JUDGMENT : SONIA GOKANI, J. This is a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, whereby, the challenge is made to the order of the Dy. Collector, Bharuch, Dated: 03.05.2003, and that of the State Government dated 29.12.2005 by which ex-post facto permission for Block No. 99 (Old Block No. 83) is granted in absence of any application made by the petitioners or their father. 2. The brief facts leading to the present petition are as follows: The petitioners are the heirs and legal representatives of the deceased, Parbatsinh Amarsinh, who has executed a registered sale deed on 29.04.1982, in favour of Respondent No. 2 for the land admeasuring 3 hectare-14 array-64 sq. mts. from Block No. 83 (New Block No. 99), which totally admeasures 11 hectare-36 array-0 sq.mts situated at Village: Aankot, Taluka: Vagra, District: Bharuch (to be referred to herein as ‘the land in question’ or ‘the disputed land’). It is the case of the petitioners that, though, registered sale deed had been executed, the possession was never handed over either by the father of the petitioner or the petitioner themselves to Respondent No. 2. 3. It is, further, the case of the petitioners that the said transaction is in contravention of the provisions of Section 31(b) of the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of the Holdings Act, 1947 (for short, ‘Fragmentation Act’), inasmuch as no permission was taken from the authority before the division of the block. 4. That, according to the petitioners, was the reason for Respondent No. 2 not to have taken any steps to get mutation entry in his favour and eventually in the year 1996 mutation Entry No. 1542, Dated: 09.04.1996 was made. However, in absence of any permission for the division of the Block No. 83 (New No. 99), the entry was not certified. 5. It appears that the RTS proceedings had been initiated by Respondent No. 2 and Dy. Collector in Appeal No. 81 of 1996 did not certify the entry No. 1542, Dated: 09.04.1996 6. The order of the Dy. Collector dated 29.03.1997, came to be challenged by Respondent No. 2 before the Collector, Bharuch, who also took note of the chronology of events and the fact that there was breach of Section 31(b) of the Fragmentation Act. Collector in Appeal No. 81 of 1996 did not certify the entry No. 1542, Dated: 09.04.1996 6. The order of the Dy. Collector dated 29.03.1997, came to be challenged by Respondent No. 2 before the Collector, Bharuch, who also took note of the chronology of events and the fact that there was breach of Section 31(b) of the Fragmentation Act. Moreover, after the registration of the sale deed in the year 1982, 14 years had passed and no move was made by Respondent No. 2 for getting the said entry mutated in his name. Accordingly, revision was not entertained and the order of the Dy. Collector, Bharuch, in Appeal No. 81 of 1996, has been confirmed. 7. The challenge was made by Respondent No. 2 before the Special Secretary Revenue Department (‘SSRD’ in brief), who, though, agreed with the reasons given by the Dy. Collector and the Collector, it partly allowed the said revision. One of the contentions raised by the learned Advocate appearing for Respondent No. 2 was that in the proceedings under the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, no action could be taken under the Fragmentation Act. It was also contended that if, at all, there was any breach made by the parties of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act, there was a need for conducting an inquiry into the matter under that Act and unless the same is done, mutation entry can not be disturbed. 8. The State Government, as mentioned above, though agreed with the findings and the reasonings of the Collector, Bharuch, as given in the Revision, noticing that the proceedings were under the Land Revenue Code, and when the entry was not certified because of the breach of the Fragmentation Act, it had directed the inquiry into the matter under the Fragmentation Act, while directing the maintenance of the status quo in respect of the land in question. It, further, directed that on completion of such inquiry, if need be so, necessary changes shall be made in respect of the entry No. 1542. 9. Said order dated 12.12.2000, then, gave rise to the order dated 03.05.2003, where the Dy. Collector inquired into the aspect of breach of Fragmentation Act and directed the parties to fulfill certain obligations and granted ex-post facto permission under the Fragmentation Act. 9. Said order dated 12.12.2000, then, gave rise to the order dated 03.05.2003, where the Dy. Collector inquired into the aspect of breach of Fragmentation Act and directed the parties to fulfill certain obligations and granted ex-post facto permission under the Fragmentation Act. This has aggrieved the present petitioners, who are the heirs of the original owner, and have challenged the said order of the Dy. Collector by way of revision, which after a detailed discussion resulted against the petitioners on 29.12.2005 That has given rise to the present petition. 10. It is the case of the petitioners that Dy. Collector, who is the competent authority under the Fragmentation Act, in respect of initiating the proceedings for breach of Section 31(b) of the said Act, cannot convert the proceedings of inquiry and grant ex-post facto permission by directing the division of the land in question as the same which is impermissible under the law. It is also the grievance of the petitioners that challenge in the revision also failed as the State Government miserably failed to appreciate the controversy between the parties and without giving any thoughtful consideration to the submissions, it upheld the order of the Dy. Collector, i.e. the competent authority. Such belated approach on the part of Respondent No. 2-purchaser for mutation of entry and also for a request for grant of permission for division of the block, is seriously challenged by the petitioners. They are therefore before this Court seeking following reliefs: “10. … (A) To stay the further operation, implementation and execution of the judgment and order of the State Government dated 29.12.2005/7.1.2006 passed in Revision Application No. Consolidation No. 2 of 2003 at Annexure-B and order of the Deputy Collector-Bharuch in Consolidation Case No. 338 dated 3.5.2003 at Annexure-A. (B) to restrain the respondent No. 2 from interfering or disturbing the possession of the petitioners in the land bearing Block No. 99 Paiki 3 hectare 14 RA and 64 sq. mtrs. Situated in the sim of village Aankot, Taluka: Vagra, District: Bharuch.” 11. Respondent No. 2 on due service filed affidavit-in-reply denying all the contentions and averments of the petitioners. According to him, there is no error of law or jurisdiction on the part of the Dy. Collector or the State Government. mtrs. Situated in the sim of village Aankot, Taluka: Vagra, District: Bharuch.” 