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2017 DIGILAW 1119 (KAR)

Devi Devaraj v. John P. Joseph

2017-08-07

ASHOK B.HINCHIGERI

body2017
JUDGMENT : This appeal is preferred against the judgment and decree, dated 30.08.1999 passed by the Court of the Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.), Bengaluru Rural District in O.S.No.390/1992 and the judgment and decree, dated 25.06.2007 passed by the Court of the District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court-V, Bengaluru Rural District in R.A.No.156/1999. The parties are referred to as per their rankings in the suit proceedings. 2. The case of the plaintiff in brief is that the suit schedule property was granted to Sri Basha Sab, S/o Buden Sab, by the Tahsildar, Hoskote on 30.05.1969 on payment of upset price of Rs.400/-. The saguvali chit (grant certificate) was also issued to the said Basha Sab on 13.03.1973. The entries in the revenue records in respect of the suit schedule property were mutated in favour of the said Sri Basha Sab. He was also paying the land revenue. He sold the suit property to Sri L.Prakash, S/o Lingaiah under the registered sale deed, dated 09.10.1974 for a consideration of Rs.1,96,000/-. The said Sri L.Prakash sold the schedule property to the plaintiff on 09.01.1992. Thereafter the plaintiff erected the stone slabs compound on the eastern side of the suit schedule property. The plaintiff has been in peaceful possession, occupation and enjoyment of the suit schedule property. Two weeks prior to the filing of the suit, the defendants obstructed the farming activities of the plaintiff and tried to tress-pass over the suit schedule property. The defendants also tried to put up unauthorized construction with the motive of creating false evidence. This drove the plaintiff to file O.S.No.390/1992 seeking the relief of declaration and injunction in respect of the suit schedule property. 3. The first defendant filed the written statement and additional written statement contenting that she purchased the schedule property under the registered sale deed, dated 30.07.1986 from the legal representatives of late Basha Sab. She denied the plaintiff's right and title to the suit schedule property. The encumbrance certificate showed that there was the sale of the property between the defendants and their vendors. The plaintiff is not an agriculturist and is therefore not entitled to purchase the suit schedule property. The plaintiff belongs to an elite class and cannot be expected to plough the land. The sale, if any, executed by Sri L.Prakash in favour of the plaintiff is prohibited under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. The plaintiff is not an agriculturist and is therefore not entitled to purchase the suit schedule property. The plaintiff belongs to an elite class and cannot be expected to plough the land. The sale, if any, executed by Sri L.Prakash in favour of the plaintiff is prohibited under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. Sri L.Prakash had also filed O.S.No.190/1992 claiming to be the owner and in possession of the suit schedule property. When he has claimed to be the owner of the suit schedule property in 1992, the plaintiff cannot contend that the property was sold to him. The sale deed, dated 09.01.1992 (Ex.P2) is a fake, invalid, collusive and an inoperative transaction. Any sale between late Basha Sab and Sri L.Prakash is illegal and does not in any way bind the defendants. As the revenue records contain the names of late Basha Sab's children, on his death there was no impediment for the defendants to purchase the property from the children. The plaintiff has not challenged the sale deed executed by the L.R.s of late Basha Sab in favour of the defendants. Therefore his suit is liable to be dismissed. 4. Based on the rival pleadings, the Trial Court formulated the following five issues and one additional issue: "1. Whether the plaintiff proves his title to the suit schedule property? 2. Whether the plaintiff proves his lawful possession in respect of the suit schedule property? 3. Whether the plaintiff proves the alleged interference by the defendants? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for declaration and permanent injunction as prayed for? 5. To what order or decree? Additional issue framed on 18.7.1996. 1. Whether the plaintiff proves that the sale deed date:30.7.1986 in favour of the defendants is invalid and it does not give any title or interest in the suit property in favour of the defendants? 