ORDER : Aggrieved by the order dated 02.08.2015, and by order dated 27.11.2015, the petitioners have approached this Court. By the former order, the petitioners were discharged from service of Central Industrial Security Force ("CISF", for short). By the latter order, the Deputy Inspector General, CISF (South Zone), Chennai, the respondent No.4, dismissed the departmental appeal filed by the petitioners, and upheld the dismissal order. 2. In short, the facts of the case are that the petitioners were serving as Constables with the CISF Unit. In 2015, they were posted at the Bharatiya Reserve Bank Note Mudrana in Mysuru. During their tenure in Mysuru, a Constable's wife filed a complaint against the petitioners. The name of the complainant is being withheld. She shall be referred to as 'the complainant'. The complainant alleged that she was blackmailed, repeatedly raped by eight constables belonging to the CISF Unit mentioned hereinabove. 3. According to her complaint, she was residing in government quarter No.B-408, along with her children. During March and April, 2015, Constable Vikas Verma, the petitioner No.1, introduced himself as her husband's friend. Since he was working in the Unit's Mess, during the absence of her husband, he offered to bring things from the market for her, as he used to visit the market frequently for procuring the goods for Unit Mess. Using this offer, he managed to obtain her cell phone numbers. She further claimed that while her husband was on leave for twenty days during March and April, 2015, initially, he would call her up, late at night, and would talk about her general health and family. But subsequently, he started talking about sexual matters. When her husband would be on night duty, he would call her around 11:00 P.M. and talk about sexual matters. One day, she does not remember the exact date and time, he called her at 10:00 A.M. and expressed his desire to have physical relationship with her in the night. Around 1:30 A.M., he called her up and told her that he is waiting outside her house. If she does not have physical relationship, he would reveal all the telephonic conversation he had with her, to her husband. For he had recorded her telephonic conversation with him. Fearing for her family life, she opened the door. He entered the house and forcibly raped her. If she does not have physical relationship, he would reveal all the telephonic conversation he had with her, to her husband. For he had recorded her telephonic conversation with him. Fearing for her family life, she opened the door. He entered the house and forcibly raped her. He left the house around 2:00 A.M. Thereafter, he kept on calling her frequently. A week later, he told her to meet him at the CISF parade ground. She reached the parade ground around 7:00 P.M. He forcibly dragged her into the bushes, and raped her again. According to her, all these incidents happened prior to 23.05.2015, when her husband was not in the station. After her husband came back, there was no call from Vikas Verma for about twenty days. 4. She further claimed that on 06.06.2015, Constable Ankush Punia, petitioner No.2, and another Constable V.K. Tiwari, were out on night duty. They called her and told her that they knew about her illicit affair with Vikas Verma. In case, she did not open the door of her house, they would disclose her illicit affair to everyone. She opened the door. They were in their uniform when they entered the house. Both of them dragged her into a room, and raped her one by one until 2:30 A.M. 5. Thereafter, she claims that Constable Chandan Kumar also contacted her, blackmailed her about her physical relationship with Vikas Verma, Ankur Punia, and V.K. Tiwari. He called her to the parade ground where he raped her. 6. On another day, she does not remember the date, Pinku Kumar, petitioner No.3, called her and told her that he got her number from Ankur Punia. He blackmailed her about her illicit physical relationship with other Constables, and threatened her that he would disclose these facts to everyone. He also came to her house, and raped her. 7. Three or four days later, on 18.06.2015, at about 1:30 A.M., Constable V.K. Tiwari had called her and blackmailed her. He came to her house with Constables Rahul Divakar, and Jitendra Singh, petitioner No.4. They not only blackmailed her, but also raped her one by one. Lastly on 24.06.2015, Constable Yogendra, petitioner No.5, called her up at 9:30 P.M., and told her that he knew about her illicit relationships. He also came to her house, raped her, and left the house around 10:30 P.M. 8. They not only blackmailed her, but also raped her one by one. Lastly on 24.06.2015, Constable Yogendra, petitioner No.5, called her up at 9:30 P.M., and told her that he knew about her illicit relationships. He also came to her house, raped her, and left the house around 10:30 P.M. 8. According to her, on 26.06.2015, her husband came back from the CISF Unit, SCCL Singreni. However, fearing for her family life, she did not disclose anything to her husband. On 28.06.2015, Constable Vikas Verma called her at 11:30 P.M. While she was talking to him, her husband snatched the phone and enquired as to whom she was talking to as the voice on the phone was a male voice. Fearing for the consequences, she told him about her ordeal on 01.07.2015. Her husband was shocked and started behaving in an abnormal manner. Therefore, she filed a complaint with the higher authorities. 