JUDGMENT : The petitioner has filed the present petition in the nature of quo warranto against respondent No. 5. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the petitioner is an employee of Municipal Council, Nepa Nagar. He was appointed as Sub Engineer in the services of Municipal Council Nepa Nagar. Respondent No. 5 was appointed on the post of Assistant Grade-III vide order dated 26-7-2015. Thereafter, respondent No. 5 has been arrested by the police for the offences under sections 302, 201 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code. The Chief Municipal Officer seek guidance from the Divisional Deputy Director, Urban Administration. The Deputy Director wrote that action under Rule 53 of the M.P. Municipal Services (Recruitment and Conditions of Services) Rules, 1968 be taken against the petitioner (sic : Respondent No. 5). Accordingly, the CMO has passed the order dated 23-8-2005 thereby placing respondent No. 5 under suspension. Thereafter respondent No. 5 was convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge, Burhanpur vide judgment dated 26-8-2008 with imprisonment of life. Against the said judgment, respondent No. 5 filed a criminal appeal No. 1931/2008 and in the said appeal this Court vide order dated 18-2-2009 has enlarged her on bail. Thereafter, she made an application on 12-5-2012 for revocation of the order of suspension and reinstatement. On the basis of legal opinion, Municipal Council has reinstated respondent No. 5 in the services. Against the said order, the petitioner has filed the present petition before this Court. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that respondent No. 5 was discharging the public duty without any legal authority. He submits that respondent No. 5 was convicted by the competent criminal Court and her conviction has not been stayed or set aside by this Court in the criminal appeal. She has only been released on bail and, therefore, looking to her conviction, she could not be reinstated. He further submits that Rule 10 of the said Rules provides disqualification for appointment on the post and as per sub-rule (2)(b) of the said Rules, she has not entitled to continue on the post. She has only been released on bail and, therefore, looking to her conviction, she could not be reinstated. He further submits that Rule 10 of the said Rules provides disqualification for appointment on the post and as per sub-rule (2)(b) of the said Rules, she has not entitled to continue on the post. He further relied on a judgment passed by this Court in the case of Lalan Thakur v. State of M.P., 2009 (1) M.P.L.J. 138 as well as the judgment passed by the Apex Court in the case of B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees' Assn., (2007) 1 SCC (L&S) 548 (2). 4. Respondent No. 4 has filed reply and in the said reply, it has stated that respondent No. 5 was appointed on the post of Assistant Grade-Ill. On the basis of police report dated 26-7-2005 respondent No. 5 has been arrested by the police for committing the offence under sections 302, 201 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code and has been placed under suspension on 23-8-2005. Thereafter, respondent No. 5 was convicted by the Sessions Court vide judgment dated 26-8-2007 with imprisonment of life for committing the offence under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. Against the said judgment, she filed an appeal before the High Court and she has been enlarged on bail by this Court. Thereafter, she submitted an application for subsistence allowance before the labour Court and vide order dated 18-2-2009 directed to payment the allowance to her. Thereafter, she submitted an application for reinstatement and revocation of the order of suspension on 12-5-2012. In pursuance to the application submitted by respondent No. 5, Chief Municipal Officer has referred the matter to the Advocate for legal opinion. The Advocate has given his opinion that the order of suspension can be revoked. Accordingly, the matter was placed before President-in-Council for consideration. The President-in-Council directed that necessary guidance may be sought from the Government. The Deputy Director thereafter wrote to the Commissioner, Urban Administration and Development, Bhopal for guidance vide memo dated 11-10-2012. The Director wrote to the CMO dated 19-3-2013 that President-in-Council is competent to take a decision in accordance with Rule 51 of the said Rules of 1968 and decide the matter on merits. The Deputy Director thereafter wrote to the Commissioner, Urban Administration and Development, Bhopal for guidance vide memo dated 11-10-2012. The Director wrote to the CMO dated 19-3-2013 that President-in-Council is competent to take a decision in accordance with Rule 51 of the said Rules of 1968 and decide the matter on merits. Thereafter legal opinion was sought and the lawyer was of the opinion that she could be reinstated in service until decision of the criminal appeal. Consequently, on the basis of the decision taken by the President-in-Council, the Chief Municipal Officer vide order dated 6-6-2013 directing her reinstatement. Thus, CMO of the Municipal Council has acted in accordance with the legal opinion, decision of the President-in-Council and service rules. 