JUDGMENT : The plaintiff in the Court below is the appellant in RFA No.4174/2012. He had filed a suit in the Court below for the relief of declaration and injunction with respect to the suit schedule properties as against defendants therein. Respondent No.1 in this appeal, who is the cross objector in RFA Crob.109/2013 was defendant No.1 in the Court below. She had also filed a counter claim in the Court below. The Court below by its judgment and decree dated 21.11.2012, decreed the suit of the plaintiff in part and ordered and decreed that the plaintiff and defendant No.2 are entitled to half share in the suit schedule properties. It also allowed the counter claim of defendant No.1 holding that she was entitled to half share in the suit schedule properties. It is the said judgment and decree, the appellant and cross-objector have assailed in their respective Regular First Appeal and Cross Objection in the said appeal respectively. The appellant has prayed for setting aside of the judgment and decree under appeal and also sought for dismissal of the suit of the respondent, whereas, the cross objector in her cross-objection filed under Order 41 Rule 22 of CPC has prayed to set aside the finding of the trial Court on issue Nos.2 to 5 in the impugned judgment and decree and also has prayed for dismissal of the suit of the plaintiff. 2. In his memorandum of appeal, the appellant has taken a contention that the finding of the Court below on issue Nos.1 and 6 and additional issue Nos.1 and 3 are erroneous and the Court below has grossly erred in holding that the appellant was not the exclusive owner of the suit schedule ‘A’ properties. He has further contended that the Court below has erred in not considering the error of the Assistant Commissioner and Panchayat Authorities and by further holding that the appellant and respondent No.2 are entitled to half share in the suit schedule ‘A’ properties. 3. On the other hand, the cross objector in her memorandum of cross-objection has taken a contention that the plaintiff was aged above 15 years as on the date of alleged adoption, as such, the adoption is bad in the eye of law. 3. On the other hand, the cross objector in her memorandum of cross-objection has taken a contention that the plaintiff was aged above 15 years as on the date of alleged adoption, as such, the adoption is bad in the eye of law. She has further taken a contention that the Court below has committed an error by applying the presumption under Section 90 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, with respect to the certified copy of alleged Adoption Deed at Ex.P8. She has further contended that the Court below committed an error by ignoring the fact that the plaintiff did not examine the scribe of Ex.P8 and that the plaintiff did not establish that ceremonies for adoption were duly performed. 4. In response to the notices, the parties are represented by their learned counsels. The lower Court records were called for and the same are placed before this Court. 5. Heard the arguments of the learned counsel for both sides. Perused the memorandum of appeal, cross-objection, impugned judgment and decree, lower Court records and materials placed before this Court. 6. After hearing the argument from both side and perusing the materials placed before this Court, the points that arise for our consideration are: i. Whether the appeal is not maintainable before this Court? ii. Whether the appellant is the adopted son of the propositus deceased Goudappa? iii. Whether the suit schedule properties under dispute are ancestral properties of deceased Goudappa? iv. What reliefs the parties are entitled to? 7. For the sake of convenience, the parties would be referred to with the ranks they were holding respectively in the Court below. 8. The summary of the case of the plaintiff (appellant herein) as could be gathered from the materials placed before this Court is that, propositus Goudappa and his wife Smt. Yamanawwa, who had only two daughters by name Kamalawwa and Sundarawwa, adopted the plaintiff Dundappa, who was the elder son of Smt. Kamalawwa. In that regard, not only the adoption ceremony and rituals were performed, but also an adoption deed came to be registered on 12.08.1983 before the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bagalkot. The community to which the parties belong allows adoption of a person who is major in his age. After the death of Goudappa, the plaintiff Dundappa and his adoptive mother succeeded to the suit properties as the only heirs. The community to which the parties belong allows adoption of a person who is major in his age. After the death of Goudappa, the plaintiff Dundappa and his adoptive mother succeeded to the suit properties as the only heirs. At the consent of defendant No.1, and by virtue of oral family arrangement, the names of plaintiff and his adoptive mother Smt.Yamanawwa were entered in revenue records. After the death of Smt.Yamanawwa, the plaintiff became the exclusive owner and successor to the suit schedule properties. However, defendant No.1 illegally got her name entered in revenue records and denied the exclusive right of the plaintiff. Hence, the plaintiff filed the suit for declaration. The summary of the contention of the defendant No.1 as could be seen from her written statement is that, the plaintiff Dundappa has never been an adoptive son of propositus Goudappa. There was no adoption of the plaintiff by the said Goudappa at any point of time, as such, the alleged adoption deed dated 12.08.1983 is also not accepted. She further denied all the plaint averments made by the plaintiff, except that herself along with Kamalawwa were the only daughters of propositus Goudappa and his wife Smt. Yamanawwa, and that the plaintiff was the elder son of said Kamalawwa. It is her further contention that entries of her name in the revenue records, for which she was entitled to, are made in accordance with law. She denied of any partition said to have been taken place with respect to the suit schedule properties. She also contended that Civil Courts have no jurisdiction to declare the orders passed by the Revenue Court, inasmuch as they are self contained codes. Therefore, she filed a counter claim claiming awarding half share by way of partition and separate possession in the suit properties and to award future mesne profits. Defendant No.2 in his written statement had admitted the averments of the plaint and further submitted that, if the court comes to the conclusion that plaintiff was the adopted son and defendant No.1 was legal heir to Goudappa, they were entitled to share in the suit properties, then defendant No.1 may be allotted share in the suit properties holding that he was the legal heir of Kamalawwa who is the daughter of deceased Goudappa and he was ready to pay the court fee. 9. 9. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the Court below framed the following issues: i. Whether the plaintiff proves that plaintiff is the exclusive owner of the suit schedule ‘A’ properties? ii. Whether the plaintiff proves that plaintiff is the adopted son of Goudappa? iii. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form as contended in para No.17 of the W.S.? iv. Whether the Court fee paid is incorrect? If so, what is the correct Court fee? v. Whether the suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties? vi. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought for? vii. What order or decree? Additional Issues: i. Whether defendant No.1 is entitled to ½ share in the suit properties? ii. Whether defendant No.1 is entitled to mesne profits? iii. Whether the defendant No.1 is entitled to share in the suit properties? To prove his case, the plaintiff himself got examined as PW1 and got examined one Sri. Neelappa Bhimappa Dasappanaver as PW2. From the plaintiff’s side documents from Exhibits P1 to P18 were produced and got marked. From the 1st defendant’s side, the 1st defendant Smt. Sunderawwa got herself examined as DW1 and got produced and marked documents from Exs.D1 to D12. The 2nd defendant did not choose to enter witness box. After hearing both sides, in its detailed judgment, the Court below answered issue Nos.1, 3, 4, 5 and additional issue No.2 in the negative, issue No.2 and additional issue Nos.1 and 3 in the affirmative and issue No.6 partly in the affirmative. With that, the Court below decreed the suit of the plaintiff in part and also decreed the counter claim of the defendant No.1. It is the said judgment and decree that has been assailed by the plaintiff and defendant No.1 in their appeal and the cross-objection respectively. Re: Maintainability:- 10. It is the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1/defendant No.1 that the appeal is not maintainable since the remedy lies in the form of revision before the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner. No doubt the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner has the power of revision under Section 136 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, which Section is reproduced hereinbelow: “Section 136 – Appeal and Revision (1) The provisions of Chapter V shall not apply to any decision or order under this Chapter. No doubt the jurisdictional Deputy Commissioner has the power of revision under Section 136 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964, which Section is reproduced hereinbelow: “Section 136 – Appeal and Revision (1) The provisions of Chapter V shall not apply to any decision or order under this Chapter. (2) Any person affected by an order made under sub-section (4) or an entry certified under subsection (6) of section 129 may, within a period of sixty days from the date of communication of the order or the knowledge of the entry certified, appeal to such officer as may be prescribed by the State Government in this behalf and his decision shall be final. (3) The Deputy Commissioner may, on his own motion or on application of a party, call for and examine any records made under section 127 and section 129 and pass such orders as he may deem fit: Provided that no order shall be passed except after hearing the party who would be adversely affected by such order.” However, what cannot be forgotten is that the relief sought for by the plaintiff in his plaint in the Court below is for declaration to declare that he is the exclusive owner of the suit schedule ‘A’ properties by holding that the order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Bagalkote in RTS Appeals No.27 and 28 of 2008-09 dated 01.02.2010 and also to the subsequent M.R.No.553/09-10 of Shirur village and 267 of Hallur village effected in respect of the suit land properties and the Taluk Panchayat order passed in 2/08-09 dated 02.04.2009 in respect of the house property are null and void. He has also sought for a consequential relief of injunction against the defendant. As already observed above, the Court below through its impugned judgment and decree has decreed the suit of the plaintiff in part ordering and decreeing that plaintiff and defendant No.2 are entitled to ½ share each in the suit schedule properties and by decreeing the counter claim of the defendant No.1, she was also held to be entitled to ½ share in the suit schedule properties. Thus, the main relief of the plaintiff is for declaration regarding his alleged ownership of the suit schedule ‘A’ properties. Since the plaint averments clearly show that the defendants have denied his alleged ownership over the said property, he has sought the said relief of declaration. Thus, the main relief of the plaintiff is for declaration regarding his alleged ownership of the suit schedule ‘A’ properties. Since the plaint averments clearly show that the defendants have denied his alleged ownership over the said property, he has sought the said relief of declaration. As entries in the revenue records have come in the way of declaring his ownership, he has prayed to hold those revenue entries as null and void. 11. Section 135 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 reads as below: “Section 135 – Bar of suits: No suit shall lie against the State Government or any officer of the State Government in respect of a claim to have an entry made in any record or register that is maintained under this Chapter or to have any such entry omitted or amended: Provided that if any person is aggrieved as to any right of which he is in possession, by an entry made in any record or register maintained under this Chapter, he may institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his title to such right, for a declaration of his right under Chapter VI of the Specific Relief Act, 1877; and the entry in the record or register shall be amended in accordance with any such declaration.” Reading of the above Section makes it clear that its proviso enables a person who is aggrieved as to any right of which he is in possession by an entry made in any record or register maintained by the Revenue Authorities under Chapter XI of the said Act, can institute a suit against any person denying or interested to deny his title, for the relief of declaration of his right. Similarly, even Section 62(b) of the very same Act also enables the private parties to institute a civil suit in the Civil Court for the purpose of establishing their private right, although it may be affected by any entry in any land record. Therefore, the suit of the plaintiff in the Court below was maintainable. Consequently, challenging the judgment and decree passed in the said suit in the form of present appeal is also maintainable. As such, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 herein on the point of maintainability is not acceptable. Re: Adoption:- 12. Therefore, the suit of the plaintiff in the Court below was maintainable. Consequently, challenging the judgment and decree passed in the said suit in the form of present appeal is also maintainable. As such, the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 herein on the point of maintainability is not acceptable. Re: Adoption:- 12. The plaintiff’s stake as a major share holder in the property of the propositus Goudappa, is on the contention that, though he was one of the grand sons of Goudappa, but he was given to the said propositus in adoption which was documented and registered on 12.08.1983. The brother of the plaintiff, who is the second defendant, though has fully endorsed the case of the plaintiff, but the second daughter of the said propositus Sundarawwa, who is the defendant No.1, has seriously denied the alleged adoption of the plaintiff by the propositus. However, the undisputed genealogy of the family of the propositus prior to the alleged adoption is as below:- Goudappa Giriyappa Dasappanavar (died on 22.07.1997) Yamanawwa (wife) (died on 01.11.2001) Kamallawwa – Died in 1981 Hanamappa Biradar Patil (Husband)Died on 04.07.2000 Sundrawwa (defendant No.1) Dundappa (Plaintiff) (1st Son) (Claims to be adopted son of Goudappa Giripap Dasappanavar) Doddappa (Defendant No.2) (2nd Son) 13. The plaint averments as well the evidence of the plaintiffs in the Court below regarding the alleged adoption is that, one Goudappa, S/o. Giriyappa Dasappanavar, was the propositus of the family of the plaintiff and defendants. The said Goudappa had a wife by name Smt. Yamanawwa and two daughters namely, Kamalawwa and Sundarawwa (defendant No.1), who were given in marriage and residing in their respective husband’s house. The said Kamalawwa had got 2 sons namely Dundappa (plaintiff) and Doddappa (defendant No.2). Since the said Goudappa and Yamanawwa had no male issues, at their joint request, natural father of Dundappa by name Hanumappa gave his eldest son Dundappa (plaintiff) in adoption to the propositus Goudappa and his wife. The said adoption was through ceremonies performed in the family and deed of adoption was also executed by Goudappa and Yamanawwa, which came to be registered on 12.08.1983 before the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bagalkot. 14. The said adoption was through ceremonies performed in the family and deed of adoption was also executed by Goudappa and Yamanawwa, which came to be registered on 12.08.1983 before the office of the Sub-Registrar, Bagalkot. 