9. Upon receiving the complaint, a preliminary enquiry was held. During the course of the preliminary enquiry, the statement of the complainant, the statements of the eight delinquent officers, and the statement of other witnesses were recorded. After going through these statements, the Group Commandant, as the Disciplinary Authority, issued eight orders on 02.08.2015, wherein he held that it is not possible to hold a regular departmental enquiry as it is one of the rarest of rare cases in the Armed Forces, where such an occurrence of repeated rapes has occurred with a wife of a Constable. Moreover, since the holding of a regular departmental enquiry would adversely affect the discipline and morale of the armed forces, the holding of the regular departmental enquiry was dispensed with. By the said order, the eight delinquent Constables were dismissed from service. Since the Constables were aggrieved by their respective dismissal order, dated 02.08.2015, they filed separate appeals before the Deputy Inspector General, the respondent No.4. However, by orders dated 27.11.2015, the respondent No.4 dismissed the departmental appeal, and upheld the dismissal order dated 02.08.2015. Hence, these petitions before this Court. 10. Mr. P.A. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has pleaded that firstly, the petitioners could not have been dismissed from their service without holding a regular departmental enquiry. However, by orders dated 27.11.2015, the respondent No.4 dismissed the departmental appeal, and upheld the dismissal order dated 02.08.2015. Hence, these petitions before this Court. 10. Mr. P.A. Kulkarni, the learned counsel for the petitioners, has pleaded that firstly, the petitioners could not have been dismissed from their service without holding a regular departmental enquiry. To do so, is not only to violate their rights under the principles of natural justice, but is also to violate the requirement of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Secondly, the disciplinary authority has not given cogent reasons for dispensing with the holding of a regular departmental enquiry against the petitioners. In fact, the reasons given are no reasons in the eyes of the law. Thirdly, both the disciplinary authority, and the appellate authority have failed to notice that the complainant has involved them in a false case. The falsity of the case is apparent from the fact that although the complainant claims the incidents had occurred between 16.03.2015 and 24.06.2015, yet she did not file the complaint with the police till 02.07.2015. Hence, there is an inordinate delay in filing of the complaint. Fourthly, the medical examination of the Complainant did not support her story that she had been raped repeatedly by eight different persons. Hence the falsity of her story is writ large. Fifthly, since the delinquent officers are not required to furnish their call details, their refusal to do so, cannot be read adversely against them. Sixthly, the call details of the complainant clearly reveal that it is she who had called the petitioner No. 1 and not the other way around. Therefore, the petitioners are innocent of the alleged misconduct. Hence, they should not only be exonerated of the alleged misconduct, but should also be reinstated in service with full back wages, and consequential benefits. 11. On the other hand, Mr. Prabhuling K. Navadagi, the learned Additional Solicitor General, for the respondents, submits that the respondents had held a preliminary enquiry into the alleged incident. The statements of the complainant, of the delinquent officers, and of other witnesses were recorded. In his statement, Vikas Verma, the petitioner No.1, has clearly stated that there was no animosity between him and the complainant, or with her husband. Similar statements were also given by the other delinquent officers. The statements of the complainant, of the delinquent officers, and of other witnesses were recorded. In his statement, Vikas Verma, the petitioner No.1, has clearly stated that there was no animosity between him and the complainant, or with her husband. Similar statements were also given by the other delinquent officers. In the absence of any animosity, there is no reason for the complainant to file a false case not only against Vikas Verma, but also against the other seven delinquent officers. Secondly, since the allegation of sexual intercourse outside the marriage would adversely affect the social standing and the marital relationship of a woman, the women would be reluctant to express an ordeal of repeated rapes and that too by different men. Hence, the defence of false implication is an afterthought. Thirdly, while Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India makes the holding of a departmental enquiry essential, but it also contains an exceptional clause. The second proviso to Article 311(2), prescribes the conditions wherein the right of hearing can be dispensed with. Moreover, in the case of Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [ AIR 1985 SC 1416 ], the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined that principles of natural justice do not necessarily have a universal application. Situations may arise where the right to a hearing may be denied to the delinquent officer/employee. Each case, where the plea of denial of rights under the principles of natural justice is raised, would have to decided on its own merits and demerits. Fourthly, to hold a full-fledged inquiry would have exposed the honour of the complainant. Moreover, since the employees of the CISF live in a colony, since often the male Constables leave the station, the exposure of such sexual occurrence would have psychological impact resulting in insecurity in the minds of many officers and employees. Thus, a regular departmental enquiry would have adversely affected the morale of the force. Hence, the disciplinary authority was legally justified in dispensing with the regular departmental enquiry. Fifthly, considering the