ORDER : D.N. PATEL, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred by the original petitioner, being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the judgment and order dated 24th February, 2015 in W.P. (L) No. 6919 of 2012, whereby, an order passed by the Labour Court, Dhanbad in M.J. Case No. 2 of 2010 preferred under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 dated 29th August, 2012 was held as a valid one and, hence, the original petitioner has preferred present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that this appellant was appointed as a Peon with the respondent-Bank. Thereafter, this appellant (original petitioner) reached to the age of superannuation on 31st January, 2007. 3. Upon his retirement, this appellant was paid Contributory Provident Fund at Rs.8,23,116.06/Paise. This appellant has also received Gratuity after his retirement at Rs.3,50,000/. 4. After three years of his retirement, this appellant had preferred M.J. Case No. 2 of 2010. This application was preferred under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 before Labour Court, Dhanbad, which was dismissed vide order dated 29th August, 2012 by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Dhanbad after taking evidences on record. 5. It appears that Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 can be invoked only when there is a preexisting right vested in the applicant. When the right of the applicant is in belligerent stage, no such application under Section 33C (2) can be allowed. The option left with such type of applicants whose rights, are yet to be established, either have to raise industrial disputes or they have to approach any competent Court to decide the rights of such type of applicants. After crystallization of the rights, application under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act can be preferred. 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Workmen, reported in (1974) 4 SCC 696 in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15, which read as under: “12. After crystallization of the rights, application under Section 33C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act can be preferred. 6. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water Transport Corpn. Ltd. v. Workmen, reported in (1974) 4 SCC 696 in paragraphs 12, 13, 14 and 15, which read as under: “12. It is now well-settled that a proceeding under Section 33C(2) is a proceeding, generally, in the nature of an execution proceeding wherein the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from his employer, or if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, the Labour Court proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. This calculation or computation follows upon an existing right to the money or benefit, in view of its being previously adjudged, or, otherwise, duly provided for. In Chief Mining Engineer East India Coal Co. Ltd. v. Rameshwar it was reiterated that proceedings under Section 33C(2) are analogous to execution proceedings and the Labour Court called upon to compute in terms of money the benefit claimed by workmen is in such cases in the position of an executing court. It was also reiterated that the right to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between an industrial workman and his employer. 13. In a suit, a claim for relief made by the plaintiff against the defendant involves an investigation directed to the determination of (i) the plaintiff’s right to relief; (ii) the corresponding liability of the defendant, including, whether the defendant is, at all, liable or not; and (iii) the extent of the defendant’s liability, if any. The working out of such liability with a view to give relief is generally regarded as the function of an execution proceeding. Determination No. (iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the defendant’s liability may sometimes be left over for determination in execution proceedings. But that is not the case with the determinations under heads (i) and (ii). They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an execution proceeding. Determination No. (iii) referred to above, that is to say, the extent of the defendant’s liability may sometimes be left over for determination in execution proceedings. But that is not the case with the determinations under heads (i) and (ii). They are normally regarded as the functions of a suit and not an execution proceeding. Since a proceeding under Section 33C(2) is in the nature of an execution proceeding it should follow that an investigation of the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) above is, normally, outside its scope; It is true that in a proceeding under Section 33C(2), as in an execution proceeding, it may be necessary to determine the identity of the person by whom or against whom the claim is made if there is a challenge on that score. But that is merely ‘incidental’. To call determinations (i) and (ii) ‘Incidental’ to an execution proceeding would be a perversion, because execution proceedings in which the extent of liability is worked out are just consequential upon the determinations (i) and (ii) and represent the last stage in a process leading to final relief. Therefore, when a claim is made before the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) that Court must clearly understand the limitations under which it is to function. It cannot arrogate to itself the functions — say of an Industrial Tribunal which alone is entitled to make adjudications in the nature of determinations (i) and (ii) referred to above, or proceed to compute the benefit by dubbing the former as “Incidental” to its main business of computation. In such cases determinations (i) and (ii) are not “Incidental” to the computation. The computation itself is consequential upon and subsidiary to determinations (i) and (ii) as the last stage in the process which commenced with a reference to the Industrial Tribunal. It was, therefore, held in State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur v. R. L. Khandelwal that a workman