JUDGMENT : S. K. SAHOO, J. 1. Heard Mr. Samvit Mohanty, learned counsel for the petitioner. None appears on behalf of the opp. party. 2. The petitioner Babaji Charan Nayak in this application under section 482 Cr.P.C. has challenged the impugned order dated 25.02.2003 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Jagatsinghpur in I.C.C. Case No. 127 of 2002 in taking cognizance of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (hereafter ‘N.I. Act’) read with section 420 of the Indian Penal Code and issuance of process against him. 3. The opposite party is the complainant and the petitioner is the accused in the complaint petition. 4. The relevant dates for the adjudication of the issue involved in this application which are mentioned in the complaint petition are as follows:- 5. The cheque in question which was for an amount of Rs.17,511/- (rupees seventeen thousand five hundred eleven) was issued by the petitioner in favour of the complainant Orissa Machinery & Sanitary on 20.12.2001 bearing no.233903 drawn on the Cuttack Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. at Kujanga Branch towards the cost of the purchased articles. The cheque was presented by the complainant in Syndicate Bank, Jagatsinghpur Branch on 12.06.2002 for collection of dues. The cheque was dishonored on 17.06.2002 by the Cuttack Central Cooperative Bank, Ltd. Kujang Branch on the ground of insufficient funds in the account of the petitioner. The Syndicate Bank, Jagatsinghpur accordingly intimated about such dishonour to the complainant on 20.06.2002. The complainant personally approached the petitioner on 04.07.2002 and served notice for payment of dues within the stipulated period of fifteen days. The petitioner requested the complainant for one month time for payment of the outstanding dues. On 26.10.2002 the complainant issued a legal notice to the petitioner by registered post with A.D. for payment of the dues within fifteen days from the date of receipt of the notice. On 04.12.2002 the complainant received back the legal notice with endorsement of the postal department that the addressee refused to receive the registered letter. The complaint petition was filed on 21.12.2002. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the dates which are mentioned in the complaint petition contended that the taking of cognizance by the learned S.D.J.M., Jagatsinghpur is barred by limitation in view of the provision under section 142 of the N.I. Act. The complaint petition was filed on 21.12.2002. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner relying upon the dates which are mentioned in the complaint petition contended that the taking of cognizance by the learned S.D.J.M., Jagatsinghpur is barred by limitation in view of the provision under section 142 of the N.I. Act. Learned counsel further contended that though the proviso to section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act stipulates that cognizance of a complaint can be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period but the impugned order does not reflect any such satisfaction by the learned Magistrate. It is further contended that clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the N.I. Act prescribes that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, shall make a demand for the payment of the cheque amount by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within fifteen days (substituted as ‘within thirty days’ w.e.f. 06.02.2003) of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. It is further contended that clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the N.I. Act prescribes that if the drawer of the cheque fails to make payment of the cheque amount to the payee or to the holder of the cheque as the case may be, within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice as contemplated under clause (b), cause of action would arise and then the complaint petition has to be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the N.I. Act as per the clause (b) to section 142(1) of the N.I. Act. It is further contended that in the case in hand, the bank intimated the complainant regarding dishonour of the cheque on 20.06.2002 and the personal notice was served on the petitioner on 04.07.2002 by the complainant stipulating fifteen days for payment of the dues. It is further contended that in the case in hand, the bank intimated the complainant regarding dishonour of the cheque on 20.06.2002 and the personal notice was served on the petitioner on 04.07.2002 by the complainant stipulating fifteen days for payment of the dues. If the payment was not made within the stipulated period and the cause of action arose then the complaint petition should have been filed within one month from such date as per the clause (b) to section 142(1) of the N.I. Act which has not been done inasmuch as the complaint petition was filed on 21.12.2002. It is further contended that after service of the first notice on the petitioner on 04.07.2002, there is no provision under the N.I. Act to serve a second notice by registered post on 26.10.2002 as was done in this case. The second notice dated 26.10.2002 is obviously much beyond the period of fifteen days as prescribed under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the N.I. Act. It is further contended that the cause of action would arise on the basis of first valid notice, if the drawer of the cheque fails to make payment of the cheque amount to the payee or to the holder of the cheque as the case may be, within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice and not on the basis of second notice. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner placed reliance in case of Yogendra Pratap Singh -Vrs.