psychological impact of sexual exploitation, considering the social stigma on the family where a woman has been sexually exploited, it is not surprising if there is some delay in reporting such an incident. Therefore, the mere delay would not be fatal to the cause of the complainant. In fact, such a delay only highlights the plight of the complainant. Therefore, the mere delay would not be fatal to the cause of the complainant. In fact, such a delay only highlights the plight of the complainant. Sixthly, in case of rape independent corroboration of complainant's testimony is not a pre-requisite to the acceptance of her testimony. Since the complainant was already married, since she was used to sexual intercourse, since the complaint was made about a month after the alleged incidents, the possibility of medical corroboration of her testimony is practically zero. But merely because there is lack of medical evidence would not dilute the truthfulness of her statement. Hence, both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority were legally justified in accepting her deposition as truth. Hence, the learned Senior counsel has supported the impugned orders. 12. In rejoinder, Mr. Kulkarni has submitted the following arguments: firstly, the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra) is distinguishable on the basis of factual matrix. Therefore, the legal principle enunciated in the said case is inapplicable to the present case. Thus, the learned counsel for the respondent is unjustified on relying upon the said judgment. Secondly, in the preliminary enquiry no opportunity was given to the delinquent officers to cross-examine the witnesses. Thus, the statements cannot be relied upon for holding the accused as guilty of having committed the alleged misconduct. Moreover, their statements are based on hearsay evidence. Hence inadmissible. Yet, relying on the such statements, the petitioners have been dismissed from their services. Hence, a full-fledged departmental enquiry should have been held as warranted by Article 311 of the Constitution of India. 13. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner, and the learned Senior counsel for the respondents, and perused the impugned orders. 14. The issues before this court are: firstly, whether the right of hearing could be denied to a delinquent officer/employee or not? Secondly, under what circumstances the said opportunity of hearing can be denied? Thirdly, whether the respondents were justified in denying the opportunity of hearing to the petitioners or not? Whether the impugned orders are legally justified or not? 15. The first two issues are no longer res-integra. For, Article 311 of the Constitution of India deals with dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or State. 16. Article 311 of the Constitution of India is as under: "311. Whether the impugned orders are legally justified or not? 15. The first two issues are no longer res-integra. For, Article 311 of the Constitution of India deals with dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or State. 16. Article 311 of the Constitution of India is as under: "311. Dismissal, removal or reduction in rank of persons employed in civil capacities under the Union or a State - (1) No person who is a member of a civil service of the Union or an all-India service or a civil service of a State or holds a civil post under the Union or a State shall be dismissed or removed by an authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed. (2) No such person as aforesaid shall be dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges. Provided that where it is proposed after such inquiry to impose upon him any such penalty, such penalty may be imposed on the basis of the evidence adduced during such inquiry and it shall not be necessary to give such persons any opportunity of making representation on the penalty proposed. Provided further that this clause shall not apply – (a) where a person is dismissed or removed or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct which has led to his conviction on a criminal charge; or (b) where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry; or (c) where the President or the Governor, as the case may be, is satisfied that in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold such enquiry. 3. If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final. 17. 3. If, in respect of any such person as aforesaid, a question arises whether it is reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry as is referred to in clause (2), the decision thereon of the authority empowered to dismiss or remove such person or to reduce him in rank shall be final. 17. A bare perusal of the provision clearly reveals that Clause (1) prohibits the removal of a person by an officer who is subordinate to the appointing authority. Clause (2) protects the civil servant from being dismissed, removed, or being reduced in rank without a full-fledged departmental enquiry. Thus, the right to be heard is incorporated in the Article itself. However, even then the Article does not make the application of the principles of natural justice a universal principle to be applied in every situation. For, the second proviso to clause (2) carves out certain circumstances when the right of hearing can be denied legitimately. Clause (2) (b) clearly states that "where the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry", then the enquiry may be dispensed with. Moreover, clause (3) makes such a decision as "final". However, such a decision is justiciable. 