JUDGMENT : DEVAN RAMACHANDRAN, J. 1. The jurisdictional contours and the amplitude of the power of suo motu revision authorised with the Deputy Commissioner under the provisions of Section 35 of the Kerala General Sales Tax Act (the KGST Act for brevity) has engaged the attention of this Court several times before. The power granted by the section being plenary in nature and seemingly without strict birdles, the courts have been extremely watchful in exercise of such power by the competent authority to ensure that the orders issued, under the power accorded, have been issued within the circumscribed parameters of the powers vested upon the Authority by the statute and that such orders restrict themselves to the strict confines of the jurisdictional ambit prescribed. 2. The factual circumstances of this case present a typical study as to the reach and ambit of the revisional power of the Deputy Commissioner in exercise of his powers under the KGST Act. A synoptic examination of the facts of this case would have to be first made before the issues relevant in this matter can be fructiferously examined. 3. The respondent herein, who is the assessee, claims to be the manufacturer of Indian Made Foreign Liquor and is registered as a dealer under the provisions of the KGST Act. The turnover tax assessment of the assessee for the years 2000-01 and 2004-05 were completed by the Assessing Authority as is evidenced from Exhibits P1 to P5 orders produced along with the writ petition. These orders were subjected to rectification and the said orders are produced as Exhibits P6 to P10. Aggrieved by the assessment orders, the assessee invoked the statutory appellate jurisdiction of the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) who ordered certain modifications to the assessments by a common order dated 20.06.2007, namely Exhibit P11. Subsequent to the order of the Appellate Authority and in order to give effect to the same, the Assessing Authority issued fresh assessment orders, which are seen produced along with the writ petition as Exhibits P12 to P16. 4. It is at this stage that the controversy in this case has its rudiment. Subsequent to the order of the Appellate Authority and in order to give effect to the same, the Assessing Authority issued fresh assessment orders, which are seen produced along with the writ petition as Exhibits P12 to P16. 4. It is at this stage that the controversy in this case has its rudiment. The Deputy Commissioner noticing that the fresh assessment orders passed by the Assessing Authority, even though had reckoned the turnover in consonance with the directions contained in the appellate order, however, did not add the applicable excise duty component on the turnover while computing the tax liability of the petitioner, invoked the revisional power available in him and issued Exhibits P23 to P27 orders holding that the assessment orders were prejudicial to the Revenue. 5. The petitioner impugns the orders of the Deputy Commissioner issued under Section 35 singularly on the assertion that since the assessment orders had been issued by the Assessing Authority in compliance and consonance with the orders in appeal issued by the Appellate Authority, the action of the Deputy Commissioner in making a suo motu revision against such orders would amount to trenching and trespassing into the areas forbidden to him jurisdictionally but reserved for the domain of the Appellate Authority. The appellant, in essential, contends that the revisional authority had no jurisdiction to invoke Section 35 of the KGST Act and if at all the Revenue had any misapprehension regarding the assessment orders, they ought to have filed appeals against the first appellate order because all that the Assessing Authority had done was to give effect to the directions contained in the appellate order. 6. We see that the learned Single Judge had accepted the contentions of the petitioner and had allowed the writ petition holding that the impugned orders were issued by the Deputy Commissioner without jurisdiction and in excess of the jurisdiction granted to him under the provisions of Section 35 of the KGST Act. The State of Kerala has, therefore, impugned the judgment of the learned Single Judge in this appeal on the primary avouchment that the revisional authority has acted well within the powers available to them under Section 35(2A) of the KGST Act. 7. The State of Kerala has, therefore, impugned the judgment of the learned Single Judge in this appeal on the primary avouchment that the revisional authority has acted well within the powers available to them under Section 35(2A) of the KGST Act. 7. Since the point of departure in this appeal revolves around the manner in which and the environs within which the Deputy Commissioner could have exercised suo motu revisional powers vested with him under Section 35(2A) of the KGST Act, particularly because the assessment orders had already been subjected to appeals before the First Appellate Authority, we deem it appropriate that the said section be read in whole and for such purpose, we extract the same as under: "35(2A): Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2), the Deputy commissioner may pass an order under sub-section (1) on any point which has not been decided in an appeal or revision referred to in Clause (b) of sub-section (2), before the expiry of a period of one year from the date of the order in such appeal or revision or before the expiry of the period of four years referred to in Clause (c) of the sub-section, whichever is later." 