-Savitri Pandey and another reported in (2014) 59 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 577 wherein it is held as follows:- “31. Section 138 of the NI Act comprises of the main provision which defines the ingredients of the offence and the punishment that would follow in the event of such an offence having been committed. Appended to this Section is also a proviso which has three clauses, viz., (a), (b) and (c). The offence under Section 138 is made effective only on fulfillment of the eventualities contained in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso. For completion of an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, not only the satisfaction of the ingredients of offence set out in the main part of the provision is necessary but it is also imperative that all the three eventualities mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso are satisfied. For completion of an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, not only the satisfaction of the ingredients of offence set out in the main part of the provision is necessary but it is also imperative that all the three eventualities mentioned in clauses (a), (b) and (c) of the proviso are satisfied. Mere issuance of a cheque and dishonour thereof would not constitute an offence by itself under Section 138. 32. Section 138 of the NI Act has been analysed by this Court in M/s. Kusum Ingots & Alloys Ltd. -Vrs.-Pennar Peterson Securities Ltd. and Ors. etc. [ AIR 2000 SC 954 : (2000) 2 SCC 745 ] wherein this Court said that the following ingredients are required to be satisfied for making out a case under Section 138 of the NI Act: (i) a person must have drawn a cheque on an account maintained by him in a bank for payment of a certain amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge of any debt or other liability; (ii) that cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (iii) that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid, either because the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank; (iv) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; (v) the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the said amount of money to the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice. 33. We are in agreement with the above analysis. 34. In K.R. Indira -Vrs.-Dr. 33. We are in agreement with the above analysis. 34. In K.R. Indira -Vrs.-Dr. G. Adinarayana [AIR 2003 SC 4789 : (2003) 8 SCC 300 )], a two-Judge Bench of this Court observed that the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act could be completed if all the above components are satisfied. ** ** **** ** **** ** 42. Section 142 of the NI Act prescribes the mode and so also the time within which a complaint for an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act can be filed. A complaint made under Section 138 by the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque has to be in writing and needs to be made within one month from the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. The period of one month under Section 142(b) begins from the date on which the cause of action has arisen under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. However, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within the prescribed period of one month, a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period.......” 8. The complainant approached the petitioner on 04.07.2002 and personally served the notice on him within the statutory period of fifteen days after receipt of intimation from the Syndicate Bank, Jagatsinghpur regarding the dishonour of cheque on 20.06.2002. This is a valid notice as contemplated under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138. Since the petitioner failed to make the payment of the cheque amount to the complainant within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice, the cause of action arose on the completion of fifteen days. The complaint petition should have been made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arose which has not been done in this case. Therefore, the complaint petition filed in this case is beyond the period as prescribed under section 142(1)(b) of the N.I. Act. In that eventuality, the order of cognizance which was otherwise barred by limitation could have been taken had the learned Magistrate condoned the delay in filing complaint petition after being satisfied with the explanation furnished by the complainant that the later had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within the prescribed period. 9. In that eventuality, the order of cognizance which was otherwise barred by limitation could have been taken had the learned Magistrate condoned the delay in filing complaint petition after being satisfied with the explanation furnished by the complainant that the later had sufficient cause for not making the complaint within the prescribed period. 9. In case of Sadanandan Bhadran -Vrs.-Madhavan Sunil Kumar reported in (1998) 15 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 372, it is held as follows:- “6.......From a plain reading of the above Section it is manifest that a competent Court can take cognizance of a written complaint of an offence under Section 138 if it is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138. (emphasis supplied) 7. In a generic and wide sense (as in Section 20 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908) 'cause of action' means every fact which it is necessary to establish to support a right or obtain a judgment. Viewed in that context, the following facts are required to be proved to successfully prosecute the drawer for an offence under Section 138 of the Act: (a) that the cheque was drawn for payment of an amount of money for discharge of a debt/liability and the cheque was dishonoured; (b) that the cheque was presented within the prescribed period; (c) that the payee made a demand for payment of the money by giving a notice in writing to the drawer within the stipulated period; and (d) that the drawer failed to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 9. If we were to proceed on the basis of the generic meaning of the term 'cause of action' certainly each of the above facts would constitute a part of the cause of action but then it is significant to note that Clause (b) of Section 142 gives it a restrictive meaning, in that, it refers to only one fact which will give rise to the cause of action and that is the failure to make the payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of the notice. The reason behind giving such a restrictive meaning is not far to seek. The reason behind giving