ORDER : B. Veerappa, J. The retired workman is before this Court for a writ of certiorari to quash the impugned award dated 27-10-2009 made in ID No. 11 of 2007 on the file of the Industrial Tribunal and also writ of mandamus directing the respondent-Corporation to refix the pay scale, seniority, promotion etc., from the date of completion of 180 days of service i.e., with effect from 27-6-1976 and pay him all consequential benefits including terminal benefits from the date of initial appointment till the date of retirement. 2. It is the case of the petitioner that he was selected and appointed as Badli Conductor on 29-6-1976 and his service has been brought on probation on 26-5-1978 and his seniority, promotion etc., has been fixed from the date of probation-and not from the date of initial appointment. Therefore he raised industrial dispute before the Industrial Tribunal. The Industrial Tribunal, without considering the entire materials on record, by the impugned award dated 27-10-2009, dismissed the reference. Hence, the present writ petition is filed. 3. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties to the lis. 4. Sri M.C. Basavaraju, learned Counsel for the petitioner vehemently contended that it is the duty of the Corporation to refix the pay scale, seniority, promotion, etc., from the date of initial appointment and not from the date of probation i.e., 26-5-1978, the same has not been considered by the Tribunal. Therefore the Tribunal was not justified in rejecting the reference. He further contended that as on 16-2-1978 the petitioner had already completed 180 days of continuous service as per Clause IV of the Industrial Truce and the Tribunal has not appreciated the Truce Agreement dated 17-2-1962 as well as the Truce Agreement dated 16-2-1978. Clause 22(ii) and IV of the said Truce Agreement depicts that "any employee working for 180 days including weekly off and other holidays will be brought on time scale of pay". The said aspect has not at all been considered by the Tribunal. 5. He further contended that the material documents produced before the Tribunal clearly indicates that from the initial appointment he has continuously worked in the Corporation and completed 180 days and the same has not been considered by the Tribunal. Therefore, he sought to allow the writ petition by setting aside the impugned award passed by the Tribunal. 6. 5. He further contended that the material documents produced before the Tribunal clearly indicates that from the initial appointment he has continuously worked in the Corporation and completed 180 days and the same has not been considered by the Tribunal. Therefore, he sought to allow the writ petition by setting aside the impugned award passed by the Tribunal. 6. Per contra, Smt. H.R. Renuka, learned Counsel for the respondent-Corporation sought to justify the impugned award passed by the Tribunal and strongly contended that the petitioner raised the dispute after lapse of 29 years before the Tribunal and further contended that he was appointed with effect from 26-11-1978 and not from 29-6-1976 as alleged and further contended that he has not produced any material documents before this Court. She further contended that by an order dated 26-11-1978, the petitioner and others were appointed as Conductors in the pay scale of Rs. 280/- with effect from 17-2-1978. Therefore, she sought to dismiss the writ petition. 7. Having heard the learned Counsel for the parties to the lis the only point that arises for consideration in the present writ petition, is: "Whether the Tribunal was justified in dismissing the reference under the provisions of Section 10(1)(d) of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 in the facts and circumstances of the present case?" 8. I have given my anxious consideration to the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties to the lis. 9. Though the petitioner claims that he was appointed as Conductor in the respondent-Corporation with effect from 29-6-1976 and he was put on probation on 26-5-1978 and his services came to be regularised or confirmed on 26-11-1978 and his seniority, promotion etc., was fixed from the said date of confirmation i.e., 26-11-1978. The fact remains that as per Ex. W. 2 dated 26 5-1978, the petitioner was appointed as Conductor in the pay scale of Rs. 280/- with effect from 17-2-1978. It is also not in dispute that the respondent-workman has raised the dispute after lapse of 29 years. The Tribunal considering the entire material on record, recorded its specific finding that as per Ex. W. 2 dated 26 5-1978, the petitioner was appointed as Conductor in the pay scale of Rs. 280/- with effect from 17-2-1978. It is also not in dispute that the respondent-workman has raised the dispute after lapse of 29 years. The Tribunal considering the entire material on record, recorded its specific finding that as per Ex. W. 2-Divisional Establishment Order No. 34 of 78 implementation of supplementary memorandum of settlement dated 16-2-1978' the following badli Conductors who have completed 180 days of service are appointed on probation under Clause IV of Industrial Truce