Jijo v. Regional Transport Authority Ernakulam, represented by it Secretary
2017-08-02
A.HARIPRASAD
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. Predominant common question arising in these cases is whether a temporary permit to ply a stage carriage with an overlapping sector greater than permitted by a nationalization scheme be granted to a private bus operator? 2. Considering commonality in the issues and identity of the parties, all these cases were heard together. O.P.(C) No.1827 of 2017 filed by the Kerala State Road Transport Corporation, Thiruvananthapuram (in short, “KSRTC”) is taken as the leading case. 4th respondent in the above petition is the petitioner in O.P.(C) No.581 of 2017. Petitioner in O.P.(C) No.1784 does not figure in the leading case. But, he is impleaded as additional 7th respondent in O.P.(C) No.581 of 2017. 3. All the petitioners are aggrieved by Ext.P5 order dated 11.01.2017 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal (in short, “STAT”) in M.V.A.R.P.No.53 of 2016. 4. Relevant short facts are thus: KSRTC is a State Transport Undertaking (in short, “STU”) established under Section 3 of the Road Transport Corporation Act. 1st respondent filed an application for a temporary permit under the proviso to Section 104 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (in short, “the Act”) through a route, Pallissery-Perumbavoor. Total route length is 28 kms. Out of which a portion of 13 kms. From Perumbavoor-Angamaly objectionably overlaps Kottayam-Kozhikode route notified vide G.O.(P) No.42/2009/Tran. dated 14.07.2009 (Ext.P8). 1st respondent's application for a temporary permit was rejected by the 2nd respondent, stating that the proviso to Section 104 of the Act is not applicable to the said route. Ext.P1 is the order passed by the 2nd respondent. Against Ext.P1, 1st respondent filed M.V.A.R.P.No.53 of 2016 before the STAT. Copy of the petition is produced as Ext.P2. KSRTC filed objection in Ext.P2 petition, which is marked as Ext.P3. After considering the objection, STAT dismissed the interim application for a temporary permit as per Ext.P4 order. Subsequently, the matter was heard by the STAT and the revision petition was allowed in part, remanding the case to the 2nd respondent with certain observations. That order is Ext.P5, which is impugned in the petitions. Consequent to the directions in Ext.P5, the 2nd respondent allowed the application by the 1st respondent for a temporary permit by order dated 23.02.2017(Ext.P6). 5. KSRTC contended that as a matter of fact they are conducting large number of trips through the notified route Angamaly-Perumbavoor. Details of the services operated through Angamaly-Perumbavoor have been produced as Ext.P7.
Consequent to the directions in Ext.P5, the 2nd respondent allowed the application by the 1st respondent for a temporary permit by order dated 23.02.2017(Ext.P6). 5. KSRTC contended that as a matter of fact they are conducting large number of trips through the notified route Angamaly-Perumbavoor. Details of the services operated through Angamaly-Perumbavoor have been produced as Ext.P7. Later, Ext.P8 has been modified by the Government as per Ext.P9 order. 6. Petitioner in O.P.(C) No.1784 of 2017 also challenged the grant of a temporary permit in favour of the 1st respondent. It is the contention of the petitioners in O.P.(C) Nos.1784 of 2017 and 581 of 2017 that one Jolly Thomas was holding a regular permit on the route Pallissery-Perumbavoor for a stage carriage No.KL-08/K 7025 and it was valid till 05.06.2010. The permit holder surrendered the permit on 28.04.2007 and obtained a clearance certificate. Suppressing these facts Jolly Thomas filed an application for renewal of the permit. By contending that his application for permit was pending, he secured temporary permits continuously. Jolly Thomas's application for regular permit was rejected by the RTA. 1st respondent is a henchman of Jolly Thomas. Contention raised by the 1st respondent that no service is operating on the route Pallissery-Angamaly-Perumbavoor by the KSRTC and other private operators and therefore the travelling public are put to difficulties is untrue. In fact, the petitioner in O.P.(C) No.1784 of 2017 himself is a regular permit holder operating service through Pallissery-Perumbavoor. Ext.P5 order is legally unsustainable. 7. Petitioner in O.P.(C) No.581 of 2017 also strongly challenged the maintainability of Ext.P5. He is a regular stage carriage permit holder operating on the route Perumbavoor-Poothamkutty. According to this petitioner, 1st respondent is the direct maternal uncle and a benami of Jolly Thomas who surrendered his regular permit. 1st respondent is acting for and on behalf of Jolly Thomas and trying to get a temporary permit against the provisions of law. 8. 1st respondent strongly opposed the averments in the petitions. It is contended by him that the existing permit holders have no right to challenge the grant of permit. There was a regular service operated on the route Pallissery-Perumbavoor with a settled set of timings. This was the only direct service on the route to cater needs of the passengers. Holder of the said permit surrendered it.