14. It is further the pleading and the evidence of the plaintiff in the Court below that the adoption ceremony was as per the customs prevailing in Hindu Reddy community, to which they were belonging to and that the said community was permitting in its custom, adoption of a person who is major in his age also. Hence, the plaintiff, though was major in his age as on the date of adoption, was taken in adoption by the propositus and his wife as per their customs. In the adoption ceremony, which was performed as per the customs prevailing in their Hindu Reddy community, defendant No.1 was also present and had given her consent. As such, after the adoption, the plaintiff has become son of the propositus and acquired all rights in his property as a son. 15. In support of his contention regarding the adoption, the plaintiff got produced and marked a certified copy of the registered Adoption Deed at Ex.P8. He also got examined one Sri. Neelappa Bhimappa Dasappanaver as PW2. The said PW2 in his evidence has stated that himself and also the parties to the suit belong to Hindu Raddy community, in which community there is a custom of adopting a person who is major in his age also. He has further corroborated the plaintiff’s version stating that the propositus Goudappa and his wife took the plaintiff in adoption and the natural father of the plaintiff gave the plaintiff to the propositus in adoption under customary ceremony for adoption. He has also stated, in the said ceremony he was also present. The witness has further stated that, after completion of adoption ceremony in the presence of witness on 12.08.1983, an Adoption Deed was written and was registered. The said document was signed by both the adopting father, mother and natural father of the plaintiff, the plaintiff, their relatives and also defendant No.1 and her husband. The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 regarding adoption was seriously disputed in their cross-examination made by the 1st defendant’s side. Similarly suggestions were made in the cross-examination of DW1 (defendant No.1) which suggestions were not admitted as true by the said witness. The evidence of PWs.1 and 2 regarding adoption was seriously disputed in their cross-examination made by the 1st defendant’s side. Similarly suggestions were made in the cross-examination of DW1 (defendant No.1) which suggestions were not admitted as true by the said witness. It is in this background, the above evidence of parties regarding the adoption, so called the certified copy of Adoption Deed at Ex.P8 is to be analysed. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 herein at the outset objected to considering the said document at Ex.P8 as secondary evidence, stating that no proper foundation was laid by the plaintiff to produce the secondary evidence. In his support, the learned counsel relied on a decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of H. Siddiqui (Dead by LRs) Vs. A. Ramalingam, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 240 . In the said case, while appreciating Section 65 of the Evidence Act, 1872 regarding admissibility of a document in secondary evidence, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe that, where the original documents were not produced at any time nor any factual foundation was laid for giving secondary evidence, it was impermissible to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that alleged copy is in fact a true copy of the original. The Hon’ble Apex Court was further pleased to observe that, for admitting such a document as secondary evidence, the Courts would be obliged to examine the probative value of the document produced in the Court or its contents for deciding the question of admissibility of the document in secondary evidence. If the principle laid down in the above case is applied to the instant case, it can be observed that, in the instant case, according to the learned counsel for the respondent No.1, plaintiff has not led any foundation for the production of secondary evidence in the Court below. The plaintiff in his plaint in the Court below, except stating that the adoption was recorded in a written document, which is the Adoption Deed and was registered on 12.08.1983, has nowhere stated as to with whom the original document is and where it lies. The plaintiff in his plaint in the Court below, except stating that the adoption was recorded in a written document, which is the Adoption Deed and was registered on 12.08.1983, has nowhere stated as to with whom the original document is and where it lies. However, for the first time it is only in the cross-examination of DW1(defendant No.1), he made a suggestion to the witness stating that original of the said document was in her custody, which suggestion was not admitted as true by the said witness. When in fact the plaintiff claims himself to be an adopted son of the propositus Goudappa, it was expected of him to retain and maintain the alleged registered Adoption Deed in its original with him. About non-possessing of the original copy with him also, he has not shown any reason. However, few more case laws on the concept of secondary evidence can also be perused. 17. One of the earliest judgment which speaks about the objection as to the mode of proof of a document can be found in the judgment of the privy counsel in Gopal Das and another Vs. Sri. Thakurji and others reported in AIR 1943 PC 83 . In the said case, with respect to Order 13 Rule 3 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, regarding objection as to the mode of proof, the Hon’ble Privy Counsel was pleased to make an observation that, where the objection to be taken is not that the document is in itself inadmissible but that the mode of proof put forward is irregular or insufficient, it is essential that the objection should be taken at the trial stage before the document is marked as an exhibit and admitted to the record. It was further observed that a party cannot lie by until the case comes before a Court of appeal and then complain for the first time of the mode of proof. 18. A similar question about the mode of proof of a certified copy of a sale deed when laying foundation for admissibility of the said document as a secondary evidence under Section 65(a) and (f), came before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in an appeal in Smt. Dayamathi Bai Vs. K. M. Shaffi reported in AIR 2004 SC 4082 . 18. A similar question about the mode of proof of a certified copy of a sale deed when laying foundation for admissibility of the said document as a secondary evidence under Section 65(a) and (f), came before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in an appeal in Smt. Dayamathi Bai Vs. K. M. Shaffi reported in AIR 2004 SC 4082 . In the said case, a certified copy of a sale deed at Ex.P1 dated 14.11.1994 was marked and admitted in evidence in the trial Court. Since no objection was raised from the defendant’s side, relying upon the said document, the suit was also decreed. The lower Appellate Court found that the plaintiff had not laid foundation for admissibility of the secondary evidence under Section 65(a) and (f) and in the circumstances, the sale was not proved. The High Court on consideration of various authorities, came to the conclusion that, since copy of Ex.P1 was a certified copy and since it was more than 30 years old document, the trial Court was right in invoking a presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act. Consequently, the appeal was allowed. In the Civil appeal, the Hon’ble Apex Court, apart from considering the presumption under Section 90 of the Evidence Act, also gave a detailed consideration about the mode of proof of a document. In the said process, it referred to its previous judgments in R.V.E Venkatachala Gounder v. Arulmigu Viswesaraswami and V.P. Temple and another reported in AIR 2003 SC 4548 and more particularly, para 20 of the said judgment, which it reproduced. The said para is most pertinent to the present case also, as such, it is reproduced hereinbelow: “20. The learned counsel for the defendant-respondent has relied on Roman Catholic Mission v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1457 in support of his submission that a document not admissible in evidence, though brought on record, has to be excluded from consideration. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the above said case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. We do not have any dispute with the proposition of law so laid down in the above said case. However, the present one is a case which calls for the correct position of law being made precise. Ordinarily, an objection to the admissibility of evidence should be taken when it is tendered and not subsequently. The objections as to admissibility of documents in evidence may be classified into two classes (i) an objection that the document which is sought to be proved is itself inadmissible in evidence; and (ii) where the objection does not dispute the admissibility of the document in evidence but is directed towards the mode of proof alleging the same to be irregular or insufficient. In the first case, merely because a document has been marked as “an exhibit” an objection as to its admissibility is not excluded and is available to be raised even at a later stage or even in appeal or revision. In the latter case, the objection should be taken when the evidence is tendered and once the document has been admitted in evidence and marked as an exhibit, the objection that it should not have been admitted in evidence or that the mode adopted for proving the document is irregular cannot be allowed to be raised at any stage subsequent to the marking of the document as an exhibit. The latter proposition is a rule of fair play. The crucial test is whether an objection, if taken at the appropriate tendering the evidence to cure the defect and resort to such mode of proof as should be regular. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. The omission to object becomes fatal because by his failure the party entitled to object allows the party tendering the evidence to act on an assumption that the opposite party is not serious about the mode of proof. On the other hand, a prompt objection does not prejudice the party tendering the evidence, for two reasons; firstly, it enables the Court to apply its mind and pronounce its decision on the question of admissibility then and there; and secondly in the event of finding of the Court on the mode proof sought to be adopted going against the party tendering the evidence, the opportunity of seeking indulgence of the Court for permitting a regular mode or method of proof and thereby removing the objection raised by the opposite party, is available to the party leading the evidence. Such practice and procedure is fair to both the parties. Out of the two types of objections, referred to hereinabove, in the latter case, failure to raise a prompt and timely objection amounts to waiver of the necessity for insisting on formal proof of a document, the document itself which is sought to be proved being admissible in evidence. In the first case, acquiescence would be no bar to raising the objection in a superior Court.” After referring to the above paragraph, the Hon’ble Apex Court was further pleased to refer to the commentary in Sarkar on Evidence, 15th Edition, page 1084. The Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe that, it was not open to the appellant to object to the mode of proof before the lower Appellate Court, since the appellant had not raised any objection while the certified copy of the sale deed was taken on record and marked as exhibit in the trial Court. As such, it was not open to the appellant to object to the mode of proof before the lower Appellate Court. It further observed that, if the objection had been taken at the trial stage, the plaintiff might have met it by calling for the original sale deed, which was on record in collateral proceedings. With this, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to dismiss the Civil Appeal. It further observed that, if the objection had been taken at the trial stage, the plaintiff might have met it by calling for the original sale deed, which was on record in collateral proceedings. With this, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to dismiss the Civil Appeal. The same principle applies in the case on hand also, while the certified copy of adoption deed was admitted in evidence and marked as Ex.P8 in the Court below, without any objection from the defendant’s side, the same defendant now in its appeal cannot raise any contention of the plaintiff not laying foundation to lead secondary evidence. Had the defendant No.1 raised such an objection in the Court below, probably the plaintiff could have met it in some manner. As such, the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 that Ex.P8, which is a certified copy of the adoption deed cannot be relied upon, is not acceptable. 19. Ex.P8 is shown to be an Adoption Deed (Dattaka Patra), wherein party No.1 is the plaintiff, who is claiming to be an adopted son, party No.2 is Goudappa S/o. Giriyappa Dasappanavar, Propositus and his wife Smt. Yamanawwa, who are said to have adopted the plaintiff and party No.3 Hanumappa, S/o. Dodappa Biradar, who is said to be the natural father of plaintiff, who is said to have given the plaintiff in adoption to party No.2. The said deed of adoption explains that the propositus and his wife were having no male issues and decided to adopt the plaintiff who was none-else than their grand son born out of their first daughter Kamalawwa. The said document further shows that on 12.08.1983, in the house of propositus Goudappa at Benakatti, as per the Hindu religion rituals and in the presence of elderly people and their community members, party No.1 Dundappa, the plaintiff, was given in adoption by party No.3, his natural father, to adopting parents i.e., party No.2 propositus Goudappa and his wife. The said document is shown to have signed by all the three parties. When this document was marked as Exhibit in the examination-in-chief of the plaintiff, none of the defendants raised any objection for production of the certified copy and marking it as exhibit. Even PW2 – Neelappa Bhimappa Dasappanavar also in his evidence has stated that the plaintiff, his natural father and adoptive parents have all signed in the adoption deed. When this document was marked as Exhibit in the examination-in-chief of the plaintiff, none of the defendants raised any objection for production of the certified copy and marking it as exhibit. Even PW2 – Neelappa Bhimappa Dasappanavar also in his evidence has stated that the plaintiff, his natural father and adoptive parents have all signed in the adoption deed. He has further stated that, even defendant No.1 and her husband also have put their signature to the adoption deed. The said statement of PW2 has not been denied or disputed in his cross-examination. Therefore, it remains that the adoption was recorded in a registered document and it has been signed by the person (natural father) giving a person (adoptee) in adoption and the person (adoptive parent) taking that person in adoption. 20. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 in his argument brought to our notice the judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Gangavva and Others Vs. Ningavva and Others reported in ILR 2008 Kar 1667, wherein for the purpose of drawing presumption under Section 16 of the Hindu Adoption and Maintenance Act, 1956, it was observed that three conditions are required to be fulfilled, they are:- 1. The registered document evidencing adoption should be produced before the Court, 2. It should be shown that the said document is signed by the person giving a child in adoption and 3. It should be shown that it is signed by the person taking the child in adoption. In the instant case, since all these three conditions are fulfilled, a presumption as under Section 16 of the said Act can be drawn. The said Section reads as below: “16. Presumption as to registered documents relating to adoption - Whenever any document registered under any law for the time being in force is produced before any court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the person giving and the person taking the child in adoption, the court shall presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of this Act unless and until it is disproved.” As such, if the aspect of not laying foundation to lead secondary evidence is kept aside, the adoption deed at Ex.P8 would entitle the Court to presume as above. When such a presumption is discharged, the burden of disproving the document or rebutting the same would shift upon the person who denies the adoption, who is respondent No.1/defendant No.1 in the instant case. 21. Apart from solely relying upon the Adoption Deed at Ex.P8, the alleged adoption can also be tested and verified upon the other available evidences also. 22. It is not in dispute that the parties to the suit belong to Hindu Raddy community and parties to the alleged adoption are from old Bombay Province area. According to the plaintiff and his evidence as PW1, there is a custom in their community of giving and taking in adoption, a person who is major in his age also. To support his evidence, PW1 has also produced and got marked certified copies of three adoption deeds at Exs. P16, P17 and P18. Further, according to the plaintiff, in the instant case, while adopting him, rituals were also followed and ceremony was performed. The said pleading was vouchsafed by defendant No.2, who is none else than the own brother of the plaintiff by birth. Moreover, PW2, who claims to be a relative for both the sides in the suit, has also supported the case of the plaintiff regarding the existence of the custom and performance of rituals in adopting the plaintiff by the propositus’s family. 