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2017 DIGILAW 1116 (BOM)

Divisional Controller, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Subhchandra s/o Premnarayan Pathak

2017-06-20

B.P.DHARMADHIKARI, ROHIT B.DEO

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JUDGMENT : B.P. DHARMADHIKARI, J. Heard Shri V.G. Wankhede, learned counsel for the appellant – Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation and Shri B.M. Khan, learned counsel for the respondent – Conductor. 2. This Court has, while issuing notice to the respondent on 18.10.2007, on prayer for stay, stayed the judgment of the learned Single Judge. This order was confirmed on 14.03.2008. In that order, the Division Bench has taken note of period of 29 years for which back wages were allowed by the learned Single Judge and stayed that part. The appellant – Corporation was directed to reinstate the Conductor. 3. According to Shri Khan, learned counsel, in view of this order, Conductor was reinstated and he worked for some time and then superannuated. 4. Shri Wankhede, learned counsel invites attention to observations by the learned Single Judge in paragraph 10 of the impugned judgment to show that on the date on which writ petition was heard, the Conductor had already superannuated. 5. We do not wish to go into this controversy. For proved misconduct of misappropriation of M.S.R.T.C. amount by tampering with the Concise Way Bill Abstract (CWA), by order dated 14.07.1983, punishment of dismissal was inflicted upon the Conductor. It is to be noted that prior thereto, on 24.04.1979, ID Application No. 75 of 1979 was moved by the present appellant before Conciliation Officer, seeking permission to dismiss the respondent – Conductor, a protected employee. The permission was refused by the Conciliation Officer on 28.05.1980. After that refusal, the Inquiry Officer took some steps and then above mentioned order of dismissal was passed. This is only to show that the period for which back wages are payable is almost 29 years. 6. The punishment of dismissal formed subject matter of Reference (IDA) No. 23 of 1990 before the Labour Court, Chandrapur. That Court decided preliminary issue regarding fairness and validity of Departmental Inquiry as also issues on merits by common order dated 31.10.1991. The inquiry was held to be valid, misconduct was held to be established and punishment was maintained. With the result, Labour Court answered the reference in negative. 7. This Award was then questioned before this Court in Writ Petition No. 419 of 1993. The learned Single Judge pronounced the judgment on 04.06.2007. The inquiry was held to be valid, misconduct was held to be established and punishment was maintained. With the result, Labour Court answered the reference in negative. 7. This Award was then questioned before this Court in Writ Petition No. 419 of 1993. The learned Single Judge pronounced the judgment on 04.06.2007. In that judgment, it has been found that authority competent to initiate departmental inquiry was Depot Manager as misconduct came to light in the premises of Aheri Depot. Initiation of proceedings by the Divisional Traffic Superintendent and issuance of charge sheet by that authority was, therefore, held bad. Apart from this, while commenting upon the validity or otherwise of Departmental Inquiry, course adopted by the Inquiry Officer, after rejection of permission by the Conciliation Officer, has been criticized. It has been held that the Conductor was not given due and proper opportunity, with the result, inquiry itself was found bad. In the light of these findings and the fact that the Conductor had superannuated already, Court granted him full back wages as relief of reinstatement could not have been granted. 8. Shri Wankhede, learned counsel, in this background submits that the misconduct consists of carrying passengers without ticket and of tampering records to misappropriate the amount. Tickets earlier sold and recorded with numbers in CWA were again shown as sold by the Conductor, with the result, double sale of very same tickets was reflected. However, while depositing M.S.R.T.C. cash and unsold tickets, this double sale was not pointed out. He contends that thus, misappropriation was not within the premises of Aheri Depot but when bus was travelling from Shironcha to Asarali and hence, the Divisional Traffic Superintendent was the right authority to issue charge sheet. 