JUDGMENT S.K. MISHRA, J. - The petitioner-Prof. Dibakar Naik is a highly educated academician having done M.Sc. in Agriculture Economics, Ph. D. in Economics and was awarded post-Doctorate in Aqua Cultural Economics with specialization in Aqua Culture Economics from the International Centre, Auburn University. He has completed 20 years as Professor; 18 Scholars acquired Ph.D. degree under his direct guidance. 2. When the appointment of Vice-Chancellor to the Orissa University of Agriculture and Technology, hereinafter referred to as the “OUAT” for brevity, was considered, he applied to the Principal Secretary to the Governor of Odisha on 18.02.2016. It is further seen that the Secretary and Director General of ICAR by virtue of letter dated 07.12.2015 in Annexure-3 recommended the petitioner’s candidature for the post of Vice –Chancellor. The petitioner sent a copy of the Bio-data to the Principal Secretary for consideration. It is also found that among 12 candidates forwarded to the Chancellor by the State Government, the petitioner was shown at the top of the list. He claims that he is not only eligible but also fittest candidate keeping in view his qualification, experience and publication etc. the search committee was formed by His Excellency the Governor of Odisha and Chancellor, OUAT. The search committee called the applicants and after scrutiny forwarded the names of the short listed candidates to the Chancellor but petitioner was not called. 3. The petitioner asserts that by adopting a misinterpretation of Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 of the Orissa University of Agriculture and Technology Act, 1965, hereinafter referred to as the “OUAT Act” for brevity, his name is not considered for the appointment of Vice-Chancellor. It is asserted that as per Sub-Section (2) of Section 9 of the OUAT Act, a person, who has not attained the age of 65 years is eligible. It is therefore contended by the petitioner that a person below 65 years is eligible for the post of Vice-Chancellor. The term of three years has nothing to do with the eligibility of the candidate. Therefore, he prayed by further elaborating on this issue that the appointment made in pursuance of the recommendation made by the search committee, thereby appointing Surendranath Pasupalak should be quashed and the opposite parties should be directed to hold fresh selection and consider the selection of Vice-Chancellor on merits. Therefore, he prayed by further elaborating on this issue that the appointment made in pursuance of the recommendation made by the search committee, thereby appointing Surendranath Pasupalak should be quashed and the opposite parties should be directed to hold fresh selection and consider the selection of Vice-Chancellor on merits. In this case, the opposite parties have appeared but the most important counter filed by the opposite party no.1, who happens to be Special Secretary to Governor of Odisha and Chancellor of OUAT. The main contention relied upon by the Special Secretary is that a conjoint reading of Sub-Sections (2) and (3) of Section 9 of the OUAT Act, 1965 it is apparent that a person, who has attained 65 years, cannot be appointed nor shall hold the post of Vice-Chancellor and the term of the office of the Vice-Chancellor shall be three years from the date of his appointment. Thus, keeping in view the statutory mandate, there is no discretion in the hands of the Chancellor to give appointment for a period shorter than three years in view of the use of the expression “shall” in Section 9(3) of the OUAT Act, 1965. Thus, from the pleadings and arguments advanced by the learned counsels for the parties, basic question that arises is regarding the interpretation of Section 9, especially Sub-Sections (2) and (3) of the aforesaid OUAT Act. It is apposite to take note of the exact words appearing in the statute. “9 (1) Omitted. (2) No person, who has attained the age of sixty-five years, shall be appointed or shall continue to hold the office of the Vice-Chancellor, (3) The term of office of the Vice- Chancellor shall be three years from the date of his appointment. Provided that the Chancellor may, from time to time, extend the aforesaid term of office for a total period not exceeding six months. (4) xxxx xxxx” 4. Several cases have been relied upon by the contesting parties regarding the interpretation of statute. In GOVINDLAL CHHAGANLAL PATEL VS. THE AGRIGULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE, GODHRA AND OTHERS (1975) 2 SCC 482 , a bench of three judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had examined Section 6(5) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1965 to consider how the word “shall” and “may” has to be interpreted. The most important discussion regarding this appears at paragraphs 9, 10 and 13. THE AGRIGULTURAL PRODUCE MARKET COMMITTEE, GODHRA AND OTHERS (1975) 2 SCC 482 , a bench of three judges of the Hon’ble Supreme Court had examined Section 6(5) of the Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Rules, 1965 to consider how the word “shall” and “may” has to be interpreted. The most important discussion regarding this appears at paragraphs 9, 10 and 13. At paragraph-9 of the aforesaid case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of the Section 6 of the aforesaid Gujarat Agricultural Produce Markets Act and held that it is the normal rule of construction of statute, a rule not certainly absolute and unqualified, but the condition which brings to play exception to that rule do not exist. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that far from it, the scheme of the Act and the purpose of particular provision in Section 6(1) underline to give provision to its plain and natural meaning. It is not reasonable in the Legislature to assume ignorance of distinction between “Section” of the statute and “sub-Section” of that Section. At paragraph-11, the Hon’ble Supreme Court quotes, Maxwell, Crawford and Craies abound in illustration where the words “shall” and “may” are treated as interchangeable. “Shall be liable to pay interest” does not mean “must be liable to pay interest”, and “may not drive on the wrong side of the road” must mean “shall not drive on the wrong side of the road”. But the problem which the use of language poses is : Does the legislature intend that its command shall be performed? Or it is enough to comply with the command in substance? In other words, the question is “is the provision mandatory or directory” The Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph-12 in the aforesaid case further observed that plainly, “shall” must normally be construed to mean “shall” and not “may” for the distinction between the two is fundamental. Granting the application of mind, there is little or no chance that one, who intends to leave a leeway will use the language of command in the performance of an act. The Apex Court further observed that since even lesser directions are occasionally clothed in words of authority, it becomes necessary to determine and ascertain the true meaning lying behind mere words. At paragraph-13, in the case of Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel Vs. The Apex Court further observed that since even lesser directions are occasionally clothed in words of authority, it becomes necessary to determine and ascertain the true meaning lying behind mere words. At paragraph-13, in the case of Govindlal Chhaganlal