Agreement dated 16-2-1978 with effect from 17-2-1978 putting the days on probation for a period of 6 months subject to terms and conditions appended in the list. Ex. W. 3 is the Divisional Establishment Order No. 340 of 80, dated 31-1-1981 shows that including the petitioner after completion of probationary period under Ex. W. 2. Ex. W. 5 is the Circular No. 74, Ex. W. 6 is the representation given by the petitioner dated 28-2-2001, Ex. W. 10 dearly indicates that he was appointed only from 26-5-1978 and not from 29-6-1976. Ex. W. 2-implementation of Supplementary Memorandum of Settlement dated 16-2-1978 reads as under: "The following Badli Conductors who have completed 180 days of service as per Clause IV of the industrial Truce dated 16-2-1978, they are hereby appointed as Conductors on pay of Rs. 280/- per month in the pay scale of 280-5-300-10-840-15-400-20-460 and other allowances, as admissible as per the rules with effect from 17-2-1978 B.N. and posted to the places shown against their names on the following terms and conditions." 10. Ex.W.3 dated 31-1-1981 is the declaration of satisfactory completion of probationary period in the post of Conductors. Tire representation made by him on 28-2-2001 as per Ex. W. 6, is after lapse of 29 years. 11. The material documents clearly depicts that firstly the Truce Agreement dated 17-2-1962 or modified agreement letter, are not produced though it is his very case that other workmen had been granted the similar benefits, the workman has been denied such benefits, but the facts remains as it is. He has not produced any corresponding documents to that effect nor he has orally stated the names of employees to whom such benefits has been granted. There is no material before the Tribunal with regard to actual vacancy as on 1976 and existing vacancy required thereto. He has not produced any corresponding documents to that effect nor he has orally stated the names of employees to whom such benefits has been granted. There is no material before the Tribunal with regard to actual vacancy as on 1976 and existing vacancy required thereto. The first party has made a representation. However, as already stated above, the representation is made after lapse of 29 years. Considering the entire materials on record, the Tribunal dismissed the reference holding that he has not proved the reference referred thereto. 12. It is an undisputed fact that the workman raised the dispute after lapse of 29 years. Though the petitioner has raised a specific contention in the objections and adduced the evidence and produced the material documents in support of his contentions, the Tribunal has not considered the same while passing the impugned Award. The material on record clearly indicates that the Tribunal has not considered the delay of 29 years in raising the dispute and has also not recorded any finding whether the dispute was alive as on the date of the dispute raised. It is also not in dispute that though the law does not prescribe any time-limit for the appropriate Government to exercise its powers under Section 10 of the I.D. Act, it does not mean that the power can be exercised at any point of time The words "at any time" used in Section 10(1) of the I.D. Act do not mean that the laws of limitation are not applicable to the proceedings under the I.D. Act. However, the policy of industrial adjudication is that very stale claims should not be generally encouraged or allowed unless there is satisfactory explanation for the delay. The Tribunal, while considering the dispute, has to record reasons and give a finding as to whether the claim is still alive or has become stale. In the present case, the Tribunal has not recorded any finding with regard to the existence of the industrial dispute between the parties for adjudication. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another, AIR 2016 SC 2984 : VI (2016) SLT 91 :(2015)15 SCC 1, has held as under: "42.1. 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court while considering the provisions of Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act, in the case of Prabhakar v. Joint Director, Sericulture Department and Another, AIR 2016 SC 2984 : VI (2016) SLT 91 :(2015)15 SCC 1, has held as under: "42.1. An industrial dispute has to be referred by the appropriate Government for adjudication and the workman cannot approach the Labour Court or Industrial Tribunal directly, except in those cases which are covered by Section 2-A of the Act. Reference is made under Section 10 of the Act in those cases where the appropriate Government forms an opinion that "any industrial dispute exists or is apprehended". The words "industrial dispute exists" are of paramount importance, unless there is an existence of an industrial dispute (or the dispute is apprehended or it is apprehended such a dispute may arise in near future), no reference is to be made. Thus, existence or apprehension of an industrial dispute is a sine qua non for making the reference. No doubt, at the time of taking a decision whether a reference is to be made or not, the appropriate Government is not to go into the merits of the dispute. Making of reference is only an administrative function. At the same time, on the basis of material on record, satisfaction of the existence of the industrial dispute or the apprehension of an industrial dispute is necessary. Such existence/apprehension of industrial dispute, thus, becomes a condition precedent, though it will be only subjective satisfaction based on material on record. Since, we are not concerned with the satisfaction dealing with cases where there is apprehended industrial dispute, discussion that follows would confine to existence of an industrial dispute. 