It is contended by him that the existing permit holders have no right to challenge the grant of permit. There was a regular service operated on the route Pallissery-Perumbavoor with a settled set of timings. This was the only direct service on the route to cater needs of the passengers. Holder of the said permit surrendered it. When the route became vacant, various operators took temporary permits in its place for plying stage carriages. In the meantime, a scheme of nationalization was published by the Government by which a portion of the route fell in a notified sector. As a result of this, the authorities became disentitled to grant a regular permit or temporary permit under Section 87 of the Act. As the route was lying vacant, 1st respondent filed an application for grant of a temporary permit to operate in the place of the regular service abandoned by Jolly Thomas by invoking proviso to Section 104 of the Act. According to the 1st respondent, this provision enabled the authorities to grant a temporary permit even covering a portion of the notified sector as it is only a temporary arrangement for a limited period fixed or till the STU apply and obtain a regular permit on the route. 1st respondent contended that Ext.P5 order is valid in all respects and grant of a temporary permit in his favour vide Ext.P6, pursuant to Ext.P5, is in compliance with the legal provisions. 9. Heard Sri. P.C. Chacko, learned Standing Counsel for the KSRTC; Sri. K.V. Gopinathan Nair, learned counsel for the 1st respondent; Sri. O.D. Sivadas, learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P.(C) No.1784 of 2017; Smt. R. Padmakumari, learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P.(C) No.581 of 2017 and Sri. M.I. Johnson, learned Senior Government Pleader. Perused the detailed argument notes submitted by the learned counsel for the contesting parties. 10. Before dealing with facts, it will be apposite for me to take note of some relevant provisions in the Act.
M.I. Johnson, learned Senior Government Pleader. Perused the detailed argument notes submitted by the learned counsel for the contesting parties. 10. Before dealing with facts, it will be apposite for me to take note of some relevant provisions in the Act. Section 2(1) of the Act defines “area” in the following words: ““rea”, in relation to any provision of this Act, means such area as the State Government may, having regard to the requirements of that provision, specify by notification in the Official Gazette” Section 2(31) defines “permit” thus: “ “permit” means a permit issued by a State or Regional Transport Authority or an authority prescribed in this behalf under this Act authorizing the use of a motor vehicle as a transport vehicle” Section 2(38) defines “route” in the following manner: “ “route” means a line of travel which specifies the highway which may be traversed by a motor vehicle between one terminus and another” Section 87 of the Act is about grant of temporary permits. It is quoted hereunder for clarity: “Temporary permits.-(1) A Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Authority may without following the procedure laid down in Section 80, grant permits to be effective for a limited period which shall, not in any case exceed four months, to authorise the use of a transport vehicle temporarily- (a) for the conveyance of passengers on special occasions such as to and from fairs and religious gatherings, or (b) for the purposes of a seasonal business, or (c) to meet a particular temporary need, or (d) pending decision on an application for the renewal of a permit, and may attach to any such permit such condition as it may think fit: Provided that a Regional Transport Authority or, as the case may be, State Transport Authority may, in the case of goods carriages, under the circumstances of an exceptional nature, and for reasons to be recorded in writing, grant a permit for a period exceeding four months, but not exceeding one year.