cannot put forward a claim in an application under Section 33C(2) in respect of a matter which is not based on an existing right and which can be appropriately the subject matter of an Industrial Dispute which requires a reference under Section 10 of the Act. 14. The scope of Section 33C(2) was illustrated by this Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan. 14. The scope of Section 33C(2) was illustrated by this Court in Central Bank of India Ltd. v. P.S. Rajagopalan. Under the Shastri Award, Bank clerks operating the adding the machine were declared to be entitled to a special allowance of Rs 10 per month. Four clerks made a claim for computation before the Labour Court. The Bank denied the claim that the clerks came within the category referred to in the award and further contended that the Labour Court under Section 33C(2) had no jurisdiction to determine whether the clerks came within that category or not. Rejecting the contention, this Court held that the enquiry as to whether the 4 clerks came within that category was purely ‘incidental’ and necessary to enable the Labour Court to give the relief asked for and, therefore, the Court had jurisdiction to enquire whether the clerks answered the description of the category mentioned in the Shastri Award, which not only declared the right but also the corresponding liability of the Employer bank. This was purely a case of establishing the identity of the claimants as coming within a distinct category of clerks in default of which it would have been impossible to give relief to anybody falling in the category. When the Award mentioned the category it, as good as, named every one who was covered by the category and hence the enquiry, which was necessary, became limited only to the clerks’ identity and did not extend either to a new investigation as to their rights or the Bank’s liability to them. Both the latter had been declared and provided for in the Award and the Labour Court did not have to investigate the same. Essentially, therefore, the assay of the Labour Court was in the nature of a function of a court in execution proceedings and hence it was held that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to determine, by an incidental enquiry, whether the four clerks came in the category which was entitled to the special allowance. 15. It is, however, interesting to note that in the same case the Court at p. 156 gave illustrations as to what kinds of claim of a workman would fall outside the scope of Section 33C(2). 15. It is, however, interesting to note that in the same case the Court at p. 156 gave illustrations as to what kinds of claim of a workman would fall outside the scope of Section 33C(2). It was pointed out that a workman who is dismissed by his employer would not be entitled to seek relief under Section 33C(2) by merely alleging that, his dismissal being wrongful, benefit should be computed on the basis that he had continued in service. It was observed: “His ... dismissal may give rise to an industrial dispute which may be appropriately tried, but once it is shown that the employer has dismissed . .. him, a claim that the dismissal ... is unlawful and, therefore, the employee continues to be the workman of the employer and is entitled to the benefits due to him under a preexisting contract, cannot be made under Section 33C(2).” By merely making a claim in a loaded form the workmen cannot give the Labour Court jurisdiction under Section 33C(2). The workman who has been dismissed would no longer be in the employment of the employer. It may be that an Industrial Tribunal may find on an investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal that the dismissal was unjustified. But when he comes before the Labour Court with his claim for computation of his wages under Section 33C(2) he cannot ask the Labour Court to disregard his dismissal as wrongful and on that basis compute his wages. In such cases, a determination as to whether the dismissal was unjustified would be the principal matter for adjudication, and computation of wages just consequential upon such adjudication. It would be wrong to consider the principal adjudication as “incidental” to the computation. Moreover, if we assume that the Labour Court had jurisdiction to make the investigation into the circumstances of the dismissal, a very anomalous situation would arise. The Labour Court after holding that the dismissal was wrongful would have no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement under Section 33C(2). And yet if its jurisdiction to compute the benefit is conceded it will be like conceding it authority to pass orders awarding wages as many times as the workman comes before it without being reinstated. The Labour Court after holding that the dismissal was wrongful would have no jurisdiction to direct reinstatement under Section 33C(2). And yet if its jurisdiction to compute the benefit is conceded it will be like conceding it authority to pass orders awarding wages as many times as the workman comes before it without being reinstated. Therefore, the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) has got to be circumspect before it undertakes an investigation, reminding itself that any investigation it undertakes is, in a real sense, incidental to its computation of a benefit under an existing right, which is its principal concern.” (emphasis supplied) 7. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Chief Supdt., Govt. Livestock Farm, Hissar v. Ramesh Kumar, reported in (1997) 11 SCC 363 in paragraph 2, which reads as under: “2. We are unable to appreciate how the application of the respondent could be entertained under Section 33C(2) of the Act. The remedy of Section 33C(2) is available only in those cases where there is no dispute about entitlement of the workman. The remedy of Section 33C(2) cannot be invoked in a case where the entitlement is disputed. In the instant case, the entitlement of the respondent to regular scale was disputed by the appellant and, therefore, it was not a case in which the remedy of Section 33C(2) could be invoked. The proper course for the respondent was to have his entitlement to regular scale determined by a competent court or tribunal and in the event of nonpayment of the amount payable to him as per his entitlement under such determination he could invoke the remedy under Section 33C(2).” (emphasis supplied) 8. