ORDER : 1. Petitioner is working as a Joint Commissioner for Transport, Bangalore (Rural) from 2016 and has worked in various posts for the past 19 years. 2. Being aggrieved by initiation of criminal proceedings by the respondent on the basis of source report dated 14.06.2017-Annexure-A and grant of approval by the Superintendent of Police, Anti Corruption Bureau (for short ACB), Central Range, Bangalore by Order dated 15.06.2017-Annexure-B authorizing Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB to register a case under Section 13(1)(e) read with section 13(2) of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for short PC Act) against petitioner and to investigate the said case and registration of the FIR in Crime No. 07/2017 dated 15.06.2017 Annexure-C, petitioner is before this Court praying to quash the same. 3. In aid of main relief, an interim order to stay the entire proceedings/investigation pursuant to source report dated 14.06.2017 Annexure-A, proceedings dated 15.06.2017- Annexure-B and conduct of investigation consequent to registration of FIR dated 15.06.2017-Annexure-C is sought for. 4. I have heard the arguments of Sri B.V. Acharya, Learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Sri D. Sadashiva for petitioner and Sri Jagadeesha B.N., Learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent. Perused the records. 5. Sri B.V. Acharya, Learned Sr. Counsel has contended that initiation of proceedings against the petitioner is liable to be quashed primarily on four grounds namely: (i) initiation of proceedings is actuated by mala-fides. (ii) source report is too vague. (iii) there is total non application of mind by Superintendent of Police who has passed the order under Section 17 of the PC Act. (iv) proceedings initiated are contrary to the law laid by Apex Court in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Others, (2014) 2 SCC 1 . 5.1 Elaborating his submissions, he would contend that on 01.05.2017-Annexure-G a complaint came to be lodged by petitioner with Sanjaynagar Police Station intimating thereunder that he had received a threatening telephone call from mobile No. 9481241822 between 5.50 P.M. and 5.58 P.M. threatening that petitioner had amassed wealth disproportionate to his source of income and in the event of not paying the amount, he would report to the ACB and Lokayukta the details of the properties possessed by him and give trouble to him which would affect his future service. Hence, petitioner requested the jurisdictional Police to take action against concerned person who is attempting to blackmail petitioner. Hence, petitioner requested the jurisdictional Police to take action against concerned person who is attempting to blackmail petitioner. Said complaint came to be registered in Crime No. 107/2017 for the offences punishable under Sections 384 & 507 IPC. Learned Senior Counsel would contend that name of petitioner came to be forwarded by the Transport Department for being considered to be appointed to the cadre of Indian Administrative Officer-IAS by communication dated 21.06.2017-Annexure-H which was in reply to the communication dated 06.05.2007 received from Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms and present proceedings initiated against the petitioner is purportedly on a suo motu source report which is without any basis. He would submit that said source report is bald, vague and bereft of material particulars and does not contain even the details of properties which purportedly petitioner and his family own and possess. He would draw the attention of the Court to the statement of objections filed by the respondent where-under it is admitted by respondent that source report was prepared on 08.06.2017 itself and no explanation whatsoever is forthcoming as to why there was no approval accorded immediately on said date by the Superintendent of Police to register a case despite said report disclosing cognizable offence. He would also submit that source report not only being vague but it is also without any particulars or details of the properties. He would submit that Order dated 15.06.2017 however came to be passed on the basis of purported another source report dated 08.06.2017 though FIR-Annexure-C disclose or refers to source report i.e. 14.06.2017 and it is not the case of prosecution there are two (2) source reports. He would vehemently contend that statement of objections filed by the respondent does not disclose about two source reports being in existence and respondent unequivocally has admitted that there is only one source report and he cannot now contend about existence of another source report and only during the course of hearing of this petitioner when arguments came to be considered, respondent had noticed the defect or irregularity and realized the illegality and to cover up the same which had crept in, a new case is now sought to be put forward by contending that there are two source reports. He would also contend that if really there was only one source report on 08.06.2017 as contended now, which even according to the prosecution was exhaustive and containing all material particulars same would disclose there was a cognizable offence and as such, it would be unthinkable as to how Superintendent of Police would have kept quite till 15.06.2017 to accord approval to the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register FIR and commence investigation. He would contend that said action would be contrary to the dicta laid down by the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari's case referred to supra. 5.2 He would also submit that it is not the case of respondent that first source report which was purportedly on 08.06.2017 was lacking material particulars and as such, Superintendent of Police not being satisfied with the same had called upon to make further preliminary enquiry, but on the other hand, it was the specific case of respondent that source report dated 08.06.2017 was exhaustive containing all details and as such, to contend source report dated 14.06.2017 is condensed or summary of source report dated 08.06.2017 is only an afterthought. 