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), a temporary permit may be granted thereunder in respect of any route or area where- (i) no permit could be issued under Section 72 or Section 74 or Section 76 or Section 79 in respect of that route or area by reason of an order of a Court or other competent authority restraining the issue of the same, for a period not exceeding the period for which the issue of the permit has been so restrained; or (ii) as a result of the suspension by a Court or other competent authority of the permit of any vehicle in respect of that route or area, there is no transport vehicle of the same class with a valid permit in respect of that route or area, or there is no adequate number of such vehicles in respect of that route or area, for a period not exceeding the period of such suspension: Provided that the number of transport vehicles in respect of which temporary permits are so granted shall not exceed the number of vehicles in respect of which the issue of the permits have been restrained or, as the case may be, the permit has been suspended.” This provision, along with other provisions relating to the grant of permits, falls within Chapter V bearing a heading “Control of transport vehicles”. 11. Chapter VI of the Act specifies about special provisions relating to State Transport Undertakings. That Chapter takes in Sections 97 to 108. It is indisputable that the Sections falling under Chapter VI form a separate class with a distinct purpose. So, they must be interpreted according to the intent and purport for which they are enacted. Section 99 is all about preparation and publication of nationalization schemes.
That Chapter takes in Sections 97 to 108. It is indisputable that the Sections falling under Chapter VI form a separate class with a distinct purpose. So, they must be interpreted according to the intent and purport for which they are enacted. Section 99 is all about preparation and publication of nationalization schemes. It reads thus: “Preparation and publication of proposal regarding road transport service of a State transport undertaking.-(1) Where any State Government is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State Government may formulate a proposal regarding a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and other relevant particulars respecting thereto and shall publish such proposal in the Official Gazette of the State formulating such proposal and in not less than one newspaper in the regional language circulating in the area or route proposed to be covered by such scheme and also in such other manner as the State Government formulating such proposal deem fit. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), when a proposal is published under that sub-section, then from the date of publication of such proposal, no permit shall be granted to any person, except a temporary permit during the pendency of the proposal and such temporary permit shall be valid only for a period of one year from the date of its issue or till the date of final publication of the scheme under Section 100, whichever is earlier.” Pursuant to the empowerment, the State Government on 14.07.2009 issued a notification by invoking Sub-section (2) of Section 100 of the Act which is produced as Ext.P8. It is an admitted case that subsequently Ext.P8 scheme was modified by Ext.P9 notification dated 23.03.2017. I need not venture to adjudicate the cases with reference to Ext.P9 because Ext.P5 and other proceedings touching these cases were before 23.03.2017 and so much so, it could only be decided as per the provisions in Ext.P8. 12.
It is an admitted case that subsequently Ext.P8 scheme was modified by Ext.P9 notification dated 23.03.2017. I need not venture to adjudicate the cases with reference to Ext.P9 because Ext.P5 and other proceedings touching these cases were before 23.03.2017 and so much so, it could only be decided as per the provisions in Ext.P8. 12. Section 104 of the Act is very much relevant for our purpose. Hence it is quoted hereunder: “Restriction on grant of permits in respect of a notified area or notified route.- Where a scheme has been published under sub-section (3) of Section 100 in respect of any notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, shall not grant any permit except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme: Provided that where no application for a permit has been made by the State transport undertaking in respect of any notified area or notified route in pursuance of an approved scheme, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may grant temporary permits to any person in respect of such notified area or notified route subject to the condition that such permit shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to the State transport undertaking in respect of that area or route.” 13. On a plain reading of the Section it is discernible that once a scheme has been published in respect of a notified area or notified route, the transport authorities shall not grant any permit, except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. Substantive part of the Section prohibits grant of regular permits against the terms of the scheme. But, the proviso attached to the Section carves out an exception. 14. Unchallengeable principle is that the normal function of a proviso is to except something out of the enactment or to qualify something enacted therein, which, but for the proviso, would be within the purview of the enactment (see Kedarnath Jute Manufacturing Co. Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer - AIR 1966 SC 12 ; Kush Sanghal v. M.C.Mitter - AIR 2000 SC 1390 and Haryana State Co-op. Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana State Co-op. Land Development Bank Employees Union - (2004) 1 SCC 574 ).
Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer - AIR 1966 SC 12 ; Kush Sanghal v. M.C.Mitter - AIR 2000 SC 1390 and Haryana State Co-op. Land Development Bank Ltd. v. Haryana State Co-op. Land Development Bank Employees Union - (2004) 1 SCC 574 ). Supreme Court in Shah Bhojraj Kuverji Oil Mills and Ginning Factory v. Subha Chandra Yograj Sinha ( AIR 1961 SC 1596 ) held that as a general rule, a proviso is added to an enactment to qualify or create an exception to what is in the enactment, and ordinarily, a proviso is not interpreted as stating a general rule. 15. Another relevant principle is that the language of a proviso, even if general, is normally to be construed in relation to the subject matter covered by the Section to which the proviso is appended. 16. Yet another well settled proposition is that except as to a case dealt with by it, a proviso has no repercussion on the interpretation of the enacting portion of the Section so as to exclude something by implication which is embraced by clear words in the enactment (see CIT, Mysore v. Indo Mercantile Bank Ltd - AIR 1959 SC 713 ). 17. In my view, if the above principles are applied to Section 104 of the Act, the proviso therein will certainly carve out an exception to the law enunciated in the Section. It will be all the more clear when we remember the legal principles that the scheme is a law in itself and the rights of the affected parties are to be decided with reference to the provisions in the scheme. 18. On a close reading of the proviso, it can be seen that when no application for permit has been made by STU in respect of a notified route in pursuance of a scheme, the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, may grant temporary permits to any person in respect of such notified route. If temporary permit can be granted to a notified route as stated above, how can there be an embargo in granting a temporary permit with a portion overlapping on a notified route? This question can be answered only in the negative. Only limitation prescribed is that such a permit shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to STU in respect of that route.
This question can be answered only in the negative. Only limitation prescribed is that such a permit shall cease to be effective on the issue of a permit to STU in respect of that route. There is absolutely no ambiguity in this regard. 19. Now, if we peruse Ext.P8 scheme, it can be seen that what is intended by the scheme is the regulation of regular permits. There is no mention in Ext.P8 against the operation of proviso to Section 104 of the Act. 20. It is strongly contended by the petitioners that a temporary permit for operating a stage carriage cannot be granted to a private bus operator by invoking the proviso to Section 104 of the Act when it overlaps a notified route more than 5 kms. or 5% of length of the route whichever is less. For arguing this proposition Clause 5(c) in Ext.P8 scheme is relied on. Per contra, learned counsel for 1st respondent would contend that Ext.P8 scheme applied only in the matter of granting regular permits and it does not apply to temporary permits. It is further contended by the learned counsel that various clauses in Ext.P8 clearly shows that the scheme becomes operational depending upon traffic demand. It can be seen from Ext.P8 that 31 routes have been specified as part of the scheme. For the aforementioned reasons, I am of the view that the contentions of the learned counsel for the petitioners are fallacious and therefore legally unacceptable. 21. Now, I shall consider the decisions cited at the Bar. 22. Relying on the decision in Adarsh Travels Bus Service v. State of U.P. ( (1985) 4 SCC 557 ), it is contended that where a scheme is published in respect of a notified route, a private operator having a valid permit for a different route cannot operate a stage carriage over that part of his route which overlaps the notified route even without picking up or dropping passengers on the overlapping part, if the scheme does not permit the same. The decision was rendered in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Some provisions of the old Act are pari materia to the provisions in Chapter VI of the present Act.
The decision was rendered in the context of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Some provisions of the old Act are pari materia to the provisions in Chapter VI of the present Act. The question posed before the Supreme Court was whether a private operator with a permit to ply a stage carriage over another route, but which has a common overlapping sector with the nationalised route, could ply his vehicle over that part of the overlapping common sector, if he did not pick up or drop passengers on the overlapping part of the route? Determination was necessitated in view of certain conflicting decisions rendered by the Supreme Court. It was observed by the Supreme Court that answer to the question really turns on the terms of the scheme rather than the statute. Supreme Court took note of the fact that right of the members of public to pass and re-pass over a highway, including the right to use motor vehicles on the public road, existed prior to the enactment of the Motor Vehicles Act and it is not the creation of a statute. In paragraph 7, the following observations have been made: “A careful and diligent perusal of Section 68C, Section 68D(3) and Section 68FF in the light of the definition of the expression 'route' in Section 2 (28A) appears to make it manifestly clear that once a scheme is published under Section 68D in relation to any area or route or portion thereof, whether to the exclusion, complete or partial of other persons or otherwise, no person other than the State Transport Undertaking may operate on the notified area or notified route except as provided in the scheme itself. A necessary consequence of these provisions is that no private operator can operate his vehicle on any part or portion of a notified area or notified route unless authorised so to do by the terms of the scheme itself. He may not operate on any part or portion of the notified route or area on the mere ground that the permit as originally granted to him covered the notified route or area. We are not impressed by the various submissions made on behalf of the appellants by their several counsel.
