JUDGMENT : M.K. HANJURA, J. 1. By the medium of this appeal, the appellant has challenged the order dated 11th August, 2017 of the writ Court, passed in OWP No. 263/2016, on the grounds, inter-alia, that the learned writ Court, while passing the impugned order, has erred in law, inasmuch as, the Court, while dismissing the writ petition, has stated that the appellant had the remedy available under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act other than the writ jurisdiction. This assertion is not based on the correct proposition and enunciation of law. The well settled law is that the proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act are subject to judicial review and the view of the writ Court that no writ will lie against the acquisition proceedings is erroneous and as a sequel thereto, the impugned judgment deserves to be set aside. 2. Learned Counsel for the appellant states that the question for the determination of the writ Court was whether the respondents, after entering into private negotiations with the appellant - writ petitioner to the effect that the remaining part of the land, (subject matter of the lis), will not be taken away and shall be utilized by the appellant-writ petitioner for herself and that she shall be at liberty to construct the shops thereon, could back out at a later stage on the face of such negotiations. The appellant contends that they had no jurisdiction to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings for they were estopped by and under the law. It is further stated that the award passed by the respondent No. 3 is invalid as it is not in consonance with the law and, therefore, violative of the principals of natural justice and the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. It is further stated that it was not within the domain and power of the respondents to issue the impugned notice of eviction on the basis of the impugned award after they had made it public and represented to the appellant that they do not require the land now and they had also acted upon the said decision and even referred the matter to the Commissioner Secretary to Govt. Revenue Department in the year 2007 itself, besides taking a similar stand before the Civil Court. Revenue Department in the year 2007 itself, besides taking a similar stand before the Civil Court. Learned counsel further states that the respondents could not rely upon the award passed in the years 2004/2006, when, for almost a decade, they had maintained that they do not require the land and had neither taken the possession of the land nor paid any compensation to the appellant assessed a decade back and that too at the back of the appellant, thus, depriving her of the grant of due compensation at the prevailing market rate. It is further stated that the impugned award has become non est in the eyes of law as it has been rendered infructuous with the passage of time and the respondents had no authority to implement the same in the year 2016, i.e. after a gap of a decade by now. 3. The appellant has further pleaded that the aforementioned pleas cannot be agitated before the District Court u/s 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and the learned writ Court has erred in dismissing the writ petition on the issues preliminary in nature, without considering the aforesaid questions, which were also raised in the writ petition. The impugned judgment of the writ Court is, therefore, illegal and against law. It deserves to be set aside as it has caused great miscarriage of justice to the appellant. 4. Heard and considered. 5. In order to find an answer to the pleas raised by the learned counsel for the appellants in his arguments, buttressed with the pleadings, the impugned judgment/order requires appraisal and the relevant excerpts thereof are reproduced below: “10. Learned counsel for petitioner contends that respondents by various communications, even in the meeting, decided not to acquire the land and cancel the award and that the Award dated 09.10.2006 is not valid and is a nullity in terms of amendment to Section 11-B of the Land Acquisition Act, whereby the award under section 11 is valid only for two years from the date of publication of declaration and therefore, issuing impugned notice after more than a decade from the date of the award is not just. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel refers to decisions rendered in Siraj-ud-Din vs. Revenue Minister and Others, 1992 SLJ 219 and Bansi Lal Bhat vs. State of J&K and Others, 2012 (3) SLJ 670 [HC]. 11. To buttress his arguments, learned counsel refers to decisions rendered in Siraj-ud-Din vs. Revenue Minister and Others, 1992 SLJ 219 and Bansi Lal Bhat vs. State of J&K and Others, 2012 (3) SLJ 670 [HC]. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents raises preliminary objections as regards maintainability of writ petition, by contending that land measuring 715 Sq. ft. owned by petitioner has been acquired by respondents strictly in accordance with mandate of Land Acquisition Act and final Award has been passed by Collector, Land Acquisition. Petitioner, if not agreed to Final Award, has to avail of alternative and efficacious remedy as available under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, and thus, writ petition is not maintainable. Further contention of learned counsel is that the Final Award is valid notwithstanding non-payment of compensation and possession of land lying with petitioner. Delay in taking over possession of land, according to learned counsel, was due to pendency of litigation titled Mst. Fazi vs. State and Others before learned Municipal Magistrate, Srinagar. Section 11-B of the Land Acquisition Act, therefore, does not bar respondents to execute Final Award, in that Section 11-B envisages that proceedings of award should have been culminated within a period of two years, i.e. from the date of publication and issuance of Notice under section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act till issuing of Final Award. In the present case, notice has been issued on 12.02.2006 and Final Award passed on 09.10.2006. As maintained by respondents, the Award has been passed within a period of two years as prescribed under Section 11-B of the Land Acquisition Act. To cement this submission, learned counsel for respondents refers to decision rendered in Mohd. Maqbool Dar and Another vs. State of J&K and Others, 2004 (3) JKJ 443 [HC]. 