5.3 He would further contend that investigation has been commenced even before registering the FIR and said source report if disclosing commission of a cognizable offence, it ought to have been entered in the Station House Diary including decision to conduct a preliminary enquiry and said procedure not having been adopted to, the investigation is vitiated. He would also contend that source report dated 08.06.2017 was not in existence at all and by way of alternate submission he contends that source report dated 08.06.2017 was not in existence when approval under second proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act came to be granted on 15.06.2017 authorising Deputy Superintendent of Police to register a case against petitioner and investigate and said order was based on the source report dated 14.06.2017 Annexure-A which was too vague and to over come the same, source report dated 08.06.2017 had been concocted, fabricated and placed before Court along with original records. He submits that if really source report dated 08.06.2017 was in existence as on that date and very approval now granted on 15.06.2017 is on said source report as asserted by respondent in its statement of objections, then, Superintendent of Police ought to have taken cognizance of the offence and order to register the FIR and investigate since source report dated 08.06.2017 makes out a cognizable offence. He would submit that source report dated 08.06.2017 now placed before Court is fabricated one and there is no source report other than source report dated 14.06.2017. He would also submit that nowhere in the statement of objections prosecution has referred to two source reports i.e. one exhaustive dated 08.06.2017 and other one dated 14.06.2017-condensed. He would contend that once a source report is available and if it disclosed cognizable offence, the minimum step which the authority who is vested with the power to register a case has to do is to order for registration of an FIR and direct investigation, so that proceedings pursuant to it would be transparent and not susceptible to any interference without leave of the Court, but on the other hand, if there is delay in registration of FIR though source report discloses cognizable offence and yet it is not registered, it would only result in allowing the prosecution to do something which is not available and thereby prejudice the rights of the accused. On these grounds, he seeks for stay of further proceedings/investigation pursuant to Annexure-A, B and C. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon the following judgments: (1) Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Others (supra) (2) State of Haryana & Others v. Bhajanlal & Others, (1992) SUPP. (1) SCC 335 6. Per contra, Sri B.N. Jagdeesha, Learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent by reiterating the contentions raised in the statement of objections and the additional affidavit of Superintendent of Police filed on 24.07.2017 would contend that Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act would be a complete bar for grant of stay of investigation or further proceedings. He would submit when there is existence of sufficient and prima-facie material to proceed against petitioner, respondent authorities are required to investigate the same. He would submit when there is existence of sufficient and prima-facie material to proceed against petitioner, respondent authorities are required to investigate the same. He would contend that respondent's right to investigate on the basis of source report which discloses cognizable offence and said report being based on the credible information received by the respondent about petitioner possessing wealth in excess of his known source of income and as such, preliminary enquiry came to be held which fact has also been recorded in the Station House Diary and on preparation of said source report, it was placed before the Superintendent of Police for approval, who on being satisfied that material placed, has accorded approval to register a criminal case and ordered for investigation, which is in consonance with the guidelines indicated by Hon'ble Apex Court in Lalita Kumari's case. Hence, he submits that this Court should not exercise extraordinary jurisdiction vested under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India or section 482 of Cr.P.C. 1973 to stay the investigation, since it may lead to vital evidence disappearing. In support of his contentions, he has relied upon the following judgments: (1) Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan, AIR (2001) SC 2856 (2) Sri Govindaraju v. State of Karnataka, AIR (2008) KAR 1560 (3) Sri Sirajin Basha v. Sri B.S. Yediyurappa, ILR (2011) KAR 5115 (4) Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta v. B. Srinivas, (2008) 8 SCC 580 (5) State of M.P. v. Awadh Kishore Gupta & Others, (2004) 1 SCC 691 (6) State of M.P. & Others v. Ram Singh, (2000) 5 SCC 88 (7) Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.L. Crl. Appeal No. 1137/2017 disposed of on 13.07.2017. He has also made available original records as well as Station House Diary for perusal of the same by this Court. 7. In reply, Sri B.V. Acharya, Learned Sr.Counsel appearing on behalf of petitioner has contended that if really there was source report sent to Superintendent of Police on 08.06.2017 which according to the prosecution was exhaustive and disclosing cognizable offence, then, it would be highly unthinkable that Superintendent of Police could have kept quiet till 15.06.2017 for registration of the case and if this contention of respondent is to be accepted, then stand of respondent would be diametrically opposite to the dicta laid down by Hon'ble Apex Court in Lalita Kumari's case particularly, paragraph Nos. 120.3 and 120.4. 