8. It is obvious from Section 35(2A) of the KGST Act that the Deputy Commissioner has been endued with the power to pass orders under sub-section (1) of Section 35 on any point which has not been decided in appeal or revision. Therefore, the examination as to whether the impugned orders suffer from error in jurisdiction or excess of jurisdiction would be axiomatically dependent on the answer to the question as to if the Deputy Commissioner has trenched upon or trespassed into the issues that had been decided by the Appellate Authority and recorded in the order in appeal. 9. Before we enter into such an enquiry, we deem it apposite that we notice the precedents on this area of law as decided by this Court as well as by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, which would give us an insight as to how the powers of the Deputy Commissioner, relating to suo motu revision, have to be reconciled harmoniously within the Scheme of the KGST Act, when statutory appeals have concluded or are pending with respect to the assessment orders. 10. 10. The earliest of the judgments that we have been able to see, which was delivered by a Division Bench of this Court is State of Kerala v. K.M. Charia Abdullah & Co. AIR 1965 SC 1585 , wherein this Court had declared unambiguously as under: "The revisional power has to be exercised for ascertaining whether the order passed is illegal or improper or the proceeding recorded is irregular and it is in aid of that power that such orders may be passed as the authority may think fit. One of the inquiries in considering the legality or propriety of the orders passed by the subordinate officer which the revising or the appellate authority may make is about the correctness of the tax levied and if after perusing the record the authority is prima facie satisfied about the illegality or impropriety of the order or about the irregularity of the proceeding, it may in passing its order direct an additional enquiry." 11. Subsequently, in the year 1969, these issues were again brought to the notice of this Court and after considering the impact of several Supreme Court judgments on the issue, which were also with respect to the suo motu revisional powers in certain tax statutes of other States, this Court summarised the position in O. Kassim Kannu v. State of Kerala, (1970) 26 STC 530 (Ker.) as under: "We summarise hereunder the effect of the five Supreme Court decisions discussed by us on the question before us in the following manner : that the revisional power of the Deputy Commissioner and the power of the Sales Tax Officer to assess escaped turnover are two different and distinct powers-two independent jurisdictions; that these two powers operate in two different fields; that the power of revision of the Deputy Commissioner cannot trench upon the power of the Sales Tax Officer to assess escaped turnover; and that in exercising the revisional power, the Deputy Commissioner may call for the records and, on perusing them, if he finds that the order of the Sales Tax Officer is illegal, irregular or improper, may direct even a further investigation, but such further investigation cannot trench upon any power conferred by the Act or the Rules on any other authority, more particularly, the power of the Sales Tax Officer to assess escaped turnover. In other words, the revisional power of the Deputy Commissioner, including the power of further investigation, is to be used only to correct the illegality, irregularity or impropriety of the order which he is entitled to revise and is not to be used in another field or jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Sales Tax Officer to assess escaped turnover." 12. A quarter of century later, Section 35(2A) of the KGST Act came up for pointed consideration before another Bench of this Court with specific reference to the powers of suo motu revision, vis-a-vis the power of the Assessing Authority under the provisions relating to assessment of escaped turnover in Deputy Commissioner of Sales Tax (Law) v. Cherian P. Varghese, 1995 (1) ILR (Ker.) 764. This Court was very clear that the authority exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 35 of the KGST Act cannot be allowed to trench on the appellate power and that none of the issues that came up for decision or have been decided by the Appellate Authority could be even considered by the authority exercising the revisional jurisdiction. This Court noticed that the provisions of Section 35 of the KGST Act are intended to confer an extra ordinary power