He may not operate on any part or portion of the notified route or area on the mere ground that the permit as originally granted to him covered the notified route or area. We are not impressed by the various submissions made on behalf of the appellants by their several counsel. The foremost argument was that based on great inconvenience which may be caused to the travelling public if a passenger is not allowed to travel, say, straight from A to B on a stage carriage, to ply which on the route A to B a person X has a permit, merely because a part of the route from C to D somewhere between the points A and B is part of a notified route. The answer to the question is that this is a factor which will necessarily be taken into consideration by the State Transport Undertaking before publishing the scheme under Section 68C, by the Government under Section 68D when considering the objections to the scheme and thereafter either by the State Transport Undertaking or by the Government when the inconveniences experienced by the travelling public are brought to their notice. The question is one of weighing in the balance the advantages conferred on the public by the nationalisation of the route C-D against the inconveniences suffered by the public wanting to travel straight from A to B. On the other hand it is quite well known that under the guise of the so-called 'corridor restrictions' permits over longer routes which cover shorter notified routes or 'overlapping' parts of notified routes are more often than not misutilised since it is well nigh impossible to keep a proper check at every point of the route. It is also well known that often times permits for plying stage carriages from a point a short distance beyond one terminus to a point a short distance beyond another terminus of a notified route have been applied for and granted subject to the so-called "corridor restrictions" which are but mere ruses or traps to obtain permits and to frustrate the scheme.
If indeed there is any need for protecting the travelling public from inconvenience as suggested by the learned counsel we have no doubt that the State Transport Undertaking and the Government will make a sufficient provision in the scheme itself to avoid inconvenience being caused to the travelling public.” It is worthy to notice that question of granting a temporary permit was not considered by the Supreme Court in Adarsh Travels's case. That was a case relating to grant of regular permits and rights of the operators having routes overlapping on nationalised routes. It is therefore clear that the question posed in this case could never be decided relying on Adarsh Travels's case. 23. Supreme Court in Karnataka SRTC v. Ashrafulla Khan ( (2002) 2 SCC 560 ) has held that road transport service scheme providing for total exclusion of private operators from the notified routes is legal and the scheme is a law which has to be protected and preserved in the public interest. It is clearly held that a permit cannot be granted for a non-notified route which overlaps, i.e., traverses or covers the same line of travel as a portion of a notified route. It was held that exception can be made in case where non-notified route cuts across or intersects a notified route for the purpose of reconnecting with the remainder of the non-notified route. Following quotation may be useful for this case: “No permit can be granted to operate on a notified route or portion thereof if a scheme prohibit such operation by a private operator and the only exception is where a private operator holding permit on non-notified route has to intersect a notified route. An intersection of a notified route does not amount to traversing or overlapping the notified route because of the prohibition contained in a scheme applies to a whole or part of the route on the highway on the same line of the route. An intersection cuts across the notified route and does not permit traversing the same line of travel on a notified route. If the vehicle is to ply on the same line of travel on a notified route it is an overlapping and if a non-notified route cuts across a notified route for its onward journey it is an intersection. Need and convenience of the travelling public is of paramount consideration under the Act.