5. On behalf of the plaintiff, his wife and General Power of Attorney Holder was examined as PW1. The plaintiff also got examined Sri Narayanaswamy (PW2) who negotiated the price for the purchase of the land by the plaintiff, Sri Noorulla Khan (PW3), the owner of the adjoining land and Sri A.N.Anjaneya Reddy (PW4), an attestor to the sale deed, dated 9.10.1974 at Ex.P3 executed by late Basha Sab in favour of Sri L.Prakash. The documents at Exs.P1 to P48 were marked for the plaintiff. The documents at Exs.P1 to P48 were marked for the plaintiff. The defendant No.1 got herself examined as DW1 marking 27 documents in the Exhibit D-series. She also got Sri M.Venkatesh, owner of the land in the vicinity of the suit schedule property, examined as DW2. 6. Based on the pleadings, oral and documentary evidence placed on its record, the Trial Court answered the contentious issues in favour of the plaintiff and decreed the suit. 7. The unsuccessful defendants filed R.A.No.156/1999 in the Court of the District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court No.5, Bengaluru Rural District). On hearing the learned advocates and on the perusal of the records, the First Appellate Court formulated the following points for its consideration: (i) Whether the plaintiff has proved that Sri L.Prakash S/o Lingaiah purchased the suit schedule property under registered sale deed dated 09.10.1974 (Ex.P3) from Sri Basha Sab Sab S/o Buden Sab and continued to be in peaceful possession and enjoyment of suit land as an absolute owner as alleged in the plaint ? (ii) Whether the plaintiff has proved that, he became the absolute owner and continued to be in possession and enjoyment of suit schedule property on the strength of the registered sale deed dated 09.01.1992 (Ex.P2) executed by Sri L.Prakash S/o Lingaiah as alleged in the plaint ? (iii) Whether the plaintiff proved that the sale deed dated 30.07.1986 (Ex.D7) said to have executed by the sons of late Sri Basha Sab S/o Buden Sab in favour of the defendants is not legally sustainable in law ? (iv) Whether the defendant No.1 has proved that she is in physical possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule property as the absolute owner on the strength of the sale deed dated 30.07.86 (Ex.D7) ? (v) Whether the Judgment & Decree dated 30.07.99 decreeing the suit requires interference by this Court ? (vi) What order ? 8. Answering the contentious points in favour of the plaintiff, the First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal by its judgment, dated 25.6.2007. 9. On suffering the concurrent judgments, the defendants have come in second appeal before this Court. 10. Sri S. Shaker Shetty, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant-appellants submits that the alleged alienation of the suit schedule property by Basha Sab in favour of L. Prakash is hit by Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969. 9. On suffering the concurrent judgments, the defendants have come in second appeal before this Court. 10. Sri S. Shaker Shetty, the learned counsel appearing for the defendant-appellants submits that the alleged alienation of the suit schedule property by Basha Sab in favour of L. Prakash is hit by Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969. He submits that the land grant in favour of Basha Sab was with the non-alienation clause for 15 years from 13.3.1973. It could not have been sold by Basha Sab to L. Prakash before the completion of 15 years; the sale transaction is said to have been taken place on 9.10.1974. He submits that the revenue authorities can grant the permission but only on the completion of 15 years' period. He submits that the transaction is void as it is hit by Section 23 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. He submits that the plaintiff also did not have the eligibility to purchase the schedule property, an agricultural land. Sections 79-A and 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 prohibits the alienation of the agricultural land in favour of parties like the plaintiff, as he was getting more than Rs.2.00 lakhs as his monthly salary. The plaintiff was an Executive in Singapore Airlines. He submits that such an averment was clearly made in paragraph No.4 of the written statement but no issues whatsoever came to be framed on it. He submits that by way of abundant caution, the defendants have also filed an I.A. invoking Order VI Rule 17 of C.P.C. seeking the amendment of the additional written statement. 11. He also brings to my notice I.A.No.3/15 seeking leave of this Court to present the amendment application in O.S.No.390/1992 on the file of the Trial Court. He submits that as additional evidence is required to be adduced on the amendment of the additional written statement, the matter may have to be remanded to the Trial Court. 12. He submits that the permission (Ex.P10) granted by the Assistant Commissioner is not at all a genuine document, because its author was the Assistant Commissioner from 17.4.1975 to 17.6.1975, whereas the permission was granted on 6.9.1974. 13. He submits that Exs.D2, D4, D5, D7, D8, D10, D11, D12, D14, D15, D16, D18, D19, D20, D21 and D22 are clearly indicative of the defendants' possession of the suit schedule property. 