JUDGMENT By the Court.—This writ petition has been filed for quashing of the notification dated 26.2.2009 issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 17 (1) of the same Act as well as notification dated 19.2.2010 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act read with Section 17 (4) of the same Act. 2. The petitioners are the recorded tenure holders of the land which is subject-matter of notifications under challenge in the present writ petition. The basic ground for challenge of the aforesaid land acquisition notification in the present writ petition is that in the facts of the case, invocation of the urgency clause with the help of Sections 17 (1) and 17 (4) of the Land Acquisition Act and thereby dispensing with the opportunity of hearing to the recorded tenure holders before acquisition as contemplated by Section 5 is wrong. 3. It has been stated that from a simple reading of the notifications under Section 4 and Section 6, it is clear that the land in question was proposed to be acquired for planned development of the area by Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority. According to the petitioner, there was no material with the State Government for invoking the urgency clause and further that the controversy with regard to invocation of the urgency clause in the matter of acquisition of land for planned development by the development authorities has been settled by the Apex Court in the case of ‘Radhey Shyam v. State of U.P.,’ 2011 (V) SCC 553. Learned counsel for the petitioner therefore submitted that in the facts of the case, the acquisition notifications are liable to be quashed. 4. Sri Ravi Kant, Senior Advocate assisted by Sri Suresh Singh and Sri Krishna Aggarwal on behalf of the Development Authority contended before us that the land was required for the planned development of the area to be undertaken by the Yamuna Expressway Industrial Development Authority. The records reflect that the urgency clause was invoked as delay in the acquisition would have resulted in unauthorized occupation/encroachment of the land holdings. It is further contended that nearly 1500 farmers were to be displaced because of the acquisition and hearing of such large number of farmers would have delayed the project. Therefore, invocation of the urgency clause with the help of Section 17 cannot be faulted with. 5. It is further contended that nearly 1500 farmers were to be displaced because of the acquisition and hearing of such large number of farmers would have delayed the project. Therefore, invocation of the urgency clause with the help of Section 17 cannot be faulted with. 5. Reference has been made to the judgement of the Apex Court in the case of Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P., 2010 (X) SC 282, as well as the judgements reported in 1993 (2) SCC 84 ‘Rajasthan Housing Board v. Kishan’, 1996 (4) SCC 212 ‘Balmokand Khatri Educational & Industrial Trust v. State of Punjab’, 1997 (9) SCC 359 ‘A.P. Sareen v. State of U.P.’, 2008(8) ADJ 329 ‘Jasraj Singh v. State of U.P.’, 2008 (6) Supreme 402 / 2008 (9) SCC 552 ‘Sooraram Pratap Reddy v. Distt. Collector Ranga Reddy’ and ‘Om Prakash v. Union of India’ AIR 2010 SC 1068 . 6. In order to ascertain what was the material available with the State Government for invoking of the urgency clause in the facts of the case, we had summoned the original records pertaining to the notification in question from the State Government under out order dated 11.4.2017. The records have been produced and have been examined in the presence of the counsel for the parties today in the Court. 7. From the records we find that there are two letters from the district authorities of Gautam Budh Nagar. The first is said to be a note for justifying the invocation of the urgency clause signed by the Additional Chief Executive Officer, Yamuna Expressway, Tehsildar, Naib Tehsildar and Lekhpal. 