and is, therefore, couched in wide language. Their Lordships then went on to declare the position as under: "A balancing of these considerations is required in deciding the issue before us. If a particular point is not likely to arise for decision at all before the appellate authorities or before this court because of the nature of the decision rendered by the assessing or other authority we are of the opinion that the Deputy Commissioner could exercise his power of revision under sub-section (2A) even during the pendency of an appeal or revision, without waiting for the termination of these proceedings. Else recovery of revenue due to the State and on which perhaps there could be no dispute, will remain put off merely because of the pendency of statutory appellate or revisional proceedings on other points. At the same time, if the matter is in issue before an appellate authority, or there is a likelihood of the appellate authority speaking on the point, the exercise of the revisional power is precluded." 13. At the same time, if the matter is in issue before an appellate authority, or there is a likelihood of the appellate authority speaking on the point, the exercise of the revisional power is precluded." 13. In fact, what is of immediate interest was that the Bench went to the extent of saying that even when an appeal is pending, the revisional power under Section 35 could be exercised by the Deputy Commissioner on an issue that was not raised in the appeal or is likely to be raised in the appeal. The pertinent consideration, therefore, is whether that particular issue is pending in appeal or if there is any likelihood of the Appellate Authority dealing with that point in such a appeal. This Court summarised the several facets and concluded that looking at the section as it stands, the only fetter on the Deputy commissioner is a de novo existence of the decision on the point by either of the Appellate Authority or by this Court and that if such decision does not exist in fact, it will be open for the Deputy Commissioner to exercise his revisional power on that point. 14. We are heartened that, in our further search, we were able to see the most relevant precedent that would lighten and guide our way. We see that in the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Deputy Commissioner v. Cochin Agencies, 1989 (1) KLT 98 , their Lordships were concerning themselves with the impact of the same section as is involved in this case, namely Section 35(2A) of the KGST Act, in its ambit and reach, in the context of virtually the same set of facts as we are concerned with. 15. Quad hoc the facts of that case, the order of the assessment was made subject to an appeal and the Appellate Authority had passed certain orders. In the meanwhile, the Deputy Commissioner noticed that the assessee had paid the excise duty but that it was totally ignored in arriving at the total turnover in the assessment. He, therefore, initiated suo motu proceedings under Section 35 of the KGST Act, which was assailed by the assessee. Their Lordships considered the validity of such proceedings in the context of the facts submitted therein and held with affirmation as under: "Under section 19, power to assess an escaped turnover is vested in the assessing authority. He, therefore, initiated suo motu proceedings under Section 35 of the KGST Act, which was assailed by the assessee. Their Lordships considered the validity of such proceedings in the context of the facts submitted therein and held with affirmation as under: "Under section 19, power to assess an escaped turnover is vested in the assessing authority. Section 35, on the other hand, confers power of revision upon the Deputy Commissioner. He may exercise such power suo motu for calling for and examining any order passed or proceeding recorded under the Act and for correcting any illegality, irregularity or impropriety which might have crept into the order passed or proceeding recorded by an Inspecting Assistant Commissioner or any officer or authority below him. The power of the assessing authority under section 19 to assess an escaped turnover is distinct and different from the revisional power of the Deputy Commissioner under section 35. While the revisional power is restricted to the examination of the records for determining whether the order of assessment was according to law, the power to assess escaped turnover can be exercised in matters de hors the record of assessment proceedings. These two sections therefore relate to different jurisdiction and different matters. A valid order under the one is not an infringement of the power under the other." 