120.3 and 120.4. He would submit that if the source report dated 08.06.2017 discloses there was a cognizable offence, there was no necessity for further clarification or gathering information inasmuch as scope of preliminary enquiry contemplated in such circumstances is not to examine the veracity or correctness or truthfulness of information so received and it is only to ascertain whether information reveals any cognizable offence or not. In the light of these undisputed facts, he contends that source report was prepared on 14.06.2017 without any particulars and in extreme hurry Superintendent of Police had perused the same on 15.06.2017 and issued the authorization to register a case and accordingly FIR came to be registered on 15.06.2017 against petitioner. He would contend that prejudice that is caused to the petitioner-accused is apparent on the face of the records. Cause for registering FIR being source report dated 14.06.2017 and there being no dispute that utmost value is attached to prompt lodging of FIR which is to maintain transparency and respondent having been given a complete go-by, the proceedings are vitiated. He contends that he need not over emphasize the value of quick and prompt lodging of FIR since registration of FIR would result in same being forwarded to jurisdictional Court and it would contain the actual source report and same cannot be altered by the investigating agency since registration of FIR containing first information would be on the basis of said source report. He contends that in such circumstances, if without any material particulars or the source report does not contain all the material which is the basis for filing of FIR, then, necessarily, respondent-prosecution can always prepare a fresh complaint or fresh source report by ante-dating it which according to him has occurred in the instant case. Hence, he contends that any statement recorded after FIR would be hit by Section 152 Cr.P.C. 1973 and it would not be open to the Investigating Agency to manipulate or create doubtful records after registration of FIR and thereafter contend that petitioner-accused would not be prejudiced. On these grounds, he seeks for interim order being granted and prays for stay of further investigation in the matter. 8. On these grounds, he seeks for interim order being granted and prays for stay of further investigation in the matter. 8. Having heard the Learned Advocates appearing for the parties and on perusal of original records made available by the Learned Special Public Prosecutor including Station House Diary, this Court is of the considered view that following question would arise for consideration: "Whether in the facts and circumstances obtained further investigation is required to be stayed as prayed for or whether interim order as sought for requires to be granted?" 9. In the light of Sri B.N. Jagadeesh, Learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent at the threshold having raised an objection with regard to this Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India inter-alia by referring to Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act, 1988 and contending constitutional Courts should not exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction to stay the proceedings under PC Act on any ground whatsoever by relying upon the judgments of Hon'ble Apex Court in the cases of Satya Narayan Sharma, Girish Kumar Suneja and Ram Singh referred to herein supra, this Court is of the considered view that it would be apt and appropriate to deal with said contention. In order to examine said contention, it would be necessary to extract the relevant Section of the PC Act pressed into service namely, Section 19(3)(c) and it reads thus: "19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution:- (1) xxx (2) xxx (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974):- (a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special Judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of the absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in, the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby. (b) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on the ground of any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction granted by the authority, unless it is satisfied that such error, omission or irregularity has resulted in a failure of justice. (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal other proceedings." 10. (c) no court shall stay the proceedings under this Act on any other ground and no court shall exercise the powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any inquiry, trial, appeal other proceedings." 10. The above said provision was the subject matter of interpretation by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the matter of Satya Narayan Sharma v. State of Rajasthan (supra) and it came to be held as under: "24. There is another reason also why the submission that, Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act would not apply to the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court, cannot be accepted. section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 starts with the words "Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code". Thus the inherent power can be exercised even if there was a contrary provision in the Criminal Procedure Code section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 does not provide that inherent jurisdiction can be exercised notwithstanding any other provision contained in any other enactment. Thus if Sn enactment contains a specific bar then inherent jurisdiction cannot be exercised to get over that bar. As has been pointed out in the cases of Madhu Limaye v. State of Maharashtra, 1977 (4) SCC 551 : AIR 1978 SC 47 : (1978) 3 Cri. L.J. 165, Janata Dal v. H.S. Chowdhary & Others, 1992 (4) SCC 305 : 1993 AIR SCW 248 : AIR 1993 SC 892 : (1993) Cri. L.J. 600 and Indra Sawhney v. Union of India and Others, 2000 (1) SCC 168 : 1999 AIR SCW 4661 : AIR 2000 SC 498 : 2000 LAB. I.C. 277, the inherent jurisdiction cannot be resorted to if there was a specific provision or there is an express bar of law. 25. We see no substance in the submission that Section 19 would not apply to a High Court, Section 5(3) of the said Act shows that the Special Court under the said Act is a Court of Session. Therefore the power of revision and/or the inherent jurisdiction can only be exercised by the High Court. 26. Thus in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act there can be no stay of trials. We clarify that we are not saying that proceedings under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 cannot be adapted. In appropriate cases proceedings under Section 482 can be adapted. 