JUDGMENT AND ORDER : S. Serto, J. This is a criminal revision petition filed under section 397/401 Cr.P.C. read with under Article 227 of Constitution of India directed against the judgment and order dated 28.05.2015, passed by Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur, in Case No. Unity-1/2015. 2. The facts and circumstances which lead to the filing of this criminal revision petition in brief are as follows; On 19.03.2015, one Shri Khrielie Usou filed an application before the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur, complaining that the petitioner in this case was disturbing his peaceful possession of his land measuring an area of 09B-00K-00Ls (Panikheti), covered by Patta No. 433, Mouza No. 3, situated at Sugar Mill area (NC), Dimapur, bounded on the North by approach road to Diphupar 'B', East by Sugar Mill Colony, South by foot path and on the West by approach road to Testo College/Nalla, and requested for restraining him and his men or agents from continuing such acts. On receipt of the said petition, the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chukumedima, Dimapur, registered the case as Case No. Unity-1/2015 and took up a proceeding under section 145 of Cr.P.C., 1973 On 28.05.2015, the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chukumedima, Dimapur, passed the impugned order in that proceeding. The operative portion of the judgment and order is given here below; "ORDER In view of the above observations and findings, it is clearly established beyond reasonable doubt and I am convinced to hold that the land covered by said Patta No. 433, Mouza No. 3, etc. is solely belongs to Shri. Khrielie Usou, which is under his possession and free from all encumbrances and shall remain in his name as the rightful owner and possessor and thus justice is served to the aggrieved party. In the result the unity Village Council and its Chairman, Shri. Nihoseh Chophy and the Secretary and their workers and agents are hereby, ordered and restrained from causing any hindrance/encroachment and interference into the complainant's property/land covered by Patta No. 433, Mouza No.3, measuring 009B-00K-00Ls, situated at Sugar Mill area (NC), Dimapur and to comply with the order of this court. It is hereby ordered that in future if any encumbrance or breach of peace interfering into the possession of the complainant, Shri. Khrielie Usou relating to the said land is made and disturbs the law and order by the opposite party an immediate and stern action shall be taken and such offender will be liable to face consequences as per law. Pronounced in any open court on 28th May, 2015. Sd/- (Thungbemo Patton) Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chukumedima, Dimapur, Nagaland". 3. Aggrieved by the impugned order passed by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur, the petitioner has come to this Court challenging the legality, propriety and questioning the jurisdiction of the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur, in passing the impugned order. 4. Heard Mr. P.B. Paul, learned counsel for the petitioner and also Mr. B. Devnath, learned counsel for the sole respondent. 5. Mr. P.B. Paul, learned counsel for the petitioner by drawing my attention to the operative portion of the order specially first part of the same submitted that the Executive Magistrate sitting in the criminal proceeding has literally decided the title or the ownership of the suit land, therefore, has exceeded his jurisdiction under section 145 Cr.P.C., 1973 as such, the same deserves to be quashed and set aside. 6. The learned counsel also read from the provision of section 145 of Cr.P.C., 1973 and submitted that the Executive Magistrate sitting in the criminal proceeding under such provision of law can only decide as to which of the parties in the dispute was in possession of the suit land on the date of the complaint and, thereafter restore possession of the same to the person who was in possession of the same if by wrongful act of the other he has been dispossessed and nothing more. However, in this case, the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur in the impugned order has clearly decided and declared who is the owner of the suit land which is beyond the jurisdiction given to him under the law. This by itself has rendered the impugned order not only improper but illegal. 7. Mr. B. Devnath, learned counsel for the sole respondent submitted at the very outset that the operative portion of the order had only restrained the petitioner and his agents from hindering or interfering in the peaceful possession of the respondent, therefore, there is nothing wrong in the order. 7. Mr. B. Devnath, learned counsel for the sole respondent submitted at the very outset that the operative portion of the order had only restrained the petitioner and his agents from hindering or interfering in the peaceful possession of the respondent, therefore, there is nothing wrong in the order. The learned counsel also submitted that the impugned order has to be read and understood from that point of view as the other parts of the same are nothing but findings of the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur, which does not necessarily declare the respondent as the owner or title holder of the subject matter. The learned counsel further submitted that on the question of title it is the decision of civil court which will supercede the decision of criminal court and also be binding on it, as such, the petitioner should have gone to the criminal court instead of coming to this High Court. In support of his submission the learned counsel cited para-15, 18 and 23 of the judgment passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Shanti Kumar Panda v. Shakuntala Devi reported in (2004) 1 SCC 438 . The contents of the paragraphs are given here below;- "15. It is well-settled that a decision by a Criminal Court does not bind the Civil Court while a decision by the Civil Court binds the Criminal Court (See Sarkar on Evidence, Fifteenth Edition, page 845). A decision given under Section 145 of the Code has relevance and is admissible in evidence to show :- (i) that there was a dispute relating to a particular property; (ii) that the dispute was between the particular parties; (iii) that such dispute led to the passing of a preliminary order under Section 145(1) or an attachment under Section 146(1), on the given date, and (iv) that the Magistrate found one of the parties to be in possession or fictional possession of the disputed property on the date of the preliminary order. The reasoning recorded by the Magistrate or other findings arrived at by him have no relevance and are not admissible in evidence before the competent court and the competent court is not bound by the findings arrived at by the Magistrate even on the question of possession through, as between the parties, the order of the Magistrate would be evidence of possession. The finding recorded by the Magistrate does not bind the Court. The competent court has jurisdiction and would be justified in arriving at a finding inconsistent with the one arrived at by the Executive Magistrate even on the question of possession. Sections 145 and 146 only provide for the order of the Executive Magistrate made under any of the two provisions being superseded by and giving way to the order or decree of a competent court. The effect of the Magistrate's order is that burden is thrown on the unsuccessful party to prove its possession or entitlement to possession before the competent court. 