18. The scope and ambit of Article 311 has been discussed extensively in the case of Tulsiram Patel (supra). While dealing with scope of the second proviso of Article 311(2) the Hon'ble Supreme Court opined as under: The keywords of the second proviso govern each and every clause of that proviso and leave no scope for any kind of opportunity to be given to a government servant. The phrase "this clause shall not apply" is mandatory and not directory. It is in the nature of a constitutional prohibitory injunction restraining the disciplinary authority from holding an inquiry under Article 311 (2) or from giving any kind of opportunity to the concerned government servant. There is thus no scope for introducing into the second proviso some kind of inquiry or opportunity by a process of inference or implication. The Apex Court further opined as under: The conclusion which flows from the express language of the second proviso is inevitable and there is no escape from it. There is thus no scope for introducing into the second proviso some kind of inquiry or opportunity by a process of inference or implication. The Apex Court further opined as under: The conclusion which flows from the express language of the second proviso is inevitable and there is no escape from it. It may appear harsh but, as mentioned earlier, the second proviso has been inserted in the Constitution as a matter of public policy and in public interest and for public good just as the pleasure doctrine and the safeguards for a government servant provided in clauses (1) and (2) of Article 311 have been. It is in public interest and for public good that a government servant who has been convicted of a grave and serious offence or one rendering him unfit to continue in office should be summarily dismissed or removed from service instead of being allowed to continue in it at public expense and to public detriment. It is equally in public interest and for public good that where his offence is such that he should not be permitted to continue to hold the same rank, that he should be reduced in rank. Equally, where a public servant by himself or in concert with others has brought about a situation in which it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry and his conduct is such as to justify his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank, both public interest and public good demand that such penalty should forthwith and summarily be imposed upon him; and similarly, where in the interest of the security of the State it is not expedient to hold an inquiry, it is in the public interest and for public good that where one of the three punishments of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank is called for, it should be summarily imposed upon the concerned government servant. 19. The Apex Court also held that while considering the applicability of the second proviso, "the disciplinary authority will have to take into account the entire conduct of the delinquent employee, the gravity of the misconduct committed by him, the impact which his misconduct is likely to have on the administration and other extenuating circumstances or redeeming features if any present in the case and so on and so forth." 20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further analyzed the provision and held as under: The condition precedent for the application of clause (b) is the satisfaction of the disciplinary authority that “it is not reasonably practicable to hold” the inquiry contemplated by clause (2) of Article 311. What is pertinent to note is that the words used are “not reasonably practicable” and not “impracticable”. According to the Oxford English Dictionary “practicable” means “Capable of being put into practice, carried out in action, effected, accomplished, or done; feasible”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “practicable” inter alia as meaning “possible to practice or perform : capable of being put into practice, done or accomplished: feasible”. Further, the words used are not “not practicable” but “not reasonably practicable”. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines the word “reasonably” as “in a reasonable manner: to a fairly sufficient extent”. Thus, whether it was practicable to hold the inquiry or not must be judged in the context of whether it was reasonably practicable to do so. It is not a total or absolute impracticability which is required by clause (b). What is requisite is that the holding of the inquiry is not practicable in the opinion of a reasonable man taking a reasonable view of the prevailing situation. 21. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further opined as under: The reasonable practicability of holding an inquiry is a matter of assessment to be made by the disciplinary authority. Such authority is generally on the spot and knows what is happening. It is because the disciplinary authority is the best judge of this that clause (3) of Article 311 makes the decision of the disciplinary authority on this question final. A disciplinary authority is not expected to dispense with a disciplinary inquiry lightly or arbitrarily or out of ulterior motives or merely in order to avoid the holding of an inquiry or because the Department’s case against the government servant is weak and must fail. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. The finality given to the decision of the disciplinary authority by Article 311(3) is not binding upon the court so far as its power of judicial review is concerned and in such a case the court will strike down the order dispensing with the inquiry as also the order imposing penalty. It is not necessary that a situation which makes the holding of an inquiry not reasonably practicable should exist before the disciplinary inquiry is initiated against a government servant. Such a situation can also come into existence subsequently during the course of an inquiry, for instance, after the service of a charge-sheet upon the government servant or after he has filed his written statement thereto or even after evidence has been led in part. In such a case also the disciplinary authority would be entitled to apply clause (b) of the second proviso because the word “inquiry” in that clause includes part of an inquiry. It would also not be reasonably practicable to afford to the government servant an opportunity of hearing or further hearing, as the case may be, when at the commencement of the inquiry or pending it the government servant absconds and cannot be served or will not participate in the inquiry. In such cases, the matter must proceed ex parte and on the materials before the disciplinary authority. Therefore, even where a part of an inquiry has been held and the rest is dispensed with under clause (b) or a provision in the service rules analogous thereto, the exclusionary words of the second proviso operate in their full vigour and the government servant cannot complain that he has been dismissed, removed or reduced in rank in violation of the safeguards provided by Article 311(2). The second condition necessary for the valid application of clause (b) of the second proviso is that the disciplinary authority should record in writing its reason for its satisfaction that it was not reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry contemplated by Article 311(2). This is a constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. 22. Therefore, while adjudicating the present case, the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court will have to be kept in mind. 23. Mr. This is a constitutional obligation and if such reason is not recorded in writing, the order dispensing with the inquiry and the order of penalty following thereupon would both be void and unconstitutional. 22. Therefore, while adjudicating the present case, the principles enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court will have to be kept in mind. 23. Mr. Kulkarni has pleaded that the respondents should have held a departmental enquiry in accordance with Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Thus, any deviation would violate the mandate of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. However, such a plea is bellied by the second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India, and by the exposition of law by the Apex Court in the case of Tulsiram Patel (Supra). Therefore, the first contention raised by Mr. Kulkarni is unacceptable. 24. Mr. Kulkarni has further pleaded that the reasons given by the Disciplinary Authority for dispensing with the departmental enquiry are not cogent. In the order dated 02.08.2015, in the case of Vikas Verma, petitioner No.1, the Disciplinary Authority has given the following reasons:- And whereas, in the facts and circumstances of the case, which is one of the rarest of rare cases in any Armed Police Force lime CISF where discipline & morale are of paramount importance, I am of the considered view that conducting enquiry into the incident is not reasonably practicable for the following reasons: Unlike civilian Government employees, all CISF personnel live inside the Unit campus, within the Unit campus, personnel living with their family are allotted government accommodation and the bachelors are accommodated in barracks under single roof. Only about 50% of the personnel in a Unit are allowed to keep their family at duty station as per authorisation. Therefore, 50% of the personnel stay as bachelors in every CISF Unit. CISF personnel are often required to stay away from their place of posting on official duty, leaving behind their family alone at the Unit campus. In the instance case, the charged official along with seven other Constables have indulged in an inhumanly act of blackmailing/threatening the wife of a fellow Constable and have sexually abused her one after the other, when her husband was away from the Unit. All the accused personnel in the case are bachelors and they live together with other bachelor members of the force inside the barracks. All the accused personnel in the case are bachelors and they live together with other bachelor members of the force inside the barracks. Therefore, if enquiry is conducted, the information relating to the heinous crime meted out to a lady wife, whose husband was away from the station, is bound to spread to every rank and file of the force which will not only have serious psychological impact resulting in insecurity in the minds of CISF personnel their families, but will also seriously undermine the efficiency of the force deployed in vital installations as well as on internal security/election duties away from the unit. Moreover, it will also lead to administrative difficulties whenever a family member is to be deployed for night duty/temporary duty away from the unit, further it will also have adverse ramification on the discipline of the force in general. 25. It is, indeed, trite to state that in order to see the reasonableness of the reasons given by the Disciplinary Authority for dispensing with the departmental enquiry, the Court is required to place itself in the position of the Disciplinary Authority. After all, the Disciplinary Authority knows the pulse of the place of the incident, the structure of the organisation, and the impact of the alleged misconduct has had on the organisation. As stated above, the Disciplinary Authority is duty bound to consider the conduct of the delinquent officer, the gravity of the misconduct, its implication for the smooth functioning of the institution etc. Unless the reasons given by the Disciplinary Authority suffer from malafide, or arbitrariness, or unreasonable, a Court does not sit as an appellate court over the decision of the Disciplinary Authority. 