7. From the records we find that there are two letters from the district authorities of Gautam Budh Nagar. The first is said to be a note for justifying the invocation of the urgency clause signed by the Additional Chief Executive Officer, Yamuna Expressway, Tehsildar, Naib Tehsildar and Lekhpal. The relevant part of the said note in respect of the urgency clause reads as follows: ^^jktLo xzke&pWkniqj] ijxuk&nudkSj] rglhy &lnj ftyk&xkSre cq)uxj ;equk ,Dlizsl&os izkf/kdj.k ds vf/klwfpr {ks= es fLFkr gSA lqfu;ksftr vkS|ksfxd fodkl gsrq izLrkfor Hkwfe dh ;equk ,Dliszl&os dks rRdky vko';drk gSA vtZu es foyEc dh n'kk esa izLrkfor Hkwfe ij vfrdze.k c<+us dh izcy lEHkkouk gS ftl dkj.k lqfu;ksftr vkS|ksfxd fodkl dh yksd fgr dh ifj;kstuk ij izfrdwy izHkko iM+sxkA 4& xzke& pWkniqj 97-3747 gs0 Hkwfe ds lqfu;ksftr fodkl gsrq vtZu izLrkfor fd;k x;k gSA fyf[kr@ekSf[kd vkifRr lqus tkus rFkk fuLrkj.k esa fuf'pr :i ls o"kksZ yxsxs rFkk vizR;kf"kr foyEc gksxk ftlls lqfu;ksftr fodkl Bi gks tk;sxkA vr% tuin xkSrecq)uxj esa ;equk ,Dliszl&os vkS|ksfxd fodkl izkf/kdkj.k }kjk lqfu;ksftr vkS|ksfxd fodkl gsrq Hkwfe dk vtZu fd;k tkuk vifjgk;Z gSA 5& vr% jktLo xzke&pWkniqj] ijxuk&nudkSj] rglhy &lnj ftyk&xkSre cq)uxj dh 97-3747 gs0] Hkwfe rRdky vf/kxzfgr fd;k tkuk gSA mDr dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq;s p;fur Hkwfe ds vf/kxzg.k gsrq dysDVj }kjk Hkwfe vtZu vf/kfu;e] 1894 ds vUrxZr /kkjk&4 ¼1½ ds lkFk ifBr /kkjk&17 dh vf/klwpuk fuxZr djk;s tkus dk iw.kZ vkSfpR; n'kkZrs gq, laLrqfr dh x;h gS rFkk /kkjk&17 ykxw gksus ds QyLo:i /kkjk&5, ds izkfo/kku foyqIr gks tkrs gS vkSj Hkw&Lokfeksa dks lquokbZ dk volj lekIr fd;s tkus ds vkSfpR; ls dysDVj }kjk iw.kZ lgefr O;Dr dh gSA mDr ds n`f"Vxr /kkjk&17 ykxw djus esa 'kklu dh lgefr O;Dr fd;s tkus esa vkifRr ugh gksrh gSA 6& ;equk ,Dlizsl&os vkS|ksfxd fodkl izkf/kdj.k ds ek/;e ls tuin xkSrecq)uxj esa lqfu;ksftr vkS|ksfxd fodkl gsrq jktLo xzke&pWkniqj ijxuk&nudkSj] rglhy &lnj ftyk&xkSre cq)uxj dh 97-3747 gs0] Hkwfe esa /kkjk&4@17 dh foKfIr tkjh djus esa vkifRr izrhr ugh gksrh gSA 8. This note is followed by a certificate issued in 2010 by District Magistrate whereby he has expressed that he is satisfied that the facts of the case do require invocation of the powers under Section 17 for dispensing with the provisions of Section 5 A which contemplates opportunity of hearing to the recorded tenure holders. This note is followed by a certificate issued in 2010 by District Magistrate whereby he has expressed that he is satisfied that the facts of the case do require invocation of the powers under Section 17 for dispensing with the provisions of Section 5 A which contemplates opportunity of hearing to the recorded tenure holders. It is worthwhile to reproduce the entire certificate as signed by the District Magistrate which surprisingly does not even bear a date. The certificate reads as under: tuin xkSrecq)uxj ds xzke pWkniqj esa vftZr dh tk jgh Hkwfe 97-3747 gS0 Hkwfe ds ;equk ,Dlizsl&os vkS|ksfxd fodkl izkf/kdj.k ds lqfu;ksftr vkS|ksfxd fodkl ds /kkjk 4@6 ds izLrko esa i`Fkd ls LFky p;u dh vko';drk ugh gS D;ksafd ;g ;equk ,Dliszl&os vkS|ksfxd fodkl izkfèkdj.k ds vf/klwfpr {ks= dk xzke gS rFkk egk;kstuk ds vuqlkj lqfu;ksftr fodkl fd;k tkuk gSA mDr Hkwfe ds vf/kxzg.k esa ifj;kstuk dks vfoyEc iw.kZ fd;s tkus dh vko';drk ds dkj.k rkRdkfyd izHkko ls izLrkfor Hkwfe dk dCtk fy;k tkuk vR;Ur vko';d gSA Hkwfe v/;kfIr dh /kkjk&17 dk iz;ksx fd;s tkus dh n'kk esa vf/kfu;e dh èkkjk&5d ds micU/k foyqIr gks tkrs gS vkSj Hkwfe Lokfe;ksa dks lquokbZ dk volj lekIr fd;s tkus ds vkSfpR; ls eSa iw.kZr;k lger gwWA eS fo'okl fnykrk gWw fd /kkjk 4@6 dh vf/klwpuk tkjh ,oa izdkf'kr fd;s tkus ij izR;sd n'kk esa vtZu fudk;@foHkkx dks rkRdkfyd :i ls dCtk fnyk nwwWxkA 9. From a simple reading of the aforesaid, it is apparently clear that two grounds have been mentioned for invoking the powers under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act and for dispensing with the opportunity contemplated by Section 5 A of the same Act, (a) there are chances of unauthorized occupation/encroachment of the land and (b) large number of farmers would be effected by the acquisition and hearing of such large number of farmers would delay the project. 10. From the covering letter on record, we find that such letters and certificate are alleged to have forwarded by District Magistrate to the State Government vide his letter dated 13.2.2009. Section 4 notification with reference to the said documents was published on 26.2.2009 but thereafter the State Government has taken nearly one year for publication of Section 6 notification. 