JUDGMENT : Dr. D.P. Choudhury, J. 1. The appellant, having been convicted for commission of offence under Sections 302/324 IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 and to undergo R.I. for two years for the offence under Section 324 IPC, has preferred this appeal from jail. Both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 2. The factual matrix leading to the case of prosecution is that due to land dispute between the parties, there was quarrel between the accused-appellant and the deceased prior to occurrence. But on 6.11.2002, in between 8 to 9 PM, when P.W.11 had gone to Bari to collect wood, appellant came with axe, arrow and assaulted by arrow to P.W.11. Hearing hullah, the deceased came to save P.W.11 but the appellant assaulted the deceased by axe causing his death there. Thereafter, the FIR (Ext.1) was lodged and during investigation, witnesses were examined, inquest was made, the autopsy was made over the dead body of the deceased, weapon of offence was seized at the instance of the appellant and after completion of the necessary investigation, charge sheet was submitted. 3. The plea of the defence is complete denial to his complicity with the commission of offence but as it appears from the statement of the accused recorded under Section 313 Cr.P.C. that he has been falsely implicated in this case due to the allegation that Budhuni (P.W.11) has an affair with the deceased after the death of deceased’s original wife. 4. In order to bring home the charge, during trial the prosecution has examined as many as twelve witnesses. P.W.1 is the informant, P.W.11 is the wife of the deceased and an eye witness to the occurrence, P.Ws.7 and 12 are the I.O., P.W.6 and P.W.10 are the doctors and rest of witnesses are villagers and police officials. Relying upon the statement of the witnesses and the documents produced by the prosecution, learned trial Court has considered and sentenced the appellant to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 IPC and further sentenced him to undergo R.I. for two years for the offence under Section 324 IPC and both the sentences were directed to run concurrently. 5. Mr. 5. Mr. Sahu, learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the trial Court has erred in law in appreciation of the evidence of the witnesses and it should have disbelieved the extra judicial confession by the appellant as the same was not made voluntarily. The statement of sole eye witness should not be relied on because she is related to the deceased. Further, it is submitted by him that if at all the occurrence is viewed seriously, then it would be found that at the fit of anger, the assault has been made as there was no pre-plan or prior meditation to cause the death of the deceased. Overall, he submitted that the statement of witnesses are equally not weighed properly to record the order of conviction under Section 302 IPC for which he prays to set aside the order of conviction and sentence recorded against the appellant and he be set at liberty. 6. Mr. Nayak, learned Additional Standing Counsel for the State submits that there are lot of material including the statement of the eye witness to show that the appellant had made a pre-planned murder because of the land dispute between the parties. He further contends that there are extra judicial confession, direct evidence of sole eye witness and seizure of weapon of offence at the instance of the appellant which consistently proved the guilt of the accused without any embellishment of evidence of prosecution witnesses. So, he submits to dismiss the jail criminal appeal and the order of conviction and sentence passed may be confirmed against appellant. 7. DISCUSSIONS P.W.1, who is the informant, has lodged FIR vide Ext.1. He testified that after hearing about the occurrence from the appellant, he went to the spot and found the deceased was lying dead. According to him, after the FIR lodged, police came and did inquest over the body of the deceased vide Ext.2. In this regard, there is no proper cross-examination. Now, the evidence of P.W.1 coupled with the inquest report show multiple bleeding injures on the person of the deceased. From the evidence of the doctor (P.W.6), who had conducted the autopsy over the dead body of the deceased, it appears that he found the following external injuries: “(i). Lacerated wound on the left side of neck and chick 7” X 2” cutting the mandible (Jaw bone) nad trachea; (ii). From the evidence of the doctor (P.W.6), who had conducted the autopsy over the dead body of the deceased, it appears that he found the following external injuries: “(i). Lacerated wound on the left side of neck and chick 7” X 2” cutting the mandible (Jaw bone) nad trachea; (ii). Lacerated would on right side of neck cutting sternomastoid muscle size 4” X ½”; (iii). Lacerated wound on left chick extending up to ear 2 ½ “ X ½”; (iv). Lacerated wound below the right eye size 2” X ½”; (v). Lacerated wound on the left chest perforating to plural cavity; (vi). 5 to 7 bruises over the left chest causing flail chest (ribs were depressed inside); and (vii). Lacerated wound on the dorsom of left eye 2”X1/2”. On dissection, he found the following internal injuries; “(i). 4 to 5 left ribs are fractures with flail chest; and (ii). Flural cavity contains blood in the left side” 8. According to the doctor (P.W.6), the cause of death was due to the injury to trachea, collapse of the lungs, haemothorax and shock due to multiple injuries. He proved the post mortem report vide Ext.7. During his cross-examination, he denied about any possibility of injuries by fall. Rather, he specifically stated that injury no.1 can be caused by a single blow. Thus, the evidence of P.W.6 read with the post mortem report (Ext.7) and other evidence as discussed above proved the homicidal death of the deceased. Now, the question arises whether the appellant has caused homicidal death of the deceased? 