42.2. Dispute or difference arises when one party makes a demand and the other party rejects the same. It is held by this Court in a number of cases that before raising the industrial dispute making of demand is a necessary precondition. In such a scenario, if the services of a workman are terminated and he does not make the demand and/or raise the issue alleging wrongful termination immediately thereafter or within reasonable time and raises the same after considerable lapse of period, whether it can be said that industrial dispute still exists. 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. 42.3. Since there is no period of limitation, it gives right to the workman to raise the dispute even belatedly. However, if the dispute is raised after a long period, it has to be seen as to whether such a dispute still exists? Thus, notwithstanding the fact that law of limitation does not apply, it is to be shown by the workman that there is a dispute in praesenti. For this purpose he has to demonstrate that even if considerable period has lapsed and there are laches and delays, such delay has not resulted into making the industrial dispute cease to exist. Therefore, if the workman is able to give satisfactory explanation for these laches and delays and demonstrate that the circumstances disclose that issue is still alive, delay would not come in his way because of the reason that law of limitation has no application. On the other hand, if because of such delay dispute no longer remains alive and is to be treated as "dead", then it would be non-existent dispute which cannot be referred. 42.4. Take, for example, a case where the workman issues notice after his termination, questioning the termination and demanding reinstatement. He is able to show that there were discussions from time to time and the parties were trying to sort out the matter amicably. Or he is able to show that there were assurances by the Management to the effect that he would be taken back in service and because of these reasons, he did not immediately raise the dispute by approaching the Labour Authorities seeking reference or did not invoke the remedy under Section 2-A of the Act. In such a scenario, it can be treated that the dispute was live and existing as the workman never abandoned his right. However, in this very example, even if the notice of demand was sent but it did not evoke any positive response or there was specific rejection by the Management of his demand contained in the notice and thereafter he sleeps over the matter for a number of years, it can be treated that he accepted the factum of his termination and rejection thereof by the Management and acquiesced into the said rejection. 42.5. Take another example. 42.5. Take another example. A workman approaches the Civil Court by filing a suit against his termination which was pending for a number of years and was ultimately dismissed on the ground that the Civil Court did not have jurisdiction to enforce the contract of personal service and does not grant any reinstatement. At that stage, when the suit is dismissed or he withdraws that suit and then involves the machinery under the Act, it can lead to the conclusion that the dispute is still alive as the workman had not accepted the termination but was agitating the same; albeit in a wrong forum. 42.6. In contrast, in those cases where there was no agitation by the workman against his termination and the dispute is raised belatedly and the delay or laches remain unexplained, it would be presumed that he had waived his right or acquiesced into the Act of termination and, therefore, at the time when the dispute is raised it had become stale and was not an "existing dispute". In such circumstances, the appropriate Government can refuse to make reference. In the alternative, the Labour Court/Industrial Court can also hold that there is no "Industrial dispute" within the meaning of Section 2(k) of the Act and, therefore, no relief can be granted." 14. Considering the entire material on record, the Tribunal was justified in rejecting the reference holding that the petitioner has not produced any material document to prove that he was appointed on 29-6-1976 and he has not made out a ground to condone the delay and the dispute was not existing as on the date of the dispute arised. The same is in accordance with law. The petitioner has not made out any ground to interference with the impugned award passed by the Tribunal exercising power vested under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, writ petition is dismissed.