10. From the covering letter on record, we find that such letters and certificate are alleged to have forwarded by District Magistrate to the State Government vide his letter dated 13.2.2009. Section 4 notification with reference to the said documents was published on 26.2.2009 but thereafter the State Government has taken nearly one year for publication of Section 6 notification. This time taken by the State Government in publishing Section 6 notification after notification under Section 4 i.e. a period of one year itself is sufficient to return a finding that there was absolutely no urgency which could have justified the invocation of the powers under Section 17 of the Land Acquisition Act so as to deprive the farmers of an opportunity of hearing under Section 5 A. 11. We may record that Section 5 A contemplates invitation of objections in a time bound manner and disposal thereof within a limited period which is much less than than the period of one year. We may further record that if the land acquisition authorities themselves are not able to comply with the time schedule contemplated by the Act in the matter of disposal of the objections to be received under Section 5 A, then it is not open to the same authority to contend that the urgency clause may be invoked on the ground that there would be large number of objections. 12. We are also of the opinion that the apprehension expressed in the note and the certificate of the District Magistrate qua there being chances of unauthorized occupation or encroachment of the land are totally unfounded and without any material. We fail to understand that if the land was in possession of the recorded tenure holders, where was the occasion of any unauthorized occupation and encroachment over the said land. Even otherwise, absolutely no material/facts have been placed in the report for justifying such objection. 13. We fail to understand that if the land was in possession of the recorded tenure holders, where was the occasion of any unauthorized occupation and encroachment over the said land. Even otherwise, absolutely no material/facts have been placed in the report for justifying such objection. 13. The issue with regard to the invocation of the urgency clause in the matters of land to be acquired for planned development for a development authorities have been subject-matter of consideration before the Apex Court in the case of ‘Radhey Shyam v. State of U.P. and others’ 2011 (V) SCC 553, wherein all earlier judgements on the subject including the one so heavily relied upon by the counsel for the Development Authority titled ‘Nand Kishore Gupta v. State of U.P.’ (supra) have specifically been taken note of. The Apex Court has clearly distinguished the said judgements. 14. We find that the Apex Court in Para 55 to Para 59 of the Judgment in the case of ‘Sri Radhey Shyam (Dead) Through L.Rs. and others (supra), it has been held as follows. 55. In our view, the above noted factors do not furnish legally acceptable justification for the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 17(1) because the acquisition is primarily meant to cater private interest in the name of industrial development of the district. It is neither the pleaded case of the respondents nor any evidence has been produced before the Court to show that the State Government and/or agencies/instrumentalities of the State are intending to establish industrial units on the acquired land either by itself or through its agencies/instrumentalities. The respondents have justified the invoking of urgency provisions by making assertions, which are usually made in such cases by the executive authorities i.e. the inflow of funds in the State in the form of investment by private entrepreneurs and availability of larger employment opportunities to the people of the area. However, we do not find any plausible reason to accept this tailor-made justification for approving the impugned action which has resulted in depriving the appellants’ of their constitutional right to property. Even if planned industrial development of the district is treated as public purpose within the meaning of Section 4, there was no urgency which could justify the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 17(1) and 17(4). Even if planned industrial development of the district is treated as public purpose within the meaning of Section 4, there was no urgency which could justify the exercise of power by the State Government under Section 17(1) and 17(4). The objective of industrial development of an area cannot be achieved by pressing some buttons on computer screen. It needs lot of deliberations and planning keeping in view various scientific and technical parameters and environmental concerns. The private entrepreneurs, who are desirous of making investment in the State, take their own time in setting up the industrial units. Usually, the State