5. Respondent No. 5 had filed her reply. In the reply she submits that petitioner has no locus to file the present petition. Learned counsel further submits that the petitioner cannot challenge the reinstatement of respondent No. 5. He further submits that by way of filing of this petition, petitioner sought a direction to issue an appropriate writ of quo-warranto against respondent No. 5, who has been reinstated. He further submits that the petitioner himself was a daily wager employee sub engineer who has been removed from the services on various charges of the financial irregularities. Even Lokayukt case is pending against him of money corruption in department. It is submitted that reinstatement of respondent No. 5 has been made by her department in accordance with law taking consent administrative order from the State Government and writ of quo warranto is not maintainable in the case of respondent No. 5. It has further been submitted that she has been reinstated in the service in accordance with the Rule 51 of the Rules. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 7. So far as the maintainability of the writ petition is concerned, the Apex Court in the case of B. Srinivasa Reddy v. Karnataka Urban Water Supply and Drainage Board Employees' Assn. (supra) in paragraphs 43, 49, 55, 56 and 57 has held as under: “Writ of Quo Warranto: 43. Whether a Writ of Quo Warranto lies to challenge an appointment made “until further orders” on the ground that it is not a regular appointment? (supra) in paragraphs 43, 49, 55, 56 and 57 has held as under: “Writ of Quo Warranto: 43. Whether a Writ of Quo Warranto lies to challenge an appointment made “until further orders” on the ground that it is not a regular appointment? Whether the High Court failed to follow the settled law that a Writ of Quo Warranto cannot be issued unless there is a clear violation of law? The order appointing the appellant clearly stated that the appointment is until further orders. The terms and conditions of appointment made it clear that the appointment is temporary and is until further orders. In such a situation, the High Court, in our view, erred in law in issuing a Writ of Quo Warranto the rights under Article 226 can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed for is for Habeas Corpus. 49. The law is well settled. The High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction in a matter of this nature is required to determine, at the outset, as to whether a case has been made out for issuance of a Writ of Quo Warranto. The jurisdiction of the High Court to issue a Writ of Quo Warranto is a limited one which can only be issued when the appointment is contrary to the statutory rules. 55. It is useful to refer to University of Mysore v. C.D. Govinda Rao, SCR at p.p. 580-81 “As Halsbury has observed”: “An information in the nature of a quo warranto took the place of the obsolete writ of quo warranto which lay against a person who claimed or usurped an office, franchise, or liberty, to inquire by what authority he supported his claim, in order that the right to the office or franchise might be determined.” Broadly stated, the quo warranto proceeding affords a judicial remedy by which any person, who holds an independent substantive public office or franchise or liberty, is called upon to show by what right he holds the said office, franchise or liberty, so that his title to it may be duly determined, and in case the finding is that the holder of the office has no title, he would be ousted from that office by judicial order. In other words, the procedure of quo warranto gives the Judiciary a weapon to control the Executive from making appointment to public office against law and to protect a citizen from being deprived of public office to which he has a right. These proceedings also tend to protect the public from usurpers of public office, who might be allowed to continue either with the connivance of the Executive or by reason of its apathy. It will, thus, be seen that before a person can effectively claim a writ of quo warranto, he has to satisfy the Court that the office in question is a public office and is held by a usurper without legal authority, and that inevitably would lead to the enquiry as to whether the appointment of the alleged usurper has been made in accordance with law or not.” 56. It is also beneficial to refer to the decision of this Court in Ghulam Qadir v. Special Tribunal, SCC p. 54, para 38 which reads thus:— “38. There is no dispute regarding the legal proposition that the rights under Article 226 of the Constitution of India can be enforced only by an aggrieved person except in the case where the writ prayed is for habeas corpus or quo warranto. Another exception in the general rule is the filing of a writ petition in public interest. The existence of the legal right of the petitioner which is alleged to have been violated is the foundation for invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under the aforesaid Article. The orthodox rule of interpretation regarding the locus standi of a person to reach the Court has undergone a sea-change with the development of constitutional law in our country and the constitutional Courts have been adopting a liberal approach in dealing with the cases or dis-lodging the claim of a litigant merely on hyper-technical grounds. If a person approaching the Court can satisfy that the impugned action is likely to adversely affect his right which is shown to be having source in some statutory provision, the petition filed by such a person cannot be rejected on the ground of his not having the locus standi. In other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi. In other words, if the person is found to be not merely a stranger having no right whatsoever to any post or property, he cannot be non-suited on the ground of his not having the locus standi. 57. It is settled law that Writ of quo warranto does not lie if the alleged violation is not of a statutory nature. Three judgments relied on by Mr. P.P. Rao can be usefully referred to in the present context.” As per the judgment of Supreme Court, writ of quo warranto is available in case when the person is holding the post contrary to the statute. 