26. Thus in cases under the Prevention of Corruption Act there can be no stay of trials. We clarify that we are not saying that proceedings under section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 cannot be adapted. In appropriate cases proceedings under Section 482 can be adapted. However, even if petition under Section 482, Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 is entertained there can be no stay of trials under the said Act. It is then for the party to convince the concerned Court to expedite the hearing of that petition. However merely because the concerned Court is not in a position to take up the petition for hearing would be no ground for staying the trial even temporarily." 11. In the aforesaid judgment, Apex Court was dealing with the statutory powers as contained in Section 482 Cr.P.C. 1973 or revisional; power available under Section 397 Cr.P.C. 1973 It came to be noticed by the Apex Court that Trial Court had taken cognizance of the offence alleged against the accused (Satya Narayan Sharma) for the offences punishable under Sections 420. 467, 468 & 471 of IPC and Section 5(2) of the PC Act (Old Act) and as such accused; therein filed a Crl. Misc. Petition before the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 1973 and sought for quashing the order passed by Trial Court taking cognizance of the offences. High Court had granted stay of the trial and there was also no progress in the Crl. Misc. Petition and it was being adjourned from time to time. In this background, it came to be observed by the Apex Court, by that method, accused successfully had delayed the trial. It was also noticed by Apex Court that ultimately, Crl. Misc. Petition had been dismissed by the High Court, which was carried by accused in Crl. Appeal before the Apex Court. In this background, Apex Court while dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant-accused therein held that what position was prevailing in SATYA Narayan Sharma's case was happening in large number of criminal cases. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that while public servants are sought to be prosecuted under the PC Act, by filing revision petitions under Section 397 Cr.P.C. 1973 or by filing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 1973 stay of trial was obtained and parties were successfully managing to delay the trial. It was observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that while public servants are sought to be prosecuted under the PC Act, by filing revision petitions under Section 397 Cr.P.C. 1973 or by filing petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C. 1973 stay of trial was obtained and parties were successfully managing to delay the trial. Hon'ble Apex Court has observed order of stay were granted by Courts without considering and/or in contravention of Section 19(3)(c) of the PC Act. 12. However, it requires to be noticed that their Lordships in Satya Narayan Sharma's case have not considered or examined the scope and power available to the High Court under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India namely, the extraordinary jurisdiction vested in the High Court to stay the proceedings under PC Act, nor their Lordships have held that in view of the provisions contained in Section 19(3), High Court has no power under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India to stay the proceedings under the PC Act. 13. The jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India is part of the inviolable basic structure of the Constitution of India. Hence, Section 19 of the PC Act cannot take away the constitutional power conferred on the High Court under Articles 226 & 227 of the Constitution of India since judicial review is an integral part of the constitutional scheme. 14. Nine Judges of Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Limited v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 has held jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of an enactment. 14. Nine Judges of Constitutional Bench of Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Mafatlal Industries Limited v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 has held jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of an enactment. It came to be held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under: "(i) Where a refund of tax/duty is claiming on the ground that it has been collected from the petitioner/plaintiff-whether before the commencement of the Central Excise and Customs Laws (Amendment) Act, 1991 or thereafter-by misinterpreting or misapplying the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 read with Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 or Customs Act, 1962 read with Customs Tariff Act or by misinterpreting or misapplying any of the rules, regulations or Notifications issued under the said enactments, such a claim has necessarily to be preferred under and in accordance with the provisions of the respective enactments before the authorities specified thereunder and within the period of limitation prescribed therein. No suit is maintainable in that behalf. While the jurisdiction of the High Courts under Article 226 and of this Court under Article 32-cannot be circumscribed by the provisions of the said enactments, they will certainly have due regard to the legislative intent evidenced by the provisions of the said Acts and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the Act. The Writ Petition will be considered and disposed of in the light of and in accordance with the provisions of Section 11-B. This is for the reason that the power under Article 226 has to be exercised to effectuate the rule of law and not for abrogating it." 15. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana and Others v. Bhajanlal and Others (supra) was examining under what circumstances and in which category of cases criminal proceedings can be quashed either in exercise of extraordinary powers vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or in exercise of inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and after referring to plethora of case laws have illustratively indicated the categories of cases where such power could be exercised by the High Court. It was held: "102. It was held: "102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principle of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. (1) Where the allegations made in the first information report of the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused. (2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code. (3) Where the un-controverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused. (6) Where there is a express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party. (7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala-fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge. However, a note of caution has also been sounded that power of quashing criminal proceedings should be exercised sparingly and with circumspection, that too in the rarest of rare cases. It is further held by the Hon'ble Apex Court as under: "103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuiness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice." 16. Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Girish Kumar Suneja v. C.B.I. (supra) has observed that jurisdiction of High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be curtailed, yet extraordinary situations would arise where it would be advisable for a High Court to decline to interfere and while examining as to whether accused can approach High Court for grant of bail under Article 226 of the Constitution of India arising out of an offence under the TADA Act and referring to Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569 , it came to be held that High Court would interfere, if at all, only in extreme and rare cases and additionally, judicial discipline and comity of Courts require that High Courts should refrain from exercising their jurisdiction in entertaining bail applications. Thus, power vested under Articles 226 & 227 of Constitution of India should be exercised sparingly and that too, in rare and appropriate cases and in extreme circumstances where it may lead to miscarriage in administration of justice or it would be abuse of process of law or it may lead to failure of justice. 17. In the light of the authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhajanlal and other case laws referred to herein above, this Court can exercise its power of judicial review in criminal matters and as such, power of judicial review can be exercised by High Court either to prevent abuse of process of any law or to secure the ends of justice. Such exercise of the power to quash the proceedings or FIR would be sparingly used and to uphold the rule of the law or where failure to exercise the said power may result in miscarriage in the administration of justice and thereby resulting right of the party approaching the Court being prejudiced. To put it differently, this Court would interfere in extraordinary jurisdiction only in exceptional circumstances and such exceptional circumstances should have obtained in a given case. There cannot be any straight jacket formula or precise set of norms prescribed. It is in this background, Apex Court in Bhajanlal's case referred to supra has indicated illustratively, types of cases when such power can be exercised as already noticed herein above. There cannot be any straight jacket formula or precise set of norms prescribed. It is in this background, Apex Court in Bhajanlal's case referred to supra has indicated illustratively, types of cases when such power can be exercised as already noticed herein above. In that view of the matter, it cannot be held that High Court while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 & 227 of Constitution of India cannot stay the proceedings or interfere with the proceedings initiated under PC Act by virtue of Section 19(3)(c) of PC Act. 18. This takes me to the next point or issue as to whether respondent on receiving credible information about petitioner purportedly possessing wealth more than his sources of income could have proceeded to conduct a preliminary enquiry, prepare source reports and thereafter register FIR and whether said proceedings is to be declared as flawed. As to whether respondent could have registered FIR against petitioner or not is a question which would not be in the domain of this Court to examine said issue. However, it can be noticed that Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lalita Kumari's case has held that registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 Cr.P.C. 1973 if information discloses commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary enquiry is required to be conducted. However, preliminary enquiry would be permissible in a situation where such information does not disclose a cognizable offence, but still there being necessity to conduct further enquiry, and in such circumstances, preliminary enquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether said information discloses cognizable offence or not. As to what type of cases preliminary enquiry is to be conducted would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case and by way of illustration, it has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court that preliminary enquiry can be made in the following category of cases: (a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes. (b) Commercial offences. (c) Medical negligence cases. (d) Corruption cases. (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in launching criminal prosecution, for example, over three months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay." It is true that they are only illustrative in nature and not exhaustive. (b) Commercial offences. (c) Medical negligence cases. (d) Corruption cases. (e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in launching criminal prosecution, for example, over three months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons for delay." It is true that they are only illustrative in nature and not exhaustive. It has been further held by the Apex Court in the said judgment that all information relating to cognizable offences which results in registration of FIR or leading to a preliminary enquiry must also be reflected in General Diary/Station House Diary/Daily Diary. It has been held as under: "120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is the record of all information received in a police station, we direct that all information relating to cognizable offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry, must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be reflected, as mentioned above." 