Government and its agencies/instrumentalities would give them two to three years’ to put up their factories, establishments etc. Therefore, time required for ensuring compliance of the provisions contained in Section 5-A cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be portrayed as delay which will frustrate the purpose of acquisition. In this context, it is apposite to note that the time limit for filing objection under Section 5-A (1) is only 30 days from the date of publication of the notification under Section 4(1). Of course, in terms of sub-section (2), the Collector is required to give opportunity of hearing to the objector and submit report to the Government after making such further inquiry, as he thinks necessary. This procedure is likely to consume some time, but as has been well said, “Principles of natural justice are to some minds burdensome but this price-a small price indeed-has to be paid if we desire a society governed by the rule of law.” 56. In this case, the Development Authority sent proposal some time in 2006. The authorities up to the level of the Commissioner completed the exercise of survey and preparation of documents by the end of December, 2006 but it took one year and almost three months to the State Government to issue notification under Section 4 read with Section 17(1) and 17(4). If this much time was consumed between the receipt of proposal for the acquisition of land and issue of notification, it is not possible to accept the argument that four to five weeks within which the objections could be filed under sub-section (1) of Section 5-A and the time spent by the Collector in making inquiry under sub-section (2) of Section 5-A would have defeated the object of acquisition. 57. 57. The apprehension of the respondents that delay in the acquisition of land will lead to enormous encroachment is totally unfounded. It is beyond the comprehension of any person of ordinary prudence to think that the land owners would encroach their own land with a view to frustrate the concept of planned industrial development of the district. 58. The perception of the respondents that there should be atleast one year’s time gap between the issue of notifications under Sections 4 and 6 is clearly misconceived. The time limit of one year specified in clause (ii)) of the proviso to Section 6(1) is the outer limit for issue of declaration. This necessarily means that the State Government can complete the exercise under Sections 5-A and 6 in a shorter period. 59. The only possible conclusion which can be drawn from the above discussion is that there was no real and substantive urgency which could justify invoking of the urgency provision under Section 17(1) and in any case, there was no warrant to exclude the application of Section 5-A which, as mentioned above, represent the statutory embodiment of the rule of audi alteram partem. 15. In view of the aforesaid we are more than satisfied that no facts existed before the State Government for invoking the powers under Section 17(1) and Section 17(4) of the land 1894 in the case in hand. As a result whereof the notifications under Section 4 and Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act are held to be bad. We have been informed that thus far no award has been made by the Special land Acquisition Officer, with reference to the notifications under challenged. 16. This takes the Court to the issue of investment of public money for development of the acquired land running into crores of rupees by the development authority subsequent to the acquisition notifications. Reference has been made to the judgment of the Apex Court in case of M/S Sahara India Commercial Corp. 16. This takes the Court to the issue of investment of public money for development of the acquired land running into crores of rupees by the development authority subsequent to the acquisition notifications. Reference has been made to the judgment of the Apex Court in case of M/S Sahara India Commercial Corp. Ltd. and others v. State of U.P. and others passed in Civil Appeal No. 11501 of 2011 alongwith connected civil appeals decided on 30.11.2016 wherein the Apex Court after coming to the conclusion that the acquisition by the State was bad, has provided that compensation be paid to the tenure holders to be determined on the basis of the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and transparency in Land Acquisition & Rehabilitation and re-Settlement Act, 2013 