JUDGMENT : C.L. SONI, J. 1. The petitioner has filed the present petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenging the order dated 02.05.1998 passed by the learned Civil Judge (S.D.), Vadodara in Review Application No.43 of 1997 along with the application at exhibit 5 preferred in such review application by the petitioner. The learned Judge has rejected the review application with application at exhibit 5 by the impugned order. As stated in the petition, respondent no.1 herein preferred Special Civil Suit No.39 of 1997 in the Court of learned Civil Judge (S.D.) at Vadodara against respondent nos.2 to 16 for specific performance of the contract pertaining to the agriculture land bearing block no.11 situated in Village : Ampad, Taluka – District: Vadodara (to be referred to as “the suit land”). It is stated that such suit was filed in collusion wherein the respondents submitted consent terms on 28.01.1997 and got the decree based on consent terms for specific performance of the contract. It is further the case of the petitioner that the petitioner had filed Special Civil Suit No.887 of 1996 against respondent no.2 to 16 wherein respondent no.1 was later on added as party and in such suit, the petitioner preferred application at exhibit 5 which was rejected by the Court below against which the petitioner preferred Appeal from Order No.316 of 1996 before this Court and in the order passed in Appeal from Order, this Court has observed that the decree passed in the suit preferred by respondent no.1 against respondent nos.2 to 16 appeared to be concocted. The petitioner, therefore, preferred Review Application No.43 of 1997 seeking review of the judgment and decree passed in Special Civil Suit No.39 of 1997. Such application as stated above is rejected by the impugned order. As stated in the petition, the petitioner had earlier challenged the impugned order by filing Civil Revision Application No.922 of 1998 before this Court, however, the revision application was disposed of, as not maintainable, by order dated 16.04.2009. 2. Learned advocate Mr. Patel for the petitioner submitted that the suit filed by respondent no.1 against respondent nos.2 to 16 was collusive suit to defeat the right of the petitioner which the petitioner acquired by agreement pertaining to the suit land. 2. Learned advocate Mr. Patel for the petitioner submitted that the suit filed by respondent no.1 against respondent nos.2 to 16 was collusive suit to defeat the right of the petitioner which the petitioner acquired by agreement pertaining to the suit land. He submitted that within short time after filing the suit, the respondents got the consent decree and such consent decree was fraud played upon the petitioner as sole aim in filing the suit, in submitting the consent terms in the suit and in getting the decree passed on consent terms was to defeat the right of the petitioner pertaining to the suit land. Mr. Patel submitted that when the right of the petitioner was defeated by the consent decree passed in the suit preferred by respondent no.1, the petitioner though was not party to the suit was very much entitled to seek review of the judgment and decree passed in the suit. Mr. Patel submitted that the learned Judge committed serious error in rejecting the review application of the petitioner on the ground that no case was made out for review or recall of the judgment and order passed in Special Civil Suit No.39 of 1997. Mr. Patel submitted that when this Court while deciding the Appeal from Order preferred by the petitioner has clearly observed that the decree obtained was concocted, the learned Judge was required to allow the review application preferred by the petitioner and to review/recall the judgment and decree passed in the suit filed by respondent no.1. 3. Though served with the rule, the respondents have not appeared. 4. The Court having heard learned advocate Mr. Patel for the petitioner finds that the petitioner preferred review application on the ground that the judgment and decree in Special Civil Suit No.39 of 1997 was obtained in collusion and behind the back of the petitioner. With such review application, the petitioner also preferred application at exhibit 5 seeking to restrain the respondents from transferring the suit land till the review application was decided. With such review application, the petitioner also preferred application at exhibit 5 seeking to restrain the respondents from transferring the suit land till the review application was decided. The premise on which, the review application was filed is that there was already an agreement to sale dated 15.05.1993 executed for the suit land by one Motibhai Lakhabhai in favour of the petitioner and based on such agreement to sell, the petitioner has already filed Special Civil Suit No.887 of 1996 in the Civil Court at Vadodara for specific performance of the contract for the suit land and, therefore, the compromise entered into in Special Civil Suit No.39 of 1997 was not binding to him and it was void ab initio and, therefore, the judgment and decree passed therein was required to be reviewed. 5. The application for review preferred by the petitioner was opposed by the respondents on the ground that they had settled the dispute out of the Court and submitted the compromise under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 (the Code) and the petitioner has no right to challenge the compromise entered between them and, therefore, review application was not maintainable. 6. Rule 3 of Order XXIII of the Code provides for passing order by the concerned Court before which the suit is pending for recording of the agreement or compromise and for passing the decree in accordance therewith on such Court being satisfied that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise or on other aspect as stated therein. Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code reads as under: “3. Rule 3 of Order 23 of the Code reads as under: “3. Compromise of suit, - Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise [in writing and signed by the parties], or where the defendant satisfies the plaintiff in respect of the whole or any part of the subject matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith [so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject-matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit] : [Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but no adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.] [Explanation – An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.]” 