13. He submits that Exs.D2, D4, D5, D7, D8, D10, D11, D12, D14, D15, D16, D18, D19, D20, D21 and D22 are clearly indicative of the defendants' possession of the suit schedule property. Both the courts below have completely ignored the documentary evidence. 14. He submits that the plaintiff himself has not entered the witness box; only his power of attorney holder has entered the witness box. As the party himself has not entered into the witness box, the evidence of his power of attorney holder cannot be looked into. In support of his submissions, he relies on the following citations: (i) AIR 2005 SC 439 (ii) 2013 AIR SCW 3561 (iii) AIR 1979 Bombay 202 (iv) ILR 2005 KAR 884 15. He submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of UNION OF INDIA AND OTHERS v. VASAVI COOPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY LIMITED AND OTHERS, reported in (2014) 2 SCC 269 , that the plaintiff should win the case by proving his case; he cannot win the case on the weakness of his adversary. He submits that the documents produced by the plaintiff are not supported by any convincing oral evidence. He submits that L.Prakash, who is said to be the vendor of the plaintiff and who is very much alive, is not examined. 16. If the Trial Court has not considered the documentary evidence or has misconstrued it, then this Court has to interfere under Section 100 of C.P.C. In support of his submissions, he relies on the following authorities: (i) (2013) 7 SCC 490 (ii) (2001) 3 SCC 179 (iii) (2013) 7 SCC 390 (iv) (2010) 2 SCC 407 (v) ILR 2003 KAR 2253 (vi) (2002) 6 SCC 404 (vii) (2001) 4 SCC 729 17. He submits that the plaintiff's vendor, L. Prakash himself had filed a suit seeking the relief of permanent injunction. It clearly shows that Prakash had never executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. On Prakash's failure to get temporary injunction, O.S.No.390/1992 is got filed through the very same advocate, who had earlier filed the suit on behalf of Prakash. Such collusive exercises disentitle the plaintiff to any relief. 18. It clearly shows that Prakash had never executed the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. On Prakash's failure to get temporary injunction, O.S.No.390/1992 is got filed through the very same advocate, who had earlier filed the suit on behalf of Prakash. Such collusive exercises disentitle the plaintiff to any relief. 18. Sri Y.R. Sadasiva Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for Sri K. Bhanu Prasad for the respondent-plaintiff submits that if two sale deeds are executed in respect of a property, the sale deed executed earlier alone operates and confers title. In support of his submissions, he relies on the decisions reported in AIR 1981 Allahabad 191 and AIR 1973 Mysore 276. 19. He submits that the general power of attorney holder can always depose the facts, which are in his/her or personal knowledge. For advancing this submission, he relies on this Court's decision in the case of KAJU DEVI AND ANOTHER v. H.S.RUDRAPPA ALIAS RUDY AND OTHERS reported in ILR 2005 KAR 4370. He submits that the testimony given by the plaintiff's wife and power of attorney holder is in respect of the things which are in her personal knowledge. He relies on this Court's decision in the case of THIMMAMMA v. SIDDARANGAIAH reported in ILR 1988 KAR 1919 for advancing the submission that under Section 133 of the Karnataka Land Revenue Act, 1964 an entry in the record of rights shall be presumed to be true until the contrary is proved or a new entry is lawfully substituted therefor. In the instant case, the plaintiff has produced voluminous documentary evidence starting from the record of rights, mutation entry, order passed by the Assistant Commissioner in appeal, order passed by the Deputy Commissioner in revision petition and finally by this Court. All these orders clearly show that the plaintiff has been in possession of the suit schedule property. He has also relied on the Hon'ble Supreme Court's decision in the case of VISHWA VIJAY BHARATHI v. FAKHRUL HASSAN AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1976 SC 1485 , wherein it is observed that the entries in the revenue records are to be generally accepted on their face value and that the court should not embark upon the appellate enquiry into their correctness. 20. 