JUDGMENT : Dr. A.K. Rath, J. 1. The plaintiffs are the appellants against a reversing judgment. 2. The plaintiffs, in the representative capacity for themselves and for the shop owners, who have their business at Gajapati Daily Market, Parlakhemundi, instituted T.S. No.23 of 2000 in the court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Parlakhemundi for a declaration that they are entitled to pay ground rent only, permanent injunction restraining the defendants from collecting licence fees and demolishing the shop houses. Case of the plaintiffs is that since the time of their forefathers, the shopkeepers are running their business in the premises at Gajapati daily market. They used to pay licence fees at the rate of Rs.6/-per month. The same was enhanced to Rs.40/-per month. Feeling aggrieved, they filed T.S No.24 of 1979 in the court of the learned Subordinate Judge, Parlakhemundi. In view of the settlement arrived at between the plaintiffs and the defendants-Municipality on 20.4.1985, the suit was dismissed as not pressed. The defendants agreed to collect ground rent at the rate of Rs.20/- per month in respect of the tiled and zinc roofed shops and Rs.12/- per month in respect of the thatched shops with effect from 10.10.1980. They paid licence fee to the defendants till 1998. Thereafter, the defendants issued notice to the shopkeepers demanding fifty paisa per sq. ft. with effect from 1.4.1998 with a stipulation that the existing shop rooms would be demolished for construction of market complex. The defendants refused to receive licence fee at the previous rate. With this factual scenario, they filed the suit seeking the reliefs mentioned supra. 3. The defendants filed a written statement denying the assertions made in the plaint. Case of the defendants is that the plaintiffs are not in possession of the shop premises in the daily market. The land in the market area belongs to Parlakhemundi Municipality. The Municipality has allotted shop rooms to different persons. The allotments are renewed from time to time. The settlement dated 20.4.1985 was only confined to the quantum of licence fee without affecting the rights of the Municipality. It is further pleaded that to renovate the daily market, the Municipality initiated administrative measures for construction of a market complex for the benefit of the public. The plaintiffs have no right, title and interest over the shop premises. 4. The settlement dated 20.4.1985 was only confined to the quantum of licence fee without affecting the rights of the Municipality. It is further pleaded that to renovate the daily market, the Municipality initiated administrative measures for construction of a market complex for the benefit of the public. The plaintiffs have no right, title and interest over the shop premises. 4. On the inter se pleadings of the parties, learned trial court framed six issues. Both parties led evidence. Learned trial court came to hold that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the shop rooms. They are in possession of the shop rooms since long, paid taxes to the Municipality and as such, they acquired right, title and interest thereon. They are liable to pay ground rent only and not licence fees. Held so, it decreed the suit and permanently injected the defendants from demolishing the shop rooms of the plaintiffs and other shop owners. Defendants appealed before the learned Addl. District Judge, Gajapati at Parlakhemundi in T.A No.2 of 2002. Learned lower appellate court came to hold that the compromise/settlement dated 20.4.1985, vide Ext.X, has no legal sanctity and not enforceable law. Enhancement of licence fee is not excessive. Held so, it set aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial court and allowed the appeal. 5. Heard Mr. S.S. Rao along with Mr. P.K. Mishra, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. Debasis Nayak, learned counsel for the respondents. 6. The sheet anchor of Mr. Rao’s submission is the settlement was arrived at between the parties on 20.4.1985, vide Ext.X, whereafter Title Suit No.24 of 1979 was withdrawn. In the said settlement, it was agreed between the parties that the plaintiffs will pay the ground rent only and not licence fees. The Municipality is bound by the same. 7. Per contra, Mr. Nayak, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that Gajapati daily market at Paralakhemundi is a public market. It is located in the centre of the town. The Municipality has constructed shop rooms and allotted the same to various people on payment of licence fee. The shopkeepers had been paying licence fee of Rs.6/-per month. The same was enhanced. Aggrieved by the enhancement of the licence fee, the plaintiffs filed Title Suit No.24 of 1979 for declaration of right, title and interest over the shop rooms occupied by them. The shopkeepers had been paying licence fee of Rs.6/-per month. The same was enhanced. Aggrieved by the enhancement of the licence fee, the plaintiffs filed Title Suit No.24 of 1979 for declaration of right, title and interest over the shop rooms occupied by them. In the so-called settlement deed dated 20.4.1985, entered into between the shopkeepers and the Chairman of the Municipal Council and Executive Officer, it is stated that the shopkeepers would pay ground rent only, is void ab initio. Neither the Orissa Municipal Act nor Rules framed thereunder authorised them to enter into such an agreement. The suit was withdrawn unconditionally. No decree has been passed on the basis of the said agreement. Moreover, there is no clause in the said agreement which prohibits Municipality from collecting licence fee from the shopkeepers. Therefore, the Municipality is not bound by the said agreement. He further contended that under Sec. 127 of the Orissa Municipal Act (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”), the Municipality can enter into a transaction relating to the property vested in it only with previous sanction of the Government. The same having not been done, acknowledgment in the settlement deed dated 20.4.1985 is non est in the eye of law. The procedure laid down under Order 1 Sub-Rules 8(2) and (4) CPC for withdrawal of suit under Order 23 Rule 1(3) CPC has not been followed. 8. There is neither any pleading nor evidence on record that the plaintiffs or their ancestors constructed the shop rooms. The shop rooms are situated over the land of the Municipality. Though the learned trial court held that the plaintiffs are not the owners of the shop rooms, but abruptly came to the conclusion that they are in possession of the shop rooms and paid tax to the Municipality and as such, they acquired right, title and interest thereon. The judgment of the learned trial court suffers from inconsistency. 9. The defendants are the owners of the shop rooms. They have every right to demolish the shop rooms so as to construct new market complex. The plaintiffs do not acquire any indefeasible right over the shop rooms. The so-called settlement deed dated 20.4.1985, vide Ext.X, is of no avail to the plaintiffs. Learned trial court traveled beyond its jurisdiction in permanently injuncting the Municipality from demolishing the shop rooms of the shop owners. 10. The plaintiffs do not acquire any indefeasible right over the shop rooms. The so-called settlement deed dated 20.4.1985, vide Ext.X, is of no avail to the plaintiffs. Learned trial court traveled beyond its jurisdiction in permanently injuncting the Municipality from demolishing the shop rooms of the shop owners. 10. Sec. 127 of the Act provides that the Municipal Council may transfer by lease any property vested in it, not being the property vested in it, or held by it on trust, for a period not exceeding three years including the period of renewal without the previous sanction of the State Government or any other authority, and for a period not exceeding six years including the period of renewal with the previous sanction of the Collector. Sec. 295 of the Act provides power in respect of public markets. Sub-section (2) of Sec. 295 of the Act postulates that subject to such control as may be prescribed the Municipality may in any public market levy any one or more of the following fees at such rates as may appear to it proper, or may frame out such fees for any period not exceeding three years at a time on such terms and subject to such conditions as it may deem fit. 11. A conspectus of the aforesaid provisions show that the Executive Officer dehors its jurisdiction in entering into the agreement. The Executive Officer without previous sanction of the Government was not authorized to enter into any agreement with any person with regard to the properties of the Municipality. The Municipality is not bound by the same. 12. Eighty years back, a five Judge Bench of the Privy Council in the case of Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 Privy Council 253 held that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of performance are necessarily forbidden. The said proposition of law is based on a legal maxim “Expressio unius est exclusio alterius”, which means “The express mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another”. 13. In the result, the appeal is dismissed since the same does not involve any substantial question of law. No costs.