JUDGMENT : Manojit Bhuyan, J. Heard Mr. N. Dhar, learned counsel for the appellants as well as Mr. S.P. Bhattacharjee, learned Standing Counsel, Education (Elementary) Department, Assam for respondent nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4. 2. This intra-Court appeal is presented against the judgment and order dated 13.05.2016 dismissing WP(C) 5063/2011 filed by the appellants herein as writ petitioners. 3. Issue involves as to whether the appellants are entitled to regular time scale of pay with effect from the date of announcement of their results of the Junior Basic Training Examination in the facts and circumstances of the case. Facts not in dispute are that the appellants were appointed as Assistant Teachers in respective Lower Primary Schools in the district of Karimganj on stipend of Rs. 900/- per month. The said appointments were made pursuant to an Advertisement dated 03.09.1991. The terms of appointment, as apparent from the order dated 16.07.1992, included that they will get a monthly stipend at the rate of Rs. 900/- per month or such sum that may be determined by the Government from time to time and they will be deputed to undergo Teachers Training for one year subject to availability of seat. On successful completion of the training they will be given regular time scale of pay of Rs. 1185-2395/- per month together with allowances as admissible under the rules from the date of announcement of the result of training. Each of the appellants completed the training and results thereof was announced on 12.04.1999. Certificates of having passed the Assam Junior Basic Training Examination in the year 1998 were issued to the appellants in seriatim on 29.07.1999, 17.06.1999, 14.06.1999 and 03.05.2000 respectively. Also not in dispute is that the appellant no. 1 was granted regular time scale of pay on and from 01.03.2002; appellant no.2 with effect from 01.02.2003; appellant no.3 with effect from 01.01.2002 and to the appellant no. 4 from 01.02.2001. 4. Alleging discrimination on the part of the State respondents in adopting a pick and choose policy in granting regular time scale of pay to persons similarly situated with retrospective effect and at the same time denying similar benefit to the appellants, the related writ petition i.e. WP(C) 5063/2011 was instituted. 4 from 01.02.2001. 4. Alleging discrimination on the part of the State respondents in adopting a pick and choose policy in granting regular time scale of pay to persons similarly situated with retrospective effect and at the same time denying similar benefit to the appellants, the related writ petition i.e. WP(C) 5063/2011 was instituted. The writ petition was heard and decided against the appellants, primarily on ground of delay and laches on the part of the appellants in approaching the Court after more than 10 years from the date of announcement of result. The learned Single Judge noticed the case-laws rendered by the Supreme Court concerning the concept of laches, primarily the case of State of U.P. v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava, reported in (2015) 1 SCC 347 as well as orders passed by Single Bench of this Hon'ble Court where directions had been made to the effect that those who have passed the training shall be paid their regular salary from the date of announcement of the result. Particular reliance was also placed in paragraph 22.3 of Arvind Kumar Srivastava (supra) which held that if the judgment of the Court was in personam, those who seek benefit of the said judgment shall have to satisfy that their petition does not suffer either laches and delays or acquiescence. On facts, the learned Single Judge found that there was an inordinate and unexplained delay of about 10 years in filing the writ petition and, accordingly, dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved, the present appeal has been instituted. 5. At the outset, we record our respectful agreement with the findings and decision of the learned Single Judge. It is true that the terms of appointment stipulated that the appellants would be given regular scale of pay upon successful completion of the Teachers Training with effect from the date of announcement of the result. It is a fact that results were declared on 12.04.1999 and Certificates thereof were also issued to the appellants. Normally, in view of the terms of appointment, they were entitled to claim regular time scale of pay from the date of announcement of the result. However, they were granted regular time scale of pay from the year 2001/2002/2003 respectively, as indicated above. Normally, in view of the terms of appointment, they were entitled to claim regular time scale of pay from the date of announcement of the result. However, they were granted regular time scale of pay from the year 2001/2002/2003 respectively, as indicated above. They continued to receive the same without making any demur or raising any demand for grant of regular time scale of pay from the date of announcement of result i.e. 12.04.1999. They raised the issue and sought protection of the Court only by way of filing the related writ petition in the year 2011, that is, after elapse of substantial number of years from the date of their results and/or from the date when they were granted regular scale of pay. The delay in approaching the Court is not explained to the satisfaction of this Court. To claim benefit of earlier orders/judgments of this Court with regard to entitlement to regular salary with retrospective effect, the appellants are required to demonstrate that the delay in approaching the Court was not intentional and it does not suffer from any laches. Apparently, the appellants have not been able to discharge this burden of satisfactorily explaining the cause of the delay and their laches. To reiterate, the appellants have been receiving regular scale of pay since 2001/2002/2003, as indicated above, and suddenly woke up after about 8/9 years seeking relief towards grant of the benefits with effect from the year 1999 by approaching this Court. On equity, the appellants are not entitled to the relief claimed. It is well settled that lapse of time is a species for forfeiture of right and law will only help those who are watchful and not those who go to sleep. The maxim that equity comes to the aid of the vigilant and not the slumbering, in certain respects, may not be applicable where litigant commits fault without intention. However, in the instant case, the maxim is squarely applicable and no equity can come to the aid of indolent litigants as in the case of the appellants herein. 6. In view of the above, we find no good ground to interfere with the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge and/or to grant any relief, as prayed for by the appellants. We find no merit in this appeal and, therefore, the same stands dismissed, however, without any order as to cost.