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State Bank of India v. Ram Chandra Dubey, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 73 in paragraph 8, which reads as under: “8. The principles enunciated in the decisions referred by either side can be summed up as follows: Whenever a workman is entitled to receive from his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit can approach Labour Court under Section 33C(2) of the Act. The benefit sought to be enforced under Section 33C(2) of the Act is necessarily a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a preexisting right. The difference between a preexisting right or benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising powers under Section 33C(2) of the Act while the latter does not. It cannot be spelt out from the award in the present case that such a right or benefit has accrued to the workman as the specific question of the relief granted is confined only to the reinstatement without stating anything more as to the back wages. Hence that relief must be deemed to have been denied, for what is claimed but not granted necessarily gets denied in judicial or quasijudicial proceeding. Further when a question arises as to the adjudication of a claim for back wages all relevant circumstances which will have to be gone into, are to be considered in a judicious manner. Therefore, the appropriate forum wherein such question of back wages could be decided is only in a proceeding to whom a reference under Section 10 of the Act is made. To state that merely upon reinstatement, a workman would be entitled, under the terms of award, to all his arrears of pay and allowances would be incorrect because several factors will have to be considered, as stated earlier, to find out whether the workman is entitled to back wages at all and to what extent. Therefore, we are of the view that the High Court ought not to have presumed that the award of the Labour Court for grant of back wages is implied in the relief of reinstatement or that the award of reinstatement itself conferred right for claim of back wages.” (emphasis supplied) 9. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of U.P. v. Brijpal Singh, reported in (2005) 8 SCC 58 in paragraph 10, which reads as under: “10. It is well settled that the workman can proceed under Section 33C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. It is well settled that the workman can proceed under Section 33C(2) only after the Tribunal has adjudicated on a complaint under Section 33A or on a reference under Section 10 that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified and has set aside that order and reinstated the workman. This Court in the case of Punjab Beverages (P) Ltd. v. Suresh Chand held that a proceeding under Section 33C(2) is a proceeding in the nature of execution proceeding in which the Labour Court calculates the amount of money due to a workman from the employer, or, if the workman is entitled to any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money, proceeds to compute the benefit in terms of money. Proceeding further, this Court held that the right to the money which is sought to be calculated or to the benefit which is sought to be computed must be an existing one, that is to say, already adjudicated upon or provided for and must arise in the course of and in relation to the relationship between the industrial workman, and his employer. This Court further held as follows: (SCC p. 150, para 4) “It is not competent to the Labour Court exercising jurisdiction under Section 33C(2) to arrogate to itself the functions of an Industrial Tribunal and entertain a claim which is not based on an existing right but which may appropriately be made the subject matter of an industrial dispute in a reference under Section 10 of the Act.” (emphasis supplied) 10. It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of U.P. SRTC v. Birendra Bhandari, reported in (2006) 10 SCC 211 in paragraph 7, which reads as under: “7. The benefit which can be enforced under Section 33C(2) is a preexisting benefit or one flowing from a preexisting right.” (emphasis supplied) 11. In the facts of the present case, this appellant is in search of pension. He is unable to establish his right to get pension. Consistent stand has been taken by the Management that necessary option was never given, by this workman-appellant, at the relevant time, for getting pension. In the facts of the present case, this appellant is in search of pension. He is unable to establish his right to get pension. Consistent stand has been taken by the Management that necessary option was never given, by this workman-appellant, at the relevant time, for getting pension. Hence, he was given, upon his retirement, amount of Rs.8,23,116.06/-Paise towards Contributory Provident Fund and amount of Rs.3,50,000/-towards Gratuity which was accepted by this appellant without any protest in the year 2007 and M.J. Case was filed in the year 2010 after three years of his retirement. 12. Thus, right to get pension by this appellant is not crystallized right vested in the appellant nor it is a preexisting right vested in the appellant. Hence, no error has been committed by the Labour Court, Dhanbad in deciding M.J. Case No. 2 of 2010 vide order dated 29th August, 2012 nor any error has been committed by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P.(L) No. 6919 of 2012 vide judgment and order dated 24th February, 2015. We see no reason to take any other view than what is taken by the learned Single Judge. Hence, there is no substance in this Letters Patent Appeal and, therefore, the same is, hereby, dismissed. 13. Accordingly, I.A. No.1333 of 2017 is also dismissed, in view of final order passed in the Letters Patent Appeal.