8. This Court also in the case of Lalan Thakur v. State of M.P. (supra) in para 15 has held as under:— “15. The petition was opposed by the respondent/State on the ground of maintainability, however, the Apex Court in the case of Calcutta Gas Company (Proprietary) Ltd. (supra) has held that Article 226 of the Constitution confers a very wide power on the High Court to issue directions and writs of the nature mentioned therein for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part-Ill or for any other purpose. It has also been held that in case of some of the writs like habeas corpus or quo warranto, a person who is not the person aggrieved can also prefer a writ petition in the matter. A similar view was expressed by the Apex Court in the other judgments cited by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner.” Thus, the writ petition filed on behalf of the petitioner is maintainable. 9. Rule 10 of the said Rules of 1968, provides disqualification for appointment on the post. Sub-rule (2) of Rule 10 reads as under:— “10. Disqualifications.………………… (2) No candidate shall be appointed to the Municipal Service or post— (a) if he has been dismissed from the service of the Government or local authority for misconduct; (b) if he has been convicted of an offence which involves moral turpitude; (c) if he is not eligible for employment under sub-section (1) of section 98 of the Act. As per clause (b) of sub-rule (2), if a person has been convicted of an offence which involves moral turpitude then he is disqualified for being appointment to the Municipal Services. 10. As per clause (b) of sub-rule (2), if a person has been convicted of an offence which involves moral turpitude then he is disqualified for being appointment to the Municipal Services. 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Ravikant S. Patil v. Sarvabhouma S. Bagali, (2007) 1 SCC 673 in para 15 has held as under:— “15. It deserves to be clarified that an order granting stay of conviction is not the rule but is an exception to be restored to in rare cases depending upon the facts of a case. Where the execution of the sentence is stayed, the conviction continues to operate. But where the conviction itself is stayed, the effect is that the conviction will not be operative from the date of stay. An order of stay, of course, does not render the conviction non-existent, but only non-operative. Be that as it may. Insofar as the present case is concerned, an application was filed specifically seeking stay of the order of conviction specifying the consequences if conviction was not stayed, that is, the appellant would incur disqualification to contest the election. The High Court after considering the special reason, granted the order staying the conviction. As the conviction itself is stayed in contrast to a stay of execution of the sentence, it is not possible to accept the contention of the respondent that the disqualification arising out of conviction continues to operate even after stay of conviction.” In the present case, the execution of the sentence is stayed by this Court but the conviction continues to operate, therefore, respondent No. 5 is not entitled to continue on the post. 11. In the present case admittedly respondent No. 5 is convicted by the competent criminal Court for committing an offence under sections 302, 201 read with section 34 of the Indian Penal Code with imprisonment for life. Against the said order, she has preferred an appeal before this Court and this Court has enlarged her on bail in a criminal appeal, however, neither the order of conviction has been stayed nor conviction has been set aside by this Court. 12. In the note sheet dated 14-12-2012 the Deputy Secretary also noted that the action should be taken against respondent No. 5 in accordance with the Rule 19(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil (Services, Classification and Control) Rules, 1966. 12. In the note sheet dated 14-12-2012 the Deputy Secretary also noted that the action should be taken against respondent No. 5 in accordance with the Rule 19(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Civil (Services, Classification and Control) Rules, 1966. The relevant extract of said note sheet is reads as under:- ^^3- bl laca/k esa lkekU; Á'kklu foHkkx ds ifji= fnukad 26 ebZ 1998 ds vuqlkj vkijkf/kd Ádj.k esa nks"k fl} ik;s tkus ij e/; Áns'k flfoy lsok ¼oxhZdj.k] fu;a=.k rFkk vihy½ fu;e 1966 ds fu;e 19¼1½ ds varxZr mfpr 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir fd;s tkus dk Áko/kku gSA bl ckr ds fy, dksbZ Áfrca/k ugh jgsxk fd ml 'kkldh; lsod us nks"k flf} ds fo:} vihy nk;j dj nh gS] blfy, 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir ugh dh tk ldrh gSA bl fLFkfr esa Hkh 'kkfLr vf/kjksfir dh tk ldrh gSA ;fn vihy esa funksZ"k ik;s tkus ij fupys U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; dks vikLr dj fn;k tkrk gS rks iwoZ ikfjr 'kkfLr vkns'k fujLr fd;k tk ldrk gSA** The Rule 19 of the Madhya Pradesh Civil (Services, Classification and Control) Rules, 1966 also provides that if an employee is convicted in a criminal case then his service should be terminated. In such circumstances, if respondent No. 5 is acquitted by this Court then she can be reinstated in the services. 13. The statutory rules provides that if a person is convicted in criminal offence then he is not entitled to continue in services. In the present case, respondent No. 5 is also convicted by the competent Court and her conviction is not yet set aside by the higher forum, therefore, her suspension could not have been revoked. In such circumstances, I allow this writ petition and the writ of quo warranto is issued against respondent No. 5 thereby directing the respondents to place respondent No. 5 under suspension.