19. A bare perusal of section 154(1) of Cr.P.C. 1973 would indicate that a Police Officer cannot refuse to record an information relating to commission of a cognizable offence and register a case or cannot refuse to register a case on the ground that he/she is not satisfied with the reasonableness or credibility of the information so furnished, when such information discloses a cognizable offence. Thus, it manifests that on information disclosing a cognizable offence if brought to the notice of an Officer in-charge of a Police Station, said Police Officer has no other option except to enter the substance of such information in the prescribed form namely, to register a case on the basis of information so received. 20. Police Officers in the field of investigation into criminal offences would be free to investigate where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed. However, there is no unfettered discretion and such exercise of power would be strictly circumscribed by the provisions of the code or the statute on which such investigation is being undertaken. 21. 20. Police Officers in the field of investigation into criminal offences would be free to investigate where they suspect that a cognizable offence has been committed. However, there is no unfettered discretion and such exercise of power would be strictly circumscribed by the provisions of the code or the statute on which such investigation is being undertaken. 21. The Privy Council in the case of Emperor v. Khwaja Nazir Ahmad, AIR (1945) PC 18 while dealing with the statutory right of the Police under Sections 154 & 156 of the Code within its province of investigation of a cognizable offence has observed as under: "...so it is of the utmost importance that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry. In India as has been shown there is a statutory right on the part of the police to investigate the circumstances of an alleged cognizable crime without requiring any authority from the judicial authorities, and it would, as their Lordships think, be an unfortunate result if it should be held possible to interfere with those statutory rights by an exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the court. The functions of the judiciary and the police are complementary not overlapping and the combination of individual liberty with a due observance of law and order is only to be obtained by leaving each to exercise its own function, always, of course, subject to the right of the court to intervene in an appropriate case when moved under Section 491, Cr.P.C. 1973 to give directions in the nature of habeas corpus. In such a case as the present, however, the court's functions begin when a charge is preferred before it and not until then." 22. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Bhajan Lal while examining the expression "reason to suspect" as occurring in Section 157(1) Cr.P.C. 1973 has held that investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the Police Officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offence is legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code. Apex Court was also examining whether Section 157 of the Code gives the Police Officers carte Blanche drawing no legal bounds in the province of investigation and whether the powers of the Police Officers in the field of investigation are wholly immune from judicial review ability and held that investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the Police Officers to investigate into cognizable offence if legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code with a caveat, that Chapter 16 of the Code mandates that Magistrate is to be kept in picture at all stages of the Police investigation but is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or monitor the investigation. However, if the Police Officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly or illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the Court on being approached by the person aggrieved would consider the nature and extent of breach and pass appropriate orders. It came to be held by the Apex Court as under: "60. The sum and substance of the above deliberation results in a conclusion that the investigation of an offence is the field exclusively reserved for the police officers whose powers in that field are unfettered so long as the power to investigate into the cognizable offences is legitimately exercised in strict compliance with the provisions falling under Chapter XII of the Code and the courts are not justified in obliterating the track of investigation when the investigating agencies are well within their legal bounds as aforementioned. Indeed, a noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. Indeed, a noticeable feature of the scheme under Chapter XIV of the Code is that a Magistrate is kept in the picture at all stages of the police investigation but he is not authorised to interfere with the actual investigation or to direct the police how that investigation is to be conducted. But if a police officer transgresses the circumscribed limits and improperly and illegally exercises his investigatory powers in breach of any statutory provision causing serious prejudice to the personal liberty and also property of a citizen, then the court on being approached by the person aggrieved for the redress of any grievance, has to consider the nature and extent of the breach and pass appropriate orders as may be called for without leaving the citizens to the mercy of police echelons since human dignity is a dear value of our Constitution. It needs no emphasis that no one can demand absolute immunity even if he is wrong and claim unquestionable right and unlimited