9. Shri Wankhede, learned counsel points out that in routine course and at random when this CWA of Conductor was checked, the mischief was discovered and thereafter action started. Merely because CWA was deposited with Depot Manager at Aheri and misconduct came to light there, it cannot be said that the misconduct occurred within Depot premises and hence Depot Manager was not and could not have been the competent authority. He further submits that regarding procedure followed in Departmental Inquiry, no grievance was made by the Conductor, when inquiry was going on and show cause notices were served upon him. He further submits that regarding procedure followed in Departmental Inquiry, no grievance was made by the Conductor, when inquiry was going on and show cause notices were served upon him. He further states that in written statement filed before the Labour Court, in specific pleadings, a right to prove misconduct before the Labour Court, if inquiry be found vitiated, was specifically reserved. Thus, the learned Single Judge, after finding that inquiry was vitiated, ought to have remanded the matter to the Labour Court for giving an opportunity to the appellant to prove misconduct. As that has not been done, the judgment impugned in present LPA is unsustainable. However, he adds that after refusal of permission by the Conciliation Officer, Inquiry Officer has not reopened inquiry but only rectified the errors pointed out by the Conciliation Officer, after giving necessary opportunity to the Conductor. 10. Shri Khan, learned counsel for the Conductor submits that after defects in inquiry were pointed out, for the first time, a copy of CWA was made available to the respondent and as such, the Inquiry Officer could not have proceeded further from the stage of show cause notice. He adds that misconduct (alleged) was about tampering in CWA and as CWA itself was not supplied, the misconduct could not have been held to be proved. He further adds that in the proceedings before the Labour Court also, CWA was not brought on record as per law by examining any witness. Overwriting or tampering therein is not proved to be by the Conductor. He submits that the learned Single Judge has, therefore, correctly found inquiry vitiated. He further adds that if inquiry is vitiated and the respondent is to be given an opportunity to prove misconduct by adducing evidence before the Labour Court, the competency of the authority to issue charge sheet may not remain material. He, however, adds that as tampering, for which action has been taken, has come to light in depot premises, Depot Manager only was the competent authority. He contends that it cannot be presumed that overwriting has been done by the Conductor in the bus while carrying passengers from Shironcha to Asarali. He, however, adds that as tampering, for which action has been taken, has come to light in depot premises, Depot Manager only was the competent authority. He contends that it cannot be presumed that overwriting has been done by the Conductor in the bus while carrying passengers from Shironcha to Asarali. Lastly, he adds that in any case, now the respondent has already superannuated and alleged misconduct is about 30 years old, therefore, remand of matter to Labour Court for proving that misconduct will be an empty formality as necessary witnesses for that purpose may not be available and it will be undue harassment not only to the respondent – conductor but also to M.S.R.T.C. Officers, who may also have superannuated. 11. In reply arguments, Shri Wankhede, learned counsel, without prejudice to the contentions noted supra, states that if back wage are to be awarded, the same could not have been for the entire stretch of 29 years. He submits that the same should have been proportionately scaled down as per settled law on the point. 12. After hearing the respective counsel, we find that the controversy which has surfaced in the year 1979 is being examined by this Curt in 2017. There is some dispute between the parties about reinstatement or otherwise. A perusal of Division Bench order dated 14.03.2008 shows a direction to reinstate, if employee had not already superannuated. There, the fact that back wages are required to be paid for huge period of 29 years finds mention. The learned Single Judge has while molding the relief to be granted, taken note of the fact that the respondent – Conductor had already superannuated. It is not in dispute that today he is not in employment and he is a senior citizen. 13. The officers of Corporation who may be required to be examined to prove alleged 1979 misconduct may not now be available. Similarly, if the respondent – Conductor is to prove his innocence, he may also face serious handicaps because of passage of time of about 29 years. Hence, even if the matter is to be sent back to the Labour Court to allow the appellant – employer to exercise its right to prove misconduct before it, grant of opportunity may not yield any positive result. 14. Hence, even if the matter is to be sent back to the Labour Court to allow the appellant – employer to exercise its right to prove misconduct before it, grant of opportunity may not yield any positive result. 