with a further direction that the constructions which had been raised prior to the acquisition notification shall also be considered by the Collector, for the purpose of determination of compensation. It has been provided that the date of notification, for acquisition shall be deemed to be the date on which the order had been passed by the Apex Court i.e. 30th November, 2016. Relevant paragraph of the judgement of Apex Court in the Case of M/S Sahara India Commercial Corp. Ltd. (Supra): “12. The next question that confronts the Court is the relief that should be granted in the present cases. Ordinarily, in the normal course, interference with the acquisition proceedings would result in a return to the status prior to the commencement of the acquisition proceedings obliging the acquiring authority to return the land to the landowners. However, from the materials placed before us it appears that the purpose for which the land was acquired has been implemented and on parts of the land constructions under different Housing and other Schemes have come up. While there is a controversy with regard to the extent of the development that has taken place what is reasonably certain is that a fairly large portion of the land has been put to use for the purposes for which the same was acquired. What, however, is clear that insofar as the land of the appellants is concerned the same continue to be largely vacant on account of the interim orders passed by the Court. What, however, is clear that insofar as the land of the appellants is concerned the same continue to be largely vacant on account of the interim orders passed by the Court. In such a situation, we are of the view that even though the impugned acquisition has been found to be legally fragile, requiring the acquiring authority to return the land to the landowners, at this stage, would have the effect of jeopardizing the Housing and other project which either have been completed or have reached completion. This would be contrary to public interest. Therefore, we are of the view that in the totality of the facts of the case we should mould the relief in the following manner: I) Though this Court is interfering with the acquisition proceedings as a whole, yet it directs that there will be no obligation on the part of the acquiring Authority to return any part of the land to any of the landowners. In other words, the acquiring Authority would have the option to retain entire of the land acquired by the notifications in question. In such an event, only in respect of the land of the appellants before this Court (Stated to be 76 in number and the area involved 281 acres, approximately) the date of the present order will be deemed to be the date of a fresh notification for acquisition of the aforesaid land of the appellants before this Court. We repeat to make it clear that for the rest of the land acquired and in respect of the landowner who may have received any part of the compensation the aforesaid directions would have no application. The compensation to be determined on the basis of the deemed notification, as directed, will be in accordance with the provisions of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 and claims of compensation for constructions that may have come up on the acquired land prior to the dates of original Notifications (16th October, 2004 and 11th November, 2004) will also be considered by the Collector on their own merits.” 17. Following the same direction of the Apex Court we deem it fit and proper to provide same relief to the petitioners before us. It is, therefore, directed as under: 18. Following the same direction of the Apex Court we deem it fit and proper to provide same relief to the petitioners before us. It is, therefore, directed as under: 18. The State shall determine and pay compensation to the petitioners, to be determined on the basis of the date of this order as the date of the acquisition notification i.e. 22.12.2016, under the provisions of Right to Fair Compensation and transparency in Land Acquisition & Rehabilitation and Re-Settlement Act, 2013. The compensation for constructions which were standing on the date of the earlier notification shall also be computed. This exercise shall be completed within 2 months from the date of the receipt of the certified copy of this order. All consequential action shall be taken after immediately thereafter. 19. Writ petition is allowed subject to the direction issued above.