If the vehicle is to ply on the same line of travel on a notified route it is an overlapping and if a non-notified route cuts across a notified route for its onward journey it is an intersection. Need and convenience of the travelling public is of paramount consideration under the Act. A situation may arise when the Transport Undertaking may be found not catering to the needs of the travelling public. In such a situation, on representation of travelling public, the State Undertaking or the Government, as the case may be, may consider the matter and provide adequate transport services if it is required. In case the Government finds that the Undertaking lacks vehicle or other infrastructure to provide an efficient and well co-ordinated transport services to the travelling public, it may modify the Scheme as to permit private operator to ply vehicles on such route or routes. In any case, it is always permissible to the legislature to amend law by providing private operators to run an efficient and well co-ordinated transport services on such route or routes on payment of adequate royalty to the State Government.” The question raised in the above case was whether a small portion or portions falling within the limits of towns or villages on a notified route under the Act are to be treated as a route overlapping or intersection? This case also was dealing with regular permits and not temporary permits. This decision was followed in B.A. Linga Reddy v. Karnataka State Transport Authority ( (2015) 4 SCC 515 ). 24. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in G.T. Venkataswamy Reddy v. State Transport Authority ( AIR 2016 SC 3469 ) examined the provisions of the old Act relating to restrictions on grant of permits in respect of a notified area/route. It has been held as follows: “Section 68FF of the Act is an important section which requires to be noted with some deeper scrutiny. Section 68FF creates a restriction on grant of permits in respect of notified area or notified route. A close reading of the said provision discloses that where an approved scheme as stipulated under Section 68D(3) of the Act in respect of an area or a route is published, then, it prohibits grant of any permit except in accordance with the provisions of this scheme.
A close reading of the said provision discloses that where an approved scheme as stipulated under Section 68D(3) of the Act in respect of an area or a route is published, then, it prohibits grant of any permit except in accordance with the provisions of this scheme. The substantive part of Section 68FF therefore makes it clear that once the approved scheme comes into play, then, there will not be any scope for grant of any permit in that area or the route covered by the scheme, except what is specifically permitted or provided under that scheme itself. By way of an analogy, it can be stated that where, under the scheme while the State Transport Undertaking alone is exclusively permitted to operate the service in any particular area or route and even while providing for such exclusive operation by State Transport Undertaking, if the operation by any existing permit holder is saved either fully or partially that as rightly stated in 'RAGHURAM' and 'EGAPPAN', such operation by other private operators gets frozen and as was held by us earlier, while interpreting Section 57(8) of the Act that application for variation will be nothing but an application for grant of a new permit. Therefore, even in respect of protected operation under the scheme of any existing operator, as on the date of the approved scheme, he will have to restrict his operations to the extent to which he was permitted as on that date and the manner in which such operation was permitted and not beyond.” It is to be remembered that the Constitution Bench took cognizance of the case on a reference doubting correctness of some previous decisions rendered by lesser Benches of the Supreme Court. The relevant question posed for determination before the Constitution Bench was whether variation is permissible in a notified scheme route? It is therefore clear that the matter heard and decided by the Constitution Bench was in respect of a completely different question. 25. In U.P.SRTC v. Sanjida Bano ( (2005) 10 SCC 280 ) the dispute that cropped up for adjudication before the Supreme Court related to Lucknow-Kursi-Tikaitganj route in the State of Utter Pradesh, which was covered by a notified scheme under Section 68D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It was not disputed that STU was operating on the route as per the notified scheme.
It was not disputed that STU was operating on the route as per the notified scheme. State Government took steps to de-notify the scheme. That was challenged before the High Court by filing a writ petition. During the pendency of the writ petition, the High Court by an interim order stayed the de-notification. Thus, factually the scheme, as notified, stood and it was in operation. Respondents before the Supreme Court filed an application before RTA for grant of temporary permits on the route. When that prayer was declined, they approached the High Court. High Court directed the RTA to make a survey of the route within a week and if survey revealed the need of grant of additional permits, then the same was directed to be issued to the applicants. That was challenged before the Supreme Court. Having regard to Section 104 of the Act, the Supreme Court held thus: “The respondents seek protection under the proviso. The applicability of the proviso is attracted “where no application for a permit has been made by the State transport undertaking in respect of any notified area or notified route in pursuance of an approved scheme”. It is not disputed that the State transport undertaking has certainly made an application for permit in accordance with the scheme and is operating on the route. Whether or not the number of buses and the trips operated by the State transport undertaking were enough to cater to the volume of need of the commuting public, is not germane to the applicability of the proviso. The scheme provides for as many permits as needed being lifted by the State transport undertaking. The State transport undertaking was operating 36 trips on the date of the order of the High Court and is now operating 40 trips, as stated by the learned counsel for the appellants at the Bar. However, the learned Senior Counsel for the respondents has disputed the correctness of this statement and submitted that the Secretary, Regional Transport Authority had found only 25 trips being in operation. Be that as it may, we are not inclined to hold that in spite of the appellant Corporation operating on the route resort can be had to the proviso to Section 104 of the Act for granting temporary permits.” 26. The above decision can be distinguished on facts.