11. Respondent No. 2 on due service filed affidavit-in-reply denying all the contentions and averments of the petitioners. According to him, there is no error of law or jurisdiction on the part of the Dy. Collector or the State Government. It is also denied that, though, the sale deed had been executed in favour of Respondent No. 2, the possession was never handed over to him. It is also contended that there is no provision for grant of ex-post facto permission under the Fragmentation Act. He has raised a grievance that after pocketing a huge amount towards consideration, it does not lie in the mouth of the petitioners to challenge the impugned order. The petitioners being the sellers of the land in question, in wake of the registered sale deed, they would not be entitled to challenge the order of the authorities and the grant of any relief in their favour would result into gross (injustice to Respondent No. 2. 12. This Court has heard, at length, the learned Advocate, Mr. J.M Patel, for the petitioners, who fervently urged that when the SSRD directed the inquiry under the Fragmentation Act, as there was no prior permission obtained for division of the block, Dy. Collector had no business to permit such division of the block without original owners making such a request. He, further, urged that the law does not permit any such sub-division, and therefore, if any transfer had to be made, the same ought to have been after seeking prior permission, in writing, of the State Government for the division of the block. Thus, when no holding or the part of the holding could have been divided, except, with the permission in writing of the State government, the sale deed on 29.04.1982, in favour of Respondent No. 2, must be held to have been executed in breach of these provisions. Out of the total land admeasuring 11 hectare, 36 array, 0 sq. mts., the learned Advocate submits that only 3 hectare, 14 array and 64 sq.mts came to be transferred, therefore, the Block No. 99 was divided and before entering into the transaction no permission, as required under Section 31AB of the Fragmentation Act, was obtained and the entire transaction is, therefore, null and void. He, further, urged that not only the Dy. He, further, urged that not only the Dy. Collector was lacking inherent jurisdiction for granting such ex-post facto permission, even the State Government would not have such powers. It is, further, his grievance that the Dy. Collector had treated the proceedings as administrative in nature, where he had not joined the present petitioners as party in the proceedings and they were also not given any opportunity of being heard. Under the circumstances, no such order could have been passed without availing any opportunity to the petitioners. More particularly, when the father of the petitioners, late Parbatsinh Amarsinh, never made a request to the authorities for division of the Block No. 99 and in absence of any such application, no permission could have been granted in favour of Respondent No. 2. It is, further, his say that the petitioners, after the said order of the State dated 12.12.2000 in RTS proceedings had written letter to the Dy. Collector requesting him to initiate proceedings under the provisions of the Fragmentation Act. In response to the same, the petitioners were informed by the competent authority that the papers were sent to the Prant Officer, Bharuch, for necessary inquiry. He, therefore, made a complaint on 04.06.2002 addressed to the Dy. Collector with a request that no permission to divide Block No. 99 had been applied for. It is the owner, according to the learned Advocate, Mr. Patel, who has a right to request for division of a block. Their request to the Dy. Collector came to be rejected on 15.06.2002 Various letters and correspondences made to the authorities fell on the deaf ears and he granted such permission on 03.05.2003 13. In support of his submissions, he has relied on the following decision: (1) ‘GOVINDSINGH RAMSINGHBHAI VAGHELA v. G. SUBBA RAO ASST. COLLECTOR, DHOLKA’, 1970 AIR 131 Guj; (2) ‘PATEL RATILAL MAGANBHAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT’, 2002 Law Suit (Guj) 48; 14. Learned Advocate, Mr. Purohit, appearing for M/s. Trivedi & Gupta for Respondent No. 2 has strongly urged that no person can be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. COLLECTOR, DHOLKA’, 1970 AIR 131 Guj; (2) ‘PATEL RATILAL MAGANBHAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT’, 2002 Law Suit (Guj) 48; 14. Learned Advocate, Mr. Purohit, appearing for M/s. Trivedi & Gupta for Respondent No. 2 has strongly urged that no person can be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The registered sale deed was executed in the year 1982, RTS proceedings had been initiated by Respondent No. 2, since, the entry was not mutated for want of requisite permission under the Fragmentation Act, and therefore, eventually SSRD directed the inquiry under the provisions of the Fragmentation Act to examine the possibility of division of block. Respondent No. 2 also made an application on 14.05.2001 and couple of correspondences made by the petitioners eventually resulted into the Dy. Collector directing on 03.05.2003 for such division. He, therefore, urged that the order of the Dy. Collector was pursuant to the directions of the SSRD dated 12.12.2000 and hence, no fault can be found. He, further, submits that if no prior permission was obtained for division at the time of registering the Sale Deed, seller surely could not be benefited from the breach of the provisions. The authority, itself had deemed it fit to grant permission on completing certain procedural requirements under the law. He, therefore, urged that there was no requirement for this Court to interfere with the order of the Dy. Collector or the State Government, which had been passed in the year 2005 and which is impugned in this petition. 15. He has sought to rely on the following decisions: (1) ‘SARVAGNA NAVINCHANDRA GODIAWALA v. STATE OF GUJARAT’, 2003 (1) GLH 426 ; (2) ‘RINKI SHASHIKANT GANDHI v. MAMLATDAR, VADODARA TALUKA’, 2012 (2) GLR 1275 ; 16. As is quite apparent from the chronology of the events, the entire controversy had arisen when, after 14 years of execution of the registered sale deed in favour of Respondent No. 2 by the father of the petitioners, for the land admeasuring 3 hectare-14 array-64 sq. mts. from Block No. 83 (New No. 99) RTS proceedings were initiated. 17. The Circle Officer, and thereafter, the Dy. Collector and the Collector also were of the opinion that there could be no division of the block, and hence, the entry in question cannot be mutated in favour of Respondent No. 2. 18. mts. from Block No. 83 (New No. 99) RTS proceedings were initiated. 17. The Circle Officer, and thereafter, the Dy. Collector and the Collector also were of the opinion that there could be no division of the block, and hence, the entry in question cannot be mutated in favour of Respondent No. 2. 