JUDGMENT : 1. The present criminal revision application, under Section 397 read with Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’) has been filed against the judgment and order, dated 19.11.2005, passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court No. V, Bhagalpur, in Criminal Appeal No. 83 of 20025/Trial No. 04 of 2005, whereby it has upheld the judgment and order of the learned Trial Court, dated 07.08.2002, passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Bhagalpur, in Trial No. 291 of 2002, whereby the learned Trial Court has recorded conviction of the appellant of the offences punishable under Sections 323, 324, 326 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code and has sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three months, for the offence under Section 323 of the Indian Penal Code, rigorous imprisonment for a period of 1½ years for the offence punishable under Section 324 of the Indian Penal Code and rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code. For the offence punishable under Section 504 of the Indian Penal Code, sentence is of rigorous imprisonment for a term of one month. 2. This is to be noted that this criminal revision application was earlier heard by this Court. This Court, by an oral judgment and order, dated 18.08.2015, had, without interfering with the findings of conviction, ordered for reduction of the sentence to the period already undergone by the petitioner. The informant, thereafter, approached Supreme Court by preferring an appeal, giving rise to Criminal Appeal No. 716 of 2017. The Supreme Court, by order, dated 07.04.2017, has passed following order:- “We find from the reading of the impugned order that the appellant herein was convicted by the Trial Court under Sections 323, 324, 326 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC) and was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months, 1½ years, 3 years and 1 years respectively for the aforesaid offences. The first appeal was dismissed by the Sessions Court. Thereafter, the appellant filed criminal revision petition, which has been dismissed by the High Court in one line i.e. “Having gone through the judgment of conviction, I do not find any reason for interference with the same”. The first appeal was dismissed by the Sessions Court. Thereafter, the appellant filed criminal revision petition, which has been dismissed by the High Court in one line i.e. “Having gone through the judgment of conviction, I do not find any reason for interference with the same”. This is clearly a non-speaking order passed by the High Court and we, accordingly, set aside the impugned order on this ground alone and remit the case back to the High Court for consideration of the revision petition afresh on merits. It may also be recorded that the High Court had by impugned order reduced the sentence to the period already undergone by the appellant. It is made clear that even this order is set aside and when the High Court considers the criminal revision petition afresh it would be open to the High Court to go into the aspect o sentence as well.” 3. It is in the background of the said order, dated 07.04.2017, of the Supreme Court, that this matter has been placed again for final hearing and disposal and is being disposed of, after having heard learned Counsel for the parties. 4. I have heard Mr. B.P. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, Mr. I.P. Mandal, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the informant and Ms. (Dr.) Indiwar Kumari, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, representing the State of Bihar. 5. Mr. B. P. Pandey, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the petitioner, has, at the very outset, agreed that there being concurrent findings of facts recorded by the Courts below, it is difficult for him to successfully assail the said findings to the extent the petitioner has been held guilty of the offence punishable under Sections 323, 324 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. He, however, submits that so far as conviction of the petitioner of the offence punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, the same is unsustainable since essential ingredients of Section 327 of the Indian Penal Code, i.e. grievous hurt, is completely absent, which could be easily seen on the basis of evidence on record. He has placed reliance on Supreme Court’s decision, in the case of Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 843 and few other decisions, in order to buttress his submission. 6. Mr. He has placed reliance on Supreme Court’s decision, in the case of Sarju Prasad v. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 843 and few other decisions, in order to buttress his submission. 6. Mr. Mandal, learned Counsel, appearing on behalf of the informant, on the other hand, has contended that since the informant’s brother lost a part of his finger, the injury comes within the definition of ‘grievous hurt’ within the meaning of Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code. He has, accordingly, submitted that the impugned judgments of the Trial Court and the Appellate Court do not require interference. 7. Same stand has been taken by Dr. Indiwar Kumari, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, appearing on behalf of the State. 8. On the basis of the materials on record and submissions advanced on behalf of the parties, as has been noted above, in my view, the only point, which deserves to be adjudicated, is as to whether the prosecution could successfully prove the commission of offence punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code or not. This can be logically done by taking into account the definition of ‘grievous hurt’ occurring in Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code and the injury, which the informant had received. 9. To deal with the issue, the case of the prosecution needs to be briefly taken note of. 10. The occurrence is of 14.02.1993, which is alleged to have taken place at about 02:45 PM, when the informant was engaged in demarcating the land, which, according to the case of the prosecution, belonged to the informant. The petitioner came, with his wife, armed with a Kata (a sharp cutting weapon) and caused an assault on the informant’s brother, Dilip Kumar Jha, claiming that the said piece of land belonged to him (Dilip Kumar Jha) and it had already been measured on several occasions. Scuffle between the parties ensued, in which the informant’s brother sustained injury in his hand. Part of ring finger of the informant’s brother, Dilip Kumar Jha, was said to be chopped off. The said Dilip Kumar Jha was taken to Banka Sadar Hospital, where he was given first aid, whereafter he was referred to Bhagalpur Hospital for treatment. 