Pulikkool Thazhekuniyil K. Dhineshan v. Peediyekkantavida Kunhimoosa represented by Constituted Power of Attorney Holder, Peediyekkantavida Kunhamu
2017-07-28
K.HARILAL, P.SOMARAJAN
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : P. Somarajan, J. 1. Aggrieved by the order of eviction granted under Section 11(4)(v) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short 'the Act'), the tenants came up with this revision. 2. Initially, a rent control petition was filed before the Rent Control Court alleging ground under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. It was dismissed by the Rent Control Court holding that there is no cessation of occupation, as alleged by the petitioner/landlord. It was taken up in appeal by the landlord before the Rent Control Appellate Authority, Kozhikode, wherein the Rent Control Appellate Authority, on a re-appreciation of the evidence and pleadings, reversed the finding of the Rent Control Court by allowing an order of eviction under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act, which is under challenge in this revision by the tenants. 3. Going by the judgment rendered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority, it is seen that the Rent Control Appellate Authority had gone into the question whether there is any sublease or not with respect to the petition schedule building, so as to arrive at an inference regarding the requirement under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. It is seemed to be so strange that even the petitioner/landlord did not have any case of sub-lease and no such ground was raised either in the Rent Control Petition or in the appeal. We are really in darkness, on what basis the Rent Control Appellate Authority found that there is a sub-lease and somebody was doing business in the petition schedule and, as such, there is a cessation of occupation by the tenants. The said finding of the Appellate Authority is really perverse and cannot be accepted even for a moment. 4. The requirement under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act is the cessation of occupation by the tenant for a period of six months without sufficient reason. The expression “cessation of occupation” stands for complete cessation of occupation by the tenant for the required period. The Commissioner who inspected the petition schedule building reported the conduct of a lottery business as well as a cool drinks parlour in the name and style of “Laza Ice Creams” in the petition schedule.
The expression “cessation of occupation” stands for complete cessation of occupation by the tenant for the required period. The Commissioner who inspected the petition schedule building reported the conduct of a lottery business as well as a cool drinks parlour in the name and style of “Laza Ice Creams” in the petition schedule. If that be so, we are in darkness, how and in what manner and on what basis the Rent Control Appellate Authority came to the conclusion that the petition schedule shop room is lying not occupied by the tenants or there is cessation of occupation for the required period of six months. Even the basic Rules and principles governing the application of Section 11(4)(v) were overlooked by the Rent Control Appellate Authority while passing the impugned judgment. 5. It is true that the presence of one Rajan in the petition schedule shop room at the time of inspection was also reported by the Advocate Commissioner. Unless there is an allegation of sub-lease or transfer of possession or any part thereof, it is not permissible for the Rent Control Court to go into that question and to enter into a finding. Further, it is not necessary to go into a question whether there is any sub-lease or not while considering the ground under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act. There is a cardinal difference between the grounds under Sections 11(4)(i) and 11(4)(v) of the Act. The grounds available under Sections 11(4)(i) and 11(4)(v) of the Act cannot be equated each other and there cannot be any overlapping of grounds under these two sections. Section 11 (4)(i) of the Act would come into play when there is sub-lease which stands for transfer of right under the lease or sub-letting the entire building or any portion thereof without the consent of the landlord. Section 11(4)(v) of the Act would come into play only when there is cessation of occupation by the tenant for a period of six months without sufficient cause. The “cessation of occupation by the tenants” has to be understood as non-occupation of the tenanted premises by the tenants or any person claiming under him. The expression “cessation of occupation” as engrafted under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act and the non-occupation by the original tenant in the case of sublease are different and lies on different and distinct grounds.
The “cessation of occupation by the tenants” has to be understood as non-occupation of the tenanted premises by the tenants or any person claiming under him. The expression “cessation of occupation” as engrafted under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act and the non-occupation by the original tenant in the case of sublease are different and lies on different and distinct grounds. It was brought to our notice the view taken by another Division Bench of this Court in Aboobacker v. Narayanan reported in 2010 (4) KLT 981, wherein it was held that “occupation” as contemplated under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act is the occupation by the tenant himself and not by anyone else. A conjoint reading of the grounds under Sections 11(4)(i) and 11 (4)(v) would clearly show that the “cessation of occupation” as contemplated under Section 11(4)(v) is non-occupation of the tenanted premises either by the tenant or by any person claiming under him, which would intake even a sub lessee. If we take a different view on the basis of the dictum laid down in Aboobacker's case (supra), it would amount to bringing the ground under Section 11(4)(i) of the Act within the sweep of Section 11(4)(v) of the Act because of the reason that in every case of sub-lease of the tenanted premises or transfer of leasehold right, the resultant effect is that the sub tenant would come into occupation of the tenanted premises instead of the original tenant. There also involves the non-occupation of the original tenant substituting the same by a sub-tenant or sub-lessee, as the case may be. A reference of the said question to a larger Bench is not necessitated in this appeal at present. 6. As discussed earlier, the Commissioner who visited the tenanted premises reported the conduct of lottery business and cool drinks parlour in the petition schedule shop room and, in the absence of a case of sub-lease, it has to be presumed that it has been done and carried on by the tenants. In short, there is no sufficient evidence, much less any evidence, to show the cessation of occupation or its period as six months just before the institution of the Rent Control Petition and hence the judgment rendered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside and we do so.
In short, there is no sufficient evidence, much less any evidence, to show the cessation of occupation or its period as six months just before the institution of the Rent Control Petition and hence the judgment rendered by the Rent Control Appellate Authority is liable to be set aside and we do so. The order passed by the Rent Control Court is restored and the petition filed under Section 11(4)(v) of the Act is hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.