16. The declaration of law as above by the Hon'ble Supreme Court is of singular importance to us because we are dealing with a situation in this case similar to that which was presented before their Lordships in Cochin Agencies (supra). In the case of Cochin Agencies, their Lordships granted an imprimatur to the exercise of powers by the Deputy Commissioner under Section 35 of the KGST Act, as per which, he had revised the original assessment order, even though it had been already tested in appeal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has approved this because the amount of excise duty paid by the assessee in that case was never an issue in the appellate proceedings since it was not included in the original assessment itself. Therefore, any decision by the Appellate Authority in that case could only be with respect to the assessment made by the Assessing Authority and that could be the only subject of the appeal. Therefore, any decision by the Appellate Authority in that case could only be with respect to the assessment made by the Assessing Authority and that could be the only subject of the appeal. The excise duty component had not been added in the assessment order which could have thus never been an issue before the Appellate Authority. This was specifically noticed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and therefore, the action of the Deputy Commissioner in revising the original assessment order was found to be valid and legally permissible. 17. The facts in this case that we are now handling would perhaps be on a better footing than the facts in the Cochin Agencies (supra). In this case, the Assessing Authority had originally completed the assessment taking into account the declared turnover, additions under Section 5A of the KGST Act with respect to the sales turnover and the applicable excise duty component. The assessee had challenged the assessment orders only on the ground that the additions for raw materials made under Section 5A was unnecessary and improper. The Appellate Authority called for a report from the Assessing Authority under the provisions of Rule 38(4) of the Kerala Value Added Tax Rules ('the Rules' for brevity) and concluded that the additions made under Section 5A was without legal sanction. He, therefore, ordered in the appeal that the turnover be computed without reckoning the additions for raw materials made under Section 5A of the KGST Act. The Assessing Authority was, thus, directed to re-work the total taxable turnover based on the report made by him under Rule 38(4) of the Rules. However, the Assessing Authority, while making the consequential assessment order, omitted to include the applicable excise duty component to the sale of IMFL and completed the assessment. This mistake was noticed by the Deputy Commissioner and he, therefore, invoked his powers under Section 35(2A) of the KGST Act to revise the assessment orders and directed that the applicable excise duty component be added on the total table turnover and compute the total turnover after such addition. It is this order that is impugned by the assesse. 18. This mistake was noticed by the Deputy Commissioner and he, therefore, invoked his powers under Section 35(2A) of the KGST Act to revise the assessment orders and directed that the applicable excise duty component be added on the total table turnover and compute the total turnover after such addition. It is this order that is impugned by the assesse. 18. The assessee's vehement claim is that since the second assessment order had been made by the Assessing Authority in obedience to the directions in the appellate order, exercise of revisional power against the same would amount to trenching upon, by the Deputy Commissioner, on the powers of the First Appellate Authority. The contention of the assessee is very simple. According to them, since the assessment orders have been made consequent to the appellate order, if the Revenue had any complaint against the assessment, they ought to have filed an appeal before the Second Appellate Authority and that instead of doing so, the Deputy Commissioner could not have revised the assessment order suo motu, thus arrogating to himself the powers that are akin to a Second Appellate Authority. The contentions of the appellants would appear, in the first view, to be attractive. But, on a closer examination of the same, it is obvious that it would loose its sheen. 19. As we have already noticed above, the original assessment order had three components, namely, the declared turnover, the additions towards raw-materials under Section 5A and the applicable excise duty, which is 100% of the declared turnover as per the provisions of the Kerala Abkari Act. It must be immediately kept in mind that the charge of excise duty is virtually automatic and charged at the rate of 100% of the turnover that is computed. The assessee had challenged the initial assessment order complaining only about the addition made under Section 5A with respect to the raw material, but did not and obviously could not have, in any manner, challenged the charge of excise duty which was a statutorily mandated automatic charge of 100% of the turnover computed as per the provisions of the Abkari Act. The charge of excise duty was not an issue before the Appellate Authority. Nor was it in any manner or at any point considered by such Authority while passing orders in appeal. The charge of excise duty was not an issue