12. Without going to the merits of the case, I will consider and deal with the preliminary issue raised by respondents as regards maintainability of writ petition. It would be appropriate to refer to Section 18 of J&K Land Acquisition Act. It provides: “18. Maqbool Dar and Another vs. State of J&K and Others, 2004 (3) JKJ 443 [HC]. 12. Without going to the merits of the case, I will consider and deal with the preliminary issue raised by respondents as regards maintainability of writ petition. It would be appropriate to refer to Section 18 of J&K Land Acquisition Act. It provides: “18. Reference to Court: (1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection be to the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the persons to whom it is payable or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objection to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made:- (a) if the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time which he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award. (b) in other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, sub-section (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire.” 13. From the very terms of Section 18, it is evident that any person, not interested to accept the award, shall approach the Court for its determination. 14. In the present case, relief, besought for by petitioner, is in the nature of Writ of Certiorari/Mandamus, declaring Award dated 09.10.2006 as non-exist and ineffective and unsustainable in the eye of law and consequently the steps initiated by the respondents for issuing notice dated 12.2.2016. Petitioner is questioning Final Award and subsequent proceedings of execution of notice for vacation. Writ petition on hand, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read with Section 103 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, is not maintainable in view of the remedy available under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. My this view is also fortified by the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in Chenab Textile Mills Kathua J&K vs. Sat Paul, 2006 (2) SLJ 621 (HC). My this view is also fortified by the judgment rendered by the Division Bench in Chenab Textile Mills Kathua J&K vs. Sat Paul, 2006 (2) SLJ 621 (HC). It was held therein that after the award was passed, no writ petition could be filed challenging acquisition notice or against any proceedings thereunder and that it is consistent view of the Supreme Court that once award is passed in land acquisition proceedings, the notification as well as the declaration cannot be challenged. 15. It is pertinent to mention here that it is for the Government to decide that a particular acquisition was required for public purpose and once the Government arrives at such a conclusion it would be a conclusive proof about the purpose. The other principle that has been ingrained is that if a project is beneficial for the larger public, inconvenience to smaller number of people is to be accepted. It has to be respectfully accepted as a proposition of law that individual interest or, for that matter, smaller public interest must yield to the larger public interest. Inconvenience of some should be bypassed for a larger interest or cause of the society. 16. The Supreme Court in Ramniklal N. Bhutta and Another vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (1997) 1 SCC 134 , while cautioning the High Courts in interfering with the land acquisition proceedings, observed and held that “Our country is now launched upon an ambitious programme of all-round economic advancement to make our economy competitive in the world market. We are anxious to attract foreign direct investment to the maximum extent. We propose to compete with china economically. We wish to attain the pace of progress achieved by some of the Asian countries, referred to as “Asian tigers” e.g. South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore. It is, however, recognized on all hands that the infrastructure necessary for sustaining such a pace of progress is woefully lacking in our country. The means of transportation, power and communications are in dire need of substantial improvement, expansion and modernization. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are generally in shape of writ petitions filed on High Courts. These things very often call for acquisition of land and that too without any delay. It is, however, natural that in most of these cases, the persons affected challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenge the acquisition proceedings in courts. These challenges are generally in shape of writ petitions filed on High Courts. Invariably, stay of acquisition is asked for and in some cases, orders by way of stay or injunction are also made. Whatever may have been the practices in the past, a time has come where the courts should keep the larger public interest in mind while exercising their power or grant in stay/injunction. The power under Article 226 is discretionary. It will be exercised only in furtherance of interests of justice and not merely on the making out of a legal point. And in the matter of land acquisition for public purposes, the interests of justice and the public purposes, the interests of justice and the public interest coalesce. They are very often one and the same. Even in civil suit, granting of injunction or other similar orders, more particularly of an interlocutory nature, is equally discretionary. The courts have to weigh the public interest vis-a-vis the private interest while exercising the power under Article 226 indeed any of their discretionary powers... There are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong; quashing the acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress. To wit, it is ultimately a matter of balancing the competing interests. Beyond this, it is neither possible nor advisable to say. We hope and trust that these considerations will be duly borne in mind by the courts while dealing with challenges to acquisition proceedings.” 