Be that as it may, we are not inclined to hold that in spite of the appellant Corporation operating on the route resort can be had to the proviso to Section 104 of the Act for granting temporary permits.” 26. The above decision can be distinguished on facts. It is to be remembered that the need to grant temporary permits has to be objectively assessed based on the ground realities. As mentioned above, Section 104 of the Act falls in a separate Chapter and the provisions therein will have to be interpreted according to the object of the enactment without referring to other provisions outside the Chapter. Parameters under Section 87 of the Act has no bearing while considering an application for temporary permit under the proviso to Section 104 of the Act Above decision cannot be taken as an authority to hold that no temporary permit can be granted on a notified route if it overlaps. 27. Many other decisions have been cited by the learned counsel for the petitioners. I am afraid, none of the decisions cited at the Bar laid down a proposition regarding grant of temporary permit under the proviso to Section 104 of the Act. 28. A Division Bench of this Court in Mohankumar v. Government of Kerala ( 2016 (2) KLT 963 ) considering various decisions of the Supreme Court observed thus: “The net effect of these situations is that if the STC does not apply for grant of permit through any route which is a notified route or covered by a Scheme, temporary permits can be granted to the private operators based on temporary need and if there are routes for which permits have been granted to the STC in relation to notified routes or notified areas and if the STC is not utilising the permit by operating the services, it will be open to the Regional Transport Authority to act on any application for grant of temporary permit to the private operators over such routes. This conclusion is the true effect and resultant practical impact of the Scheme in the backdrop of the relevant provisions of the 1988 Act and the Rules in the light of the different precedents laid down by the Apex Court, in particular Punjab Roadways (2010 (2) KLT Suppl.51 (SC) = (2010) 5 SCC 235 ) and the decisions referred to therein. It is so declared.” 29.
It is so declared.” 29. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent relying on an unreported decision in W.A.No.188 of 1986 passed by a Division Bench of this Court contended that the proviso to Section 68FF of the old Act empowered the Regional Transport Authority to grant a temporary permit to operate through a notified route till a regular permit is granted in favour of KSRTC. 30. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent relied on another Division Bench decision of this Court in Babudas N.R. v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation (2010 (4) KHC 802) to contend a proposition that as long as no application has been made by STU in a notified route, it is open to the State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, to consider grant of temporary permits to private operators. 31. Learned counsel for the 1st respondent also cited numerous decisions to support his contentions. Relying on Ratheesh v. R.T.A. ( 2015 (1) KLT 248 ), a decision rendered by a Larger Bench of this Court, it is contended by the learned counsel for the 1st respondent that existing permit holders can raise objections only about timings and they cannot oppose grant of a permit whether it be a regular permit or a temporary permit. This contention is proper and hence deserves to be upheld. 32. Smt. Padmakumari, learned counsel for the petitioner in O.P. (C) No.581 of 2017 vehementally contended that temporary permits cannot be granted to operate a stage carriage on a route partially overlapping the notified route. To buttress this contention, a decision rendered by the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in A.P.S.R.T. Corpn. v. K.S.T.A., Bangalore ( AIR 1991 AP 135 ) is pressed into service. The question cropped up for decision was whether temporary permits under Section 68F of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 could be granted on a route which was already covered by an approved scheme? Having considered the facts and circumstances, High Court observed thus: “The counsel for the 3rd respondent has tried to distinguish this Supreme Court case on the ground that it was not dealing with the grant of a temporary permit under Section 68-F(1C) and the controversy was about the effect of implementation of an approved scheme on the existing permits.