before the Appellate Authority. Nor was it in any manner or at any point considered by such Authority while passing orders in appeal. Even the report that was called for by the Appellate Authority under Rule 38(4) of the KVAT Rules from the Assessing Authority was only with respect to the turnover and its calculation as is discernible from the records and returns of the assessee. The report so submitted by the Assessing Authority did not, even passingly, deal with the charge of applicable excise duty, which, as we have stated above, is an automatic statutory charge of 100% of the declared turnover. The Appellate Authority had only directed the Assessing Authority to re-work the total turnover on the basis of the report made by him under Rule 38(4). The Appellate Authority certainly did not, at any point of time, direct that the charge of excise duty be excluded and we are sure that, it being statutory in character, even if the Appellate Authority so wanted, he could not have ordered such exclusion. 20. However, the Assessing Authority, while re-computing the total taxable turnover after the remand ordered by the Appellate Authority, omitted to charge the applicable excise duty which, as per Section 5(2)(c) of the Act, would become part of the turnover and applicable tax would have to be charged on such total turnover. This was obviously and perceptibly a clear mistake. The Deputy Commissioner noticing this, acted within the time available to him for initiating suo motu revision and made the impugned orders since indubitably they were prejudicial to the Revenue. 21. We are firm in our opinion that he was entitled to exercise his jurisdiction because the Assessing Authority had, while making the fresh assessment orders after remand, omitted to charge the excise duty component which was impermissible and illegal as per the provisions of the Kerala Abkari Act and the Deputy Commissioner was only rectifying the obvious mistake committed by the Assessing Authority. 22. As was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Cochin Agencies (supra), generally, it is true that the determination of total turnover is the ultimate issue in every appeal, but it is possible that sometimes specific issues are raised without raising others. 22. As was observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Cochin Agencies (supra), generally, it is true that the determination of total turnover is the ultimate issue in every appeal, but it is possible that sometimes specific issues are raised without raising others. In this case also what was raised was the issue of addition under Section 5A and not the charge of the applicable excise duty. This issue not having been raised or impliedly raised in this appeal, there is no doubt that the Deputy Commissioner would be entitled to exercise his jurisdiction validly under Section 35 (2A) of the KGST Act. 23. We are, therefore, of the view that this is a case where the competent authority has exercised the jurisdiction vested in it and has acted within the circumscribed parameters of such power. In such summation of the factual and legal perspectives, we see no reason and we do not find any way to hold or even to suspect that the orders impugned in this appeal suffers from any infirmity or illegality or excess of jurisdiction and we, therefore, have no hesitation in holding that it is issued in valid exercise of power and with full and due application of mind. This is signally so because if this has not been done, it would have assuredly led to loss of revenue of the amount of tax, legitimately to be charged on the total turnover, statutorily reckoned with the addition of excise duty component. 24. We are aware that the assessee has an alternative remedy against the impugned orders under the provisions of the Statute. We do not want to frustrate that in any manner. We have confined ourselves in this judgment to the enquiry as to whether revisional jurisdiction has been exercised by the Deputy Commissioner validly and as to whether such exercise is within his powers under the provisions of Section 35(2A) of the KGST Act. We do not propose to go into the correctness or otherwise of the orders that are impugned except holding that jurisdictionally the Deputy Commissioner was entitled and irreproachable in exercising jurisdiction under Section 35(2A) of the KGST Act in the facts of this case. If the assessee is desirous of challenging the impugned orders on its merits, he is at liberty to do so invoking the remedies available to him under the KGST Act. If the assessee is desirous of challenging the impugned orders on its merits, he is at liberty to do so invoking the remedies available to him under the KGST Act. We make it clear that we have not considered the correctness or otherwise of the impugned orders in this proceedings. This appeal is thus allowed, vacating the impugned judgment of the learned Single Judge. In the facts and circumstances of this case, we, however, make no order as to costs and the parties are directed to suffer their respective costs.