20. He submits that the presumption that the possession goes with the title applies to all kinds of land, as held by the Kerala High Court in the case of THIRUVANCHAN SANKARAN v. KUNJIPILLAI AMMA GOURI AMMA AND OTHERS reported in AIR 1970 KERALA 310. Drawing the support from the Madras High Court's judgment in the case of KARUPPIAH MOOPPANAR v. MUTHUKARUPPAN SERVAI reported in AIR 1975 MADRAS 221, he contends that it is not necessary to call the plaintiff's vendor to establish the execution of the sale deed. 21. He would contend that the proceedings for violating of Sections 79-A and 79-B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act cannot be initiated after long lapse of time. 22. The submissions of the learned counsel have received my thoughtful consideration. Virtually no arguments whatsoever are addressed on the issues formulated by this Court on 5.9.2007 at the time of admission of this appeal. I am therefore constrained to recast the substantial questions of law based on the submissions of the learned advocates. The substantial questions of law are re-formulated as follows: (i) Whether the I.A. for amendment of pleadings can be filed in the appeal? If the answer is in the affirmative, whether the defendants' I.A. for amendment of the additional written statement deserves to be allowed? (ii) Whether the sale deed, dated 9.10.1974 can be held to be invalid on the ground of the alleged violation of Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules and Sections 79-A, 79-B and 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961? (iii) Whether the non-consideration of documentary evidence, particularly, the sale deed, dated 30.7.1986 (Ex.D7) executed by the children of late Basha Sab in favour of the defendants, has lead to perversity in the conclusions reached? (iv) Whether the judgments under appeal are liable to be set aside for the failure of the plaintiff to enter the witness box? 23. Heard the learned advocates appearing for the parties on the aforesaid re-formulated substantial questions of law. 24. Sri Shaker Shetty submits that no issue is framed by the Trial Court as to whether the sale transactions would be invalid when they are made in violation of law. He submits that the two sale deeds - one executed by Sri Basha Sab and the other executed by L. Prakash are non-est in the eye of law. 24. Sri Shaker Shetty submits that no issue is framed by the Trial Court as to whether the sale transactions would be invalid when they are made in violation of law. He submits that the two sale deeds - one executed by Sri Basha Sab and the other executed by L. Prakash are non-est in the eye of law. The two sale deeds do not contain any recitals as to how the purchasers are eligible and entitled to purchase the agricultural land. 25. As the said sale transactions are hit by Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969, they are void. He prays for the remand of the matter to the Trial Court in that regard. When the plaintiff has admitted the execution of the sale deed (Ex.D7) in his amended plaint, the Trial Court observes that the defendants have not proven Ex.D7. The reading of the Trial Court runs contrary to Section 58 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, which states that the facts admitted need not be proved. He submits that the Court has failed to take judicial notice of the things, as required by Section 57 of the Indian Evidence Act. 26. He submits that the plaintiff has not entered the witness box to establish that he is an agriculturist and that his income did not exceed a particular limit. He submits that the adverse inference has to be drawn from the plaintiff's failure to enter the witness box. He submits that the plaintiff has also not examined his vendor, L. Prakash. The plaintiff is content with executing the general power of attorney in favour of his wife on the day of the filing the suit and leaving the matter to rest on her testimony. 27. Sri Sadasiva Reddy, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent - plaintiff submits that the defendants have no locus standi to challenge the sale deed executed by Basha Sab in favour of L. Prakash and by L.Prakash in favour of the plaintiff. He seriously takes exception to the conduct of the plaintiff in moving the amendment application after 25 years of filing the suit. 28. He submits that the courts have no jurisdiction to initiate any enquiry or action under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. He seriously takes exception to the conduct of the plaintiff in moving the amendment application after 25 years of filing the suit. 28. He submits that the courts have no jurisdiction to initiate any enquiry or action under the provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. He submits that the advocate, who had filed the suit on behalf of L. Prakash withdrew the suit and filed the suit on behalf of the present plaintiff. He submits that there is nothing wrong in what has been done by the said advocate. He submits that no dispute whatsoever is raised to the sale deeds (Ex.P2 and Ex.P3). In Re. substantial Question No.(i): 29. The first substantial question of law does not require any lengthy discussion. The issue is no more res integra. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of MAHILA RAMKALI DEVI AND OTHERS v. NANDRAM reported in AIR 2015 SC 2270 has held that the amendment of the pleadings can be permitted at the appellate stage. It is held therein that there is no prohibition against an Appellate Court permitting an amendment at the appellate stage merely because the necessary material is not already before the Court. The first substantial question of law is answered in the affirmative. 30. The allied question is whether the appellants' I.A.No.3/2015 for amendment of additional written statement is to be allowed. My perusal of the contents of the said I.A. reveals that the sought amendment is with a view to contend that the plaintiff is not eligible to buy the agricultural land, as he was not an agriculturist and as his income exceeded the limit prescribed by law. Further, through the said I.A. the defendants propose to contend that the alienation of the suit schedule property within 15 years of the issuance of the saguvali chit is bad. The defendants want to show that the author of Ex.P10 was not even the Assistant Commissioner at the time of its issuance. The defendants are complaining of the violations of Sections 79-A and 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 and Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969. I do find some rudimentary or elementary foundation for complaining of the violations of the said provisions in the pleadings. Besides, for raising these questions of law, the amendment of the additional written statement is not required. I do find some rudimentary or elementary foundation for complaining of the violations of the said provisions in the pleadings. Besides, for raising these questions of law, the amendment of the additional written statement is not required. I have already framed the substantial question of law on the said point. 31. I have gone through the affidavit filed in support of the said I.A. It does not state as to when and how the defendants came to know that the author of Ex.P10 was not the Assistant Commissioner. The affidavit does not even show that the defendants have exercised the due diligence in the matter. The decision on the I.A. for amendment is a very serious exercise. The Apex Court has this to say in paragraph No.64 of its judgment in the case of REVAJEETU BUILDERS AND DEVELOPERS v. NARAYANASWAMY AND SOND AND OTHERS reported in (2009) 10 SCC 84 : "64. The decision on an application made under Order 6 Rule 17 is a very serious judicial exercise and the said exercise should never be undertaken in a casual manner. We can conclude our discussion by observing that while deciding applications for amendments the courts must not refuse bona fide, legitimate, honest and necessary amendments and should never permit mala fide, worthless and/or dishonest amendments. " 32. When the defendants have not shown that they have exercised the due diligence (the suit is of 1992 vintage), when the amendment is not required for the purpose of determining the real question in controversy between the parties and when the substantial questions of law is framed on the violation of Sections 79-A, 79-B and 80 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act and Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, I do not find any reason for allowing the said I.A. It is therefore dismissed. Consequently, I.A.No.4 seeking the permission from this Court to present the amendment application in O.S.No.390/1992 is also dismissed. In Re. substantial Question No.(ii): 33. Section 79-A of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, as on the date of the sale deed, dated 9.10.1974, contained the prohibition for the purchase of agricultural lands by anybody, whose family's income exceeded Rs.50,000/- (rupees fifty thousand only) from the non-agricultural sources. 34. Section 79-B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act contains the prohibition for the purchase of the lands by non- agriculturist. 34. Section 79-B of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act contains the prohibition for the purchase of the lands by non- agriculturist. Section 80 bars the transfer of agricultural land to non-agriculturist. 