JUDGMENT : 1. This appeal is preferred against the order dated 14/07/2016 passed by the District Judge-9, Nagpur in Regular Civil Appeal No. 246/2016 thereby partly allowing the appellants application for interim injunction filed under order-39, Rule 1 and 2 of Civil Procedure Code restraining the respondent from creating any third party interest in the suit property; however, rejecting the prayer of restraining the respondent from disturbing the appellants possession in the suit property, till disposal of appeal. 2. The case of the appellant is to the effect that respondent herein, had by executing an agreement of sale dated 15/05/2000 agreed to sell the suit property to the appellant and accepted the total consideration of Rs. 75,000/-. On the date of agreement itself, the appellant was put in possession of the suit land and since then, he was and he in is in lawful possession thereof. However, as the appellants suit for specific performance of the contract came to be dismissed by the Trial Court, the respondent was trying to create third party interests in the suit property and also trying to disturb the appellants possession in the suit property; hence, it was necessary to restrain the respondent from doing so. 3. Respondent resisted this application for interim injunction, contending inter-alia that appellant is not in possession of the suit property. It was submitted that the learned trial court has already recorded clear finding that amount of Rs.75,000/- was given as a hand loan and alleged agreement of sale was also not registered or executed on proper stamp paper and hence cannot be read in to evidence. Therefore no case was made out by appellant-either for grant of relief of restraining the respondent from creating third party interest or from disturbing the alleged possession of the appellant over the suit property. 4. After hearing the learned counsels for appellant and respondent, the First Appellate Court was pleased to hold that except for agreement of sale, in which there is an averment that possession of the suit land was handed over to the appellant, there was no other evidence proving that appellant was in actual physical possession of the suit land. The First Appellate Court further held that as the said agreement of sale is not registered and also not executed on proper stamp paper, it can not be read in evidence. The First Appellate Court further held that as the said agreement of sale is not registered and also not executed on proper stamp paper, it can not be read in evidence. It was further held that trial court has already held the transaction to be not of sale but of security towards the repayment of loan. In this view of the matter, the First Appellate Court rejected the appellants prayer for restraining respondent from disturbing his possession in the suit land, however allowed the prayer of appellant to the extent of restraining respondent from creating third party interest in the suit land. 5. While challenging this order of the First Appellate Court before this court, it is submission of learned counsel for appellant that the First Appellate Court has not at all considered the documentary evidence produced on record. It is submitted that, as per the evidence of respondent himself, he is having two other brothers and the suit land is being cultivated by one of his brothers. It is submitted that respondent has disclosed this fact for the first time in the court as in the written statement no such case is made out. It is admitted by him Respondent that he has not disclosed this fact in the written statement. 6. Secondly, it is submitted that as per the agreement executed inter-se between respondent and his two brothers, the partition has already been effected between respondent and his brothers and as regards the suit land, in the interse agreement between them dated 7.1.2011 it is stated that respondent was put in possession of the suit land which was allotted to his share; whereas, his brothers are in possession of the lands allotted to their share. It is urged that, if this evidence was taken into consideration, the first appellate court would have inevitably come to the conclusion that appellant was put in possession of the suit land by the Respondent. It is coupled with the fact that there is a clear averment to that effect made in the agreement of sale that on the date of agreement itself the possession of the suit land was delivered to appellant as a part performance of the agreement. Learned counsel for appellant has further submitted that the agreement is an exhibited document and no objection was taken, when the trial court admitted it in evidence and exhibited the same. Learned counsel for appellant has further submitted that the agreement is an exhibited document and no objection was taken, when the trial court admitted it in evidence and exhibited the same. Moreover such agreement, even if it is unregistered or not executed on the proper stamp paper, it can be considered for collateral purpose of deciding as to who is in possession of the suit land. It is thus submitted by learned counsel for appellant that, as learned First Appellate Court has not considered this aspect, the impugned order passed by it, rejecting the appellants request for restraining respondent from disturbing his possession, needs to be set aside. 7. Per contra, learned counsel for respondent has supported the impugned order of the First Appellate Court and in my considered opinion rightly so. It may be true that in the agreement of sale it is stated that possession of the suit land was delivered to the appellant on the date of agreement itself. However, the judgment of the trial Court which is a based on the appreciation of evidence of the attesting witnesses clearly goes to show that it was not a transaction of sale but a transaction of hand loan and for the security of repayment of such hand loan, this alleged agreement was executed. This fact is admitted by the attesting witness to the agreement, viz. Ramchandra Gopal Shende, who is examined by the appellant himself. In his cross examination this witness has admitted in so many words that the agreement was executed as a security for the hand loan obtained by the respondent. There are also averments in the agreement of sale itself, produced at page no. 87 in this appeal to the effect that, in order to repay the amount of hand loan, the period for execution of the sale deed was extended. 8. Thus it goes without saying that it was not a true and genuine transaction of agreement of sale but it was executed as security for repayment of loan amount. Normally the possession of the property which is used as a security, is not given in such cases though in the agreement it is stated that, the possession was handed over. Thus it goes without saying that it was not a true and genuine transaction of agreement of sale but it was executed as security for repayment of loan amount. Normally the possession of the property which is used as a security, is not given in such cases though in the agreement it is stated that, the possession was handed over. Therefore, if alleged agreement of sale which is treated and considered rightly by trial court as an agreement of security towards the repayment of loan then, even if it is considered for collateral purpose also, it becomes difficult to accept that on the basis of said agreement, the possession of land was handed over by respondent to the appellant. It is apart that said agreement was also not executed on the proper stamp paper and is also not registered. Merely because it is exhibited, in the absence of learned counsel, respondent, much evidential value cannot be attached to it. 9. Moreover, except for this bare averment made in the agreement, absolutely no corroborative evidence is produced on record by the appellant to prove his possession over suit land. If the agreement was executed on 15/5/2000 itself, at least in possession column of 7/12 extract or in any other revenue record, the name of the appellant would have appeared as cultivator or the occupant. However, no such document is produced on record by the appellant. Relying upon certain averment in the inter-se agreement between respondent and his brothers, the appellant cannot prove his possession over the suit land. Moreover, in the light of the facts of the present case when the alleged agreement is already held to be a sham and bogus document, as apparently it was a transaction for repayment of loan and that finding of the learned trial court is based on evidence on record, it can not be said, in the absence of any other documentary evidence proving the possession of the appellant over the suit land, that the discretion exercised by the first appellate court in rejecting the appellants application for restraining respondent from disturbing his peaceful possession can be interfered with. As the said discretion is exercised properly and justified from the facts of record, no interference is warranted in the impugned order of the First Appellate Court. The appeal therefore being devoid of merits, stands dismissed.