23. Though the pleading and evidence of the parties are on the above lines, the cross-objector who is the respondent No.1 in the main appeal has objected to the same. It is the serious contention of the learned counsel for the respondent No.1 that the custom said to be prevailing in their community enabling the parties to adopt a person who is major in age has not been established. In his support, the learned counsel relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Salekh Chand (dead) by LRs Vs. Satya Gupta and Others reported in (2008) 13 SCC 119 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to essentials and burden of proving the existence of a custom is concerned, was pleased to observe that, the parties setting up a custom, must allege and prove the custom on which it relies. The custom in order to be binding must derive its force from the fact that by long usage it has obtained the force of law. The custom in order to be binding must derive its force from the fact that by long usage it has obtained the force of law. Thus, what must be proved is that the usage has been acted upon in practice for such a long period and with such invariability to show that it has, by common consent, been submitted to as the established governing rule of a particular locality. It was further observed in the same case that, in the English rule that “a custom in order that it may be legal and binding, must have been used so long that the memory of man runneth not to the contrary” should not be strictly applied to Indian conditions. Custom is a matter of fact and it must be established inductively and not be a priori method. It cannot be extended by analogy or enlarged by parity of reasoning. One custom cannot be deduced from another. The Hon’ble Apex Court further observed that, a custom may be proved by general evidence as to its existence by members of the tribe or family who would be cognizant of its existence or its exercise without controversy. 24. The learned counsel for the respondent No.1 also relied upon another judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Harnek Singh Vs. Pritam Singh & Ors. Reported in 2013 AIAR (Civil) 516. In the said case, regarding pleading and proving of custom, the Hon’ble Court was pleased to observe that, if any party wants the Court to rely on a custom, onus is on the party to plead the custom in the precise terms and lead evidence to establish the said custom. In the instant case, as already observed above, the plaintiff as PW1 and his witness who is PW2, have stated that there is a custom in their community of giving and taking in adoption a person who is above the age of 15 years. The pleading of the plaintiff in that regard has been admitted by the defendant No.2, who is supporting the case of the plaintiff. 25. The plaintiff has got produced certified copies of three adoption deeds at Exs. P16, P17 and P18. Ex.P16 is with respect to adoption said to have taken place on 22.04.1958, as could be seen in the said document. 25. The plaintiff has got produced certified copies of three adoption deeds at Exs. P16, P17 and P18. Ex.P16 is with respect to adoption said to have taken place on 22.04.1958, as could be seen in the said document. Ex.P17 shows the date of adoption as 22.04.1958 and Ex.P18 shows the date of adoption as 10.03.1988. According to the witnesses producing these documents, in all these three adoptions, the age of the adopted person was above 15 years age, which aspect has not been disputed from the defendants’ side. Apart from the same, PW1 in his evidence has stated that in his adoption, the rituals as prevailing in their Hindu Reddy community and the custom was followed. He was subjected to a thorough and searching cross-examination from the defendants’ side on this aspect, wherein he has stated that, at the time of adoption ceremony, a swamiji (head of religion) by name Basayya was summoned. He has named several other persons who were present in the said ceremony. 26. Similarly, PW2, in his evidence has given a detailed account as to what transpired at the time of adoption. In his cross-examination, some more details were elicited from the defendants’ side, wherein he has stated that adoption took place in the morning at about 10.00 am and at that time, rituals took place keeping the sacred fire in the middle through the head of their community. “XXXXXX” The said statement regarding conducting the rituals and the statement of the said witness that in their community adopting a person who is major in his age is permitted, has not been denied or disputed specifically in his cross-examination. 27. Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to make an observation regarding trustworthiness of the evidence of DW1. Defendant No.1 in the Court below was examined as DW1. She had also had filed a counter claim. Further, she is also a cross-objector in RFA Crob.No.107/2013. She is the only contesting defendant/respondent in the matter. 27. Before proceeding further, it is appropriate to make an observation regarding trustworthiness of the evidence of DW1. Defendant No.1 in the Court below was examined as DW1. She had also had filed a counter claim. Further, she is also a cross-objector in RFA Crob.No.107/2013. She is the only contesting defendant/respondent in the matter. Though she has given a detailed evidence denying the contentions raised by the plaintiff, more particularly with respect to the alleged adoption of the plaintiff by the propositus Goudappa, after she denied a suggestion made to her in her cross-examination from the plaintiff that she was also present when the adoption deed was executed and has subscribed her signature to it, few more questions were put to her from the plaintiff’s side in her cross-examination. The said portion of the evidence is reproduced hereinbelow: “XXXXXX” Her above statement, wherein she denied her alleged signatures in her Vakalath affidavit evidence would clearly go to show that she had only determined to deny each and every signature shown to her suggesting the same were her signatures. As such, the said conduct of the witness casts a shadow of suspicion about the truthfulness in her entire evidence. However, keeping the said aspect also aside, for the limited purpose, her evidence is being analysed in this judgment. 28. Thus, the evidence led from the plaintiff’s side establish that there is a custom in their community of adopting a person above the age of 15 years and that the plaintiff was given in adoption to the family of propositus by his natural father. It is not in dispute that by the time the plaintiff was given in adoption, his natural mother was not alive. As such, it is only the natural father, who had given him in adoption. In this juncture, the statement that has come out in the cross-examination of PW1 cannot be lost sight of. The said statement is reproduced hereinbelow:- “XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX” Thus, while making a suggestion that, as at the time of adoption the mental health of propositus Goudappa was not alright, the defendant No.1 has admitted that plaintiff was adopted by the said Goudappa. 29. Apart from the above, two more decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant herein can be looked into. In the case of Alturi Brahmanandam Vs. 29. Apart from the above, two more decisions relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant herein can be looked into. In the case of Alturi Brahmanandam Vs. Anne Sai Bapuji, reported in (2010) 14 SCC 466 , Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to proof of custom was pleased to observe that, normally all customs must be proved, exception to it is where High Court recognizes that a custom is prevailing in the State and is legal and valid and decision to such effect remaining unchallenged and binding, custom gets blended into law and proof thereof would become unnecessary under Section 57 of the Evidence Act. In the said case, the question was about the validity of adoption of a person who was above the age of 15 years in Kamma community in Andhra Pradesh. The Hon’ble Apex Court observing that the respondent before it had laid the said prevalence of custom by leading cogent and reliable evidence, however, the appellant had failed to challenge the said evidence and also to disprove the adoption. Moreover, in view of a decision of the Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in a case reported in 1964, recognizing such a custom in Andhra Pradesh as legal and valid, having remained binding till date, the Court observed that such a custom gets blended into law and proof thereof becomes unnecessary under Section 17 of the Evidence Act. Another judgment relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant in his argument is in the case of Kondiba Rama Papal alias Shrike (dead) by his heirs & LRs and another Vs. Narayana Kondiba Papal reported in AIR 1991 SC 1180 . In the said case, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to