ORDER : 1. Four acres of land comprised in Sy. No. 58 New Sy. No. 141 situated at Singrahalli Village, Kundana Hobli, Devanahalli Taluk was purchased by the petitioner under registered Sale Deed dated 30.11.2011 from one D. Subramanya. After purchasing the land in question, petitioner applied for change of nature of the land from agricultural zone to residential zone before the planning authority i.e. Bengaluru International Airport Area Planning Authority (BIAAPA). The said planning authority, after obtaining necessary report from the jurisdictional revenue authority and after getting approval of BMRDA, Urban Development Department and after collecting necessary fees, permitted petitioner to change nature of the land from agricultural zone to residential zone. This is evident from Annexure-N to N-3 annexed to the writ petition. 2. Petitioner learnt from the neighbouring landowners that the Tahsildar, Devanahalli, had issued notice in the month of August, 2013 under Rules 39 and 94 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Rules. Hence, petitioner approached the Tahsildar and produced all the relevant documents to show his title over the land in question. The Tahsildar, Devanahalli, forwarded the documents to the 2nd respondent-Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Rural District, requesting him to initiate proceedings under Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act (for short, ‘the Act’). A copy of this letter is produced at Annexure-Q. A perusal of the said letter-Annexure-Q would disclose that notice issued to the petitioner had not been served on him and the proceedings had been set in motion based on a complaint given by one K. Shivappa of Harohalli stating that spurious documents had been created to show that grants had been made in favour of various persons in Sy. No. 58. It is in this background, the Tahsildar requested the Deputy Commissioner to initiate proceedings under Section 136(3) of the Act to hold an enquiry and take over the land by the Government. Subsequently, on 05.03.2014, another communication-Annexure-R was addressed by the Tahsildar, Devanahalli to the Deputy Commissioner, wherein with regard to the present petitioner, the Tahsildar stated that 4 acres of land comprised in Sy. No. 58 had been purchased by Basavachar in public auction by way of Darkast and that the said fact had been noted in the Darkast Register. He also pointed out that for the year 1968-69, khatha of the land in question was transferred in the name of Basavachar and the same was entered in the RTC. No. 58 had been purchased by Basavachar in public auction by way of Darkast and that the said fact had been noted in the Darkast Register. He also pointed out that for the year 1968-69, khatha of the land in question was transferred in the name of Basavachar and the same was entered in the RTC. The Tahsildar in the said letter refers to various transactions which were entered into regarding the said 4 acres of land which was originally purchased by Basavachar in public auction. It is forthcoming from the details furnished by the Tahsildar in the said communication that Basavachar sold the land in favour of Ramachandra vide Sale Deed dated 13.02.1973. Thereafter, Ramachandra sold the same in favour of T. Madduraiah vide Sale Deed dated 25.05.1981, from whom one M. Govindappa purchased the same vide Sale Deed dated 16.05.1985. Thereafter, the land was sold in favour of D. Subramanya on 02.08.1996 and it was the said D. Subramanya, who sold it in favour of present petitioner as per Sale Deed dated 30.11.2011. It is also noticed by the Tahsildar in the said communication that a proceeding had been initiated for violation of provisions of Section 79A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act against D. Subramanya, vendor of the petitioner. After enquiry, vide order dated 30.10.2000 passed in LRF-SR-79/97-98 & 267/96-97 the land was ordered to be forfeited. This was challenged by D. Subramanya, vendor of the petitioner before the Karnataka Appellate Tribunal. By order dated 06.04.2011, the Tribunal set aside the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner. 3. Thus, it is seen that the land in question was subject matter of various transactions including proceedings initiated for forfeiture as per the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, before the same was purchased by petitioner. 4. It is relevant to notice at this stage that petitioner asserts that old Sy. No. 58 in which 4 acres of land was purchased by him was assigned new No. 141 by conducting phodi on the request made by the vendor of the petitioner-D. Subramanya. 5. Based on the report submitted by the Tahsildar, Deputy Commissioner has exercised revisional power under Section 136(3) of the Act and passed an order on 02.03.2015 holding that by creating spurious documents, grant in favour of Basavachar had been obtained. 5. Based on the report submitted by the Tahsildar, Deputy Commissioner has exercised revisional power under Section 136(3) of the Act and passed an order on 02.03.2015 holding that by creating spurious documents, grant in favour of Basavachar had been obtained. Therefore, entries in the name of petitioner were liable to be set aside with a direction to enter the name of the Government in the revenue record and take over the land by the Government. 