Having considered the facts and circumstances, High Court observed thus: “The counsel for the 3rd respondent has tried to distinguish this Supreme Court case on the ground that it was not dealing with the grant of a temporary permit under Section 68-F(1C) and the controversy was about the effect of implementation of an approved scheme on the existing permits. The said distinction does not make any difference on the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has pointed out that there is no inconsistency between Section 68-FF and 68-F (1C) and the difficulty, if any, arises because of terms of the scheme, if adequate provision is not made while framing it or grant of its approval regarding partial overlapping. As a result, there is no difficulty in holding that a permit under Section 68-F(1C) cannot be granted on a route if it partially overlaps an approved route and is prohibited by the terms of the scheme in view of the provisions of Section 68-FF. Therefore, the Bench decision in W.A.No.888/1982 dated 22-10-1982 confirming the judgment of the learned single Judge reported in M. Ramasubamma v. S.T.A.T, A.P.(1982 LS(AP) 222) (supra), is overruled.” 33. A Division Bench decision of this Court in Managing Director, KSRTC. v. Secretary, RTA (2013 (3) KHC 820) was also cited. It has been held that temporary permits in respect of notified routes cannot be granted except to the extent saved by the scheme with restrictions imposed therein. It is submitted by Sri. K.V. Gopinathan Nair, learned counsel for the 1st respondent that the view taken in Managing Director, KSRTC's decision has been doubted by another Division Bench in Pramod Kumar v. K.S.R.T.C. ( 2014 (1) KLT 511 ). However, on a perusal of Pramod Kumar's decision, it can be seen that correctness of the ratio in Managing Director, KSRTC's decision did not directly come up for consideration and observations therein can only be treated as an obiter dictum. 34. Smt. Padmakumari relied on U.P. State Roadways Transport Corpn. v. Anwar Ahmed ( (1997) 3 SCC 191 ) to urge a proposition that no temporary permit can be granted to the 1st respondent in this case.
34. Smt. Padmakumari relied on U.P. State Roadways Transport Corpn. v. Anwar Ahmed ( (1997) 3 SCC 191 ) to urge a proposition that no temporary permit can be granted to the 1st respondent in this case. In paragraph 7 the law laid down is thus: “It would, therefore, be seen that where the scheme has been published under sub-section (3) of Section 100 in respect of any notified area or notified route, the State Transport Authority or the Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, shall not grant any permit except in accordance with the provisions of the scheme. Thus, the appellant-Corporation has the exclusive right or monopoly to ply their stage carriages and obtain the required permit as per the scheme. The proviso gives only a limited breath of life, namely, until the Corporation puts the vehicles on the notified routes as per the scheme, temporary permits may be granted to private operators. Thereby, it would be clear that temporary inconvenience to travelling public is sought to be averted till the permits are taken and vehicles are put on the route by the appellant. Therefore, the temporary permits will have only limited breath of life. Private operators are attempting to wear the mask of inconvenience to travelling public to infiltrate into forbidden notified area, route or portion thereof to sabotage the scheme. The permits were taken by the appellant and the vehicles are put on the route in terms of the scheme. Therefore, the direction given by the High Court at the pain of contempt is obviously illegal. It is stated by Shri V.R. Reddy, Aditional Solicitor General, on instruction that the appellant is prepared to take all the permits required on the routes.” The above quotation will not fortify the case of petitioners. On the contrary, it supports the view that a temporary permit can be granted on such a route for a limited period until STU puts the vehicles on the notified route as per the scheme. 35. Reckoning the legal principles mentioned above and the factual situation revealed in this case, especially Ext.P8 scheme, I find that the petitioners failed to establish a case that the 1st respondent or any other private operator is not entitled to get a temporary permit, overlapping on a notified route, by invoking proviso to Section 104 of the Act.
35. Reckoning the legal principles mentioned above and the factual situation revealed in this case, especially Ext.P8 scheme, I find that the petitioners failed to establish a case that the 1st respondent or any other private operator is not entitled to get a temporary permit, overlapping on a notified route, by invoking proviso to Section 104 of the Act. State Transport Authority or Regional Transport Authority, as the case may be, as a temporary measure and until STU puts vehicles on the route, can grant temporary permits to cater the need of travelling public. It is the bounden duty of the STU to cater the needs of the commuting public and if it fails to fulfil obligations, the Government should intervene and pass appropriate modifications/changes in the scheme so as to provide amenities to the passengers. It is for the Government and the authorities to take stock of the situation periodically and reconsider the notification, if STU could not discharge their obligations in the expected lines. Till then, the authorities may invoke power conferred on them by proviso to Section 104 of the Act. In the result, original petitions are dismissed confirming Ext.P5 order.