9. It is reported in Jose vs. The State of Kerala; AIR 1973 SC 944 at para-5, where Their Lordships have observed as follows:- “……. According to the learned Counsel it is not safe to base a conviction for murder on the testimony of a single witness. We are not inclined to accept this contention of Mr. Ramachandran. There is no impediment in law in a conviction being based upon the testimony of a single witness provided the Courts come to the conclusion that his evidence is honest and trustworthy……….” With due respect to above decision we observe that it is the quality not quantity of evidence which matters. If the evidence of single prosecution witness is creditworthy and honest, same can be the basis to record conviction. Section 134 of the Evidence Act also enshrines so. If the evidence of single prosecution witness is creditworthy and honest, same can be the basis to record conviction. Section 134 of the Evidence Act also enshrines so. We hasten to observe that if the prosecution evidence on record is creditworthy and sufficient, the question of extending any benefit of doubt to the said accused is non-est. 10. Keeping in mind the above principle of law, let the other evidence on record be scrutinized. On perusal of evidence of P.W.11, who is claiming to be wife of the deceased, it is revealed that while she had gone to court yard to bring wood, appellant has assaulted her by arrow there and on hearing hullah, the deceased came to her rescue but the appellant gave axe blow on the neck of the deceased who fell down with multiple bleeding injuries. She stated to have also sustained injuries. In cross-examination, she reiterated the same plank of evidence. On the other hand, defence could not shake her testimony well. Even if she is wife of the deceased, her testimony cannot be discarded. Reliance is placed in this regard on the decision reported in Joginder Singh V. State of Punjab; AIR 2009 SC 2263 where Their Lordships observed at para-9:- “We may also observe that the ground that the witness being a close relative and consequently being a partisan witness, should not be relied upon, has no substance. This theory was repelled by this Court as early as in Dalip Singh’s case (supra) in which surprise was expressed over the impression which prevailed in the minds of the Members of the Bar that relatives were not independent witnesses. Speaking through Vivian Bose, J. it was observed: “We are unable to agree with the learned Judges of the High Court that the testimony of the two eye-witnesses requires corroboration. If the foundation for such an observation is based on the fact that the witnesses are women and that the fate of seven men hangs on their testimony, we know of no such rule. If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased, we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in _’Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan’( AIR 1952 SC 54 at p.59). If it is grounded on the reason that they are closely related to the deceased, we are unable to concur. This is a fallacy common to many criminal cases and one which another Bench of this Court endeavoured to dispel in _’Rameshwar v. State of Rajasthan’( AIR 1952 SC 54 at p.59). We find, however, that it unfortunately still persists, if not in the judgments of the Courts, at any rate in the arguments of counsel.” It is also reported in Bhagga & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh; AIR 2008 SC 175 where Their Lordships observed at para-15:- “…. As held by both the courts below, the mere fact that all the said eye-witnesses belong to one family cannot be a reason to disbelieve their evidence, since they were all on the spot or nearby the spot when the incident occurred…….” With due respect to the decisions, it is clear that in the instant case, the evidence of P.W.11 is accepted after being scrutinized, even if she is related to the deceased. So, she being the eye witness has witnessed the overt act of the appellant causing multiple bleeding injuries on the person of the deceased and the deceased succumbed to such injuries. P.Ws.1 and 4, corroborating the evidence of P.W.11, testified that immediately after the occurrence, they reached the spot and found the deceased lying with multiple bleeding injuries. 11. The evidence of the P.W.1, who is the informant and the brother of the deceased shows that before him the appellant made extra judicial confession stating that due to land dispute between the parties, he committed murder of his brother by means of axe and inflicted injuries on the person of the wife of the deceased. After testing the evidence of P.W.1as per the parameters, nothing has been elicited during cross-examination to doubt his veracity. Thus, the statement of P.W.1 remained unshaken to prove the extra judicial confession voluntarily by the appellant before the relative of the deceased. Similarly, P.W.5 stated that the accused-appellant had confessed before him that he had killed his brother over a land dispute by means of axe. Of course in his cross-examination, denying the suggestion, he stated to have stated before the police about such confession by the appellant by him. But, P.W.7 has denied about such statement of P.W.5 recorded by him. Similarly, P.W.5 stated that the accused-appellant had confessed before him that he had killed his brother over a land dispute by means of axe. Of course in his cross-examination, denying the suggestion, he stated to have stated before the police about such confession by the appellant by him. But, P.W.7 has denied about such statement of P.W.5 recorded by him. So, such statement of P.W.5 is omission with his earlier statement recorded under Section 161 Cr.P.C. It is stated that every omission does not amount to contradiction but the material omission merits consideration. Such omission with P.W.5 in his evidence being material, having effect of contradiction is not considered to make his evidence creditworthy in this regard. But the evidence of P.W.1 is clear, cogent and creditworthy to prove voluntary extra judicial confession made by the appellant. 