JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. “WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REBUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation; IN OUR CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY this twenty-sixth day of November, 1949, do HEREBY ADOPT, ENACT AND GIVE TO OURSELVES THIS CONSTITUTION.” The Constitution of India starts with the said Preamble. These are the opening words of Constitution of India. Fortunately, since then, citizens are not dependent on the mercy of any individual and dispensation of justice is not dependent or determined with and on the basis of length of the Chancellor’s Foot, but the principle of Rule of Law, as the procedure established by law. 2. Petitioner, who was appointed as an Art and Craft Teacher, by the School Management Committee (SMC), claiming parity in the disbursement of Grant-in-Aid, approached this Court, and the petition, so filed, was disposed of vide judgment dated 20.3.2015, passed in CWP No.912 of 2013, titled as Ganesh Dutt v. State of H.P. and others, with the passing of the following order: “Mansoor Ahmad Mir, C.J. (Oral) It is contended that the respondents have released the grant-in-aid to the writ petitioners in CWP(T) No.4939 of 2008 and CWP(T) No.5156 of 2008, but the petitioner, being similarly placed, has been denied the same.” 2. Respondent No.1 has filed the reply. 3. In the facts of the case, I dispose of the writ petition by directing the respondents to examine the case of the petitioner in the light of the judgments passed by this Court in the writ petitions referred to above and make a decision within a period of six weeks from today. 4. Pending CMS, if any, also stand disposed of. Sd/- Mansoor Ahmad Mir, CJ” 5. Alleging violation of the same, petitioner has filed the instant petition, praying for initiation of proceedings for contempt, under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. In the course of discharge of his duties as Director, Elementary Education, Himachal Pradesh, the respondent has willfully disobeyed the directions of this Court, reproduced supra. 6. Sd/- Mansoor Ahmad Mir, CJ” 5. Alleging violation of the same, petitioner has filed the instant petition, praying for initiation of proceedings for contempt, under the provisions of Contempt of Courts Act. In the course of discharge of his duties as Director, Elementary Education, Himachal Pradesh, the respondent has willfully disobeyed the directions of this Court, reproduced supra. 6. What is pointed out is also violation of the following interim orders passed by this Court, in the instant proceedings: “27.6.2017 ……………………… The petitioner has filed the rejoinder alongwith two copies of judgments made by the learned Single Judge of this court Annexure C3 and C4. In given circumstances, we deem it proper to direct the respondent to pass fresh consideration order while keeping in view Annexure C3 and C4. Ordered accordingly. List on 3rd August, 2016” “29.03.2017 ………………….. “Vide order dated 27th June, 2016, passed in this contempt petition, the respondent as commanded to pass fresh consideration order while keeping in view the judgments passed by this Court, Annexures C-3 and C-4, annexed alongwith the rejoinder filed by the learned Counsel for the petitioner. We have gone through the fresh consideration order, which appears to have been passed on 1st August, 2016, in compliance to the order dated 27.06.2016. It appears that the respondent is in breach. Issue notice. Mr. J.K. Verma, learned Deputy Advocate General, waive the same on behalf of the respondent. Respondent to show cause and also to appear in person on the next date. List on 27.04.2017. Copy dasti to the learned Advocate General.” 7. Little background, leading to the passing of the said interim orders. 8. Pursuant to directions issued by this Court in Ganesh Dutt (supra), respondent did pass order dated 25.7.2015 (Annexure C-2). Applicability of the decisions rendered in CWP(T) No.4939 of 2008, titled as Vijay Atri v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others; and CWP(T) No.5156 of 2008, titled as Amarjit Kaur v. State of Himahcal Pradesh & others, was considered. Thus far, in our considered view, the matter could have been put to rest. 9. Be that as it may, on 29.3.2017, this Court did record, that apparently respondent was in breach of the order. Thus far, in our considered view, the matter could have been put to rest. 9. Be that as it may, on 29.3.2017, this Court did record, that apparently respondent was in breach of the order. One may only observe that pursuant to interim order dated 27.6.2016, respondent did pass a fresh order dated 1.8.2016, by considering judgments (Annexures C-3 & C-4), which incidentally are the very same decisions referred to in the decision dated 20.3.2015. 