27.10.2016 it becomes clear that based upon the report dated 29.07.2016 by the District Registrar of Co-operative Societies, Registrar of Cooperative Societies for the State has issued such show cause notice intimating the petitioners that they have persistently made default and they were negligent in performing their duty imposed by or under the Act and that their activities have been prejudicial to the interest of society and its members in following manner; "(a) suspending elected members of the society and nominating members of their choice against provision of law whereby elected members namely Ashokbhai Bhavsangbhai Chaudhari, Pradhanji Nathuji Thakore and Raimalbhai Jayrambhai Desai were suspended from the board. (b) amongst them Ashokbhai Bhavsangbhai Chaudhari has pointed out to the board that there was huge scam in purchasing goods without following tender process. (c) because of such disclosure, on 26.06.2016 aforesaid elected directors were not allowed to attend the meeting and they were forcefully restricted to enter into the premises of the society so as to attend the general body meeting. During such force one of the elected directors namely Raimalbhai Jayrambhai Desai has been injured and was required to undergo immediate treatment. For such instances of high handedness, a criminal complaint being I - C.R. No. 138 of 2016 has been registered on 26.06.2016 with Mahesana Police Station. (d) In the same meeting without an agenda or an issue raised by the Chairman, only on proposal by one of the directors, above three elected directors were suspended without following due process of law i.e. without issuance of show cause notice to them that why they should not be suspended and that too in their absence in the meeting after applying force by security staff at the main gate of the dairy. As already stated herein above their absence was not normal but they were not allowed to attend the meeting by using force against them by security staff at main gate of the dairy. (e) on the same day in place of above three elected members, petitioners have nominated three members namely Nanjibhai Ramjibhai Chaudhari, Jagaji Nathaji Thakore and Ganeshbahi Madhabhai Desai without following due process of law and absolutely against the provisions of law. (f) agenda and the date of the meeting was not conveyed to the nominated directors, who were nominated by the financial institutions and the government to the board. (g) Though Vipulbhai M. Chaudhari was held to be ineligible for holding any post and though there is no order in favour of Vipulbhai, such fact has been withheld from the body so as to allow Vipulbhai to dictate the board. (h) not approving the decisions by general body in its meeting dated 17.09.2015 without any reason or substance and in violation of provision of law. (i) in taking up the issue which was not declared as agenda item prior to meeting and, thereby, committing financial irregularity by adjusting the improper payment of Rs. 47,25,20,365/-. (h) not approving the decisions by general body in its meeting dated 17.09.2015 without any reason or substance and in violation of provision of law. (i) in taking up the issue which was not declared as agenda item prior to meeting and, thereby, committing financial irregularity by adjusting the improper payment of Rs. 47,25,20,365/-. (j) though there was an order dated 23.06.2016 by the competent Court under the Act in Laved Suit No. 116 of 2016, the decision was taken ignoring such order by the competent Court and thereby committing breach of Court's order in taking the decision that cooperative society should not take action to recover the amount of Rs. 22.50 Crore for Sagardan - Cattle feed. By an order dated 23.06.2016 in such Laved suit No. 116 of 2016 though respondents were restricted and prohibited to take any decision in a meeting dated 26.06.2016 against decision by earlier committee as per change item No. 8 and 9, not only meeting was held on 26.06.2016 but decision was taken on such agenda item Nos. 8 and 9 regarding decision taken by previous custodian committee and against above referred three elected members, which is nothing but pure disobedience of Court's order. (k) there is absolute disregard to the directions by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 21268 of 2015 by ignoring the nominated directors of the financial institutions and the government in activities of the society. (l) not forwarding the minutes of the meeting to the District Registrar." 6.14 When all above irregularities are discussed and explained in detail, it is really surprising to note that even after such details in show cause notice, it is argued that none of such activities can be considered as negligence in performing duties or prejudice to the interest of the society and its members. These are the real reason for delay in judicial process, when Court has to deal with all such arguments in detail it certainly consumes considerable Court hours during which, the Court can decide few more cases, where really speedy justice is indeed required. 6.15 It is submitted that the State has not to advocate the three members who are suspended by the general body because decision of general body is final when such people are acting against interest of the society. 6.15 It is submitted that the State has not to advocate the three members who are suspended by the general body because decision of general body is final when such people are acting against interest of the society. However, it cannot be ignored that the Act provides ample powers to the competent authority to verify that who is acting against interest of the members of the society and, therefore, it is not proper for the present petitioners, against whom there are allegations of irregularity and illegality to become the investigator and judge for their own cause. 6.16 So far as political rivalry is claimed, I have already reproduced the relevant decision from the decision between the same parties in Special Civil Application No. 6089 of 2017 in previous part of this judgment and, therefore, for such reasons there is no substance in such submission that government is advocating the directors who were suspended by the general body. 6.17 As already discussed, number of allegations and issues raised either by the competent authority against the society or by the society itself would not and cannot be considered as a mala-fide intention by the competent authority or the State. Therefore, only because one of the division bench of this High Court in its judgment dated 17.04.2015 in Special Civil Application No. 1611 of 2015 directed the competent authority to pass fresh order of delimitation and after considering observations made in such judgment, directs the completion of such exercise within 7 weeks and to complete the election within 5 months thereafter and non interference by the Honourable Supreme Court against such judgment in SLP (Civil) No. 12093-12095 of 2015 would not help the petitioner in any manner what so ever to conclude that show cause notice is illegal and bad. So also decision dated 06.07.2015 in Special Civil Application No. 1012 of 2015 that election is to be held at the earliest and non interference by the Honourable Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No. 20356 of 2015 would not help the present petitioner, in any manner, whatsoever. So also decision dated 06.07.2015 in Special Civil Application No. 1012 of 2015 that election is to be held at the earliest and non interference by the Honourable Supreme Court in SLP (Civil) No. 20356 of 2015 would not help the present petitioner, in any manner, whatsoever. So also decision dated 30.10.2015 in Special Civil Application No. 17877 of 2015 to hold elections at the earliest and in LPA No. 1363 read with judgment dated 03.11.2015 in Civil Application No. 12177 of 2015 so also decision dated 05.10.2015 in MCA (For contempt) No. 2838 of 2015 in Special Civil Application No. 1645 of 2015 is not material to hold that show cause notice is illegal. It is quite clear and obvious that all above decisions are limited to election process and, therefore, at present it is nothing but dealing with the administrative and financial irregularities, which amounts to illegality committed by the present petitioners and, therefore, if any such irregularity or illegality is proved, then competent authority can certainly take action in accordance with law. For the purpose at present only show cause notice is issued and, therefore, it would be appropriate for the petitioners to respond to such notice by filing reply and waiting for decision by the competent authority which is appealable again before the appellate authority under the Act and, thereby, when it is settled legal position that the High Court should not interfere at the stage of show cause notice under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and more particularly when alternative remedy is available under the Act, there is no substance in the petition. 