refer to the observation made by the High Court while allowing the plaintiff’s appeal that, so far as the Bombay State is concerned, the position is well settled in view of more than one judicial decision and as pointed out in Mulla’s Hindu Law, 14th Edition at page 550, that in the Bombay State a person may be adopted at any age though he may be older than the adopter and though he may be married and has children. Further, the Apex Court was pleased to observe that the plaintiff and the defendant belong to the area which was part of the old Bombay State and accordingly, the said custom prevailed amongst them as regards adoption of a child at any age. 30. In the instant case also, the parties belong to the area which was a part of old Bombay State. As such, adoption of a person at the age of 15 years had got legal recognition much earlier itself. However, the learned counsel for respondent No.1 placed before us a photocopy of a judgment of the learned Single Judge of this Court in Shivangouda Virupaxi Ganachari @ Patil Vs. Shrimanth Chinnappa Ganachari @ Patil and Others disposed of on 09.10.2007 (unreported), and drew our attention that the observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in Kondiba Rama’s case (supra) was not followed. The learned counsel while producing a photocopy of the order of the Hon’ble Apex Court, dated 12.08.2013, passed in SLP (Civil) No.24807/2008, which SLP was against Shivangouda Virupaxi Ganachari @ Patil’s case (supra), also submitted that the said Special Leave Petition was dismissed. With this, he submitted that the observation made in Kondiba Rama’s case that in old Bombay Province, there is a custom of adopting a boy above the age of 15 years was not recognized by the Hon’ble Supreme Court subsequently. 31. With great respect to those two judgments, it is observed that in the case of Shivangouda Virupaxi Ganachari @ Patil (supra), the Court did not deviate from the observation made in Kondiba Rama’s case (supra) by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it has only stated that in the case before it, so far as adoption is concerned, both the lower Courts had recorded a concurrent finding of fact to the effect that there was neither pleading nor proof to show that there was any custom or usage in the family of the plaintiff or for that matter, in the family of the adopted parents, a person aged more than 15 years has been taken in adoption. Further, in the said case, it was also observed that the plaintiff himself had not entered the witness box and therefore in the face of such situation occurring in the case on hand, the High Court observed that the lower Appellate Court had rightly observed at para 13 of its judgment that it was neither pleaded nor proved that in the area and community of the people, to which the plaintiff belongs that there is a custom of adoption of any age. While concluding it was categorically observed that in view of there being no pleading nor any proof, the adoption of the plaintiff could not be held to be valid. 32. Thus, the learned Single Judge did not change from the observation made in Kondiba Rama’s case (supra) but only stated that to apply the said principle in the case on had before him, there was neither any pleading nor evidence, as such, the observation made in Kondiba Rama’s case (supra) that in old Bombay State there is a custom enabling adoption of a person above 15 years has already got judicial recognization. 33. Apart from all these aspects, one more point which definitely requires to be noticed is the defendant No.1 as DW1 herself in her cross-examination has admitted a suggestion as true that in their Reddy community there is a custom of adoption of a person aged above 18 years. The said admission on the part of DW1 which is elicited in her cross-examination is reproduced hereinbelow:- “XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX” The admission of DW1 on these lines further go to establish the prevailing custom among the Hindu Reddy community on adoption of a person who is major in his age. 34. Thus, in the instant case, though the plaintiff Dundappa was at the age of 15 years as on the date of his adoption in the year 1983, still his community practicing the adoption of a person above 15 years of age has permitted for such adoption and the evidence led before the Court below has proved that the plaintiff Dundappa has been adopted by the propositus Goudappa duly performing the rituals and ceremonies prevailing in their community. Re: Whether Ancestral Property 35. The plaintiff in his plaint has contended that he is the exclusive owner of the suit schedule ‘A’ properties, which comprise three pieces of land and a house. Re: Whether Ancestral Property 35. The plaintiff in his plaint has contended that he is the exclusive owner of the suit schedule ‘A’ properties, which comprise three pieces of land and a house. No where in his plaint he has stated the mode of acquisition of those properties. However, by a reading of the plaint, it goes to show that he is claiming his exclusive ownership of those properties in his alleged capacity as the adoptive son of Goudappa. His evidence as PW.1 adds nothing more to his pleading except producing the copies of few revenue records, like, records of rights, extract of mutation entries, certified copies of mutation register from Exs.P1 to P14. However, the only document, which throws some light on the acquisition of the suit property in the family of the parties to the suit is the extract of mutation entry No.9032 dated 10.08.1956, which is at Ex.P10. Incidentally, the same document has also been relied upon, produced and got marked as Ex.D3 by defendant No.1 also. The said document, which both side are relying upon, go to show that property in R.S.No.1093 and 780, which are the suit schedule properties came to the share of propositus Goudappa under a family partition dated 12.07.1956, which came to be entered in the revenue records on 10.08.1956. Defendant No.1 in her written statement cum counter claim in the Court below also has not specifically stated as to whether the suit schedule properties are self acquired properties of Goudappa or ancestral properties to the parties. Throughout in her written statement, she has only used the word “owned” calling that the suit properties were owned by the propositus Goudappa Giriyappa Dasappanavar. However, as DW.1, she in her examination-in-chief has called the suit schedule properties as ancestral properties. It is because she has stated in her examination-in-chief as below:- “XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX” The same witness further in her examination-in-chief itself at para 5 has stated as below:- “XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX” Through the above statement DW.1 on her own, categorically stated that the suit schedule properties are ancestral properties and that no partition has taken place between the parties to the suit with respect to those properties. Form these points, it is clear that the suit schedule properties are ancestral properties. 36. Form these points, it is clear that the suit schedule properties are ancestral properties. 36. Learned counsel for the respondent, however in his argument relied upon three decisions of Hon’ble Supreme Court and submitted that the suit properties are self acquired properties of propositus Goudappa. The first case relied upon by the learned counsel in this regard is of Mallika Vs. Chandrappa reported in (2007) 5 AIR Kant R 283. In the said case with respect to succession under Hindu Law, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe that the property of the father, who had separated from his family were inherited and held by his sons after the death of their father and in their individual capacity son’s sons/son will have no right as coparceners. The said judgment was delivered referring to and following its own previous judgment in Commissioner of Wealth-tax, Khanpur Vs. Chander Sen reported in AIR 1986 SC 1753 . In the said case, after noticing the partition of the joint family business between the father and his only son, and son forming joint family with his own sons, the Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to observe that, after the death of father, amount standing to the credit of deceased father in account of the Firm devolves on son as his individual income and such income cannot be included in computing net wealth of son’s joint family. The third decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent is of Uttam Vs. Saubhag Singh and Others reported in (2016) 4 SCC 68 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court with respect to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, was pleased to observe that, after devolution of joint family property as per Section 8 of Hindu Succession Act, upon death of male Hindu intestate property would cease to be joint family property and said female heir and other coparcener succeeding to the same would hold their respective share in property as tenants-in-common and not as joint tenants. Therefore, grandson born after the death of male Hindu cannot maintain suit for partition claiming his share by division of alleged joint family property. 