18. SSRD also agreed largely to the said reasonings and the findings of both the authorities below. However, on agreeing with the submissions of the learned Advocate appearing for Respondent No. 2 that at the time of proceedings under the Gujarat Land Revenue Code, there was no requirement of initiating proceedings under the Fragmentation Act and there was a separate inquiry needed under the said Act. It directed the concerned competent authority to inquire into the matter under the Fragmentation Act and upon such inquiry, necessary correction was directed to be carried out in the entry No. 1542, which was mutated in favour of Respondent No. 2. Such entry at the time of passing of an order on 12.12.2000 had been kept intact on record by the SSRD. 19. It needs to be noted that Respondent No. 2 wrote to the competent authority, i.e. Dy. Collector, thereafter, on 14.05.2001 The petitioners also made requests on 10.04.2002, 26.04.2002, 04.06.2002, 15.06.2002, 25.06.2002, 09.06.2002, 16.07.2002 etc.. These correspondences with the office of the competent authority, i.e. Dy. Collector, indicate that notices were sent to the petitioners. It is apparent that they chose not to remain present earlier and vide their communication dated 16.07.2002, they showed their desire to be represented through an advocate. A communication dated 20.07.2002 speaks of Special Civil Application No. 6680 of 2002 preferred before this Court, where the grievance was made by the petitioners that Dy. Collector, Bharuch, was not deciding the question as directed by the Secretary vide order dated 12.12.2000 By the said order, las observed by this Court, the Secretary had directed to hold proper inquiry under the Fragmentation Act. Therefore, it was requested for and on behalf of the petitioners that the Dy. Collector was bound to act as per the observations of the Secretary in the said order. Instead he had initiated proceedings for the purpose of dividing block under the provisions of the Fragmentation Act. This Court (Coram: P.B Majmudar, J.), according to him, in the order dated 18.10.2002, observed that no final order is passed by the Dy. Collector was bound to act as per the observations of the Secretary in the said order. Instead he had initiated proceedings for the purpose of dividing block under the provisions of the Fragmentation Act. This Court (Coram: P.B Majmudar, J.), according to him, in the order dated 18.10.2002, observed that no final order is passed by the Dy. Collector so far, and therefore, while taking the final decision, he would take into account the observations made by the Secretary (Appeals) in the order dated 12.12.2000 and the proper decision will be taken in accordance with law. With regard to the contentions of the petitioners that no division of the block could be made without their consent, the Court chose not to enter into these contentious areas and directed the Dy. Collector to decide all these questions, after taking into consideration the submissions of both the sides and thereby, the proceedings before the Dy. Collector were not interfered with. The Court also kept the challenge open in future for both the parties. 20. It is quite apparent that such a challenge was I made before this Court, during the pendency of the proceedings, when not only the petitioners were aware all along the proceedings were going on but they were also issued notice and at that point of time, they chose not to appear. They also communicated on 20.07.2002 to the competent authority not to proceed, as they challenged the proceedings before the Dy. Collector by preferring a Special Civil Application. Thus, the challenge to the non-granting of any relief and breach of principles of natural justice, in the opinion of this Court, cannot be sustained. Not only the petitioners were aware of the pending proceedings all along, but, they had also been given the opportunity by the authorities concerned. Moreover, no such challenge was made before this Court in the earlier round of litigation. Had the petitioners any grievance of breach of principles of natural justice, it could have been urged before this Court. The challenge, however, was essentially in respect of the competent authority having no powers, decided on its own the division of the land in question and it has not acted as per the order dated 12.12.2000 21. This comes to the question of Dy. The challenge, however, was essentially in respect of the competent authority having no powers, decided on its own the division of the land in question and it has not acted as per the order dated 12.12.2000 21. This comes to the question of Dy. Collector/competent authority deciding on administrative side without there being any application of the original owners or of the Respondent and exercising the jurisdiction, which it did not have. 22. Here, it would be, therefore, relevant to reproduce Section 31 of the Fragmentation Act, which reads as under: “31. Restrictions on alienation and sub-division of consolidated holdings.- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, no holding allotted under this Act, nor any part thereof shall save as otherwise provided in this section - (a) be transferred, whether by way of sale (including sale in execution of a decree of a Civil Court or for recovery of arrears of land revenue or for sums recoverable as arrears of land revenue) or by way of gift, exchange, lease, or otherwise; or (b) be sub-divided, whether under a decree or order of a Civil Court or any other competent authority, or otherwise, so as to create a fragment, without the previous sanction of the Collector. Such sanction shall he given by the Collector in such circumstances and subject to such conditions as may be prescribed. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to any land - (a) which is situated in any area for which - (i) a municipal corporation is constituted under the Bombay Municipal or the City of Nagpur Corporation Act, 1948; or (ii) a municipal council is constituted under the Maharashtra Municipalities Act, 1965; or (iii) a cantonment is constituted under the Cantonments Act, 1924; or (b) which is situated in a notified area for which a Special Planning Authority is constituted or appointed under section 40 of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966; or (c) Which is situated in an area designated as a site for a new town for which a Development Authority is constituted under section 113 of the Maharashtra Regional land Town Planning Act, 1966; or (d) which is situated in any area specified by the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, as being reserved for non-agricultural or industrial development. (3) Nothing in sub-section (I) shall also apply to any land which is to be transferred - i. to the tenant of the holding or his heir; or ii. to an owner of the adjoining holding who cultivates his land personally; or iii. To an agriculturist or agricultural labourer, in its entirety; or iv. to a person who is rendered landless by reason of acquisition of his land for a public purpose; v. to a co-operative society; or vi. by way of gift (whether by way of rust or otherwise) bona fide made by the owner in favour of a member of his family; or vii. By way of exchange, where such land is cultivated personally by the holder, for any other land allotted under this Act, which is also likewise cultivated personally by its holder:— Provided that, no such transfer shall be made so as to create a fragment.” 