10. Thus, in terms of directions issued by this Court, respondents have issued order dated 25.7.2015 and 1.8.2016. 11. In response to the Show Cause Notice, it stands clarified that cases of Amarjit Kaur (supra) and Vijay Atri (supra) are totally distinct and distinguishable, inasmuch as mode of appointment of the petitioner therein as SMC was totally different than that of the present petitioner. Allegedly, petitioner’s appointment is not in accordance with the Rules. Hence, making him ineligible for disbursement of Grant-in-aid. Well, we are not adjudicating correctness of such fact, for we leave it open to be considered and decided in an appropriate proceedings, if the petitioner so chooses to do so. For, the scope of consideration in the instant petition is totally different. 12. This Court is concerned with the questions as to whether, (a) there has been violation of the directions issued by this Court, in judgment dated 20.3.2015, passed in CWP No.912 of 2013 (supra), or interim orders dated 27.6.2017 and 29.3.2017, passed in the instant petition; (b) violation, if any, is willful in nature; and (c) act and conduct of the respondent is contumacious or not. 13. 13. In the given facts, we find it not to be so and this we say so for the reason that (a) there has been consideration of the petitioner’s case with the passing of orders dated 25.7.2015 (Annexure C-2) and 1.8.2016 (Annexure R-1); (b) applicability of the decisions referred to in the judgment, with respect to the petitioner’s case also stands considered; (c) the decisions, which are distinguishable, have been held to be not applicable in the petitioner’s case, and correctness of such findings, in our considered view, requires adjudication on facts, in an appropriate proceedings, based on correct and complete appreciation of material on record, which at the first instance, petitioner ought to have so done; (d) there was no adjudication of this Court, any which way, of the rights of the petitioner, making the said decisions also applicable to the case of the petitioner, binding the respondent. 14. The Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), was enacted to define and limit the powers of certain Courts in punishing for contempt of courts and to regulate their procedure in relation thereto. “Contempt of Court” can be “civil” or “criminal”. In the instant case, petitioner alleges the respondent to have committed the former. Now what is “civil contempt” stands defined in clause (b) of Section 2 of the Act. It means willful disobedience to any judgment, decree, directions, order, writ or other process of a Court or willful breach of an undertaking given to a Court. 15. The instant case is definitely not that of breach of an undertaking, for none came to be given. 16. What is “disobedience”, and that too willful, has been a matter of discourse, so to say, over a period of time. 17. Yes, the Court cannot allow its majesty and authority to be compromised and be a mute spectator in seeing its order violated, but then it is also a settled principle of law that every act cannot be said to be willful disobedience and even if it were so, then also it is not the requirement of law that the Court must, under all circumstances, punish the alleged offender and send him behind the bars. 18. 18. In Babu Ram Gupta v. Sudhir Bhasin and another, (1980) 3 SCC 47 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, has held that “Even if an undertaking is given to the Court, it should be carefully construed to find out the extent and nature of the undertaking actually given by the person concerned. It is not open to the Court to assume an implied undertaking when there is none on the record. While it is duty of the Court to punish a person who tries to obstruct the course of justice or brings into disrepute the institution of the judiciary, this power has to be exercised not casually or lightly but with great care and circumspection and only in such cases where it is necessary to punish the contemner in order to uphold the majesty of law and the dignity of the Courts.” To similar effect is the judgment rendered by the Apex Court in Bank of Baroda v. Sadruddin Hasan Daya and another, (2004) 1 SCC 360 . 19. Power to punish for contempt has to be exercised not casually or lightly but with great care and circumspection; and only where it is necessary to punish the contemnor to uphold the majesty of law and the dignity of the Courts, it must do so. (Babu Ram v. Sudhir Bhasin, (1980) 3 SCC 47 ). 20. Contempt jurisdiction is to uphold the majesty and dignity of the Courts. It is not aimed at protecting judicial officers from criticism. (Vishram Singh Raghubanshi v. State of U.P., (2011) 7 SCC 776 ). 