18. In Jhunamal alias Devandas v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors., (1988) 4 SCC 452 , this Court has held that a concluded order under Section 145, Cr.P.C., 1973 made by the Magistrate of competent jurisdiction should not be set at naught merely because the unsuccessful party has approached the civil Court. An order made under Section 145, Cr.P.C., 1973 deals only with the factum of possession of the party as on a particular day. It confers no title to remain in possession of the disputed property. The order is subject to decision of the civil Court. The unsuccessful party therefore must get relief only in the civil Court. He may move the civil court with a properly constituted suit. He may file a suit for declaration and prove a better right to possession. The civil Court has jurisdiction to give a finding different from that which the Magistrate has reached. Here again we may hasten to add that the expression 'civil court' used by this Court in Jhunamal's case (supra) means competent court and not necessarily a civil court as commonly understood. 23. For the purpose of legal proceedings initiated before a competent court subsequent to the order of an Executive Magistrate under Sections 145/146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the law as to the effect of the order of the Magistrate may be summarized as under:- (1) The words 'competent court' as used in sub-section (1) of Section 146 of the code do not necessarily mean a civil court only. A competent court is one which has the jurisdictional competence to determine the question of title or the rights of the parties with regard to the entitlement as to possession over the property forming subject matter of proceedings before the Executive Magistrate; (2) A party unsuccessful in an order under Section 145(1) would initiate proceedings in a competent court to establish its entitlement to possession over the disputed property against the successful party. Ordinarily, a relief of recovery of possession would be appropriate to be sought for. In legal proceedings initiated before a competent court consequent upon attachment under Section 146(1) of the Code it is not necessary to seek relief of recovery of possession. As the property is held custodia legis by the Magistrate for and on behalf of the party who would ultimately succeed from the court it would suffice if only determination of the rights with regard to the entitlement to the possession is sought for. Such a suit shall not be bad for not asking for the relief of possession. (3) A decision by a criminal court does not bind the civil court while a decision by the civil court binds the criminal court. An order passed by the Executive Magistrate in proceedings under Sections 145/146 of the Code is an order by a criminal court and that too based on a summary enquiry. The order is entitled to respect and weight before the competent court at the interlocutory stage. At the stage of final adjudication of rights, which would be on the evidence adduced before the court, the order of the Magistrate is only one out of several pieces of evidence. (4) The Court will be loath to issue an order of interim injunction or to order an interim arrangement inconsistent with the one made by the Executive Magistrate. However, to say so is merely stating a rule of caution or restraint, on exercise of discretion by Court, dictated by prudence and regard for the urgent/emergent executive orders made within jurisdiction by their makers; and certainly not a tab on power of Court. The Court does have jurisdiction to make an interim order including an order of ad-interim injunction inconsistent with the order of the Executive Magistrate. The jurisdiction is there but the same shall be exercised not as a rule but as an exception. The Court does have jurisdiction to make an interim order including an order of ad-interim injunction inconsistent with the order of the Executive Magistrate. The jurisdiction is there but the same shall be exercised not as a rule but as an exception. Even at the stage of passing an ad-interim order the party unsuccessful before the Executive Magistrate may on material placed before the Court succeed in making out a strong prima facie case demonstrating the findings of the Executive Magistrate to be without jurisdiction, palpably wrong or self-inconsistent in which or the like cases the Court may, after recording its reasons and satisfaction, make an order inconsistent with, or in departure from, the one made by the Executive Magistrate. The order of the court final or interlocutory, would have the effect of declaring one of the parties entitled to possession and evicting therefrom the party successful before the Executive Magistrate within the meaning of sub-section (6) of Section 145". 8. From the submission of both the learned counsels and the provision of law under section 145 Cr.P.C., 1973 and the ruling cited by Mr. B. Devnath, learned counsel for the respondent one thing is very clear, that is, the Executive Magistrate sitting in criminal proceeding has no jurisdiction to decide on the title or ownership of a subject matter in a dispute. Secondly, there is no dispute of the fact that the impugned judgment and order was passed by the Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur, in a criminal proceeding under section 145 Cr.P.C., 1973 Viewing the operative portion of the impugned judgment and order particularly, the first portion beginning with the words "In view of the above" and ending with the words "aggrieved party", I am of the opinion that the learned Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur, has entered into a jurisdiction which is not given to him. Because in that portion of the order he has come to the conclusion that the subject matter in the dispute solely belongs to the respondent and the same shall remain in his name as the rightful owner. The language used by Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur, are quite clear, therefore, it need no further interpretation. Because in that portion of the order he has come to the conclusion that the subject matter in the dispute solely belongs to the respondent and the same shall remain in his name as the rightful owner. The language used by Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur, are quite clear, therefore, it need no further interpretation. It would have been sufficient if Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur, in the proceeding under section 145 Cr.PC, had recorded in his finding as to who was in possession of the subject matter at the relevant time and decide who should be in possession of the same. But by having concluded that the respondent is the sole owner and his name shall remain as the rightful owner have exceeded his jurisdiction under section 145 of Cr.PC. Therefore, without going any further, it is concluded that the impugned order was passed without jurisdiction. Hence, the same is quashed and set aside. Let the record be send back to Extra Assistant Commissioner, Chumukedima, Dimapur. On receipt of the record, he shall issue notice to the parties and decide the issue afresh as per law. With this, the appeal is disposed.