23. It is quite clear from the above provisions that without the prior permission of the State Government, no holding allotted under the Fragmentation Act nor any part thereof shall be transferred either by way of sale or by way of gift, exchange or lease or otherwise. Therefore, without any permission in writing of the State Government the sub-division of a decree or order by a Civil Court or of any competent authority is made impermissible. It is, therefore, emphasized that no ex-post facto permission would validate the action of sub-division or a sale that had been effected in the year 1982. The petitioner, therefore, in post 12.12.2000 period had made various correspondences with the competent authority, who was looking into the proceedings under the Fragmentation Act, as per the order of the Secretary (Appeals) and insisted that in absence of any permission of the State Government in writing prior to the registered sale deed in the year 1982, grant of ex-post facto permission would be contrary to law. 24. This Court notices that out of the total land admeasuring 11 hectare, 36 array, 0 sq. mts., as per the submission of the learned Advocate that only 3 hectare, 14 array and 64 sq.mts land from the Block No. 83 (New No. 99) had been sold/to Respondent No. 2 on 29.04.1982 It is true that for the mutation of entry in the name of Respondent No. 2, he moved after about 14 years. mts., as per the submission of the learned Advocate that only 3 hectare, 14 array and 64 sq.mts land from the Block No. 83 (New No. 99) had been sold/to Respondent No. 2 on 29.04.1982 It is true that for the mutation of entry in the name of Respondent No. 2, he moved after about 14 years. No reason comes forth as to why there is such a delay. It is not palatable nor has it come anywhere on record from any evidence that the possession was not parted of the said land. Respondent No. 2, however, when moved the authorities for mutation of the entry under the revenue laws, up to the Revisional Authority, i.e. the Collector, it did not uphold his request only on the ground that there was breach of provisions of the Fragmentation Act. 25. Later on, Secretary (Appeals) on finding the need for inquiry into such breach had allowed the status quo to continue and directed the inquiry to be made by the Dy. Collector. Hence, it is quite apparent that the owners, who sold the land in question way back in the year 1982, are desirous of taking disadvantage of the provisions of law and have chosen to contest the litigation and raised serious objections against the action of the authorities under the Fragmentation Act. 26. Having pocketed the amount of consideration and also having enjoyed it long ago, legally and morally both, they were expected to support the cause of Respondent No. 2 and yet, they have chosen not to so do it and instead, attempted to ensure that no inquiry is made under the Fragmentation Act nor any order is passed, which may, eventually, result into division of Block No. 83 (New No. 99). 27. In the opinion of this Court, not only the competent authority, i.e. the Dy. Collector, was entitled, as per the order of the Secretary (Appeals), to inquire into the various aspects of the Fragmentation Act but also it was to take decision, as the effect was to be given to the entry, which was allowed to be continued on record. Had there been a conclusion of non-granting any permission under the Fragmentation Act, said authority could have then consequently directed the mutation entry No. 1542 not to continue on record or have cancelled the same. 28. Had there been a conclusion of non-granting any permission under the Fragmentation Act, said authority could have then consequently directed the mutation entry No. 1542 not to continue on record or have cancelled the same. 28. An additional factor, which had led the competent Authority also to inquire into the aspect, was the application made by Respondent No. 2 after about 5 months of the order of the Secretary (Appeals) of SSRD. There was also couple of applications of the petitioners, which needed adjudication to say that it was an administrative order because the format of the said order was administrative in nature, it cannot take away the essence of this order. It was obligatory on the part of the competent authority being the subordinate authority to comply with the directions of the superior authority and even otherwise, as required under the law, while deciding the matter under the Land Revenue Code, when the inquiry under the provisions of the Fragmentation Act was going on, the competent authority could not have arrived at any decision when there, in fact, was no breach. 29. Thus, it is clear from the discussion herein above, neither the order of the competent authority is administrative in nature nor could it have been done in breach of any of the provisions. This Court cannot be oblivious of the fact that if neither side takes a permission for making division of the block, the authority is not helpless to initiate actions against the parties concerned. Moreover, with the amendment in the relevant Act in the year 1995, the authority has powers to impose penalty if there is any breach of the said provisions. 30. In the case of ‘DASHRATHLAL M. PATEL, HEIRS & L.RS MAGANBHAI JOITARAM OTHERS v. STATE OF GUJARAT & OHTERS’ (Supra), the three Judges Bench was examining the two decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of ‘GOVINDSINGH RAMSINGHBHAI VAGHELA v. G. SUBBA RAO ASST. COLLECTOR, DHOLKA’ (Supra) and ‘PATEL RATILAL MAGANBHAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT’ (Supra). The Court while considering the equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has held that “a Court of equity when exercising its equitable jurisdiction under Art. 226 must so act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud and the Courts are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith, as far as it lies within their power. Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law.” It is also to exercise this jurisdiction to prevent perpetration of legal fraud and to promote good faith and honesty. It cannot be exercised in favour of a defaulting party to frustrate legitimate claim of the other party. The Court concluded that the Collector, i.e. the competent authorities under law can take up the stand that the transaction is without obtaining prior permission and, therefore, is void and no limitation would come in the way of the competent authority for declaring that the transaction is void. However, such powers are to be examined within the reasonable time and it was also examined as to what would happen if the restoration of the possession is made at the instance of the seller of the property? The Court held that the seller will have to establish before the competent Court that when the transaction of sale was entered into it was disclosed by the seller to the purchaser that the permission of the competent authority before entering into the registered sale deed was required and in spite of the same the purchaser has at his own risk agreed to purchase the land without permission of the competent authority. 31. The question before both the benches was as to what would be the position of the land, which is held to be unauthorizedly in occupation if the transfer under the Fragmentation Act is held to be void. The Court held that no Civil Court has any jurisdiction to decide a stale question or to deal with any question taking into consideration the provisions of Section 36A and B of the Fragmentation Act and the competent authority, as referred to in decision of the ‘PATEL RATILAL MAGANBHAI v. STATE OF GUJARAT’ (Supra), should be referred to by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The Court observed thus: “30. The Court observed thus: “30. In view of Section 36A of the Act and the decision rendered by the Supreme Court, while we hold that no Civil Court has any jurisdiction, we further hold that the “competent Court” as mentioned by the Division Bench in the case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai [ 2003 (1) GLR 562 ] should be referred to as “this Court” under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with respect to which the Division Bench observation that a Court of equity when exercising its equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 must so act as to prevent perpetration of a legal fraud and the Court are obliged to do justice by promotion of good faith, as far as it lies within their power. Equity is always known to defend the law from crafty evasions and new subtleties invented to evade law and thereby must refuse to grant relief. 31. Thus, we hold that the Division Bench decision in the case of Govindsingh Ramsinghbhai Vaghela [1970 (11) GLR 897] and the Division Bench decision in the case of Patel Ratilal Maganbhai [ 2003 (1) GLR 562 ], hold good on the ratio laid down by the Division Bench and they do not run counter to each other. 32. The rest of the questions as raised in the appeals including the question whether the decision of the competent authority that the transfer of the land is valid or not, are left open for decision by the Division Bench before whom the appeals were pending. For such decision on such issue, the matter may be placed before the Division Bench. The question thus raised for determination by the Larger Bench is answered as detailed above.” 32. In case of ‘SARVAGNA NAVINCHANDRA GODIAWALA v. STATE OF GUJARAT’ (Supra), the vendor had challenged the sale deed of the land after 17 years of transaction. The Court held that the authority erred in setting aside the sale after such lapse of time, more particularly, at the instance of the vendor, who himself was at fault. It further held that even a void order has to be challenged within reasonable time. It was the case, where an application was made by the seller to the Collector for taking out proceedings under the Fragmentation Act and summary eviction of the buyer. It further held that even a void order has to be challenged within reasonable time. It was the case, where an application was made by the seller to the Collector for taking out proceedings under the Fragmentation Act and summary eviction of the buyer. The Collector had set aside the sell on the ground that it was in breach of the Fragmentation Act and order of summary eviction was passed against the buyer. This was when challenged before the Addl. Secretary (Appeals), it also concluded that the transaction was void and the same could not have been challenged after so many years, and therefore, the challenge on the ground of delay was negated and the matter was remanded for availing appropriate opportunity to the parties. The relevant paragraphs read as under: “16. On behalf of respondent No. 3 therein, it was submitted as under:— “8. On behalf of respondent No. 3, Mr. A.J Patel has submitted that the voluntary sale came to be executed by the father of the appellants and the deceased has received full consideration and executed the sale deed and has enjoyed the amount for his benefit and the benefit of the family and for a period of 16 years no whisper is made by the deceased or the appellants herein who are legal heirs of the deceased regarding transaction for sale. He further submitted that both the authorities have found that the block is not divided and even if the block is divided the permission is granted and the show cause notice is withdrawn. He further submitted that both the authorities have found that the block is not divided and even if the block is divided the permission is granted and the show cause notice is withdrawn. He further submitted that when the deceased transferor himself is a party to the voluntary sale and for about 16/17 years he has not challenged the legality and validity of the sale and when he has received the full consideration, the sale cannot be declared void at his instance or at the instance of the appellants who are legal heirs of the transferor, that too when neither the deceased nor the appellants have chosen to file appropriate proceedings of filing suit for declaring the sale as void and therefore, in his submission this is a fit case of abuse of process of law and this court should not permit the party to invoke the extraordinary equitable jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution who themselves are admitting that they have committed wrong and have pocketed the undue benefits pursuant to transaction of sale which is under challenge.” It is also pertinent to extract paragraphs 16 and 17 of the aforesaid judgment in the Letters Patent Appeal:— “16. Mr. A.J Patel has drawn our attention to the judgment of the Division Bench (Coram: Mr. K.G Balakrishnan, CJ & Mr. Justice J.N Bhatt) dated 2.9.1999 in Letters Patent Appeal No. 1153/98 in Special Civil Application No. 6265/98 in the case of legal heirs of Mithabhai Mavjibhai v. State of Gujarat. Before the Division Bench the aforesaid matter was under the present Act itself and the Division Bench speaking through K.G Balakrishnan, CJ observed as under:— “We have heard the appellants' counsel. The