17. For all what has been discussed above, writ petition is devoid of any merit and is, accordingly, dismissed along with connected M.P. However, petitioner is at liberty to avail of appropriate remedy as available under law.” 6. The judgment of the writ Court is clear and vivid. It cannot be interfered with. It is based on the sound foundations of the law and reason. The judgments and the law cited and relied upon by the writ Court to decide and determine the petition of the petitioner (appellant here in this appeal) are suited to the purpose propounded under it. These are pertinent to the facts and the circumstances of the case. 7. It is based on the sound foundations of the law and reason. The judgments and the law cited and relied upon by the writ Court to decide and determine the petition of the petitioner (appellant here in this appeal) are suited to the purpose propounded under it. These are pertinent to the facts and the circumstances of the case. 7. It is trite to say that after the award is passed, no writ petition can be filed to challenge the acquisition notice or against any proceedings thereunder. It is within the power and the authority of the Government to decide whether the acquisition is, or is not, required for public purpose. Individual interest or a smaller public interest has to give way to the larger public interest. The interest of justice and the public purpose grow together and these are the indispensable conditions embedded in the matter of the land acquisitions. 8. This writ Court has also held that the appellant had an alternative remedy available to her under section 18 of the Jammu and Kashmir Land Acquisition Act. This aspect has been rightly dwelt upon in the judgment of the writ Court. To this it may, however, be added that the appeal of the appellant is ineffective, incomplete, incompetent and defective. Dealing with a matter almost identical to the present one a Division Bench of this Court in case bearing LPA No. 173/2007 titled Western Bus Service vs. Assistant Labour Commissioner and Others, decided on 16.10.2007 has held as under: “In a more recent decision in A.P. Foods vs. S. Samuel, (2006) 5 SCC 469 , a case arising under the labour law, the Supreme Court once again re-affirmed the same legal position, making reference to the earlier decisions, in U.P. State Bridge Corporation Ltd. vs. U.P. Rajya Setu Nigam, (2004) 4 SCC 268 , Premier Automobiles Ltd. vs. Kamelkar Shantaram Wadke, (1976) 1 SCC 496 , Rajasthan SRTC vs. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75 , Chanderkant Tukaram, Nikam vs. Municipal Corporation of Ahmedabad, (2002) 2 SCC 542 , Scooters India vs. Vijai E.V. Eldred, (1998) 6 SCC 549 and Basant Kumar Sarkar vs. Eagle Rolling Mills Ltd. (1964) 6 SCR 913 . The decision reiterates the view that a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India should not be entertained when the statutory remedy is available under the Act unless exceptional circumstances are made out.” 9. On the dimensions of the provisions of “The Jammu and Kashmir Land Acquisition Act” detailed herein before, the petitioner had a right to seek the remedy under section 18 of the Jammu and Kashmir Land Acquisition Act. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to persuade this Court as to how and in what manner the writ petition can be entertained on the anvil of the availability of an alternative remedy. No reasons have been put forward in brushing aside the right to exhaust the alternative remedy available to the appellant-writ petitioner and to file the writ petition against the award. There can be no denial of the fact that the existence of an alternative remedy does not ipso facto curtail or bar the jurisdiction vested in the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The remedy under Article 226 is, in general, a discretionary one and the High Court has the power to refuse to grant it where the alternative remedy, which is equally efficient and adequate, is in existence unless there are good grounds therefor. The rule of exhaustion of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion but it is difficult to comprehend as to why this Court should entertain the petition filed under section 226 of the Constitution of India and pass the orders thereon by remaining oblivious to the fact that the petitioner has a remedy provided by the legislation/Statute in which a detailed mechanism has been evolved. On the face of the existence of such a remedy, the Court has to exercise circumspection, care and caution in the exercise of discretion in attending to such matters. It is true that in peculiar cases, if the petitioners is/are able to show that his/her/their case falls on the pedestal of the exceptions carved out to this rule, the Court can pass appropriate orders. However, in the writ petition, the petitioner has not been able to bring her case within the canons of the exceptions chiseled out in various judicial pronouncements. 10. However, in the writ petition, the petitioner has not been able to bring her case within the canons of the exceptions chiseled out in various judicial pronouncements. 10. Elaborating the principles of law on the subject, the apex court of the country in the case of Modern Industries vs. Steel Authority of India Limited, (2010) 5 SCC 44 , held that where the remedy was available under the interest on Delayed Payments to Small Scale and Ancillary Industrial Undertakings Act, 1993, the High Court was not justified in entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is a matter of serious concern that despite repeated pronouncement of this Court, the High Courts continue to ignore the availability of statutory remedies under the DRT Act and SARFAESI Act and exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 for passing orders which have serious adverse impact on the right of banks and other financial institutions to recover their dues. We hope and trust that in future the High Courts will exercise their discretion in such matters with greater caution, care and circumspection. Insofar as this case in concerned, we are convinced that the High Court was not at all justified in injuncting the appellant from taking action in furtherance of notice issued under Section 13 (4) of the Act. 11. In the given circumstances and on the application of the law cited by the writ Court in the impugned judgment, buttressed with the judicial pronouncements quoted above, the appellant cannot be allowed to take an oblique course impermissible under law. In this view of the matter, this appeal entails dismissal and is accordingly dismissed. 12. The appellant shall, in case she opts to do so, be at liberty to agitate her claim before the appropriate forum as envisaged under the law. 13. In view of the judgment passed in the LPA No. 143/2017 above, the Contempt Petition No. 15/2017, has become infructuous. It is, accordingly, closed.