JUDGMENT : Veerendr Singh Siradhana, J. Matter comes up on an application (IA No. 17435/2017), with a prayer for vacation of the ex-parte interim order dated 14th December, 2015. However, since the factual matrix and legal issues raised in above-noted two writ applications are closely interlinked; the matters have been taken up for final adjudication together, at this stage, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 2. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (for short, the petitioner-Corporation) has instituted the instant writ applications assailing the legality, validity and correctness of the orders made by the Labour Court-I, Jaipur. Order dated 14th May, 2015, is with reference to grant of subsistence allowances as a measure of interim relief on application dated 28th April, 2015, instituted by the respondent-employee. In the connected writ application No. 10625/2015, the petitioner-Corporation has impeached the order dated 3rd December, 2014, whereby the domestic enquiry conducted, was declared to be unfair. 3. Shorn off unnecessary details, essential material facts are that the petitioner-Corporation conducted a domestic enquiry against the respondent-employee serving a charge-sheet on 21st November, 2006. On conclusion of the enquiry proceedings with finding of guilt on the charge of wilful absence from duty, inflicted penalty of dismissal from service on 24th February, 2007. The respondent-employee raised an industrial dispute under the provisions of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (for short, the Act of 1947), leading to a reference for adjudication under Section 10 (1)(d) of the Act of 1947. It is pleaded case of the petitioner-Corporation that the respondent-employee was proceeded with domestic enquiry, strictly adhering to the procedures prescribed under the Rajasthan State Road Transport Workers & Work Shop Employees Standing Orders, 1965 (for short the Orders of 1965), for wilful absence from duty. The Labour Court vide impugned order dated 3rd December, 2014, held the enquiry unfair for violation of cardinal principles of natural justice for the respondent-employee was not served with any notice of the enquiry proceedings conducted against him. Further, the petitioner-Corporation moved an application seeking permission to lead evidence to prove the charges against the respondent-employee, which was granted by the Labour Court on 4th March, 2015. On an application instituted by the respondent-employee claiming subsistence allowances as an interim measure; was granted by the Labour Court vide impugned order dated 14th May, 2015, which is the subject matter of challenge in SBCWP No. 18059/2015. 4. On an application instituted by the respondent-employee claiming subsistence allowances as an interim measure; was granted by the Labour Court vide impugned order dated 14th May, 2015, which is the subject matter of challenge in SBCWP No. 18059/2015. 4. The only argument that has been advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner-Corporation is, that the order made by the Corporation as a consequence of domestic enquiry terminating the services of the respondent-employee is, perfectly legal and valid. The impugned order dated 14th May, 2015, is sought to be assailed relying upon the opinion of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation Parivahan Marg, Jaipur v. Girvar Singh: 2017 (1) WLC (Raj.) 687. 5. Mr. O.P. Sheoran, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner-Corporation, while assailing the legality and validity of the order dated 14th May, 2015, granting the application of the respondent-employee for subsistence allowances as an interim measure, asserted that in the case of Girvar Singh (supra), on a consideration of several opinions including law declared by the Supreme Court, this Court held that claim for subsistence allowances during suspension, as an interim relief, against the dismissed workman, is not admissible. 6. According to learned counsel, the impugned order made by the Labour Court, holding the domestic enquiry as unfair, under challenge in the connected writ application No. 10625/2015; is illegal and arbitrary for proper procedure, as contemplated under the Orders of 1965, was strictly adhered to, and thus, there is no violation of principles of natural justice. Therefore, the order holding the enquiry as unfair is bad in the eye of law. 7. Per contra; Mr. B. L. Gupta, learned counsel, while supporting the impugned orders declaring the domestic enquiry as unfair vide impugned order dated 3rd December, 2014, and granting application of the petitioner for subsistence allowances as an interim measure; emphatically argued that the issue raised is, no more res-integra in view of law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi & Ors. v. Hotel Workers Union, 1959 (II) LLJ 544 (SC) as well as opinion of a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Chief Manager, Ajmer v. Hitlar Prasad & Anr.: 2013 (4) RLW 3410 (Raj.), wherein relying upon the law declared by the Apex Court of the land in the case of Hotel Imperial (supra) and other opinions, including that of Dena Bank v. D. V. Kundadia: (2011) 15 SCC 690; it was observed that no writ application lies against an interim order of Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal for in case final award is made against the aggrieved party, it can be challenged in writ proceedings before the High Court including the interim orders. 8. Learned counsel further urged that same Co-ordinate Bench in the case of Nortanmal Joshi v. RSRTC & Anr.: 2013 (3) RLW 2454, in no uncertain terms, held that grant of application of the workman for interim relief/subsistence allowances pending the approval of application to inflict punishment of dismissal from service can be maintained and granted. Hence, the writ applications instituted by the petitioner-Corporation are liable to be dismissed by this Court on that count alone. 9. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and with their assistance perused the relevant materials available on record as well as gave my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions at Bar. 10. Indisputably, the Labour Court on a close scrutiny of the materials available on record and pleadings of the parties declared the domestic enquiry as unfair vide impugned order dated 3rd December, 2014, observing that the petitioner-Corporation did not serve any notice on the respondent-employee while proceedings with the domestic enquiry against him. Therefore, the conclusion arrived at, suffered with vice of infraction of fundamental principles of natural justice, and thus, domestic enquiry was held to be unfair. 11. By order dated 14th May, 2015, the Labour Court granted application of the respondent-employee for grant of subsistence allowances while the petitioner-Corporation sought permission to lead evidence in order to prove the charges, that was granted on 4th March, 2015. 12. On being quarried as to the divergent stand adopted by the petitioner-Corporation while pursuing the instant writ applications; one against the order dated 3rd December, 2014, holding the enquiry proceedings as unfair; and the other, against grant application of the respondent-employee for subsistence allowances. 12. On being quarried as to the divergent stand adopted by the petitioner-Corporation while pursuing the instant writ applications; one against the order dated 3rd December, 2014, holding the enquiry proceedings as unfair; and the other, against grant application of the respondent-employee for subsistence allowances. For if the writ application against order dated 3rd December, 2014, succeeded, the other writ petition would become infructuous. No explanation is put forth by counsel for the petitioner-Corporation. 13. Undeniably, the petitioner-Corporation has been allowed permission on its application to lead evidence in order to prove the charges against the respondent-employee. The objection as to grant of application of the respondent-employee for subsistence allowances, may not detain this Court for long in view of opinion of the Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in the case of Nortanmal Joshi (supra), wherein taking note of the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Dena Bank (supra) and Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen: AIR 1961 SC 860 , the Co-ordinate Bench, observed thus: "22. The difference between two provisions is required to be understood for appreciation of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Hotel Imperial (supra). That was a case for permission under section 33(1) of the Act, whereas, provision of section 33(2)(b) of the Act is not similar. In the aforesaid background, interim relief in the shape of subsistence allowance cannot be granted if the enquiry is held to be unfair while adjudicating approval application. 23. A bare comparison of sub-section (2) with sub-sections (1) and (3) of Section 33 reveals that under the provisions of Section 33(1) and (3) prior permission before the action of dismissing an employee is required to be taken and the employee continues under suspension. Dismissal of such an employee takes effect from the date of permission granted by the Tribunal and it is not related back to the date of application preferred by the employer under Section 33(1) or (3). Whereas in the cases falling under Section 33(2)(b) the requirement is that the employer must obtain previous permission and the grant of such approval relates back to the date of dismissal and/or discharge. Whereas in the cases falling under Section 33(2)(b) the requirement is that the employer must obtain previous permission and the grant of such approval relates back to the date of dismissal and/or discharge. This distinction between Section 33(1) and (3) and Section 33(2) was particularly highlighted in the case of "Lord Krishna Textile Mills v. Its Workmen", reported as: AIR 1961 SC 860 Para 10 of the said judgment is reproduced here as under: (10) It would be noticed that even during the pendency of an industrial dispute the employer's right is now recognised to make an alteration in the conditions of service so long as it does not relate to a matter connected with the pending dispute, and this right can be exercised by him in accordance with the relevant standing orders. In regard to such alteration no application is required to be made and no approval required to be obtained. When an employer, however, wants to dismiss or discharge a workman for alleged misconduct not connected with the dispute he can do so in accordance with the standing orders but a ban is imposed on the exercise of this power by the proviso. The proviso requires that no such workman shall be discharged or dismissed unless two conditions are satisfied; the first is that the employee concerned should have been paid wages for one month, and the second is that an application should have been made by the employer to the appropriate authority for approval of the action taken by the employer. It is plain that whereas in cases falling under Section 33(1) no action can be taken by the employer unless he has obtained previously the express permission of the appropriate authority in writing, in cases falling under Section 33(2) the employer is required to satisfy the specified conditions but he need not necessarily obtain the previous consent in writing before he takes any action. The requirement that he must obtained approval as distinguished from the requirement that he must obtain previous permission indicates that the ban imposed by Section 33(2) is not as rigid or rigorous as that imposed by Section 33(1). The jurisdiction to give or withhold permission is prima facie wider than the jurisdiction to give or withhold approval. 