such a restrictive meaning is not far to seek. Consequent upon the failure of the drawer to pay the money within the period of 15 days as envisaged under Clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138, the liability of the drawer for being prosecuted for the offence he has committed arises, and the period of one month for filing the complaint under Section 142 is to be reckoned accordingly. The combined reading of the above two sections of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of Section 142(c) arises and can arise only once. 8. Besides the language of Sections 138 and 142 which clearly postulates only one cause of action there are other formidable impediments which negates the concept of successive causes of action. One of them is that for dishonour of one cheque there can be only one offence and such offence is committed by the drawer immediately on his failure to make the payment within fifteen days of the receipt of the notice served in accordance with Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138. That necessarily means that for similar failure after service of fresh notice on subsequent dishonour the drawer cannot be liable for any offence nor can the first offence be treated as non est so as to give the payee a right to file a complaint treating the second offence as the first one. At that stage, it will not be a question of waiver of the right of the payee to prosecute the drawer but of absolution of the drawer of an offence, which stands already committed by him and which cannot be committed by him again. 9. The other impediment to the acceptance of the concept of successive causes of action is that it will make the period of limitation under Clause (c) of Section 142 otiose, for, a payee who failed to file his complaint within one month and thereby forfeited his right to prosecute the drawer, can circumvent the above limitative clause by filing a complaint on the basis of a fresh presentation of the cheque and its dishonour. Since in the interpretation of statutes the Court always presumes that the legislature inserted every part thereof for a purpose and the legislative intention is that the every part should have effect the above conclusion cannot be drawn for, that will make the provision for limiting the period of making the complaint nugatory. 10. Now, the question is how the apparently conflicting provisions of the Act, one enabling the payee to repeatedly present the cheque and the other giving him only one opportunity to file a complaint for its dishonour, and that too within one month from the date the cause of action arises, can be reconciled. Having given our anxious consideration to this question, we are of the opinion that the above two provisions can be harmonised, with the interpretation that on each presentation of the cheque and its dishonour a fresh right and not cause of action accrues in his favour. He may, therefore, without taking peremptory action in exercise of his such right under Clause (b) of Section 138, go on presenting the cheque so as to enable him to exercise such right at any point of time during the validity of the cheque. But, once he gives a notice under Clause (b) of Section 138, he forfeits such right for in case of failure of the drawer to pay the money within the stipulated time, he would be liable for the offence and the cause of action for filing the complaint will arise. Needless to say, the period of one month for filing the complaint will be reckoned from the day immediately following the day on which the period of fifteen days from the date of the receipt of the notice by the drawer, expires. 11. For the foregoing discussion, this appeal stands dismissed as the appellant had earlier taken recourse to Clause (b) of Section 138 of the Act but did not avail of the cause of action that arose in his favour Under Section 142(b) of the Act.” 10. In case of S.L. Construction and Anr. -Vrs.- Alapati Srinivasa Rao and Anr. reported in (2009) 42 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 303, it is held as follows:- 32. In case of S.L. Construction and Anr. -Vrs.- Alapati Srinivasa Rao and Anr. reported in (2009) 42 Orissa Criminal Reports (SC) 303, it is held as follows:- 32. As the issuance of cheque, non-payment thereof on presentation, issuance of a valid notice calling upon the drawer of the cheque to pay the amount in question and the appellants' failure to pay to the complainant the amount in question within a period of 15 days from the date of receipt of a copy of the said notice upon them, a cause of action arose for filing a complaint petition, in our opinion, the High Court cannot be said to have committed any error in passing the impugned judgment. 33. In view of the findings aforementioned, we have no hesitation to hold that the cause of action for filing a complaint arose only once and not more than once as contented by by Mrs. Desai, learned Counsel.” 11. Therefore, since the complaint petition has been filed beyond the prescribed period of one month and the learned Magistrate has not condoned the delay after being satisfied with the sufficient cause shown by the complainant for not making the complaint within such prescribed period, on a careful consideration of the submission made at the Bar and the ratio laid down in the decisions referred to above, I am of the view that impugned order dated 25.02.2003 passed by the learned S.D.J.M., Jagatsinghpur in I.C.C. Case No. 127 of 2002 in taking cognizance of offences punishable under section 138 of the N.I. Act read with section 420 of the Indian Penal Code is not sustainable in the eye of law and accordingly, the same stands quashed. I would have granted certain time to the complainant-opposite party to approach the learned Magistrate and permitted him to file appropriate application in the complaint petition for condoning the delay in filing the complaint petition showing sufficient cause but since the amount of the cheque is not that high and about fifteen years is going to be passed since the date of institution of the complaint petition, I refrained from passing any such order in favour of the complainant-opposite party. Accordingly, the CRLMC application is allowed.