present appeal is filed by the legal heirs of the original transferor. The counsel contended that the sale deed executed contrary to the provisions contained in the Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1947 is a void transaction and therefore, no rights will flow from such a transaction and the Collector was justified in setting aside the same even after a period of 21 years. It is important to note that the present challenge is made by the heirs of the original transferor. The original transferor accepted consideration and must have made the transferees believe that the transaction was in accordance with law. It is important to note that the present challenge is made by the heirs of the original transferor. The original transferor accepted consideration and must have made the transferees believe that the transaction was in accordance with law. Therefore, the present appellants who are the legal heirs of the original transferors cannot be heard to say that they are entitled to the benefit of such a transaction which was opposed to law.” 17. We are of the view that the aforesaid judgment of the Division Bench of this court is squarely applicable to the facts of the present case.” Ultimately, the appeal was dismissed by imposing costs of Rs. 5,000/-. 17. The well-known maxim “In Pari Delicto Potior Est Conditio Possidentis” (in a case of equal or mutual fault between two parties, the condition of the party in possession (or defending) is the better one, and where the fault is mutual, the law will leave the case as it finds it), in my view, is applicable to the facts of the present case. 18. Considering the aforesaid aspects, in my view, initiation of proceedings, after such a long time, cannot be permitted and the Collector has committed an error of law in setting aside the transaction on the basis of the application made by respondent No. 3, who, after having received the full consideration, thought it fit to challenge the said transaction after 17 years. In my view, a void order is also required to be challenged, as, it is submitted by Mr. A.J Patel that the petitioners have also become owners by way of adverse possession. It is also not in dispute that even the Revenue Authorities were aware about the said transaction in view of the entry which was posted in 1981, but, the authorities had not thought it fit to take any proceedings for about 17 years. 19. Under these circumstances, in my view, proceedings are not required to be conducted at the instance of the respondent No. 3. Even otherwise, the land in question is situated in T.P Scheme, which is introduced and the same is now in residential zone. In that view of the matter, even rigour of Act, to an extent, is watered down. This being in residential zone in the Town Planning Scheme, the land can be converted into N.A Use. 33. Even otherwise, the land in question is situated in T.P Scheme, which is introduced and the same is now in residential zone. In that view of the matter, even rigour of Act, to an extent, is watered down. This being in residential zone in the Town Planning Scheme, the land can be converted into N.A Use. 33. In ‘RINKI SHASHIKANT GANDHI v. MAMLATDAR, VADODARA TALUKA’ (Supra), where the Court held that the Collector, under sub-Rule 108(6) of the Gujarat Land Revenue Code is not vested with the powers to direct forfeiture of the land to the State Government, since, no notice was issued under the Fragmentation Act. In that case, the proceedings had been initiated by the vendor after 4 years from the date of registration of the sale deed, which was held to be unreasonable by the Court. 34. On exclusively examining the law on the subject, the Court held that the person aggrieved by a sell transaction could not be the seller, who was a willing party to the sale deed and he cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. The Court, further, held that he had no locus standi to initiate the proceedings after unreasonable time, after having done the said transaction. The court held and observed as under: “20. Considering the above legal and factual aspects of the matter, this Court has no hesitation in concluding that respondent No. 4 is not a ‘person aggrieved’ by the sale transaction. The said respondent is a willing party to the Sale Deed and cannot be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. He, therefore, had no locus standi to file an appeal after an unreasonable period of time, against the mutation entry evidencing the sale transaction. 21. Having considered the above aspects of the matter, the question whether the Collector could have cancelled the entry of sale and directed forfeiture of the land to the State Government, for violation of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act, would now arise for consideration. 22. The nature of the power to be exercised by the Collector under RTS proceedings is clear from sub-rule (6) of Rule 108 reproduced hereinabove. As already held by this Court, the said power does not extend to directing forfeiture of the land in question. 22. The nature of the power to be exercised by the Collector under RTS proceedings is clear from sub-rule (6) of Rule 108 reproduced hereinabove. As already held by this Court, the said power does not extend to directing forfeiture of the land in question. A more important aspect of the matter is: under which proceedings is the Collector empowered to exercise the power conferred by Rule 108(6)? Under this sub-rule the Collector is exercising power under RTS proceedings regarding disputed mutation entries and certainly not under the provisions of the Fragmentation Act. The impugned order of the Collector very clearly reveals that he has come to the conclusion that the sale transaction between the petitioner and respondent No. 4 is hit by the provisions of the Fragmentation Act, and on this ground has directed forfeiture of the land to the State Government. 23. The Fragmentation Act is a self-contained Code that lays down a detailed procedure to be followed by the competent authority in the event that its provisions are found to be violated. It also envisages giving of notice to the person concerned. The circumstances under which the fragment of land shall vest in the State Government is also laid down. It is significant to note in the present case, that no proceedings, whatsoever, under the Fragmentation Act have been initiated against the petitioner. The proceedings initiated by respondent No. 4 are RTS proceedings, under the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972. In exercise of power under sub-rule (6) of Rule 108 in RTS proceedings, the Collector cannot exercise power under the Fragmentation Act. Being a quasi judicial authority, the scope of exercise of power by the Collector is confined to the extent permitted by sub-Rule (6) of Rule 108. He is not empowered to transgress the limits of the power vested in him under RTS proceedings, as the power to be exercised by him is a statutory power. It may be possible that the Collector was under the mistaken notion that the power he exercises is inherent in his position or designation, as Collector. If it is so, such a notion is an absolutely erroneous one. The Collector cannot, by virtue of his position or designation, exercise power under another enactment when he is dealing with a matter under a different enactment. The position of law in this regard is no longer res integra. 