11. The Police, on completion of investigation, submitted charge sheet, whereafter cognizance was taken. Upon framing of charge, the trial commenced. The said Dilip Kumar Jha was taken to Banka Sadar Hospital, where he was given first aid, whereafter he was referred to Bhagalpur Hospital for treatment. 11. The Police, on completion of investigation, submitted charge sheet, whereafter cognizance was taken. Upon framing of charge, the trial commenced. After examination of prosecution’s witnesses, statement of accused, under Section 313 of the Code, were recorded. 12. Upon appreciation of evidence adduced at the trial, the learned Trial Court held the petitioner guilty of the offence punishable under Sections 323, 324, 326 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner’s wife, Pushpa Devi, was also convicted, but of the offence punishable under Sections 323 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, only. The co-convict, Pushpa Devi, was given benefit of Section 3 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 13. The prosecution’s witnesses, at the trial, supported the case of the prosecution. The victim, Dilip Kumar Jha, who was examined as PW 4, deposed that he received injury on his finger adjacent to the little finger of his left hand (ring finger), caused by kata, because of which a part of the ring finger stood chopped off. 14. In view of the plea, which has been taken on behalf of the petitioner, as noted above, since the petitioner has opted not to assail conviction of the petitioner of other offences, except Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, it is to be seen whether the said injury, even if accepted to have been caused by the petitioner, can be said to be a grievous injury to attract Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code. 15. Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code reads thus: “326. 15. Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code reads thus: “326. Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means.- Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” 16. Learned Senior Counsel is correct in his submission that Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishment for voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means. The essential ingredients of offence under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code are that a grievous hurt is caused by a person by means of (i) instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or (ii) instrument likely to cause death if used as weapon of offence, or (ii) fire or any heated substance, or (iv) any poison or corrosive substance, or (v) any explosive substance, or (vi) any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive into the blood, or (vii) by means of any animal, or (viii) the case must not come within the ambit of Section 335 of the Indian Penal Code. 17. ‘Grievous hurt’ has been defined in Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code, which is as follows: “320. Grievous hurt.--The following kinds of hurt only are designated as "grievous":- First.- Emasculation. Secondly.- Permanent privation of the sight of either eye. Thirdly.- Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear. Fourthly.- Privation of any member or joint. Fifthly.- Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. Sixthly.- Permanent disfiguration of the head or face. Seventhly.- Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. Secondly.- Permanent privation of the sight of either eye. Thirdly.- Permanent privation of the hearing of either ear. Fourthly.- Privation of any member or joint. Fifthly.- Destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint. Sixthly.- Permanent disfiguration of the head or face. Seventhly.- Fracture or dislocation of a bone or tooth. Eighthly.- Any hurt which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits.” 18. The case of the prosecution cannot be said to be falling in the first, second, third, fourth, sixth and seventh illustrations, as above. It has been argued on behalf of the informant that it certainly comes under the fifth and eighth illustration of definition of ‘grievous hurt’, under Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code. 19. I do not find this case would fall under the fifth illustration of Section 320 of the Indian Penal Code, which deals with destruction or permanent impairing of the powers of any member or joint, since it is the case of the prosecution that the victim sustained injury in the finger adjacent to the little finger of the left hand. The eighth illustration states that it must be a hurt, which endangers life or which causes the sufferer to be during the space of twenty days in severe bodily pain, or unable to follow his ordinary pursuits. 20. Learned Senior Counsel has rightly submitted that the prosecution failed to establish that the victim was unable to follow his ordinary pursuits during the space of twenty days because of severe bodily pain and, therefore, the eighth illustrations can have no application. It has rightly been submitted that there is no evidence on record to suggest that there was any intention to cause death, i.e. intention to cause such injury as the petitioner knew to be likely to cause death or intended to inflict an injury, which was sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death or that he knew that the act was so eminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or cause injury as is likely to cause death. He has rightly relied on the Supreme Court’s decision, in the case of Sarju Prasad (supra). 21. He has rightly relied on the Supreme Court’s decision, in the case of Sarju Prasad (supra). 21. Considering the above and other materials available, I find substance in the submission advanced on behalf of the petitioner that the prosecution could not establish, beyond all reasonable doubts, commission of offence punishable under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code. Thus, without interfering with the conviction of the petitioner of the offences under Sections 323, 324 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code, his conviction, under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code, is hereby set aside. 22. Since the occurrence is of the year 1993 and the matter has remained pending for all these years, I do not think any purpose would be served by asking the petitioner to serve remaining sentence upon his conviction being sustained of the offences under Sections 323, 324 and 504 of the Indian Penal Code. There is nothing on record of his previous conviction. In that background, I am of the view that provisions of Sections 3 and 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, need to be invoked. Invoking the said provisions, I direct the release of the petitioner after due admonition by the learned Trial Court. 23. This application is allowed to the extent as above.