24. The requirement that he must obtained approval as distinguished from the requirement that he must obtain previous permission indicates that the ban imposed by Section 33(2) is not as rigid or rigorous as that imposed by Section 33(1). The jurisdiction to give or withhold permission is prima facie wider than the jurisdiction to give or withhold approval. 24. The Supreme Court in the above case explained the scope of jurisdiction under Section 33(2)(b) in para 19 which is also quoted herein below: In dealing with cases falling under Section 33(2) the industrial authority will be entitled to enquire whether the proposed action is in accordance with the standing orders, whether the employee concerned has been paid wages for one month and whether an application has been made for approval as prescribed by the said subsection. It is obvious that in cases of alteration of conditions of service falling under Section 33(2) (a) no such approval is required and the right of the employer remains unaffected by any ban. Therefore, putting it negatively the jurisdiction of the appropriate industrial authority in holding an enquiry under Section 33(2)(b) cannot be wider and is, if at all, more limited, than that permitted under Section 33(1), and in exercising its powers under Section 33(2) the appropriate authority must bear in mind the departure deliberately made by the Legislature in separating the two classes of cases falling under the two subsections, and in providing for express permission in one case and only approval in the other. It is true that it would be competent to the authority in a proper case to refuse to give approval, for Section 33(5) expressly empowers the authority to pass such order in relation to the application made before it under the proviso to Section 33(2) (b) as it may deem fit; it may either approve or refuse to approve, it can, however, impose no conditions and pass no conditional order. (12)..........The Legislature has indicated that there should be no time lag between the making of the application and its final disposal, and so by subsection (5) it has specifically and expressly provided that such application should be disposed of as expeditiously as possible. This view proceeds on the assumption that the word "unless" "really means "until" and introduces a condition precedent. 25. This view proceeds on the assumption that the word "unless" "really means "until" and introduces a condition precedent. 25. The Court observed that in view of the limited nature and extent of the enquiry permissible under Section 33(2) (b) all that the authority can do in dealing with an employer's application is to consider whether a prima facie case for according approval is made out by him or not. If before dismissing an employee, the employer conduct a proper domestic enquiry and has proceeded to pass the punishment order as a result of the said enquiry all that the authority can do is to enquire whether the conditions prescribed by Section 33(2)(b) and the proviso are satisfied or not. 26. It is clearly seen from the observations that the Court noted the distinction between Section 33(1) and 33(3) and Section 33(2)(b). The Court further noted that under Section 33(1) and (3), previous permission of the authority concerned should be obtained before any action is taken against the workman concerned unlike a case falling under Section 33(2)(b) of the Act where only its approval to an action already taken is required to be sought. This is also apparent from para 11 where the Court has emphasised that the cases filed under Section 33(1) or Section 33(3) of the Act are 'permission' clauses and not approval clauses. In short, suspension of the employee does not amount to severance of employer-employee relationship and, therefore, the management is obliged to pay such workman service benefits and to pay him all the wages and subsistence allowance during the period of suspension. 27. Similar view was taken by the Bombay High Court in the case of "Air India Ltd. and etc. v. Libio Francisco Colaco & Anr.", reported as: 2004 (4) SLR 116 : (2003 Lab IC 3257). Para 16 of the said judgment reads as under:- 16. Relying upon the observations in Jaipur Zila the learned single Judge has held that there is no distinction between the provisions of Section 33(2) (b) and Section 33(1) and (3). v. Libio Francisco Colaco & Anr.", reported as: 2004 (4) SLR 116 : (2003 Lab IC 3257). Para 16 of the said judgment reads as under:- 16. Relying upon the observations in Jaipur Zila the learned single Judge has held that there is no distinction between the provisions of Section 33(2) (b) and Section 33(1) and (3). It was therefore, held that the decisions in Fakirabhai: (1986 Lab IC 879 (SC) : ( AIR 1986 SC 1168 ) and Ram Lakhan: (2000 Lab IC 1371 (SC) : ( AIR 2000 SC 1946 ) would apply with equal force to the cases under Section 33(2) (b), We are unable to agree with the view expressed by the learned single Judge. In Fakirabhai and Ram Lakhan the Court has confined its ratio only to the cases under Section 33(1) and (3) of the Act. In fact, in Fakirabhai a clear distinction is made between the two types of classes. In the former, the employee cannot be dismissed from service without obtaining the permission from the Tribunal. Therefore, obtaining a permission is condition precedent before the employee could be dismissed from service. However, under Section 33(2)(b), an employer can dismiss the employee from service On payment of one month's wages and such an employer has to apply for approval under Section 33(2)(b). Once the employee is dismissed from service, the question of putting him under suspension does not arise. Therefore, the ratio in Fakirbhai and Ram Lakhan is clearly inapplicable to proceedings under Section 33(2)(b). 28. The issue aforesaid can be viewed from different angle also. The subsistence allowance is prayed as per provision of Standing Orders or the rules applicable to the employee. The rules for subsistence allowance are applicable when an employee is placed under suspension. If the instant case is looked into, declaring enquiry to be unfair does not place a dismissed employee under suspension. 