ORDER 1. This civil revision under section 115 of CPC is directed against the order dated 16.8.2017 passed by the appellate Court dismissing the appeal on the ground of limitation, as appeal was found barred by six years with no explanation much less plausible explanation for the delay caused in filing the appeal. 2. Upon perusal of the application seeking condonation of delay, there is a mere lip service indicated in the application without narration of relevant facts of ailment and the period and place of treatment undertaken by the appellant. Under such circumstances, the application is totally devoid of substance and under no circumstances can be considered to be an application showing sufficient cause for the delay caused in filing the appeal. 3. Law as regards sufficient cause under section 5 of the Limitation Act has been well explained by the Supreme Court in the case of Lanka Venkateshwarlu (dead) by LRs v. State of Andhra Pradesh [ (2011)4 SCC 363 ] has observed as under : “19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the Courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and others v. Katiji and others [ (1987)2 SCC 107 ]. 23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh, [ (2010)8 SCC 685 ], as follows : “25. We may state that even if the term “sufficient cause” has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of “reasonableness” as it is understood in its general connotation.” 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of d elay under section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers. ” Hon. Supreme Court in a recent decision in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan, Mumbai, [ (2012)5 SCC 157 ] has held as under : “24. What colour the expression “sufficient cause” would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay.” 4. Following aforesaid principle of law having juxtaposition with the facts in hand, this Court is of the view that the appellate Court has not committed error of law and fact while dismissing the application. 5. The civil revision sans merit stands dismissed. S.P. Khare for petitioner.