6.18 Similar is the situation with reference to decision dated 01.12.2015 in Misc. Civil Application No. 2838 of 2015 in Special Civil Application No. 1645 of 2015 so also decision dated 245.11.2015 in Special Civil application No. 19046 of 2015 and decision dated 14.07.2015 in Special Civil application No. 9929 of 2015 wherein activities by suspended members has been considered with reference to the issue raised in such petition with reference to appointment of custodian and, therefore, that judgment would also not help the present petitioners to hold that the impugned notice is illegal and bad in law. Since petitioner has annexed all above judgments, there is no option but to scrutinize the same and to deal with as above. Since petitioner has annexed all above judgments, there is no option but to scrutinize the same and to deal with as above. One more such judgment is dated 30.10.2015 in Special Civil application No. 18357 of 2015. However, it cannot be ignored that so far as above referred three suspended directors are concerned, they are duly elected and, therefore, any activity against them certainly needs to be completed in accordance with law and not in arbitrary manner as being done by the present petitioners. 6.19 It is also undisputed fact that in addition to elected members there are nominated members to the board of the petitioner and record shows that they are not being properly informed about the agenda item and minutes of the general body are not forwarded to the competent authority as per law. 6.20 The record also shows that in meeting dated 26.06.2016 though there is interim relief in favour of Riamalbhai against the society some decision were taken in disobedience of such judicial orders which can be visualized from the copy of minutes of meeting dated 26.06.2016 at Annexure P (page 162) and Court's order dated 23.06.2016 at Annexure Q (page 173), whereby certainly an attempt was made by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that order of injunction in favour of the Raimalbhai in Laved Suit No. 116 of 2016 was not served upon the Chairman but served upon Managing Director and therefore when there is no proof that whether such order was served before 26.06.2016 or not, there cannot be any consideration of disobedience of Court's order. It is disturbing to note the submission that service upon the Managing Director is tried to be considered as improper service upon the cooperative society. The petitioners have failed to realize that in fact there are two respondents before the Court of board of nominees i.e. (1) Mahesana Milk Producing Co - Operative Union Limited through its Managing Director and (2) In charge Chairman Smt. Ashaben by her personal name. In view of such disclosure in cause title of the suit as well as in the order of injunction, when order of injunction was served upon the Managing Director and in charge Chairman, it is not proper for the petitioners to submit that it is not binding to the society, since it is not served upon the Chairman on 26.06.2017. In view of such disclosure in cause title of the suit as well as in the order of injunction, when order of injunction was served upon the Managing Director and in charge Chairman, it is not proper for the petitioners to submit that it is not binding to the society, since it is not served upon the Chairman on 26.06.2017. It cannot be ignored that the plaintiff in whose favour such interim injunction was restrained by the security staff from entering into general meeting and thereby complaint was filed and, therefore, such high handedness cannot be overlooked. 6.21 Reference to Rule 25 and Rule 29(2) of the bye-laws are referred to emphasise that final authority of the union shall be the general body of the union. However, perusal of Section 73 of the Act itself provides that it is always subject to the provisions of the Act and Rules and that too only if general body meeting is called upon following due process of law. "Rule 25. That final authority of the sangh shall be of the general meeting of the sangh. General Meeting can be convened with the majority of members of the Board of Directors at any time and same shall be convened every year within 3 months from the year ended on 30th June. Such meetings shall be deemed to be Annual General Meeting. Each affiliated society shall send the representative from their respective Board of Directors who is not getting any salary or remuneration from such Co-operative Societies or sangh. Rule 29. Notice of 14 days' period for General Meeting and notice of 7 days' period for extra ordinary General Meeting shall be placed on the main Notice Board or office of the sangh and the same shall be published at least in one local news paper. This notice shall specify day, time, place or meeting work to be transacted in the same. This notice shall specify day, time, place or meeting work to be transacted in the same. (1) xxxx xxxx xxxx (2) Any proceedings conducted in such meetings shall not become illegal if notice is not served on any member or received by any member for any incidental error." 6.21 In support of nomination of three members against suspended members, a reference was made to Rule 33 (3) of the bye-laws, however petitioner has failed to realize that such power is vested only if any seat becomes vacant on account of death of the member and the words or for other reasons cannot be allowed to expand such rule by suspending the member, though Rule 27(12) empowers the general body in removing any member with 3/4th majority, more particularly without having declared such subject in agenda and that too after restraining such elected members to even enter into general body meeting by application of force through security guards. It goes without saying that any by-laws if at all is against settled legal position and against statutory provisions then only because it is part of bye-laws, it is always subject to scrutiny by the competent authority and may not required to be followed and thereby in general terms if any bye laws is not in consonance with the basic principal of constitutional provisions and statutory requirement of the Act or against principle of natural justice, then they cannot be considered as a power of statute or rule. 6.22 Reference to the case of Rajkot District Co-operative Bank limited v. R.B. Solanki and Ors. is made by annexing the entire judgment in Special Civil Application No. 8659 of 1972 dated 15.11.1972 at annexure S. 6.23 So far as cited decision is concerned, when petitioner is relying upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajkot District Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. R.B. Solanki in Special Civil Application No. 865 of 1972 dated 15.11.1972 in support of his submission that Registrar being nominating authority of one Director in the Committee of the society like petitioner, he is not empowered to pass any order under the statute and therefore, Government has by G.R. dated 15.4.2005 formed a Committee; the learned Addl. Advocate General has rightly distinguished the fact of such case by pointing out that there is factual difference in cited case and case on hand inasmuch as in the cited case, Registrar himself was deputed and being member of the Rajkot District Co-operative Bank and therefore, the Division Bench has held that he is not permitted to issue orders u/s. 86. However, the situation before us is quite different inasmuch as the respondent No. 2 is neither a member of the Committee of the petitioner since he was never deputed as such, but he was only the deputing authority and some other officer was deputed in the Committee of the petitioner and therefore, the judgment of Rajkot District Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra) stands distinguished in factual details. Therefore, according to Addl. Advocate General, there is no harm for the present respondent No. 1 to pass appropriate order under Section 81 of the Act. The respondents have on the contrary, made it clear that, in fact, the deputed officer of the department is equally liable and responsible for any misdeeds either committed by himself or by his consent and therefore, respondents are keen to prosecute such officer also, if found guilty. Therefore, only because of such judgment under reference, it cannot be said that respondent No. 2 has no authority whatsoever to pass the impugned order.. 