26. A bare perusal of the reasons given by the Disciplinary Authority clearly bring out the facts that firstly, the Disciplinary Authority has considered the setting where the alleged misconduct had taken place: the employees live in close proximity to each other. While the families are allotted Government accommodation, the bachelors are housed in Barracks. But the Government accommodation and the Barracks exist within the unit campus. Secondly, 50% of the personnel are not allowed to keep the family in duty station. Therefore, even the married persons have to live like bachelors. Thirdly, many CISF personnel are required to stay away from the place of posting, thus leaving the families alone in the Unit campus. But the Government accommodation and the Barracks exist within the unit campus. Secondly, 50% of the personnel are not allowed to keep the family in duty station. Therefore, even the married persons have to live like bachelors. Thirdly, many CISF personnel are required to stay away from the place of posting, thus leaving the families alone in the Unit campus. Fourthly, since a wife of a fellow Constable was subjected to blackmailing, and sexual abuse, it was an inhumanly act. Fifthly, in case, the information relating to the alleged misconduct were to spread on the campus, it would have "serious psychological impact resulting in insecurity in the minds of CISF personnel and their families." Sixthly, that the psychological insecurity would undermine the efficiency of the Force. Seventhly, it would lead to administrative difficulties as personnel have necessarily to be assigned night duties, or duties away from the unit. Lastly, the holding of a detailed departmental enquiry would adversely affect discipline of the Force in general. 27. Needless to say, it is the duty of the Disciplinary Authority to maintain the morale and the discipline of the unit. Any act which would create psychological insecurities in the mind of the personnel, or which would corrode the cohesiveness and unity within the Force, or which would undermine the discipline of the Force, such an act must be avoided. Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority has given cogent and legal reasons for dispensing with the detailed departmental enquiry. Hence, the second contention raised by the learned counsel for petitioners is clearly unacceptable. 28. The learned counsel for petitioners is not justified in claiming that an adverse inference cannot be drawn against Vikas Verma, petitioner No.1, for his refusal to furnish the call details. In the preliminary enquiry held by the respondents, Mr. Vikas Verma was directed to produce the call details as the allegations against him were that he called the complainant late in the night. However, he refused to furnish the same. In case, the call details were to support his case, that he never called the complainant, the call details would have buttressed his defence. Since he refused to produce the call details, the only inference that can be drawn validly is that the production of call details would have exposed, if not weakened, his defence. Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority was justified in drawing an adverse inference against Mr. Vikas Verma. 29. Since he refused to produce the call details, the only inference that can be drawn validly is that the production of call details would have exposed, if not weakened, his defence. Therefore, the Disciplinary Authority was justified in drawing an adverse inference against Mr. Vikas Verma. 29. The delay in informing about the sexual exploitation of a lady is generally not fatal to the case of the complainant. For, a woman to make allegations against others, that her body has been soiled by others, is to jeopardise her individual dignity, marital relationship, and social standing. In a society as conservative as ours, ordinarily women are reluctant to speak about the sexual abuses they are subjected to by anyone outside their marriage. Hence, merely because the complainant had filed her complaint with some delay, would not dilute the veracity of her complaint. 30. Since the medical evidence has a limited shelf-life, namely not beyond a period of 48 - 72 hours, the medical examination of the complainant carried out after a delay of one month, would not reveal the possibility of a sexual abuse. But, in cases of sexual abuse, it cannot be forgotten that lack of medical corroboration does not dilute the veracity of the complainant's testimony. Therefore, in the present case, even if the medical evidence does not exist, it would not weaken the truthfulness of the complainant's statement. Therefore, the said contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioners is unsustainable. 31. Moreover, the learned counsel for petitioners has pleaded that an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses was not given to the petitioners, while the preliminary enquiry was conducted. However, a preliminary enquiry is a fact finding enquiry. Therefore, an opportunity to cross-examine the witness need not be given to the delinquent officer. Lastly, a bare perusal of the statements of the petitioners clearly reveal that although the petitioners claim that the complaint is a concocted one, but none of them claim either that there was any animosity between them, and the complainant, or between them and the complainant's husband. Thus, the defence taken by them is clearly unacceptable. 32. In conclusion, for the reasons stated above, this court does not find any illegality in the impugned orders. Since the writ petitions are devoid of any merit, they are hereby dismissed. No order as to costs.