12. It is reported in the case of Kishore Chand –V- State of Himachal Pradesh; AIR 1990 SC 2140 where Their Lordships have observed that an unambiguous extra-judicial confession possesses high probative value force as it emanates from the person who committed the crime and is admissible in evidence provided it is free from suspicion and suggestion of its falsity. But in the process of the proof of the alleged confession, the Court has to be satisfied that it is voluntary one and does not appear to be result of inducement, threat or promise envisaged under Section 24 of Evidence Act or was brought about in suspicious circumstances to circumvent Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act. This view of the Hon’ble Supreme Court has also been followed in the case of Gura Singh –V- State of Rajasthan; AIR 2001 SC 330 . With due regard to the above decisions, the voluntarily extra judicial confession of appellant being proved lends sufficient corroboration to the direct evidence and undoubtedly the same evidence is a link to the circumstances appearing against the appellant. 13. The evidence of P.W.9 shows that during custody, the appellant-accused disclosed that he has concealed the axe, the weapon of offence, by which he inflicted assault, at the courtyard of one Saina Munda and if led, he would give recovery of the same. The appellant recorded his statement vide Ext.5 and also led the police to the spot. On being discovered by the appellant, police seized the weapon of offence and prepared the seizure list vide Ext.5/2. The appellant recorded his statement vide Ext.5 and also led the police to the spot. On being discovered by the appellant, police seized the weapon of offence and prepared the seizure list vide Ext.5/2. P.W.9 also produced the axe vide M.O.I. During cross-examination, there is no meaningful cross-examination to discredit his statement. Even if he is police officer and the I.O., there is no reason to discard his evidence. Of course, the statement of the appellant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act has not been recorded separately but the same is mentioned in the circumstance of seizure. Although he should have recorded the statement of the appellant at first separately and then proceeded with appellant to the spot of recovery, but this departure is not major one to disbelieve the recovery made by the appellant because there is neither cross-examination on this aspect to the I.O nor any circumstance is found to disbelieve such part of evidence of the I.O. (P.W.9). 14. P.W.2, being the witness to the disclosure statement of the appellant and seizure witness, has stated that in presence of police, the accused-appellant made statement to the effect that he had concealed the axe, the weapon of offence, on his courtyard and led the police to that spot and gave recovery of axe in his presence and axe was seized vide Ext.5/2. Seizure list shows that the accused-appellant made recovery of axe (M.O.I) from the courtyard adjoining house of Saina Munda. The contradictions between P.W.2 and P.W.9 as to the place of seizure cannot be termed as major discrepancy with said part of evidence of P.W.9 as in the tribal village, normally there is no fixed courtyard of individual but they lived in a compact area as revealed from the spot map prepared by the I.O. On the other hand, there are well-neated evidence of P.Ws.2 and 9 as to disclosure statement of the appellant towards recovery of the axe (M.O.I) relevant under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, consequent thereof leading to discovery of such M.O.I at the instance of accused-appellant relevant under Section 8 of the Evidence Act amply proved the vital link to the chain of circumstances against the appellant. 15. 15. It is revealed from the evidence of P.W.6 that M.O.I was sent for the opinion of the doctor and the doctor opined that said injuries on the person of the deceased are probable by M.O.I which was seized by the police on being led by the appellant from the place of concealment. So, said opinion of the doctor is also another link to chain of circumstantial evidence. 16. It is needless to observe that there is land dispute between the parties as apparent from the evidence of P.Ws. Of course, it is trite in law that motive is immaterial if there is direct evidence available against the accused. But, in the instant case land dispute between the appellant and the deceased being motive is well proved by the prosecution and it is also one of circumstances against the appellant to prove his culpability. 17. It is revealed from the evidence of P.W.11 that she has got injury on her person being assaulted by the appellant by means of an arrow. At the same time, the doctor who has examined as P.W.10, has clearly stated that during examination, he found one incised lacerated injury on the abdomen of P.W.11 with a size of 1 ½ “X ¼”, which is simple in nature. He also stated that said injury might be caused by hard and sharp cutting weapon. He proved the examination report vide Ext.16/2. Thus, the evidence of P.Ws.10 and 11 clearly proved that the appellant has not only caused the murder of the deceased but also voluntarily caused lacerated injury on the person of P.W.11 by sharp cutting weapon. Thus, offence under Section 324 IPC is well proved against the appellant. 18. In terms of the above discussion, it appears that prosecution has been able to prove the occurrence and culpability of the appellant beyond all shadow of doubts. The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 IPC be converted to Section 304 IPC has no basis because there is well pre-planned culpable homicide committed by the appellant amounting to murder of the deceased. No material is there to prove that the appellant did so at fit of anger or on sudden provocation or any material to convert the conviction from 302 IPC to 304 IPC. No material is there to prove that the appellant did so at fit of anger or on sudden provocation or any material to convert the conviction from 302 IPC to 304 IPC. So, the finding of the trial Court to convict the appellant under Sections 302/324 IPC cannot be said to be faulted with. Thus, we hereby confirm the order of the conviction and sentence passed by the learned trial Court. In the result, the JCRLA, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.