6.24 It is further submitted that impugned show cause notice does not fall within powers under Section 81 of the Act, in as much as, it is not disclosing any irregular or illegal conduct by the committee and that no reasons are assigned for the need to remove the elected body. However, there is no substance in such submission in as much as impugned notice is categorically disclosing the irregularity, illegality and conduct of the committee. It cannot be ignored that such submission is contrary to the submission with reference to the case of Siements Ltd. (supra) in as much as petitioner is submitting that if irregularity and illegality are known to the competent authority, then it amounts to pre-determination of the issue as observed in case of Siements Ltd. (supra) and, therefore, writ petition is maintainable and on the other hand it is submitted that there is no proper disclosure of conduct of the committee which can be considered as irregularity and illegality so as to remove the elected body. Therefore if second submission is accepted as such, then it becomes clear that at this stage of statutory notice, practically competent authority has simply to disclose the area where there is possibility of irregularity and illegality and that whether elected body is to be removed or not is to be decided by the competent authority only after reply and explanation put forwarded by the petitioner in response to such show cause notice. Therefore, it becomes clear that petitioners are struggling with vain attempt to get rid of any action against them. For the purpose, petitioners have filed one after another several petitions at every stage of proposed inquiry against them for the mis-deed committed by them. It cannot be ignored that total scam by the petitioners is more than Rs. 1000 Crores for which different proceedings are initiated by the competent authority and, therefore, petitioners who are probably involved in a scam of more than Rs. 1000 Crore have audacity to spend huge amount for legal battle to save their skin. 6.25 So far as interim relief by the Court of board of nominees are concerned, it is submitted that Registrar has no power to grant such interim relief and, therefore, there is no breach of Court's order. It is further submitted that when except three directors who were suspended, majority members are supporting such suspension government or any authority has no role to play in the activities of the society. However, pursuant to the provisions of Section 73 such submission has no force. Whereas Court of Board of Nominees has jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders in case of dispute relating to the constitution, maintenance or business of the society and since it is settled legal position, no further discussion is required. Therefore, there is no substance in such submission also. However, pursuant to the provisions of Section 73 such submission has no force. Whereas Court of Board of Nominees has jurisdiction to pass appropriate orders in case of dispute relating to the constitution, maintenance or business of the society and since it is settled legal position, no further discussion is required. Therefore, there is no substance in such submission also. 6.26 So far as validity of decision in general meeting dated 26.06.2016 is concerned though it is submitted that in such meeting nominated members to the board of directors were present and, therefore, it was by their consent and though an attempt was made to show that they have been informed about meeting; the fact remains that minutes of the meeting produced at page 162 does not confirm that they were present or that whether they have consented to resolution since it not bears their signature and even it is not disclosing names of the persons who were present in the meeting. Therefore, though at Annexure N (page 156), documents are produced to show that nominated members were present in the committee, the petitioners have failed to realize that Annexure N is regarding meeting dated 02.01.2016 and not of meeting dated 26.06.2016. If nominated members were present in the meeting dated 26.06.2016 also then documentary evidence to confirm their presence should have been disclosed on record. When such documents are not produced on record an adverse inference can certainly be drawn against petitioners when respondents have categorically pleaded to that effect. It is really surprising fact that a litigant like present petitioners are trying to mislead the Court by referring Annexure N as a proof of presence of nominated members in the meeting. Learned AGP has drawn attention to issue No. 2 in show cause notice, which categorically discloses that how petitioners are ignoring government nominated directors though there are orders of the High Court in Special Civil Application No. 21268 of 2015 and thereby how petitioners have failed in complying with the provisions of law. 6.27 It is also further submitted that when the State Government has delegated its powers so also powers of the Registrar to the committee now Registrar and the Government cannot pass any order. 6.27 It is also further submitted that when the State Government has delegated its powers so also powers of the Registrar to the committee now Registrar and the Government cannot pass any order. It is also submitted that when Registrar has nominated his representative to the committee then he becomes member and part of the committee and, therefore, party to the decision taken by the committee and thereby now he is not permitted to agitate the issues or allege any act as illegal when he himself is party to such act. 7. Learned Senior Counsel has rightly confirmed that such issues were argued by the present litigant being Co-operative society only before this Court that too recently in Special Civil Application No. 6089 of 2017 wherein this Court has dealt with such issue in detail. Therefore, instead of discussing the issue, reference to the observations in judgment and order dated 31.03.2017 in Special Civil Application No. 6089 of 2017 between same parties can be recollected here by reproducing the same as under, though such judgment is under challenge in Letters Patent Appeal. However, at present Letters Patent Appeal is yet not admitted and there is no interim relief or order of staying the operation of such judgment. "40. It is submitted by learned Counsel for the petitioner that when Registrar has nominated his representative to the Committee of the Society, he becomes party to the Committee of the Society and activities carried out by such Committee and therefore, he cannot be a complainant so also witness and party to the proceeding of the Committee and therefore, he is not empowered to pass any order u/s. 84 etc. In support of such submission, petitioner is relying upon the Government resolution (G.R., for short) dated 15.4.2005 and Notification dated 26.4.2005, copies of which are produced at Annexure-R Collectively (page 322). With reference to such G.R. and Notification, it is contended that when Government has as back as in the year 2005, delegated the powers of the Registrar to the Committee constituted for the purpose so as to exercise powers of the Registrar u/ss. 81 to 94, now, the Registrar cannot pass order u/s. 86, but it is only the Committee, which can pass any such order. 41. 81 to 94, now, the Registrar cannot pass order u/s. 86, but it is only the Committee, which can pass any such order. 41. Considering the difference in the language of the G.R. and Notification, whereby the phrase Federal Co-operative Societies is not disclosed in the notification, though it was disclosed in the G.R., it is contended that such G.R. and Notification is applicable to every kind or type of Society and therefore, Registrar cannot pass any order u/s. 84 (5A) against the petitioner. It is really a surprising position when such arguments are being advanced on behalf of a well-known institution like the present petitioner, because if we peruse the notification, it becomes clear that the notification is simply conveying the execution of resolution dated 15.4.2005, which is confirmed in the notification that in exercise of the powers conferred by sub-clause (b) of Section 162 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 (as amended from time to time), the Government delegates the powers to the Registrar of Co-operative Societies u/ss. 81 to 94 of the Act to the Committee constituted vide G.R. dated 15.4.2005 issued in pursuance to Rule 39(b) of the Gujarat Co-operative Society Rules, 1965. It becomes clear that, practically, the notification is simply endorsing and declaring the effectiveness of G.R. dated 15.4.2005 without reproducing the contents of such G.R. or any other details and therefore, it is to be read only to the effect that it confirms execution and implementation of the G.R. and not beyond it. Therefore, non-disclosure of the phrase Federal Co-operative Societies of the State in notification is not much material. Thereby, it is to be understood that the notification also confirms that this Committee is constituted only for the Federal Co-operative Societies and not for all other type of Societies including the apex society etc. 42. If we peruse the provision of Rule 39(b), it becomes clear that there is a provision regarding constitution of Committee for supervision of Federal Co-operative Societies in the State. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 39(b) confirms that the Committee shall carry out its function subject to the supervision and control of the Government in Co-operative Department and shall comply with such directions as may be given to it from time to time by the State Government. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 39(b) confirms that the Committee shall carry out its function subject to the supervision and control of the Government in Co-operative Department and shall comply with such directions as may be given to it from time to time by the State Government. The list of Federal Co-operative Societies is disclosed in a table at the end of such rule and identified as such in Sub-rule(1) itself, wherein there is no reference of District Milk Producers Union. Thereby, it is contended by the respondents that District Co-operative Milk Producers Union cannot be termed as Federal Society, but it is only the State level society, which is identified as Federal Society and therefore, provision of G.R. and notification are not applicable to the petitioner. 43. Both the sides have tried to emphasize differently in their favour that pursuant to Rule 39(b), petitioner is a Federal Cooperative Society and against that, petitioner is no a Federal Co-operative Society. 44. In support of their stand, the petitioner has referred the provisions of Section 74C of the Act contending that all District Co-operative Milk Unions are added in the list and therefore, respondent have not authority to pass impugned order. 45. However, if we peruse the provisions of Section 74C, surprisingly, there is no clarity at all that which are Federal Co-operative Societies though there is disclosure of several Co-operative Societies. The perusal of section on the contrary makes it clear that the provision of Section 74C would be applicable to different types of societies, including apex societies as mentioned in the schedule under the Section. And such other apex societies as the State Government may by general or special order published as such having regard to financial position and share capital of such society. And such other apex societies as the State Government may by general or special order published as such having regard to financial position and share capital of such society. Whereas, all those societies are apex societies, more particularly when apex society is only one of the items in such list with a clarity that apex societies, which are mentioned in the schedule to such section, are subject to provision of this section with a list of as many as six other different types of societies to which provisions of Section 74C is though equally applicable to the apex society as well as District Co-operative Milk Unions, it cannot be said that District Co-operative Milk Unions i.e. unions like present petitioners are also included as apex societies for which in fact a separate schedule is provided under the statute. It is undisputed fact that in such schedule, there is no reference of the District Co-operative Milk Unions, but there is reference of state level unions only. Therefore, if petitioner is not a apex society as contended by the learned Counsel and thereby, if it is not a Federal society also as defined under the Act, then, provision of G.R. and notification under reference would not apply to it. 46. It is contended by learned Counsel for the petitioner that considering the different provision and nature of classification, all apex societies are Federal Societies, but all federal societies may not be apex societies and that when petitioner is a federal society, provision of G.R. and notification would be applicable to it and thereby, Registrar could not pass the order u/s. 84(5A). 47. Whereas, learned Addl. Advocate General has submitted that when there is no such clarification or classification in provisions of Section 84(5A) and when Section 84(5A) is not part of the G.R. dated 15.4.2005 and notification dated 26.4.2005, there is no restriction upon the respondents to pass any order under Section 84(5A) of the Act. 48. Irrespective of such unwarranted submissions by the petitioner, the fact remains that by G.R. dated 15.4.2005 and notification dated 26.4.2005, the State Government has simply delegated the powers of the Registrar to some Committee, but in any case the Government has not curtailed or restricted the power of the Registrar in any manner whatsoever. 48. Irrespective of such unwarranted submissions by the petitioner, the fact remains that by G.R. dated 15.4.2005 and notification dated 26.4.2005, the State Government has simply delegated the powers of the Registrar to some Committee, but in any case the Government has not curtailed or restricted the power of the Registrar in any manner whatsoever. The Sub-rule (4) of Rule 39(b) confirms that such Committee shall carry out its functions subject to supervision and control of the Government and shall abide by such direction as may be given to it from time to time. But, it nowhere restricts the power of the principal i.e. respondents in any manner whatsoever. It is quite clear and obvious that even if powers are delegated to subordinate officer, the principal officer can certainly exercise the same powers and only because of delegation of powers, it cannot be said that thereafter, principal does not have those powers at all. It is also clear from the statute and rules that Committee is subordinate to the respondents and therefore, it has to function as an agent only and it can never become sole authority on the subject. 49. The bare reading of G.R. dated 15.4.2005 and notification dated 26.4.2005 makes it clear that it nowhere restricts the powers of the respondent No. 2 even if some powers are delegated to any such committee. 50. Under the delegation of authority, the delegator or delegation does not surrender his authority completely, but only shares certain responsibility with the subordinate and delegates that much authority, which is necessary to complete that responsibility. 51. Delegation of authority of power, is a term which like the word "delegate" which does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself as confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ishwar Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2005) 2 SCC 334 : AIR 2005 SC 773 : 2005 AIR SCW 385 in following words: 8. It is an accepted position in law that to 'delegate' to another is not to denude yourself. It is an accepted position in law that to 'delegate' to another is not to denude yourself. As was observed by Wills, J. in Huth v. Clarke (25 Q.B.D. 391, 'In my opinion the word, in its general sense and as generally used, does not imply, or point, to, a giving up of authority, but rather the conferring of authority upon someone else". As observed by Lord Coleridge, C.J. in 25 Q.B.D. 304, the word 'delegation' implies that powers are committed to another person or body which are as a rule, always subject to resumption by the power delegating. The person delegating does not denude himself. (Per Wharton's Law Lexicon, 1976 Reprint Ed. at page 316). Delegation implies also the power to withdraw delegation. As indicated in Wharton's Law Lexicon, delegation is a sending away; a putting into commission; the assignment of a debt to another; the entrusting another with a general power to act for the good of those who depute him. The word 'delegate' means little more than an agent. An agent exercises no power of his own but only the powers of his principal. The observation in Huth's case (supra) was referred to in Roop Chands case1 (supra). In general, a delegation of power does not imply parting with authority. The delegating body will retain not only power to revoke the grant, but also power to act concurrently on matters within the area of delegated authority except in so far as it may already have become bound by an act of its delegate. (See Battelley v. Finsbury Borough Council (1958 LGR 165). 9. In Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 26, 'delegate' has been described as follows : "As a noun, a person sent and empowered to act for another, one deputed to represent another in a more popular but less accurate sense, a regularly selected member of a regular party convention. As a verb, in its general sense and as generally used, the term does not imply, or point to, a giving up of authority, but rather the conferring authority upon someone else. At common law, it is the transfer of authority by one person to another, the act of making or commissioning a delegate. As a verb, in its general sense and as generally used, the term does not imply, or point to, a giving up of authority, but rather the conferring authority upon someone else. At common law, it is the transfer of authority by one person to another, the act of making or commissioning a delegate. Expression 'delegation of authority of power' is a term which like the word 'delegate' does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to the conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself." 10. In Collins English Dictionary the word 'delegate' has been stated to be a person who is chosen to vote or make decisions on behalf of a group of other people. If you delegate duties, responsibilities or power to someone, you give them those duties, those responsibilities, or that power so that they can act on your behalf. If you are delegated to do something you are given the duty of acting on someone else's behalf by making decisions, voting, or doing some particular work. 11. In Black's Law Dictionary, 6th Edition, the word 'delegate' has been stated to mean a person who is appointed, authorized, delegated or commissioned to act in the stead of another. Transfer of authority from one to another. A person to whom affairs are committed by another. 