7. Thus, as per Rule 3 of Order XXIII, the decree in accordance with agreement or compromise could be made by the concerned Court where the suit is pending so far as such compromise or agreement relates to the parties to the suit and whether such compromise or agreement is subject-matter of the suit or not, on Court satisfying itself that the suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise made in writing and signed by the parties. But if any party disputes the adjustment or satisfaction stated to have been arrived,, such party to the suit is to approach the very Court and it will be for the same Court to decide the question concerning such dispute. Section 96 (3) of the Code provides that no appeal shall lie from decree passed by any Court with the consent of the parties. Rule 3A of Order 23 provides that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. 8. Section 96 (3) of the Code provides that no appeal shall lie from decree passed by any Court with the consent of the parties. Rule 3A of Order 23 provides that no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. 8. Therefore, the party to the suit has remedy to approach the very Court which passes the decree on compromise to make a grievance against such decree. The petitioner, being not the party to the suit has no such remedy. The question is whether the petitioner has remedy of review under Order 47 of the Code. 9. As per Order 47, Rule 1 of the Code, a person feeling himself as aggrieved by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal is preferred, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. Thus, the remedy for review is available either on discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made and/or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. But such is not the case of the petitioner. The review can also be obtained for any other sufficient reason. The question is whether the petitioner holding agreement to sale and pending his suit for specific performance of the contract when the compromise decree was made in the suit filed by respondent no.1 could be said to be sufficient reason to obtain the review. The petitioner has independent right for enforcement of his agreement to sale which the petitioner has sought by filing the suit for specific performance of the contract. The petitioner has independent right for enforcement of his agreement to sale which the petitioner has sought by filing the suit for specific performance of the contract. In the suit of the respondent no.1, when the decree passed is on compromise, whether compromise is lawful or not is between the parties to such suit. As provided in Rule 3A of Order XXIII, no suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful. However, if a person feels that the decree passed on compromise is concocted, or obtained by collusion to defeat his right pertaining to the suit land, he could certainly challenge such decree by filing separate suit seeking declaration that the decree is collusive decree obtained with only aim to defeat his right pertaining to the suit land. But such reason is not available for seeking review of the judgment and decree as it would require leading of evidence to establish the right acquired pertaining to the suit land and the aspect of collusion in obtaining the decree on compromise with intention to defeat the right of the party applying for review. 10. In the case of Union of India Vs. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Limited and Others reported in 2013 (8) SCC 337 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph nos.11, 12, 12.1 to 12.3 as under: “11.Order 47 Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for an application for review which reads as under:- “1. Application for review of judgment. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Limited and Others reported in 2013 (8) SCC 337 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed in paragraph nos.11, 12, 12.1 to 12.3 as under: “11.Order 47 Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 provides for an application for review which reads as under:- “1. Application for review of judgment. - Any person considering himself aggrieved – (a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred, (b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or (c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes, and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the decree or made the order.” 12. Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute: 12.1 Discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not within the knowledge of the petitioner or could not be produced by him. 12.2 Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record. 12.3 Any other sufficient reason. The words “any other sufficient reason” have been interpreted in Chhajju Ram v. Neki and approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Mar Poulose Athanasius, to mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule”.” 11. Learned Judge in the impugned order has observed that the best course for the petitioner is to join the respondents as parties in his suit wherein, in fact, the respondents also applied for joining as parties. As stated in the petition, the petitioner has joined the respondents in his suit. Learned advocate Mr. Patel has, however, relied on the decisions in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagar (D) by L.R. Vs. As stated in the petition, the petitioner has joined the respondents in his suit. Learned advocate Mr. Patel has, however, relied on the decisions in the case of Pushpa Devi Bhagar (D) by L.R. Vs. Rajinder Singh and Others, reported in AIR 2006 SC 2628 and in the case of Banwari Lal Vs. Smt. Chando Devi (through L.R.) and another, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1139 so as to urge that the person who is not the party to the suit has no remedy under Order 23 Rule 3 and also cannot file appeal under Section 96 of the Code . He, therefore, submitted that only remedy with the petitioner was to apply for review under Order 47 of the Code. 12. However, as observed above, the petitioner has remedy of filing the civil suit to establish that the decree obtained by respondent no.1 was collusive to defeat his right to get specific performance of the contract pertaining to the suit land and such decree was fraud played upon the petitioner and as observed by the learned Judge in the impugned order he can join the respondents as party in the suit. Therefore, it cannot be said that the petitioner is left with no remedy. 13. For the reasons stated above, the Court finds that no interference is required in the impugned order in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The petition is, therefore, dismissed. Rule is discharged. Petitions dismissed.