24. If it is so, such a notion is an absolutely erroneous one. The Collector cannot, by virtue of his position or designation, exercise power under another enactment when he is dealing with a matter under a different enactment. The position of law in this regard is no longer res integra. 24. In Evergreen Apartment Cooperative Housing Society v. Special Secretary, Revenue Department, Gujarat State (Supra), this Court has held: “12 **** **** ***** So the entire inquiry and revisional power has to proceed under the Bombay Land Revenue Rules and not under any enactments like the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Act, Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act or Bombay Prevention of Fragmentation and Consolidation of Holdings Act. It is quite possible that an officer of the Revenue Department may be occupying different capacities under different enactments. That, however, would not empower him to exercise any powers under one enactment while proceeding under another enactment. So far as the proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules, popularly known as RTS proceedings, are concerned, it is well settled that the entries made in the revenue records have primarily a fiscal value and they do not create any title. Such mutations have to follow either the documents of title or the orders passed by competent authorities under special enactments. Independently the Revenue Authorities, as mentioned in Rule 108 of the Rules, cannot pass orders of cancelling the entries on an assumption that the transaction recorded in the entry are against the provisions of a particular enactment. Whether the transaction is valid or not has to be examined by the competent authority under the particular enactment by following the procedure prescribed therein and by giving an opportunity of hearing to the concerned parties likely to be affected by any order that may be passed. Thus on this second ground also the orders of the Collector and the Additional Chief Secretary appear to be beyond their jurisdiction. The Additional Chief Secretary has held that the sale by auction was not consistent with the provisions of Section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. Section 27 relates to prohibition of transfer of any urban land with a building thereon. The Additional Chief Secretary has held that the sale by auction was not consistent with the provisions of Section 27 of the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act. Section 27 relates to prohibition of transfer of any urban land with a building thereon. Apart from legal position that Section 27 has been struck down as ultra vires, it is quite obvious that no such question of transferring urban land with a building thereon has ever arisen in the present case. Thus, the order of the revisional authority has proceeded on a misconception of relevant legal provisions also.” (emphasis supplied) 25. The culmination of the above discussion, in light of the judicial pronouncements and reasons stated hereinabove, leads this court to the following conclusions: 1. The proceedings initiated by the vendor, respondent No. 4, after four years of execution of the sale transaction and five years of the registration thereof, suffer from delay, having been instituted after an unreasonably long period of time. As such, the Collector could not have acted upon those proceedings by passing the impugned order. 2. Respondent No. 4, being the vendor of the land in question has no locus standi to challenge the entry of sale, in respect of a transaction to which he was a willing party, after pocketing the sale consideration. Under these circumstances, respondent No. 4 is not an aggrieved person and cannot be permitted to take undue advantage of his own wrong. 3. The Collector, under sub-rule (6) of Rule 108 is not vested with power to direct forfeiture of the land to the State Government. The direction in the impugned order, to this effect, is beyond the jurisdiction vested in the Collector under Rule 108(6) in R.T.S Proceedings. 4. The Collector, in exercise of power under Rule 108(6) in RTS proceedings cannot exercise power under the Fragmentation Act, merely by virtue of his position or designation or the fact that he may be acting in different capacities under different enactments. Being a quasi judicial authority, the Collector is bound to exercise power within the limits prescribed by the particular enactment under which he is called upon to adjudicate, and cannot transgress the limits of such statutory power, in a manner that overlaps a different enactment. Being a quasi judicial authority, the Collector is bound to exercise power within the limits prescribed by the particular enactment under which he is called upon to adjudicate, and cannot transgress the limits of such statutory power, in a manner that overlaps a different enactment. By passing the impugned order, the Collector has transgressed the scope and ambit of the power conferred by sub-rule (6) of Rule 108 of the Gujarat Land Revenue Rules, 1972, and has erroneously exercised power under the Fragmentation Act, which is not permissible. No proceedings have been initiated against the petitioner under the Fragmentation Act and no notice has been issued to her under this enactment. By holding the sale transaction to be violative of the provisions of the Fragmentation Act and directing forfeiture of the land to the State Government, the petitioner has been seriously prejudiced, as it virtually amounts to setting aside the Sale Deed in RTS proceedings.” 