'Delegation' according to said dictionary means instructing another with a general power to act for the good of those who depute him; transfer of authority by one person to another. 12. According to Venkataramaiya's Law Lexicon, 'delegation' as the word generally used does not imply a parting with powers by the person who grants the delegation, but points rather to a conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise the person would have to do himself. 52. The above view is confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in recent decision in the case of Sidhartha Sarawgi v. Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata reported in AIR 2015 SC 1271 ; where in it observed as under in para 2 of the judgment: 2. Delegation is the act of making or commissioning a delegate. 52. The above view is confirmed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in recent decision in the case of Sidhartha Sarawgi v. Board of Trustees for the Port of Kolkata reported in AIR 2015 SC 1271 ; where in it observed as under in para 2 of the judgment: 2. Delegation is the act of making or commissioning a delegate. It generally means parting of powers by the person who grants the delegation and conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself. Delegation is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as "the act of entrusting another with authority by empowering another to act as an agent or representative". In P. Ramanatha Aiyar's, The Law Lexicon, "delegation is the act of making or commissioning a delegate. Delegation generally means parting of powers by the person who grants the delegation, but it also means conferring of an authority to do things which otherwise that person would have to do himself". Justice Mathew in Gwalior Rayon Silk Manufacturing (Wvg.) Co. Ltd. v. The Assistant Commissioner of Sales Tax and others (1974) 4 SCC 98 : ( AIR 1974 SC 1660 ), has succinctly discussed the concept of delegation. Paragraph 37 reads as follows: "37........ Delegation is not the complete handing over or transference of a power from one person or body of persons to another. Delegation may be defined as the entrusting, by a person or body of persons, of the exercise of a power residing in that person or body of persons, to another person or body of persons, with complete power of revocation or amendment remaining in the grantor or delegator. It is important to grasp the implications of this, for, much confusion of thought has unfortunately resulted from assuming that delegation involves or may involve, the complete abdication or abrogation of a power. This is precluded by the definition. Delegation often involves the granting of discretionary authority to another, but such authority is purely derivative. The ultimate power always remains in the delegator and is never renounced." 53. This is precluded by the definition. Delegation often involves the granting of discretionary authority to another, but such authority is purely derivative. The ultimate power always remains in the delegator and is never renounced." 53. Whereas, so far as cited decision is concerned, on one hand when petitioner is relying upon the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Rajkot District Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. R.B. Solanki in Special Civil Application No. 865 of 1972 dated 15.11.1972 in support of his submission that Registrar being nominating authority of one Director in the Committee of the society like petitioner, he is not empowered to pass any order under the statute and therefore, Government has by G.R. dated 15.4.2005 formed a Committee; the learned Addl. Advocate General has rightly distinguished the fact of such case by pointing out that there is factual difference in cited case and case on hand inasmuch as in the cited case, Registrar himself was deputed and being member of the Rajkot District Co-operative Bank and therefore, the Division Bench has held that he is not permitted to issue orders u/s. 86. However, the situation before us is quite different inasmuch as the respondent No. 2 is neither a member of the Committee of the petitioner since he was never deputed as such, but he was only the deputing authority and some other officer was deputed in the Committed of the petitioner and therefore, the judgment of Rajkot District Co-operative Bank Ltd. (supra) stands distinguished in factual details. Therefore, according to Addl. Advocate General, there is no harm for the present respondent No. 2 to pass appropriate order u/ss. 84 or 86 or 93 of the Act. The respondents have on the contrary, made it clear in the impugned order so also in their submission that, in fact, the deputed officer of the department is equally liable and responsible for any misdeeds either committed by himself or by his consent and therefore, respondents are keen to prosecute such officer also, if found guilty. Therefore, only because of such judgment under reference, it cannot be said that respondent No. 2 has no authority whatsoever to pass the impugned order. 54. Therefore, only because of such judgment under reference, it cannot be said that respondent No. 2 has no authority whatsoever to pass the impugned order. 54. The petitioner is also relying upon the provisions of Section 2(9) of the Act, which defines Federal Society submitting that petitioner is a federal society and therefore, provision of G.R. dated 15.4.2005 would be applicable to it. 55. However, as discussed herein above, there is no substance in such submission because delegation of power does not restrict the power of delegating authority." 8. However, as is discussed herein above, it is to be made clear that such delegation is by the State and not by the Registrar and, therefore, Registrar has ample jurisdiction to act in accordance with law in absence of any restrictions, both under the statute and by the notification under reference for such delegation to confirm that because of such delegation, Registrar would have no power to act in accordance with law. It goes without saying that when statute confirms any power upon any authority then only by delegation of such powers to some other body, the powers of competent authority cannot be taken away only by notification. Therefore, there is no substance in such submission by the petitioner that there is difference in delegation of the powers then what is discussed and determined in judgment and order dated 31.03.2017 in Special Civil Application No. 6089 of 2017. 9. Thereby the sum and substance of the petitioners submissions are dealt with herein above. But I do not find any substance in any such submissions so as to interfere with the proceedings initiated by the competent authority by issuing impugned show cause notice and thereby to quash such show cause notice. Therefore, there is no substance in the petition so as to admit it and grant interim relief as prayed for. 10. However, considering the nature of litigation and allegations, though petition needs to be summarily disposed and that though submission by the respondents may not be material, when petitioners have tried to negativate all the submission by the respondents and that too in detail, it would be appropriate to consider such rival submission to avoid an agitation that the Court has not dealt with all the submissions in detail, even at the cost of making this judgment lengthy. 11. 11. This is certainly time when heavy cost needs to be imposed for such litigation. However, it would not serve the purpose because ultimately it seems that such cost would be upon the members of the co-operative society and therefore I am restricting myself from imposing cost. 12. Learned Additional Advocate General Mr. Prakash Jani has explained the details of cooperative movement and several different activities by the petitioners and the society to confirm that they have no regards for rule of law or of Court or even order by the Court of Board of Nominees and they are taking disadvantage of innocence of illiterate members of the cooperative society who are actually producing milk and trusting the petitioners to administrate the cooperative society. It is further submitted that for their illegal activity, the petitioners are taking shelter of the numbers of members in the board. It is also submitted that when actions are being taken against erring directors, how the cooperative society being Mahesana District Milk Producers Union Ltd. - the cooperative body of the union of several other societies formed by the milk producers farmers is interested in initiating such litigation. It is submitted that thereby, by all means cost of such litigation in the form of payment of legal charges must have been debited in the accounts of the society to safe guard the skin of the members who have committed irregularity and illegality which would ultimately result into debarring them from holding similar post in future. Therefore, after committing huge scam, they have again involved in similar activity by agitating such issue in the name of cooperative society when no action is suggested by any competent authority against co-operative union. 