29. The question comes as to how an employee can be made entitled to subsistence allowance while he is not under suspension, rather, he is a dismissed employee? If the provision of Standing Orders is looked into, subsistence allowance is payable only to an employee under suspension and not to the employee dismissed from service. If the prayer of the petitioner workman is accepted, then by granting subsistence allowance, his status would be changed from a dismissed employee to that of an employee under suspension. If the provision of Standing Orders is looked into, subsistence allowance is payable only to an employee under suspension and not to the employee dismissed from service. If the prayer of the petitioner workman is accepted, then by granting subsistence allowance, his status would be changed from a dismissed employee to that of an employee under suspension. It is not within the jurisdiction of the labour court tribunal, rather, even of this court. This is more so when grant of approval of punishment relates back from the date of its order in view of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of R. Thiruvirkolam: ( AIR 1997 SC 633 ) (supra). Therein, the issue was as to whether by declaration of the enquiry to be unfair and subsequent order in favour of the employer, would make the order of punishment effective from the date of its passing or from the date of final order by the tribunal/labour court. It was held that the decision of the labour court/tribunal will relate back to the date of order of punishment originally passed. 30. If the proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court applies to the present matter, then grant of approval will relate back to the date of order of punishment and if that is so, then how an employee dismissed from service will be entitled to interim relief during the period subsequent to the order of dismissal, more so when it will relate back or would be effective from the date of the order of punishment. In a case where approval is not granted, the employee is safeguarded as he would be entitled to all consequential benefits as if the order of dismissal was never passed. Thus, to balance the equities also, grant of subsistence allowance during the pendency of approval application seems to be improper because if the approval is granted, the workman would still get subsistence allowance without having relation of employer and employee and if approval application is dismissed then he would be entitled to full wages. Thus, in both the cases, workman will have the advantage against the rule of equity. 31. Thus, in both the cases, workman will have the advantage against the rule of equity. 31. In view of aforesaid, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order passed by the Industrial Tribunal and otherwise interference in the interim order is not warranted while this court exercises jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India as held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Dena Bank (supra). Para 2 of the said judgment is quoted hereunder for ready reference- "It is well settled by this Court that no writ should be entertained against an interim order of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. It is only when a final award is given, then a party should be allowed to challenge it if he is aggrieved." It is reflected from the opinion in the case of Girvar Singh (supra) that opinion in the case of Nortanmal Joshi (supra) of this Court was not brought to the notice of the Co-ordinate Bench. 14. Be that as it may, the legal position as to maintainability of writ application against an interim order made by the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal is no more res-integra in view of the opinion of Supreme Court in the case of Dena Bank (supra), observing thus: "It is well settled by this Court that no writ should be entertained against an interim order of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. It is only when a final award is given, then a party should be allowed to challenge it if he is aggrieved." 15. In the case of Hitlar Prasad (supra) another Co-ordinate Bench while dealing with the issue of maintainability of writ application, against an interim order relying upon the opinion of the Supreme Court and other opinions of Karnataka High Court, observed thus: "5. The primary contention raised by the Counsel for the petitioner that interim relief cannot be granted by the Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer, is not sustainable. The issue was considered by the Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as back as in the year 1959, in the case of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and others, (supra). The primary contention raised by the Counsel for the petitioner that interim relief cannot be granted by the Industrial Tribunal, Ajmer, is not sustainable. The issue was considered by the Larger Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, as back as in the year 1959, in the case of Hotel Imperial, New Delhi and others, (supra). It had observed as under: After a dispute is referred to the tribunal under section 10 of the Act, it is enjoined on it by section 15 to bold its proceeding expeditiously and on the conclusion (hereof submit its award to the appropriate government. An "award" is defined in section 2(b) of the Act as meaning "an interim or final determination by an Industrial Tribunal of any industrial dispute or of any question relating thereto," Where an order referring an industrial dispute has been made specifying the points of dispute for adjudication, the tribunal has to confine its adjudication to those points and matters incidental thereto; (section 10(4)). It is urged on behalf of the appellants that the tribunal in these cases