6. This order was challenged by the petitioner in W.P. No. 13730/2015. The said writ petition was allowed on 01.12.2015 and the matter was remitted for fresh consideration mainly on the ground that petitioner had not been notified and no opportunity of hearing had been given to him. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner passed the impugned order dated 20.05.2017 holding that alleged grant of land in Sy. No. 58 measuring 4 acres in favour of Basavachar was not genuine; that there was no order granting the land or issuing saguvali chit in favour of Basavachar and therefore, entries in the name of Basavachar were illegal and consequently entries made in the names of purchasers from Basavachar including the petitioner herein were not sustainable in law. The Deputy Commissioner, therefore, comes to the conclusion that mere entries reflected in the name of Basavachar in respect of land in question in the record of rights, pahani, etc. did not clothe him with any manner of right, title or interest over the land in question, hence, the first Sale Deed executed in favour of Ramachandra alienating the land in question was null and void as the same, had been executed by a person, who had no right, title or interest over the land in question. The Deputy Commissioner has further found that all further alienations made pursuant to the said Sale Deed in favour of other purchasers including the petitioner herein were illegal and null and void. The Deputy Commissioner has ultimately declared that purchase made by petitioner as per the Sale Deed dated 30.11.2011 would not confer him any right, title or interest over the land in question and the defective possession of land held by him also did not clothe him with any other legal right. The Deputy Commissioner has ultimately declared that purchase made by petitioner as per the Sale Deed dated 30.11.2011 would not confer him any right, title or interest over the land in question and the defective possession of land held by him also did not clothe him with any other legal right. Ultimately, the Deputy Commissioner directs cancellation of entries in the revenue records found in the name of petitioner in respect of land in question and directs resumption of land in favour of Government free from all encumbrances by evicting persons in possession of the said land. 7. Sri Jayakumar S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner contends that revisional power under Section 136(3) of the Revenue Act cannot be exercised for the purpose of invalidating the grant made decades ago or for that matter to annul the sale deed executed in favour of the grantee and the successive purchasers. In support of the challenge made, he has placed strong reliance on the following judgments of the Apex Court and also of this Court: 1. Santoshkumar Shivgond Patil and Others vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Others, (2009) 9 SCC 352 2. Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Thummala Krishna Rao and Another, (1982) 2 SCC 134 3. Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another vs. D. Narsing Rao and Others, (2015) 3 SCC 695 8. It is his submission that the land has been purchased in public auction which was reflected in the revenue record; the revenue authorities had, on several occasions examined the entries traceable to the original grantee Basavachar while effecting entries of different transactions right from the year 1968. He further emphasizes the fact that proceedings had been initiated under Section 79A of the Land Reforms Act against the vendor of the petitioner and even at that time, the revenue authorities had every opportunity to verify and examine the right, title and interest enjoyed by petitioner and his predecessors in title with regard to the land in question. Had there been any doubt regarding genuineness of the grant made in favour of original grantee, he urges, the authorities would not have kept quiet. He, therefore, contends that very initiation of proceedings by the authorities after long lapse of time of nearly 50 years is illegal and unauthorised. 9. Learned Additional Government Advocate supports the order of the Deputy Commissioner. He, therefore, contends that very initiation of proceedings by the authorities after long lapse of time of nearly 50 years is illegal and unauthorised. 9. Learned Additional Government Advocate supports the order of the Deputy Commissioner. She takes me through the statement of objections and contends that as a finding has been recorded by the Deputy Commissioner that there was no grant at all, question of setting aside the grant did not arise. 