12.1 So far as factual details are concerned, it is submitted that agenda for meeting dated 26.06.2016 which is circulated on 10.06.2016 was neither forwarded to all concerned and not placed on record of this petition submitting that it confirms the selectiveness of the petitioners in hiding material information from the Court. It is further submitted that no annual general meeting was called upon in time and as provided under Section 77 of the Act and that no notice was ever been given as provided in Subsection (4) of Section 77 and there is no compliance of Sub- Section (2) and (3) of Section 77. It is further submitted that no annual general meeting was called upon in time and as provided under Section 77 of the Act and that no notice was ever been given as provided in Subsection (4) of Section 77 and there is no compliance of Sub- Section (2) and (3) of Section 77. It is categorically alleged that though Baldevbhai, Lalubhai and Rajendrabhai were nominated to the Board of petitioners' union as provided under Section 80(2) of the Act, they are not called for in some meetings, which confirms the mala-fide intention of the petitioners showing that they have no regards for rule of law. It is also contended that though there was a stay against several activities to be performed in meeting dated 26.06.2016 by an order dated 23.06.2016 in Laved Suit No. 116 of 2016 petitioners have continued the disobedience of Court's order and they have no shame in submitting that such order is in the name of cooperative society and served upon the Managing Director and not upon the petitioners. It is specifically alleged and disclosed in the show cause notice itself that notice of meeting dated 26.06.2016 was not served upon the nominated members of the board and that such nomination was challenged by the petitioners before this Court and that High Court has not allowed any such relief in favour of the present petitioners, the petitioners have never bothered to disclose such fact in the present petition and they simply considered that nominated members may not be called for. 12.2 Learned Additional Advocate General has further submitted that there is no breach of any constitutional rights or statutory rights of the petitioners. The impugned order is not by the District Registrar but by the Registrar of the Co-operative Societies for the State of Gujarat. Reference of previous allegations is unwarranted since it pertains to litigations and appointment of nominee on behalf of the government. Thereby they were independent issues for which even alternative proceedings are pending as on date and, therefore, it cannot be said that because of such proceedings, show cause notice cannot be issued or that there is mala fide intention of the government. Thereby they were independent issues for which even alternative proceedings are pending as on date and, therefore, it cannot be said that because of such proceedings, show cause notice cannot be issued or that there is mala fide intention of the government. There is no contention either in the pleadings or in the oral submission, so as to consider that show cause notice is without any authority or jurisdiction and, therefore, present petition is premature since by impugned show cause notice the competent authority has simply called upon the petitioners to explain and to represent themselves either through advocate or in person and either by oral submission or even by written submission and, therefore, without availing the alternative remedy as per law and without raising the grievance before the Deputy Secretary (Appeal) as provided under the statute; - filing of present petition is only with a view to delay the proceedings against them. - That provisions of Section 81 of the Act is different from the authority of the district registrar and, therefore, nomination of District Registrar in the Board of society has no barring at all and the State Registrar under Section 81 of the Act cannot be said or held to be precluded from initiating any proceedings because when the State Registrar has not nominated any Director on the board and when he is not part of the body it cannot be said that action by the State Registrar amounts to be Judge of his own cause. - The bare reading of Section 81 of the Act makes it clear that in respect of committee of the society having the Registrar as its member, the State Government and in respect of society which does not have District Registrar as its member, District Registrar can initiate proceedings as provided under the Section. - Same is the situation in respect of Section 93 in as much as, reference of Section 93 is out of context because it is providing altogether a different action. - There is no breach of any principles of natural justice as only show cause notice has been issued and no final order has been passed - It is clear that final order would be passed only after extending reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to represent their case before the competent authority. - There is no breach of any principles of natural justice as only show cause notice has been issued and no final order has been passed - It is clear that final order would be passed only after extending reasonable opportunity to the petitioners to represent their case before the competent authority. However, instead of appearing before the competent authority with their reply and submission, petitioners have rushed to this Court. - Since requirement of Section 81 of the Act are fulfilled and when Sub-Section (1) of Section 81 of the Act has wide scope and when show cause notice is issued under the purview of Section 81 it cannot be said that it amounts to superseding the committee; - because if any of the Directors is found violating the provisions of law as contemplated in Section 81 of the Act as well as in the Act and Rules then he may be removed or disqualified and thereby there is no reason to presuppose that it would amount to superseding the entire committee; - the conduct of the petitioners is quite clear from their activity by filing a petition in the name of the District Co-operative Union whereas on other hand they are raising the contention that the order passed by the Board of Nominees was not served upon them but was served upon the society, through its Managing Director; - this goes to show that petitioners are taking disadvantage of their position, which cannot be permitted. 12.3 So far as irregularities are concerned, they are in following terms; "I. Improper administration and breach of Section 77, Rule 34(3) and bye laws 24 and 29; (a) That the elected Directors were suspended and unauthorized appointments have been given and the elected Directors have not been permitted to carry out their responsibilities and by application of unwarranted force, it has been ensured that the said 3 directors are not able to participate in meeting. (b) The details have been suppressed from the General Meeting and an attempt has been made to overreach the orders of the Honourable Courts. (c) That an amount of Rs. 47,25,20,367/- has been mismanaged and the members have been misled and accounting irregularities have been clearly highlighted against the interest of the society. (b) The details have been suppressed from the General Meeting and an attempt has been made to overreach the orders of the Honourable Courts. (c) That an amount of Rs. 47,25,20,367/- has been mismanaged and the members have been misled and accounting irregularities have been clearly highlighted against the interest of the society. (d) That the dispute was raised by one Raimalbhai Ramjibhai Desai, member of the Managing Committee of Kashva Milk Producer Cooperative Society under Section 96 before the Board of Nominees vide Laved Suit No. 116 of 2016, wherein, stay was granted, however the same was not brought to the attention of the members in general meeting, acting head strong and overreaching legal proceedings. II. Not providing the agenda of the meeting of the management committee to the government representative; The directors appointed under Section 80(2) have not been provided with the agenda of the meeting and in fact, numerous communications and intimations were also made to provide the same. However, intentionally the same are not provided and a frivolous ground with reference to having 21 members under Section 74(1) has been raised. Therefore, it clearly amounts to breach of Section 80(2) and its purpose read with the bye-law 40(2) of the Society. III. Not providing the details of proceedings of meeting of the Directors; The details of the meetings of the Directors have intentionally neither been provided to the 3 elected directors as mentioned herein above, who were not permitted to participate in the meetings, nor to the District Registrar. The communications and reminders were also sent to the said extent. III. Not providing the details of proceedings of meeting of the Directors; The details of the meetings of the Directors have intentionally neither been provided to the 3 elected directors as mentioned herein above, who were not permitted to participate in the meetings, nor to the District Registrar. The communications and reminders were also sent to the said extent. However, the same are not provided as on today which amounts to breach of Section 74 and the bye laws of the society." 