powers exercisable up to unfathomable cosmos. Any recognition of such power will be tantamount to recognition of Divine Power which no authority on earth can enjoy." (Emphasis supplied) 23. Thus, it would emerge from the above discussion that on receipt of an information, if it does not disclose a cognizable offence, there would be no necessity to proceed further and in the event of there being a necessity for preliminary enquiry and in order to ascertain whether such information disclose cognizable offence or not, as held by the Apex Court in Lalita Kumari's case referred to supra, Police Officer may undertake to conduct such preliminary enquiry as he deems fit and same requires to be entered in the Station House Diary and this is mandatory and there cannot be any dispute to the proposition of law particularly in the background of dicta laid down in Lalita Kumari's case at paragraph 120.8 already extracted herein above. As already discussed herein above, information relating to preliminary enquiry being conducted is to be reflected in the Station House Diary and necessarily all further proceedings pursuant thereto. 24. Once the preliminary enquiry is conducted and information is gathered, which may disclose there is a cognizable offence, the next immediate step which the Police Officer has to undertake is to register the case without any delay. 24. Once the preliminary enquiry is conducted and information is gathered, which may disclose there is a cognizable offence, the next immediate step which the Police Officer has to undertake is to register the case without any delay. Only on registration of the case, the authorised or empowered Officer would get the power to investigate the crime as otherwise not. 25. If a special statute like the PC Act prescribes the mode of investigation can be undertaken or commenced as prescribed thereunder and the statute mandates that investigation is to be carried out by only those persons who are authorised under law and same being pre-requisite to conduct the investigation, non-fulfilment of statutory requirement in terms of prescribed statute, the investigation if any carried out would be ultimately be an investigation without authority of law. Thus, when the authority of a person to carryout the investigation is questioned on the ground that he does not fulfil the statutory requirements laid down thereof in terms of statute, burden, undoubtedly would be on the prosecution to dispel the said doubt or to prove such Investigating Officer has acted in accordance with statute. 26. Keeping these salutary principles in mind, it can be noticed that under Section 17 of the PC Act, persons authorised to investigate has been indicated and as such, it would be necessary to extract Section 17 of the PC Act and it reads as under: "17. Persons authorised to investigate:- Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), no police officer below the rank:- (a) in the case of the Delhi Special Police Establishment, of an Inspector of Police. (b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as such under sub-section (1) of section 8 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant Commissioner of Police. (c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank. (b) in the metropolitan areas of Bombay, Calcutta, Madras and Ahmedabad and in any other metropolitan area notified as such under sub-section (1) of section 8 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), of an Assistant Commissioner of Police. (c) elsewhere, of a Deputy Superintendent of Police or a police officer of equivalent rank. Shall investigate any offence punishable under this Act without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make any arrest therefore without a warrant: Provided that if a police officer not below the rank of an Inspector of Police is authorised by the State Government in this behalf by general or special order, he may also investigate any such offence without the order of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Magistrate of the first class, as the case may be, or make arrest therefore without a warrant: Provided further that an offence referred to in clause (e) of sub-section (1) of section 13 shall not be investigated without the order of a police officer not below the rank of a Superintendent of Police." 27. As to whether authorization given by Superintendent of Police to conduct investigation was contrary to the view expressed in Bhajan Lal's case was the subject matter of consideration by Apex Court in the case of Superintendent of Police, Karnataka Lokayukta and Another v. B. Srinivas (supra) and Apex Court after examining Sections 17 and 19(3) of PC Act, has held that facts obtained in Bhajan Lal's case was distinct since Superintendent of Police appears to have applied his mind and passed an order authorizing investigation by an Inspector under the peculiar circumstances of the case and as such it came to be held that High Court should not have liberally construed provisions of the Act in favour of the accused resulting in closure of trial when serious charges have been made against respondent-accused therein in relation to commission of an offence punishable under the Act, which enactment was legislated to curb the illegal and corrupt practices of the Officers and to eradicate the menace of corruption. It was also held that even otherwise, effect of Section 19(3) of PC Act relating to prejudice is lost sight of by High Court and as such, order passed by High Court quashing the proceedings came to be set-aside. It was also held that even otherwise, effect of Section 19(3) of PC Act relating to prejudice is lost sight of by High Court and as such, order passed by High Court quashing the proceedings came to be set-aside. It has been held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in B. Srinivas's case as under: "16. If one looks at the order passed, which formed the subject-matter of challenge in Ram Singh case (2000) 5 SCC 88 it is crystal clear that the order passed in the present case by the Superintendent of Police is more elaborate and as rightly submitted by learned counsel for the appellant, the reasons are clearly discernible. Even otherwise, the effect of Section 19(3) of the Act relating to prejudice has been completely lost sight of by the High Court. The second reason indicated by the High Court to quash the proceedings also has no substance." 