21. True, the Judges should not be hypersensitive but that does not mean and imply that they ought to maintain angelic silence also. Immaterial it is as to the person but it is the seat of the justice which needs protection: it is the image of the judicial system which needs protection. Nobody can be permitted to tarnish the image of the temple of justice. The majesty of the Court shall have to be maintained and there ought not to be any compromise or leniency in that regard. (Prem Surana v. Addl. Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, (2002) 6 SCC 722 ). 22. The law of contempt stems from the right of the courts to punish by imprisonment or fine persons guilty of words or acts which either obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. (Prem Surana v. Addl. Munsif & Judicial Magistrate, (2002) 6 SCC 722 ). 22. The law of contempt stems from the right of the courts to punish by imprisonment or fine persons guilty of words or acts which either obstruct or tend to obstruct the administration of justice. This right is exercised in India by all courts when contempt is committed in facie curiae and by the superior courts on their own behalf or on behalf of courts subordinate to them even if committed outside the courts. Formerly, it was regarded as inherent in the powers of a Court of Record and now by the Constitution of India, it is a part of the powers of the Supreme Court and the High Courts. (E.M. Sankaran Namboodripad v. T. Narayanan Nambiar, (1970) 2 SCC 325 ). 23. The stream of administration of justice has to remain unpolluted so that purity of court's atmosphere may give vitality to all the organs of the State. Polluters of judicial firmament are, therefore, required to be well taken care of to maintain the sublimity of court's environment; so also to enable it to administer justice fairly and to the satisfaction of all concerned. (Chandra Shashi vs. Anil Kumar Verma, (1995) 1 SCC 421 ) 24. Anyone who takes recourse to fraud, deflects the course of judicial proceedings; or if anything is done with oblique motive, the same interferes with the administration of justice. Such persons are required to be properly dealt with, not only to punish them for the wrong done, but also to deter others from indulging in similar acts which shake the faith of people in the system of administration of justice. [Chandra Shashi (supra)]. 25. Be it noted that exercise of powers under the Contempt of Courts Act shall have to be rather cautious and use of it rather sparingly after addressing itself to the true effect of the contemptuous conduct. The Court must otherwise come to a conclusion that the conduct complained of tantamounts to obstruction of justice which if allowed, would even permeate in our society. This is a special jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts to punish an offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law. (Mrityunjoy Das vs Sayed Hasibur Rahaman, (2001) 3 SCC 739 ) 26. This is a special jurisdiction conferred on to the law courts to punish an offender for his contemptuous conduct or obstruction to the majesty of law. (Mrityunjoy Das vs Sayed Hasibur Rahaman, (2001) 3 SCC 739 ) 26. The other aspect of the matter ought also to be noticed at this juncture viz., the burden and standard of proof. The common English phrase "he who asserts must prove" has its due application in the matter of proof of the allegations said to constitute the act of contempt. 27. Now, it is one thing to say that the standard of proof in a contempt proceeding is no less rigorous than a criminal trial but it is something entirely different to insist that the manner of proof for the two proceedings must also be the same. It is now well settled and so also the High Court has held that the proceeding of contempt of court is sui generis. In other words, it is not strictly controlled by the provisions of the CrPC and the Indian Evidence Act. What, however, applies to a proceeding of contempt of court is the principles of natural justice and those principles apply to the contempt proceeding with greater rigour than any other proceeding. This means that the Court must follow a procedure that is fair and objective; that should cause no prejudice to the person facing the charge of contempt of court and that should allow him/her the fullest opportunity to defend himself/herself. (R.K. Anand v. Registrar, Delhi High Court, (2009) 8 SCC 106 ). 28. Hence, in our considered view, act of the respondent, in any manner, cannot be said to be contumacious, by this Court. Notice is discharged. Liberty reserved to the petitioner to independently assail the order, in accordance with law, if so required and desired. As such, present petition stands dismissed. Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.