37. With great respect to the above three judgments, it is seen that the dispute in the suit under consideration is mainly among the children of propositus Goudappa. Therefore, grandson born after the death of male Hindu cannot maintain suit for partition claiming his share by division of alleged joint family property. 37. With great respect to the above three judgments, it is seen that the dispute in the suit under consideration is mainly among the children of propositus Goudappa. Further, the interest of any of the grandson, who is said to have born after the death of a male Hindu or the dispute regarding the wealth tax are not the elements in the case on hand. 38. On the other hand, as observed above, the evidence of PW1 and DW1 and the recognition of partition through mutation as per Ex.P10 and Ex.D3 clearly go to establish that the suit properties are ancestral properties and in spite of the alleged entries in the revenue records, like the records of rights and the house tax extract, which the parties have relied upon, the suit properties have not lost its character as ancestral property. Since, the alleged oral agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant No.1 as canvassed by the plaintiff in the Court below has not been established convincingly and the said point has not been pressed by either of the parties in this appeal, without much discussion on those aspects, it can be observed that the suit schedule properties under the dispute are the ancestral properties of the deceased Goudappa. 39. Consequently, the finding of the Court below on additional issue No.1, wherein it has held that defendant No.1 before it was entitled for ½ share, proves to be erroneous. Further, since the Court below even after noticing that mere entries in revenue record would not prove the title to the property still was carried away by those revenue entries itself, which led it to come to an erroneous conclusion to hold that defendant No.1 before it was entitled for ½ share in the property. 40. The above discussion shows that plaintiff, defendant No.1 and Smt. Kamalavva-the mother of defendant No.2 are the children of propositus Goudapa. Among those three children the plaintiff was the adopted son of propositus. The suit schedule ‘A’ properties being the ancestral properties inheritance to those property would be as per Hindu Succession Act, 1956, since the parties are Hindu by religion. 41. Among those three children the plaintiff was the adopted son of propositus. The suit schedule ‘A’ properties being the ancestral properties inheritance to those property would be as per Hindu Succession Act, 1956, since the parties are Hindu by religion. 41. According to the learned counsel for the plaintiff/appellant, propositus Goudappa died on 22.07.1997 and his both the daughters, Smt. Kamalavva and defendant No.1 i.e. Smt. Sundarawwa were born prior to 1956. As such, in the suit schedule ‘A’ properties, which are ancestral properties, Goudappa and the plaintiff Dundappa, who is the adopted son of propositus Goudappa will have ½ share each. After the death of said Goudappa and his wife Smt. Yamunavva, the undivided ½ share would devolve upon the plaintiff and both the defendants equally. In his support, he relied upon judgments reported in ILR 2010 KAR 1484 and 2015 AIR SCW 6160. 42. On the other hand, learned counsel for defendant No.1/Cross-objector, in his argument submitted that the devolution of property would not be as per survivorship and it is according to intestate succession under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. As such, both the parties to the litigation being Class-I heirs, the property would devolve upon them in the equal proportion at 1/3rd each. 43. It is not in dispute that, apart from the parties to the litigation being Hindus, propositus Goudappa died intestate. As already observed in the previous paragraphs, the suit schedule ‘A’ properties are ancestral properties. As such, it is Section 6 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956, which is applicable regarding devolution of interest in the coparcenary property. The said Section, prior to its amendment in the year 2005 and after its amendment under Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 with effect from the date 09.09.2005, reads as below:- Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act Section 6 on and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 6. Devolution of interest of coparcenary property. The said Section, prior to its amendment in the year 2005 and after its amendment under Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 with effect from the date 09.09.2005, reads as below:- Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act Section 6 on and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 6. Devolution of interest of coparcenary property. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: PROVIDED that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation I: For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2: Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. 6. Explanation 2: Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who has separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. 6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.- (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall,- (a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son; (b) have the same rights in the coparcenary property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenary property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (3) Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship, and the coparcenary property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place and, (a) the daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a son; (b) the share of the predeceased son or a predeceased daughter, as they would have got had they been alive at the time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such predeceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; and (c) the share of the predeceased child of a predeceased son or of a predeceased daughter, as such child would have got had he or she been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such predeceased child of the predeceased son or a predeceased daughter, as the case may be. Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation.- For the purposes of this sub-section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. (4) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, no court shall recognise any right to proceed against a son, grandson or great-grandson for the recovery of any debt due from his father, grandfather or greatgrandfather solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu law, of such son, grandson or greatgrandson to discharge any such debt: Provided that in the case of any debt contracted before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect- (a) the right of any creditor to proceed against the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be; or (b) any alienation made in respect of or in satisfaction of, any such debt, and any such right or alienation shall be enforceable under the rule of pious obligation in the same manner and to the same extent as it would have been enforceable as if the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 had not been enacted. Explanation.-For the purposes of clause (a), the expression “son”, "grandson" or “greatgrandson” shall be deemed to refer to the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be, who was born or adopted prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005. (5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004. Explanation.