10. Having heard the learned counsel for both parties, the questions that arise for consideration are: (i) Whether the Deputy Commissioner had the power and jurisdiction to anull the Sale Deeds exercising revisional powers under Section 136(3) of the Act? (ii) Whether the proceedings initiated under Section 136(3) of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, after lapse of 50 years to declare that grant made in favour of Basavachar was spurious and was not genuine and consequently entries made in the name of Basavachar and subsequently in the names of successive purchasers were bad, are sustainable in law? 11. The question raised before the Court is no longer res integra. The Apex Court in the case of Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another vs. D. Narsing Rao and Others, (2015) 3 SCC 695 dealing with exercise of suo-motu revisional powers after nearly 5 decades has ruled that unexplained and inordinate delay in invoking such power would itself tantamount to fraud upon statute apart from being arbitrary and opposed to rule of law. Useful reference can be made to the observations made in paragraphs 14, 16 and 17 which read as under: “14. Admittedly, the names of the predecessors-in-title of the respondents are found mentioned in the khasra pahani of the year 1954-1955 pertaining to Survey Nos. 36 and 37 of Gopanpally Village. The purchase of the said lands by the respondents from them under registered sale deeds are also not seriously disputed. The further fact is that they have been regularly paying land revenue continuously since the year 1954. The appellants herein issued impugned notice dated 31.12.2004 under Section 166-B of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317-F (1907) for cancellation of entries in the khasra pahani of the year 1953-1954, by fixing the date of inquiry as 5.2.2005 and that notice is the subject-matter of challenge here. 16. The appellants herein issued impugned notice dated 31.12.2004 under Section 166-B of the A.P. (Telangana Area) Land Revenue Act, 1317-F (1907) for cancellation of entries in the khasra pahani of the year 1953-1954, by fixing the date of inquiry as 5.2.2005 and that notice is the subject-matter of challenge here. 16. No time-limit is prescribed in the above section for the exercise of suo-motu power but the question is as to whether the suo-motu power could be exercised after a period of 50 years. The Government as early as in the year 1991 passed an order reserving 477 acres of land in Survey Nos. 36 and 37 of Gopanpally Village for house sites to the government employees. In other words, the Government had every occasion to verify the revenue entries pertaining to the said lands while passing the Government Order dated 24.9.1991 but no exception was taken to the entries found. Further the respondents herein filed Writ Petition No. 21719 of 1997 challenging the Government Order dated 24.9.1991 and even at that point of time no action was initiated pertaining to the entries in the said survey numbers. Thereafter, the purchasers of land from Respondents 1 and 2 herein filed a civil suit in OS No. 12 of 2001 on the file of the Additional District Judge, Ranga Reddy District praying for a declaration that they were lawful owners and possessors of certain plots of land in Survey No. 36 and after contest, the suit was decreed and said decree is allowed to become final. By the impugned notice dated 31.12.2004 the suo-motu revision power under Section 166-B referred to above is sought to be exercised after five decades and if it is allowed to do so it would lead to anomalous position leading to uncertainty and complications seriously affecting the rights of the parties over immovable properties. 17. In the light of what is stated above we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court was right in affirming the view of the learned Single Judge of the High Court that the suo-motu revision undertaken after a long lapse of time, even in the absence of any period of limitation was arbitrary and opposed to the concept of rule of law. 12. 12. Reiteration of this aspect is again found in paragraphs 30 and 31, where the Apex Court refers to the decision in the case of Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. vs. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598 and in paragraph 31 where principal of law is laid down as under: “31. To sum up, delayed exercise of revisional jurisdiction is frowned upon because if actions or transactions were to remain forever open to challenge, it will mean avoidable and endless uncertainty in human affairs, which is not the policy of law. Because, even when there is no period of limitation prescribed for exercise of such powers, the intervening delay, may have led to creation of third-party rights, that cannot be trampled by a belated exercise of a discretionary power especially when no cogent explanation for the delay is in sight. Rule of law it is said must run closely with the rule of life. Even in cases where the orders sought to be revised are fraudulent, the exercise of power must be within a reasonable period of the discovery of fraud. Simply describing an act or transaction to be fraudulent will not extend the time for its correction to infinity; for otherwise the exercise of revisional power would itself be tantamount to a fraud upon the statute that vests such power in an authority.” 13. In the present case also there is delay of 50 years in initiating suo-motu proceedings. Therefore, facts in the present case and facts in the case decided by the Apex Court are comparable with regard to the nature of the dispute and the extent of delay. Hence, even in this case, it cannot, but be said that exercise of power by the Deputy Commissioner tantamounts not only to arbitrary and illegal exercise of such power but may border on being characterized as fraud on the statute. 14. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner is right and justified in inviting the attention of the Court to the decision in the case of Santoshkumar Shivgond Patil and Others vs. Balasaheb Tukaram Shevale and Others, (2009) 9 SCC 352 , where the Apex Court dealing with exercise of suo-motu powers even where period of limitation is not prescribed, has ruled that the said power has to be exercised within a period of 3 years. Indeed, the Apex Court has dealt with several provisions, namely Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code (See paragraph 7) and Sections 65 and 211 of the Bombay Land Revenue Code, 1879 (See paragraph 8) and Section 84-C of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, 1976 (See paragraph 9) which clothed the authorities with suo-motu revisional power. 15. In paragraph 12 of the said judgment the Apex Court has ruled as under: “12. Ordinarily, the reasonable period within which the power of revision may be exercised would be three years under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code subject, of course, to the exceptional circumstances in a given case, but surely exercise of revisional power after a lapse of 17 years is not a reasonable time. Invocation of revisional power by the Sub-Divisional Officer under Section 257 of the Maharashtra Land Revenue Code is plainly an abuse of process in the facts and circumstances of the case assuming that the order of the Tahsildar passed on 30.3.1976 is flawed and legally not correct.” 16. Yet another important aspect that requires to be examined in this matter is regarding scope of power under Section 136(3) of the Act. This Court has dealt with a similar question in W.P. No. 57847/2016 disposed of on 16.03.2017 regarding the scope of power under Section 136(3) of the Revenue Act. Observations made in paragraphs 10 to 12 are relevant and have a direct bearing on the question raised in this case. They are extracted hereunder: “10. The fact that grant made in favour of petitioner in 1952 and the consequent entry made in her favour were found to be genuine by the revenue authorities themselves is an ancillary and additional factor. Petitioner is not basing her claim solely on the strength of the orders passed by the Special Deputy Commissioner exercising his power under Section 136(3) while holding that the grant made was genuine. Indeed, as rightly pointed out by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, the Special Deputy Commissioner has only accepted the report submitted by the Tahsildar after verification of the records and has opined that there was no reason to suspect the genuineness of the grant. The question precisely is, whether the Deputy Commissioner could have invoked Section 136(3) to set aside the grant of the year 1952. The question precisely is, whether the Deputy Commissioner could have invoked Section 136(3) to set aside the grant of the year 1952. Section 136(3) reads as under: “136(3) The Deputy Commissioner may, on his own motion or on application of a party, call for and examine any records made under Section 127 and Section 129 and pass such orders as he may deem fit: Provided that no order shall be passed except after hearing the party who would be adversely affected by such order.” 11. It is thus apparent from a reading of Section 136(3) of the Act that revisional power can be exercised to call for records (to examine the correctness of the entries) made under Sections 127 and 129 and pass such orders as he may deem fit. Section 127 deals with record of rights. It lays down as to how the record of right shall be prepared and maintained. Section 129 deals with registration of mutations and register of disputed cases in connection with mutations. Therefore, the revisional power under Section 136 is not available to examine the correctness of the grant made in favour of the late husband of the petitioner. 12. Even otherwise, revisional power to be exercised has to be exercised within a reasonable manner. Reasonable exercise of power includes exercise of power within a reasonable period. The Apex Court has on several occasions ruled that power vested in the authority has to be exercised reasonably and within a reasonable period. Useful reference can be made to the judgments of the Apex Court in this regard, in the case of Ram Chand and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (1994) 1 SCC 44 , Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin vs. Fatmabai Ibrahim, (1997) 6 SCC 71 and Joint Collector Ranga Reddy District and Another vs. D. Narsing Rao and Others, (2015) 3 SCC 695 .” 17. Ultimately in paragraph 14 of the said judgment, this Court has held that suo-motu power was sought to be exercised after lapse of 64 years to upset things which had been done in the year 1952 and which had been recognized consistently by the revenue authorities. Thus, action of the Deputy Commissioner in the said case was set at naught. 18. The facts and circumstances of the present case depict the same picture. Thus, action of the Deputy Commissioner in the said case was set at naught. 18. The facts and circumstances of the present case depict the same picture. The Deputy Commissioner has invoked revisional jurisdiction after 50 years and has assumed power that is not vested in him under Section 136(3) of the Revenue Act in annulling the Sale Deeds and declaring that there was no genuine grant made in favour of Basavachar in the year 1964. Hence, petitioner is entitled to succeed. 19. Therefore, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned order passed by the Deputy Commissioner is set aside.