12.4 Several decisions were taken in general meeting dated 26.06.2016 without agenda and even without intimating the nominated directors - the prohibitory order dated 23.06.2016 in Laved Suit No. 116 of 2016 was well within the knowledge of the petitioners but they have intentionally disregarded and committed breach of such order; - it is undisputed fact that even District Registrar was not present in the meeting dated 26.06.2016, on the contrary by communication dated 24.06.2016 objections and representation was made to the petitioners for not considering agenda for such prohibitory order in the annual general meeting; - however petitioners have failed to appreciate such communication dated 24.06.2016 by the District Registrar - respondent No. 1 has acted as a State as referred under Section 81 and he was neither in the board of directors of the society and by Government Resolution dated 15.04.2005 his powers were never delegated to the committee; - therefore it cannot be said that respondent No. 1 has no powers under Section 81 of the Act pursuant to Resolution dated 15.04.2005; - some of the elected directors namely, Raimalbhai, Sardarbhai and Pradhanji had already made representation on 22.06.2016 for not acting upon the agenda No. 7 and 8 and proposed annual general meeting dated 26.06.2016 based upon such representation District Registrar has intimated the petitioners by communication dated 24.06.2016; - issue regarding removal of Managing Directors is also different then the present show cause notice and, therefore, it cannot be said that such action is mala fide or with ulterior motive; - it is quite clear and obvious that if somebody is continuously committing same irregularity and illegality then there would be several different actions against him and in that case, only because of several actions, it cannot be said that all such actions are with mala fide intention. 13. 13. Though it is undisputed fact that impugned show cause notice is issued by the respondent No. 1 being Registrar of cooperative societies, Gujarat State having its office at Gandhinagar and not by the District Registrar having its office at Mahesana in the Mahesana district, unfortunately petitioners have again contended in their affidavit in rejoinder that Registrar being member of the Board of Directors of the society he cannot issue show cause notice under Section 81 of the Act. The designation (Registrar) may be common as a designation (Judge) in judicial system. But there is "Civil Judge", "District Judge", "High Court Judge" and "Supreme Court Judge". But since their powers and authorities are different, it cannot be said that common designation being Registrar would preclude higher authority only because their designation seems to be common. The designation Registrar is also used in administrative branch of the Courts. But, thereby it cannot be said that they are empowered to take action under any such Act. Though there is no separate definition of District Registrar and Registrar for the State, the overall reading of entire Act makes it clear that there is clear distinction in both such posts i.e. respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It is quite clear that respondent No. 1 has to act for entire state. However, District Registrar has limited powers within the district and, therefore, they are separate authorities and thereby when nomination to the board of any such authority is only by respondent No. 2 and not by respondent No. 1, it cannot be said that respondent No. 1 has no authority under Section 81 more particularly when Section 81 specifically distinguishes the difference between respondent Nos. 1 and 2 so also their powers under Section 81. 14. It is also submitted by learned Additional Advocate General that different judgments between the parties annexed from Annexure B to K are irrelevant, in as much as, it does not give licence to act in illegal manner and any such irregular or illegal act cannot be legal or it cannot be said that because of such litigation even illegal act cannot be checked. 14.1 Learned Additional Advocate General is also relying upon decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 6089 of 2017 dated 31.03.2017 and in Special Civil Application No. 1577 of 2017 dated 26.04.2017. 14.1 Learned Additional Advocate General is also relying upon decision of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 6089 of 2017 dated 31.03.2017 and in Special Civil Application No. 1577 of 2017 dated 26.04.2017. Since these are recent judgments and may be under challenge in appeal, I do not want to discuss it further more particularly, since these are the judgments by this Court only. However, reference of relevant portion has been made herein above. 15. So far as decision in case of Siemen (supra) is concerned, it is pointed out by the learned Additional Advocate General that it is the case wherein there was evidence that authority has predetermined the issue but when there is no such predetermination in the impugned show cause notice but is simply conveying the details of irregularity and illegality and thereafter calling the petitioners to represent themselves as contended in such show cause notice, it cannot be said that only because of one such judgment, show cause notice should be quashed and set aside. However, it cannot be ignored that even in case of Siements limited (supra), the Honourable Supreme Court has not quashed and set aside the show cause notice but simply remanded back the matter to the High Court for its consideration afresh on its own merits, though it is observed that because of pre-determination of liability of the appellant before it and thereby when only question which remains for consideration is quantification of liability and therefore it does not remain in realm of show cause notice. However, such is not the case before us so far as facts are concerned and, therefore, the petition at such stage of show cause notice is certainly pre mature and cannot be entertained as such. 16. At this stage reference to the case of Oryx Fisheries Private Ltd. v. Union of India reported in (2010) 13 SCC 427 and State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Sanjay Nagayach & Ors. reported in (2013) 7 SCC 25 would be relevant, which is also relied upon by the petitioners but it does not help the petitioners, details of which is disclosed herein under: 16.1 If we peruse the judgment in detail in case of Oryx Fisheries (supra), it becomes clear that reference to such judgment is not only unwarranted and irrelevant; but in fact it goes against petitioners themselves. It is undisputed fact that in such cited case before the Honourable Supreme Court the concerned authority has already decided the breach of terms of conditions by the appellant before the Court, when show cause notice under reference in cited case, which was reproduced entirely in para 22 of the judgment discloses following details; "At the meeting it was convincingly proved that the cargo shipped by you to the above-mentioned buyer was defective and you have not so far settled the complaint." "You have dishonoured your written agreement with M/s. Cascade Marine Foods, LLC, Sharjah to settle the complaint made by the buyer as you had agreed to compensate to the extent of the value of defective cargo sent by you and have now evaded from the responsibility." "This irresponsible action have brought irreparable damage to India's trade relation with UAE." 16.2 Above three sentences are disclosure in the show cause notice makes it clear that there was predetermination of issue when the concerned authority has conveyed the appellant that something is proved against him whereas so far as proposed action is concerned there is anticipatory decision against appellant that failure to reply within 10 days will amount to cancellation of registration. 