- For the purposes of this section "partition" means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a court.' Analyzing the above provisions of law prior to amendment and subsequent to its amendment in the year 2005, a coordinate Bench of this Court in Pushpalatha N.V. Vs. Padma and Others reported in ILR 2010 Kar 1484 was pleased to observe that, on a proper interpretation of Section 6 after its amendment, it follows that, when the status of a coparcener is conferred on the daughter on and from the date of commencement of Amendment Act. Padma and Others reported in ILR 2010 Kar 1484 was pleased to observe that, on a proper interpretation of Section 6 after its amendment, it follows that, when the status of a coparcener is conferred on the daughter on and from the date of commencement of Amendment Act. As the right is given to her by birth, she must have been born after 17.06.1956, the day on which the Act came into force. Thus, according to the said judgment the daughter of a coparcener, who is born after the Act came into force alone will be entitled to a right in the coparcenary property and not a daughter, who was born prior to 17.06.1956. 44. However, in a subsequent case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prakash and Others Vs. Phulavati and Others reported in 2015 AIR SCW 6160 : 2015(6) Kar.L.J. 177 (SC), though observed that the amendment under Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 is prospective, but the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9th September 2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born, before disposition or alienation including partitions, which may have taken place before 20th December 2004 as per law applicable prior to the said date will remain unaffected. Thus, the said interpretation of Hon’ble Apex Court shows that, for the application of the amended Section 6 of the said Act, both the coparcener and the daughters must be living as on 9th September 2005. 45. However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, subsequently in the year 2016 in the case of Uttam Vs. Saubhag Singh and Others reported in (2016) 4 SCC 68 in paragraph 18 of its judgment, was pleased to summarize the law relating to devolution of interest in coparcenary property governed by Mitakshara School prior to the amendment Act, 2005 as below: “The law, therefore, insofar as it applies to joint family property governed by the Mitakshara School, prior to the amendment of 2005, could therefore be summarized as follows:- (i) When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, having at the time of his death an interest in Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property will devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary (vide Section 6). (ii) To proposition (i), an exception is contained in Section 30 Explanation of the Act, making it clear that notwithstanding anything contained in the Act, the interest of a male Hindu in Mitakshara coparcenary property is property that can be disposed of by him by will or other testamentary disposition. (iii) A second exception engrafted on proposition (i) is contained in the proviso to Section 6, which states that if such a male Hindu had died leaving behind a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that Class who claims through such female relative surviving him, then the interest of the deceased in the coparcenary property would devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, and not by survivorship. (iv) In order to determine the share of the Hindu male coparcener who is governed by Section 6 proviso, a partition is effected by operation of law immediately before his death. In this partition, all the coparceners and the male Hindu’s widow get a share in the joint family property. (v) On the application of Section 8 of the Act, either by reason of the death of a male Hindu leaving selfacquired property or by the application of Section 6 proviso, such property would devolve only by intestacy and not survivorship. (vi) On a conjoint reading of Sections 4, 8 and 19 of the Act, after joint family property has been distributed in accordance with section 8 on principles of intestacy, the joint family property ceases to be joint family property in the hands of the various persons who have succeeded to it as they hold the property as tenants in common and not as joint tenants.” 46. Facts similar to the case on hand was also the fact in the case before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Anar Devi and Ors. Vs. Parmeshwari Devi and Ors. Reported in AIR 2006 SC 3332 . In that case also, the question involved was regarding devolution of interest in the coparcenary property, which property was an ancestral property. The deceased and his son were constituting coparcenary. The deceased also had two daughters, thus three children at the time of his death. The case was decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 18.09.2006 i.e., a year after Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into force. The deceased and his son were constituting coparcenary. The deceased also had two daughters, thus three children at the time of his death. The case was decided by the Hon’ble Apex Court on 18.09.2006 i.e., a year after Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into force. The Hon’ble Apex Court was pleased to hold in that case, that, the deceased and his son were constituting coparcenary, as such, notional partition has to be assumed between them before death of deceased original owner. Half interest of the deceased would devolve on his death upon three children i.e., son and two daughters. Daughters would have thus 1/6th share each and not 1/3rd share. 47. In the instant case, undisputedly as on 09.09.2005, propositus Goudappa was not alive. It is not in dispute that he died on the date 22.07.1997. Further, both his daughters Kamalawwa and Sundarawwa were also born prior to 1956. As such, notionally the coparcenary property will stand divided between the propositus Goudappa and his adopted son Dundappa/plaintiff in equal share. That share, which has gone to the part of deceased Goudappa would be his interest in the coparcenary property, which after his death will devolve upon Class-I heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. According to which, his wife Yamanawwa and adopted son Dundappa/plaintiff and two daughters Kamalawwa and Sundarawwa (defendant No.1) would get 1/4th of half share, which is the interest of Goudappa in the coparcenary property. Admittedly, wife of Goudappa i.e., Smt. Yamanawwa died on 01.11.2001. As such, her 1/4th share would be further divided equally between three children i.e., the plaintiff, Kamalawwa and defendant No.1. Thus, 1/3rd of 1/4th share of Yamanawwa in the half undivided share of deceased Goudappa would be 1/6th. Thus, in total, plaintiff Dundappa gets 1/2+1/8+1/24 = (12+3+1)/24 = 16/24 = 2/3, which is equivalent to 4/6. Defendant No.2 Doddappa, who is the successor to deceased Kamalawwa and defendant No.1 Sundarawwa each would get 1/8+1/24 = (3+1)/24 = 4/24 = 1/6. The total of all the three shares would be 4/6+1/6+1/6 = 6/6 = 1 unit, which is suit schedule ‘A’ property. 48. Defendant No.2 Doddappa, who is the successor to deceased Kamalawwa and defendant No.1 Sundarawwa each would get 1/8+1/24 = (3+1)/24 = 4/24 = 1/6. The total of all the three shares would be 4/6+1/6+1/6 = 6/6 = 1 unit, which is suit schedule ‘A’ property. 48. The Court below, even after observing that suit schedule ‘A’ property being coparcenary property was amenable to partition, has still committed an error in applying the correct principle of devolution of interest in the said coparcenary property, among the parties before it, which has resulted in passing an erroneous judgment decreeing the counter claim of the defendant No.1 before it and to hold that she was entitled to half share in the suit schedule property. Thus, the impugned judgment and decree deserves an interference at the hands of this Court and deserves modification in the form of alternation in the allocation of shares between the parties to the suit and dismissal of counter claim of defendant No.1 as well the cross-objection of the said defendant before this Court. 49. Accordingly, we proceed to pass the following order: ORDER : RFA No.4174/2012 is allowed in part. The judgment and decree dated 21.11.2012 passed by the Principal Senior Civil Judge, Bagalkote, in O.S.No.57/2010 is modified and it is hereby ordered and decreed that the plaintiff in the original suit is entitled for 4/6th share in the suit schedule ‘A’ properties and defendants No.1 and 2 in that suit are entitled for 1/6th share each in suit schedule ‘A’ properties. RFA Crob.No.109/2013 before this Court as well the counter claim of defendant No.1 in the Court below are dismissed. The remaining part of the decree under appeal remains unaltered. Draw modified preliminary decree accordingly.