28. Keeping these principles in mind, it requires to be noticed that there is no denial of the fact that in the case registered against petitioner, even in the absence of authority by the Superintendent of Police authorizing the Investigating Officer i.e. Deputy Superintendent of Police in law to investigate the offence falling under Clause (e) of Section 13 of the PC Act, the Superintendent of Police is and was authorised or empowered to investigate such offence. Thus, question which would fall for consideration in the instant case relates to deficiency if any, in the authorization issued by the Superintendent of Police authorizing Deputy Superintendent of Police to investigate on the basis of source report and whether said authorization dated 15.06.2017-Annexure-B is based on source report dated 08.06.2017 referred to therein or there is any other source report? As already noticed here-in-above, Sri B.V. Acharya, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner has contended that basis for registration of FIR is the source report dated 14.06.2017 Annexure-A and this has not been reflected in Station House Diary and as such, it has vitiated entire further investigation. As already noticed here-in-above, Sri B.V. Acharya, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner has contended that basis for registration of FIR is the source report dated 14.06.2017 Annexure-A and this has not been reflected in Station House Diary and as such, it has vitiated entire further investigation. When said contention is examined in the background of second proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act and the authorization or Order of approval dated 15.06.2017-Annexure-B, it would further emerge from the records produced by Learned Special Public Prosecutor that in the first instance, respondent-authority on receiving credible information with regard to petitioner possessing wealth disproportionate to his sources of income, was of the view that a preliminary enquiry is required to be held. Thus, said step taken or adopted by respondent-authorities is in consonance with the dicta laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Lalita Kumari's case. 29. It is no doubt true that in the instant case, the basis for registration of FIR is the source report and respondent-authority in its statement of objections at paragraph 22 has categorically asserted that there is only one source report which is dated 08.06.2017. However, Sri B.N. Jagadeesha, Learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for respondent has supplemented his arguments by contending that there is a source report available in the original records even as on 08.06.2017 and source report dated 14.06.2017 Annexure-A is only condensed or summary of the source report dated 08.06.2017, though too hard to digest, fact remains there is reference to source report dated 08.06.2017 in the order of sanction dated 15.06.2017 Annexure-B passed by the Superintendent of Police authorizing the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB to register a case against petitioner under Sections 13(1)(e) and 13(2) of PC Act. That apart, Station House Diary would also disclose that there is source report dated 08.06.2017 and said source report which is available in the original record has also been perused by this Court and this fact has been recorded in the Station House Diary and as rightly contended by Sri B.V. Acharya, Learned Senior Counsel appearing op behalf of petitioner, the Superintendent of Police could have taken cognizance of the offence at that juncture itself namely, on 08.06.2017 when it was placed before her for perusal, since it disclosed a cognizable offence. However, this has not been done. 30. However, this has not been done. 30. Had it been the case of prosecution that basis for initiation or registration of FIR being source report dated 14.06.2017, then contention put forward by Learned Senior Counsel appearing for petitioner would have been susceptible to acceptance. But, on the other hand, Order dated 15.06.2017 Annexure-B would disclose that on the basis of source report dated 08.06.2017 approval was granted to register the case and to conduct investigation. Said source report dated 08.06.2017 (available in original file and referred to in Station House Diary) is exhaustive in nature and report dated 14.06.2017 Annexure-A is only summary of source report dated 08.06.2017. Both these reports disclose cognizable offence and as such Superintendent of Police seems to have applied her mind on 15.06.2017 to accord approval to register the case and investigate which is in consonance with second proviso to Section 17 of PC Act and as such it cannot be construed that approval accorded by Superintendent of Police on 15.06.2017 Annexure-B to the Deputy Superintendent of Police to register the case and to conduct investigation was on the basis of report dated 14.06.2017 Annexure-A. On perusal of Order of approval dated 15.06.2017 (Annexure-B) and Station House Diary, this Court is satisfied that said approval is in consonance with second proviso to Section 17 of the PC Act. 31. In the light of afore-stated discussion, the procedure adopted for granting approval to Deputy Superintendent of Police to register the case against petitioner cannot be held or construed as having resulted in right of petitioner being prejudiced. In that view of the matter, it cannot be held that there is prima facie case in favour of petitioner or case in question falls in the "rarest of rare cases" for grant of an interim order of stay of investigation. Hence, this Court is of the view that it is not a fit case for grant of interim prayer. Accordingly, interim prayer sought for is hereby rejected. 32. It is made clear that observations made in the course of this order is for the limited purpose of examining the interim prayer only. 33. Court Officer is hereby directed to return the original records to Learned Special Public Prosecutor under due acknowledgement.