35. If there is any transaction in contravention of the said provisions, every village officer and every officer of the Revenue, Registration and Land Records Department shall report to the prescribed authority (Assistant Commissioner). On holding the summary enquiry, in exercise of the power conferred by Section 83 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the Assistant Commissioner shall declare such a transaction as illegal. Thereafter the land would vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. In the instant case, I do not find any pleadings either in the written statement or in the additional written statement to the effect that L. Prakash was not eligible to buy the agricultural lands. Nowhere it is stated that he was not an agriculturist and that his income exceeded the prescribed limit. The defendants have only averred that the plaintiff is not an agriculturist and therefore he could not have purchased the agricultural land in question. It is also to be noticed that no suit is filed by the defendants to have the sale deed, dated 9.10.1974 executed by Basha Sab in favour of L. Prakash. The defendants have also not filed any counter claim raising the challenge to the sale deeds, dated 9.10.1974 or 9.1.1992. In the absence of any challenge to the said sale deeds and in the absence of L. Prakash, I am not persuaded to say anything, which would have the effect of invalidating the said sale transactions. 36. I also do not find it desirable to de-settle the settled conditions. The sale deed, dated 9.10.1974 cannot be lightly interfered with after 43 years of its execution. That apart, the violation of the said provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act are being complained by somebody, who claims to have purchased the agricultural property but impliedly admits that it is in violation of the said provisions. The defendant No.1 (DW1) has this to say in the course of her cross-examination: "I am a registered Medical Practitioner. My husband is doing business......I am the resident of Bangalore. In Bangalore District, we have had no lands earlier to our family. I am not owning any agricultural implements or any bullock cart. The defendant No.1 (DW1) has this to say in the course of her cross-examination: "I am a registered Medical Practitioner. My husband is doing business......I am the resident of Bangalore. In Bangalore District, we have had no lands earlier to our family. I am not owning any agricultural implements or any bullock cart. I have no personal knowledge of cultivating of lands." 37. These admissions by the defendant No.1 clearly indicate that the defendants also had no eligibility to buy the agricultural lands. 38. Be it as it may, whether there was any prohibition for the purchase of the agricultural lands by L. Prakash or by the plaintiff or by the defendants cannot be gone into in the suit proceedings. It is for the concerned revenue authorities to initiate appropriate proceedings for the violation of the said provisions of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act. If the authorities were showing any inaction in the matter, then the aggrieved parties ought to have approached this Court seeking the writ of mandamus. Further, it is not that if a transaction is declared to be illegal by the Assistant Commissioner, in exercise of the power conferred by Section 83 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, the land will revert back to its erstwhile owner. Such a land would vest in the State Government free from all encumbrances. Under the circumstances of the case, I have no hesitation in holding that the alleged violation of the provisions of the said Act can neither be used as a sword nor as a shield by any party. 39. Similarly, if the grantee of the land (Basha Sab in this case) has sold the granted land to L. Prakash in violation of Rule 9 of the Karnataka Land Grant Rules, 1969, the land grant shall be cancelled and resumed to the Government free from all encumbrances by the authority which granted the land. On coming to know of the execution of the sale deed, dated 9.10.1974, it is not known why nobody has approached the revenue authorities for the cancellation of the said land-grant. As noticed earlier, neither the defendants have filed any suit nor made any counter claim in the suit and challenged to the sale deeds, dated 9.10.1974 and 9.1.1992. 40. For all the aforesaid reasons, the substantial question No.(ii) is answered in the negative. In Re. substantial Question No.(iii): 41. As noticed earlier, neither the defendants have filed any suit nor made any counter claim in the suit and challenged to the sale deeds, dated 9.10.1974 and 9.1.1992. 40. For all the aforesaid reasons, the substantial question No.(ii) is answered in the negative. In Re. substantial Question No.(iii): 41. Ex.D7 is the sale deed, dated 30.7.1986 executed by the children of Basha Sab in favour of the defendants. The defendants have not examined the executants of the said sale deed, namely, the children of Basha Sab. They have not examined the scribe of or any attesting witness to Ex.D7. 42. In the course of cross-examination, DW1 has said as follows: "I am not aware that Basha sold the property in favour of one Prakash on 9.10.74 vide Ex.P3................. I do not know whether Basha had obtained permission to sell the land in favour of Prakash from the Competent authority. I do not know whether the mutation was effected in favour of L.Prakash in M.R.No.2/75-76..........It is true that I came to know that Prakash sold the property to the plaintiff after filing of the suit.........I do not know whether my sale deed Ex.D7 is in typed written or hand written............ (witness says my husband has done all these things. Till today I do not know who was the attestor and who has got type written Ex.D7)...............I do not know whether my vendors were not in possession of grant certificate............" 43. The perusal of the relevant cross-examination of the defendants reveals that DW1 hardly knew anything about the sale transaction between her husband and the L.R.s of Basha Sab. For the reasons best known to herself, she did not get her husband examined as the witness. As stated earlier, she has also not got the L.R.s of Basha Sab examined. She has also not produced the original grant certificate/saguvali chit issued by the Government to Basha Sab. It is hard to believe that she is the bonafide purchaser, as she is not in possession of the title deed, that is the grant certificate or the saguvali chit. She is content producing only an extract of saguvali chit register (Ex.D1). It is also to be noted that the original grant certificate is produced and marked by the plaintiff as Ex.P4. 44. On evaluating the oral and documentary evidence placed on its record, the Trial Court has come to the right conclusion. She is content producing only an extract of saguvali chit register (Ex.D1). It is also to be noted that the original grant certificate is produced and marked by the plaintiff as Ex.P4. 44. On evaluating the oral and documentary evidence placed on its record, the Trial Court has come to the right conclusion. On re-appreciating the evidence, the Appellate Court has confirmed the findings of the Trial Court. I find that the consideration of the documentary evidence and particularly the sale deed, dated 30.7.1986 (Ex.D7) to be fair and proper. I do not find any perversity in the conclusions reached by them. 45. The averment that the schedule property was sold by L. Prakash in favour of the plaintiff vide sale deed, dated 9.1.1992 is found in paragraph No.7 of the plaint. This averment has not been specifically denied by the defendants in the written statement. Paragraph No.8 of the written statement contains that version of the defendants in response to what is stated in paragraph No.7 of the plaint. 46. When Basha Sab had sold the schedule property to L. Prakash during his life time, the L.R.s of Basha Sab can have no surviving interest in the schedule property. The rights of the L.R.s of Basha Sab cannot be better or higher than those of Basha Sab himself. It is also worthwhile to notice that neither Basha Sab, during his life time nor his L.R.s after his demise have questioned the sale deed, dated 9.10.1974 in favour of L. Prakash. 47. For all the aforesaid reasons, the third substantial question of law is answered to the effect that the consideration of documentary evidence, particularly the sale deed, dated 30.7.1986 (Ex.D7) is in proper perspective. Therefore there is no perversity in the conclusions reached. In Re. substantial Question No.(iv): 48. The plaint is signed by the plaintiff's wife and general power of attorney holder on behalf of the plaintiff. My perusal of what the plaintiff has said in the course of examination-in-chief and cross-examination shows that they are in respect of the acts of which she is personally aware. If she were to depose in respect of the acts done by the principal (her husband), it is then that the principal is obliged to enter the witness box. My perusal of what the plaintiff has said in the course of examination-in-chief and cross-examination shows that they are in respect of the acts of which she is personally aware. If she were to depose in respect of the acts done by the principal (her husband), it is then that the principal is obliged to enter the witness box. When the pleadings are verified and the corresponding evidence is adduced by the general power of attorney holder based on her personal knowledge, the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that the principal has not entered the witness box. In the given factual scenario, the non-examination of the plaintiff is not a legal defect. The facts of the case are such that nothing pertaining to the case can be said to be within the exclusive knowledge of the principal. Therefore, I answer the last substantial question of law to the effect that the judgments under appeal are not liable to be set aside for the failure of the plaintiff to enter the witness box. 49. In the result, I dismiss this appeal by upholding the concurrent judgments, dated 30.8.1999 passed by the Court of the Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Dn.), Bengaluru Rural District in O.S.No.390/1992 and dated 25.6.2007 passed by the Court of the District and Sessions Judge, Fast Tract Court-V, Bengaluru Rural District in R.A.No.156/1999.