Patel Vs. The Agricultural Produce Market Committee, Godhara & others (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court took note of a very American case approvingly the plain question whether statue is mandatory or directory depends upon the intent of the legislature and not upon the language in which the intent is clothed. The meaning and intention of the legislature must govern, and these are to be ascertained, not only from the phraseology of the provision, but also by construing its nature, design, and consequence which would follow from constructing in the way or the other. After quoting the same, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case held that the governing factor is the intent of legislature, which should be gathered not form the words used by the legislature, which should be gathered not from the words used by the legislature but from the variety of other circumstance and consideration. In other words, the use of word “shall” or ‘may’ is not conclusive whether a particular requirement of law is mandatory or directory. But the circumstance that legislature has used a language of compulsive force is always great relevance in the absence of anything contrary in the context indicating that a permissive interpretation is permissible, the statue ought to construed as peremptory. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that if the words of a statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, no more is necessary than to expound those words in ordinary sense, the words themselves in such case best declaring the intention of the legislature. Thereafter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has examined the ratio decided in Khub Chan v. State of Rajasthan, (1967) 1 SCR 120 , Haridwar Singh v. Bagun Sumbrui, (1973) 3 SCC 889 In re Presidential Poll, (1974) 2 SCC 33 & 49 and come to the conclusion at paragraph-18 that the word appearing in the statue cannot be treated as “may” and the notification must be issued in the Gujarati newspaper having circulation in a particular area. This judgment is a locus-classicus and perhaps it is not necessary to go into the other judgments relied upon by the parties. 5. This judgment is a locus-classicus and perhaps it is not necessary to go into the other judgments relied upon by the parties. 5. This Court finds it profitable to take note of the case of GURU JAMBHESWAR UNIVERSITY THROUGH REGISTRAR v. DHARAM PAL, (2007) 2 SCC 265 . The Hon’ble Supreme Court has the occasion to examine the Section 25- F (b) and 2(aaa) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. After taking into consideration a number of earlier cases decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, it at paragraph-10 of the aforesaid case, in a very clear and uncertain term observed that the language used in Section 2 (aaa) is absolutely plain and clear and, therefore, there is no slightest ambiguity in the same. The Hon’ble Supreme Court further held that it is well settled principle of law that words of a statute are first understood in ordinary or popular sense and phases and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless that leads to some absurdity or there is something in the context or in the object of the statue to suggest to the contrary. The true way is to take the words of the legislature have given them, and to take the meaning which the words given naturally imply, unless where the construction of those words it, either by the preamble or the context of the words in question, controlled or altered. As is often said the golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning and ordinary meaning of the words should not be departed from unless it can be shown that the legal context in which the words are used requires a different meaning. 6. Coming to the question at hand by applying the aforesaid principles, this Court takes note of the fact that Sub-Section (2) of Section 9 of the OUAT Act, 1965 provides that no persons, who has attained 65 years shall be appointed or shall hold the office of Vice-Chancellor. Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 of the OUAT Act provides that the term of the office of the Chancellor shall be three years from the date of his appointment. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 of the OUAT Act provides that the term of the office of the Chancellor shall be three years from the date of his appointment. The learned Senior Advocate Mr. Dora submitted that if the Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 of the OUAT Act is given effect, it will make Sub-Section (2) nugatory in the sense that a person, if he is attained at the age of 62 years, may continue up to 65 years but a person, who has already completed 62 that may have lesser time as tenure in the office and shall also be appointed as Vice-Chancellor and the words “shall” appearing in Sub-Section (3) should be interpreted as “may” On this issue, the learned Counsels appearing for the opposite parties, especially Mr. Asok Mohanty, Senior Advocate contends that the two provisions has to be read together and in a harmonious way. There is no ambiguity is Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 of the OUAT Act. So, there is no need to control the same by the objectives and reasons of the enactment or the preamble of the OUAT Act, 1965. It is argued that if Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 of the OUAT Act is taken to be lying down a mandatory even that the term of the VC shall be three years from the date of his appointment, a person, who has already crossed 62 cannot appointed as the Vice-Chancellor. 7. In applying the principles in the aforesaid discussed cases of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and giving harmonious interpretation to both the provisions, this Curt is of the opinion that the word “shall” appearing in Sub-Section (3) is mandatory. This interpretation of the clause is also in the public interest as the statute itself provides that a person should at least work as Vice-Chancellor of the OUAT for three years, thereby he can make a better plan of his academic career of the students in a better way and still have a effective implementation of the said plan and objectives. This provision of having at least three years of service from the date of appointment of the Vice-Chancellor is also taking out short tenures appointment, thereby protecting University from frequent change of administration and fluctuating administrative decisions and policies. This provision of having at least three years of service from the date of appointment of the Vice-Chancellor is also taking out short tenures appointment, thereby protecting University from frequent change of administration and fluctuating administrative decisions and policies. So, this Court is of the opinion that the word “shall” appearing in Sub-Section (3) of Section 9 of the OUAT Act is mandatory and the provision that the term of the office of the Vice-Chancellor shall be three years from the date of his appointment does not render Sub-Section (2) of Section 9 of the OUAT Act nugatory, which provides that a person shall not be appointed or continue after he attained the age of 65. Hence, there is no merit in the writ petition. The writ petition is, therefore, dismissed. However, there shall be no orders as to the costs. Urgent certified copy of this order be granted on proper application. Petition dismissed.