had to confine itself to adjudicating on the points referred and that as the question of interim relief was not referred to it, it could not adjudicate upon that. We are of opinion that there is no force in this argument, in view of the words "incidental thereto" appearing in section 10(4). There can be no doubt that if, for example, question of reinstatement and/or compensation is referred to a tribunal for adjudication, the question of granting interim relief till the decision of the tribunal with respect to the same matter would be a matter incidental thereto under section 10(4) need not be specifically referred in terms to the tribunal. Thus interim relief where it is admissible can be granted as a matter incidental to the main question referred to the tribunal without being itself referred in express terms, 6. Thus interim relief where it is admissible can be granted as a matter incidental to the main question referred to the tribunal without being itself referred in express terms, 6. Thereafter in the case of Laxminarayana N. and another v. Management of Loka Shikshana Trust and another: 2001(3) LLJ 1318 the High Court of Karnataka had held, in Para 9, as follows: The next question is whether the Tribunal could pass the order granting interim relief, This order was not questioned by the respondent and the same has become final and conclusive, Even otherwise, I hold that the Court has ample power to pass interim orders dependent upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The order of the nature passed in this case is in a way sustenance amount as the matter has been pending for several years without any progress. In this case, the relationship of the parties was not in dispute. Equally, there was no dispute that when the matter was pending in the Court, these petitioners were dismissed from service and without permission of the Court, etc. The inordinate delay leads to misery and jeopardize the life of the petitioners. 7. Similarly in the case of Management of Kanoria Industries Ltd. v. Bangalkot Cement Company Workers Union and another: 2001 (1) LLJ 155 : 2001 (89) FLR 71 (SC) a Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court had observed in Para 8 that: Hence, if the Tribunal or the Labour Court, is yet to pronounce on the propriety of the punishment imposed on the worker the worker is equated to the status of an employee suspended pending inquiry. If so, any payment in the form of interim relief is nothing but subsistence allowance contemplated under the Service jurisprudence. In such a situation/to contend that the finding on the domestic enquiry by the Tribunal/Labour Court is sine qua non for considering as to whether interim relief has to be granted or not is not a correct proposition of law. 8. Coming to the question of maintainability of the writ petition, as raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent, this Court is of the considered opinion that the contention has force. 8. Coming to the question of maintainability of the writ petition, as raised by the learned Counsel for the respondent, this Court is of the considered opinion that the contention has force. No writ petition lies against an interim order of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal because it is only against passing of a final award that a party aggrieved can challenge the same before the High Court. The said principle has been laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Vena Bank v. D.V. Kundadia: 2011 (131) FLR 775 and it was held in Para-2 as under: It is well settled by this Court that no writ should be entertained against an interim order of the Labour Court or the Industrial Tribunal. It is only when a final award is given, then a party should be allowed to challenge it if he is aggrieved. 9. In view of the above, the contention raised by the petitioner that no interim relief can be granted by a Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal is not sustainable. The preliminary objection raised by the learned Counsel for the respondents with regard to maintainability of the writ petition deserves to be allowed. 10. Consequently, the writ petition is dismissed as not maintainable. However, in case the final award is passed against the petitioner, then it will be open for him to challenge the interim order of the Tribunal dated 28.2.2012 at that time. The stay application is also dismissed." 16. For the reasons and discussions herein above as well as in view of the law declared by the Supreme Court, the objection raised by the counsel for the respondent-employee as to maintainability of writ application against interim order made by Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal is upheld. The writ applications are, therefore, dismissed. 17. The petitioner-Corporation after declaration of the domestic enquiry as unfair, has proceeded with further accepting the order and sought permission to lead evidence that was granted leading to consequential impugned order dated 14th May, 2015 while according application of the respondent-employee for subsistence allowances. Therefore, the diametrically opposite course of action adopted in institution of the writ applications by the petitioner-Corporation, cannot be appreciated. 18. No other point was raised by the counsel for the parties for consideration of this Court. 19. Therefore, the diametrically opposite course of action adopted in institution of the writ applications by the petitioner-Corporation, cannot be appreciated. 18. No other point was raised by the counsel for the parties for consideration of this Court. 19. Consequently, both the writ applications are devoid of any substance and lack in merit, and therefore, deserves to be dismissed. However, it is made clear that the petitioner would be at liberty to challenge the intrim orders impugned herein, if otherwise permissible, along with final award, if determined against it. Ordered accordingly. No costs.