16.3 In background of above factual details, the Honourable Supreme Court has considered the issues raised before it to quash the show cause notice but even thereafter it was made clear that if authorities are so inclined, they can proceed further from the stage of show cause notice afresh but strictly in accordance with law and following fair procedure indicated in the judgment. Therefore, it cannot be considered that this judgment is confirming that irrespective of decisions already recorded herein above confirming that writ jurisdiction should not be exercised against show cause notice are either overruled or not a good law. In another words this judgment does not confirm that irrespective of factual details show cause notice can be quashed. Whereas factual details of the present case makes it clear that there is no pre-determination or anticipatory order against present petitioner but petitioners are simply called upon to submit their representation and explanation so as to enable the competent authority to decide the issue that whether further actions are required to be taken against them or not. Whereas factual details of the present case makes it clear that there is no pre-determination or anticipatory order against present petitioner but petitioners are simply called upon to submit their representation and explanation so as to enable the competent authority to decide the issue that whether further actions are required to be taken against them or not. Thereby if at all petitioners are clear and certain that they have not committed any irregularity or illegality in any manner whatsoever then they have nothing to bother and to disclose the details which proves their innocence before respondent No. 1. Moreover decision by respondent No. 1 is appealable before the Secretary and thereby alternative remedy is already available to the petitioners if at all decision by respondent No. 1 is against them. In view of above position the cited judgment would not help the petitioners, more particularly when competent authority in such cited case had after show cause notice dated 23.01.2008 (which was under consideration) by its order dated 19.03.2008 held that the registration certificate of the appellant stood cancelled without giving any reason and without giving any personal hearing to the appellant before the Honourable Supreme Court. Such fact can be confirmed from para 15, 22 and 45 of the judgment. Whereas in the present case, petitioners are called upon for personal hearing by impugned show cause notice and therefore this judgment would not help the petitioners in any manner whatsoever. 17. Thereby though facts are very much clear that there is no substance in the present petition, surprisingly petitioners have tried to convince the Court by submitting that there is no breach of Court's order since name of defendant Nos. 1 and 2 in Laved Suit No. 116 of 2016 is insignificant in as much as it does not bind the petitioners. 1 and 2 in Laved Suit No. 116 of 2016 is insignificant in as much as it does not bind the petitioners. I am surprised to listen to such arguments from Senior Counsel, more particularly when respondent No. 1, Mahesana District Milk Producers Union Ltd. being defendant No. 1 in Laved Suit is one of the petitioners before this Court, it is really surprising to note that though in general notice of such body would be served upon the concerned authority of the body, in the present case it was served upon the in charge Managing Director, the petitioner has an audacity to say that service upon the Managing Director is not to be considered as a service upon the union. I have no words to comment against such submission except to ignore it, considering the settled legal position that service upon the Managing Director of such union can certainly be considered as good service. By all means Managing Director of the Co-Operative Union is bound to convey such communication to the Board of Directors and the Chairman and thereby Board of Directors and Chairman cannot be allowed to plead and submit that they were not served with the prohibitory order passed by the competent authority. Petitioners are advised to read Rule V of the Code of Civil Procedure in their benefit to realize that what is delivery of summons by the Court. 18. Similarly respondent No. 2 was in fact in charge Chairman namely Ashaben at the relevant time, in such Laved Suit No. 116 of 2016 and when she is petitioner No. 1 in Special Civil application No. 18837 of 2016 being one of the petition under consideration. 19. It is also contended that in reply by respondent though there is no suppression of any fact to any of the members of the board and that general body is empowered to take up any issue even it is not part of agenda and, therefore, However, there is no substance in such submission also. 20. So far as financial irregularity in dealing with huge amount of Rs. 20. So far as financial irregularity in dealing with huge amount of Rs. 47,25,20,367/- is concerned it is contended that it cannot be considered as a scam but it is an issue of accounting only in as much as the amount has been decided to be spread over in three financial years as per advised to the board and, therefore, it cannot be said that there is any financial irregularity. Thereby, now in fact petitioners have admitted that though an amount of Rs. 47,25,20,367/- was paid in one financial year being 2013-14, they wanted to make a show that this amount is paid separately in three financial year i.e. 2013-14, 2014-15 and 2015-16, it is certainly amount to financial irregularity. Therefore, there is no substance in the submission that even if payment is made in one financial year and even if it is disclosed that it is paid in three financial years, it does not amount to any financial irregularity. Such submission and admission makes it clear that to get some disadvantage by showing selective financial report, the amount which was due to be paid in the year 2012-13 was not paid in that year and considering the details of such irregularity which will come on record during the proceedings pursuant to impugned show cause notice, an attempt was made to show that such amount is paid in three different financial years, whereas practically disclosure was already made in one financial year only that amount is already paid. Therefore, what is required to be scrutinized by the competent authority is actual payment by verifying the mode of payment and date of payment. Surprisingly it is submitted before this Court that by spreading the payment in three financial years a proper balance sheet may be shown to get benefit for the society. Prima facie evidence to proceed further under Section 81 of the Act. 21. Similarly another surprising submission was made with reference to the spending of amount of cooperative society by its Managing Committee contending that it is an absolute power of the Board of Director and Managing committee to spend the amount and no one has another say. This also amounts to admission of irregularities and illegality, which results into prima facie evidence to proceed further by calling the petitioners to show the reason that why further action should not be taken. 22. This also amounts to admission of irregularities and illegality, which results into prima facie evidence to proceed further by calling the petitioners to show the reason that why further action should not be taken. 22. So far as non disclosure and non pleading of certain facts is concerned, it is submitted that details of judicial process may not be required to be pleaded since it is in public domain. Even if we consider that there is some force in such submission, the fact remains that at least there is selectiveness by the petitioners in disclosing certain details and hiding certain facts and to that extent, it can certainly be said that petitioners have not came forward with clean hands. 23. So far as suspension of three directors is concerned, it is contended that it was a decision by majority to suspend three directors. However, it cannot be ignored that such decision was taken in their absence and that too without allowing them to appear in meeting dated 26.06.2016 and thereby without following principles of natural justice by offering opportunity to them that why they should not be suspended. 24. Lastly it is submitted that decision of general body is proper and all the actions by the State are against present Chairman namely Vipulbhai Chaudhari and thereby it reflects political rivalry and therefore show cause notice is requested to be quashed and set aside. 25. However, I do not find any force or substance in any such submissions by the petitioners for the reasons discussed herein above. Therefore, there is not substance as to admit the petitions for further consideration or to grant any interim relief as prayed for in any of the matter. Therefore both the petitions are hereby dismissed. Petition Dismissed.