35. Thus, it is quite clear that when the proceedings are initiated under the Gujarat Land Revenue Code in exercise of the powers under sub-Rule (6) of Rule 8 in RTS proceedings, the Collector cannot exercise the powers under the Fragmentation Act. Drawing from the decision of this Court in ‘EVERGREEN APARTMENT CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY v. SPECIAL SECRETARY, REVENUE DEPARTMENT, GUJARAT STATE’, 1991 (1) GLR 113 , the Court held that an officer of the Revenue Department may be occupying different capacities under different enactments. That, however, would not empower him to exercise any powers under one enactment while proceeding under another enactment. So far as the proceedings under Rule 108 of the Rules, popularly known as RTS proceedings, are concerned, it is well settled that the entries made in the revenue records have primarily a fiscal value and they do not create any title. The authorities have to follow the procedure prescribed under the Fragmentation Act. As can be noticed from the order of the Secretary (Appeal), relying on the decision in ‘EVERGREEN APARTMENT CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY v. SPECIAL SECRETARY, REVENUE DEPARTMENT, GUJARAT STATE’ (Supra), it had directed the concerned authority to inquire into the provisions of the Fragmentation Act on following due procedure. The authorities have to follow the procedure prescribed under the Fragmentation Act. As can be noticed from the order of the Secretary (Appeal), relying on the decision in ‘EVERGREEN APARTMENT CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY v. SPECIAL SECRETARY, REVENUE DEPARTMENT, GUJARAT STATE’ (Supra), it had directed the concerned authority to inquire into the provisions of the Fragmentation Act on following due procedure. In both the above referred authorities, even the time of four years for initiating any action for breach of the Fragmentation Act has been considered to be bad in law, whereas, in this case, the petitioners, who are the heirs of the original seller and who have enjoyed and taken benefits of the sale consideration, are desirous of taking advantage of their own wrong after nearly 20 years and made an application to the authority concerned for not granting permission for division of the Block, which, in the opinion of this Court, cannot be permitted. 36. It is to be noted that in the case of ‘PATEL RATILAL MAGANBHAI’ (Supra), the Suit was preferred for declaration of the sale deed as void after nearly 16 years and such prayer was made in the writ-petition after nearly 18 years. It was held to be a misuse of process of law by the Court. The Court also held that it is the duty of the purchaser of an immovable property to verify the title of the seller. However, in a case where the permission to sell is required to be obtained of any competent authority, it is obligatory on the part of the seller to disclose to the purchaser that the permission of the competent authority is required to be obtained, and thereafter, the sale should be effected. If, such information’s are withheld by the seller from the purchaser and subsequently on account of non-availability of permission the sale is declared illegal or void and the purchaser is visited with the consequences of depriving of the property or otherwise, the purchaser can legitimately sue the seller for recovery of damages permissible under law. But, when it comes to the question of voluntary sale to be declared void on the account of breach of any provision of law, the Court held that the Court would have to examine, as to whether the seller had disclosed all the material facts before the purchaser or not. But, when it comes to the question of voluntary sale to be declared void on the account of breach of any provision of law, the Court held that the Court would have to examine, as to whether the seller had disclosed all the material facts before the purchaser or not. It, further, held that the competent authority may say that the transaction being without prior permission is void and no limitation would come in the way of the authorities. However, when the seller of the property challenges the sale, he has to establish that he had disclosed everything to the buyer, who had purchased the same at his own risk and he could be declined relief by the Court. The Court in the end held that the appeal was a clear misuse of the process of law in the following manner and held thus: “21. In our considered opinion, the present appeal is clear misuse of process of law, and therefore, we cannot accept the last submission of Mr. Shelat that the sale to be declared void and the possession of the land should be restored to the appellants. 22. At this stage, we find that equitable considerations are against the appellants and prima facie it appears that the appellants want to use the process of law with a view to take undue benefit by contending that the transaction of voluntary sale was void or was opposed to law. During the period of 16 years not a single whisper is made by the appellants or the transferor regarding any infirmity or illegality in the sale, but at the stage when the Deputy Collector withdrew the notice the appellants want to take undue benefit of such proceedings even though the limitation for filing suit for such relief under Law of Limitation has expired. We are of the view that the instant case is nothing but clear misuse and abuse of process of law and we agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge while dismissing the petition and we find that there is no substance in the appeal, and therefore, the appeal is dismissed. Notice is discharged.” 37. We are of the view that the instant case is nothing but clear misuse and abuse of process of law and we agree with the view taken by the learned single Judge while dismissing the petition and we find that there is no substance in the appeal, and therefore, the appeal is dismissed. Notice is discharged.” 37. Reverting back to the merits of the instant case, in the order of the Secretary (Appeal) of the year 2000, he carefully followed the ratio laid down by this Court in ‘EVERGREEN APARTMENT CO-OPERATIVE HOUSING SOCIETY v. SPECIAL SECRETARY, REVENUE DEPARTMENT, GUJARAT STATE’ (Supra) and ‘RINKI SHASHIKANT GANDHI v. MAMLATDAR, VADODARA TALUKA’ (Supra) instead of proceedings against the parties in RTS proceedings, it had chosen to direct the competent authority to initiate inquiry under the Fragmentation Act, as provided under the law, itself. This has been duly followed by the concerned authority, as held herein above not only he had been given the opportunity of hearing, the petitioners were all along conscious of the proceedings, which were going on. The directions were also sought from this Court in the earlier round of litigation being Special Civil Application No. 6680 of 2002, it cannot be said therefore that the order passed was either without owner's request of such division of block or without any application before the concerned authority. Once having entered into the registered sale deed and having enjoyed the amount of sale consideration out of the said transaction, the heirs of the seller concerned when chose to challenge the same after a long gap of 20 years, when the authority declared the said transaction as void and has granted the retrospective permission, it has committed no illegality. Even, though, Section 31 of the Fragmentation Act provides for prior permission of the State in writing, the amendment in law permits the regularisation, even by imposing penalty as provided under the law. 38. Resultantly, this petition stands DISMISSED as devoid of merit. Rule is discharged. Interim relief, if any, stands VACATED.