14. If we accept the arguments of Shri Wankhede, learned counsel and hold that the Divisional Traffic Superintendent has rightly issued charge sheet and initiated disciplinary inquiry, as the inquiry is vitiated, appeal cannot succeed. If we accept his arguments on law, as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Cooper Engineering Ltd. vs. P. P. Mundhe, reported at AIR 1975 SC 1900 , the matter needs to be sent back to the Labour Court. Sending matter back to Labour Court will be undue harassment not only to the appellant but also to the respondent. At the same time, the findings on procedure followed by the Inquiry Officer, after the denial of permission by the Conciliation Officer, cannot be ignored. The facts show that very important document like CWA was not made available to the respondent during Departmental Inquiry initially. Though he may have maintained that document, that by itself does not mean that he has tampered with it and overwriting, if any, upon it is by him. This fact, therefore, is required to be established independently. Law requires grant of opportunity not only to the appellant for that purpose but also to the respondent. It follows that Departmental Enquiry held is rightly found unsustainable by the learned Single Judge. 15. Hence, if we record any finding on any of the contentions raised by Shri Wankhede, learned counsel, at this stage, at the most matter may be required to be sent back to Labour Court. That course is now practically rendered infructuous. In this situation, instead of dwelling more on this controversy, we find it appropriate to concentrate only on quantum of wages i.e. back wages from the date of termination i.e. from 13.01.1979 till the date of reinstatement (if there was any reinstatement) or then till the date of superannuation. The period in either case is about 29 years. 16. If the Conductor was reinstated, as claimed by Shri Khan, learned counsel, he may have worked thereafter till his superannuation, earned his salary and may also have secured retirement benefits. The period in either case is about 29 years. 16. If the Conductor was reinstated, as claimed by Shri Khan, learned counsel, he may have worked thereafter till his superannuation, earned his salary and may also have secured retirement benefits. If he has not worked, wages allowed by the learned Single Judge may be the only compensation available to him. 17. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Lokmat Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Shankarprasad, reported at 1999 (6) SCC 275 , considered grant of back wages for the period from 22.06.1982 to 03.05.1995 i.e. for about 13 years. 1/3rd of the wages due for this period have been allowed as reinstatement was not possible due to superannuation on 03.05.1995. A Single Judge of this Court (B.P. Dharmadhikari, J.) in the case of Punjaram s/o Dharmaji Wogdarkar vs. Presiding Officer, School Tribunal, Amravati & Anr., reported at 2007 (3) Mh. L.J. 627, while considering the similar issue under the provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977, when back wages were due for 13 years, allowed back wages at 25%. This grant has been upheld by the Division Bench of this Court while rejecting LPA. The judgment of the Division Bench is in the case of P.M. Ruikar Trust, Yavatmal vs. Punjaram s/o Dharmaji Wagdarkar, reported at 2016 (5) LJS 76/ 2016 (2) Mh. L.J. 783. It appears to be a settled position in such circumstances that when reinstatement is not possible and back wages are required to be allowed for huge period, 1/3rd amount is normally granted to the concerned employee. 18. Hence, keeping in mind this position, we direct the appellant – Corporation to calculate wags of the employee from the date of his termination/ dismissal till his reinstatement or till his superannuation (whichever event may have taken place earlier) and to pay 1/3rd amount thereof to him in lieu of reinstatement. This exercise shall be finished within a period of four months from today. If the exercise is not so finished, the respondent – Conductor shall be paid interest calculated @ 8% per annum on said amount from today till realization thereof by him. 19. At this stage, on the request of Shri Khan, learned counsel for the respondent – Conductor, we add that non payment accordingly may invite action in contempt. 20. If the exercise is not so finished, the respondent – Conductor shall be paid interest calculated @ 8% per annum on said amount from today till realization thereof by him. 19. At this stage, on the request of Shri Khan, learned counsel for the respondent – Conductor, we add that non payment accordingly may invite action in contempt. 20. With these directions, we partly allow the present Letters Patent Appeal. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.