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2017 DIGILAW 1130 (JHR)

Hasan Rizvi, son of late M. A. Haque v. Tata Iron & Steel Company Limited (now known as Tata Steel Limited)

2017-07-14

AMITAV K.GUPTA

body2017
ORDER : This writ application has been filed by the petitioner seeking direction upon the respondent for quashing the order dated 15.06.2017 (Annexure-7 to this writ application) passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division-I, Jamshedpur, in Execution Case no. 10 of 2016 arising out of Eviction Suit no. 30 of 2001, whereby the Executing Court was pleased to direct issuance of writ of delivery of possession and fixing the case on 15.07.2017 awaiting execution report. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that it would be evident from the impugned order that the petitioner had preferred Eviction Appeal no. 06 of 2016 against the decree passed in Eviction suit no. 30 of 2001. That in the meantime, the decree was put into execution and the judgment debtor filed the show cause challenging the execution petition. That the petitioner had also filed the petition for stay of the proceeding in execution case and rejoinder was filed by the respondent. That the matter was posted for hearing on 24.06.2017, as disclosed in the impugned order. It is contended by the counsel that without awaiting the order of the appellate court, the executing court has passed the impugned order which is against the provisions of law. It is argued that in terms of Order XXI Rule 26 of the Civil Procedure Code, the court below should have stayed the proceeding and directed the petitioner to furnish sufficient security for the same. In course of his argument, learned counsel has submitted that the respondent had also filed a case under Section 630 of the Companies Act in which petitioner was acquitted with a finding that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. That the quarter, which is in occupation of the petitioner, is not in occupation by the petitioner as an employee of Tata Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. i.e., the respondent, on the contrary it has been allotted to him in the capacity of his being an M.L.A., and the issue “whether there exists relationship of landlord and tenant” is yet to be adjudicated in the appeal. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent has submitted that the petitioner had earlier preferred W.P.(C) no. 2682 of 2009, which was rejected by this Court on 04.09.2009. Thereafter, the petitioner again filed W.P.(C) no. 1094 of 2010, which was dismissed on 13.05.2010. The petitioner again filed W.P.(C) no. 3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent has submitted that the petitioner had earlier preferred W.P.(C) no. 2682 of 2009, which was rejected by this Court on 04.09.2009. Thereafter, the petitioner again filed W.P.(C) no. 1094 of 2010, which was dismissed on 13.05.2010. The petitioner again filed W.P.(C) no. 5113 of 2010, which stood dismissed on 19.09.2011. That the petitioner again filed W.P.(C) no. 6748 of 2011, which was allowed with observation vide order dated 11.12.2012. Thereafter, the petitioner again filed W.P.(C) no. 2546 of 2015, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 17.02.2015. That it would be evident that the petitioner has been invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court, on frivolous and vexatious grounds, only to delay trial and at this stage the petitioner is delaying the execution proceeding for denying the usufruct of the decree to the respondent. That since the eviction suit was filed way back in the year 2001 and the litigation has continued for more than 16 years on account of the writs being filed by this petitioner. 4. Heard. On perusal of the impugned order it is relevant to take notice of the finding of the court below which reads as under:- “So far the proceeding of the case is concerned, this execution case is filed for execution of the decree passed in Eviction Suit no. 30 of 2001. After passing of the decree present case is filed on dated 27.04.2016 and judgment- debtor appeared on 22.07.2016. Already 16 years of litigation has gone between the parties and even after filing of this execution case more than one year has lapsed. In spite of giving more than reasonable opportunity judgment-debtor fails to bring any stay order from the superior court and provision of Order 41 Rule 5 C.P.C. mandates that there shall not be any stay of decree unless superior court specifically grants it. Moreover, there is also the provision of restitution under section 144 of C.P.C. that in case of reversal or setting aside of the decree, opposite party is entitled to go back into the same position. Decree-holder must enjoy the fruit of decree and otherwise entire successive litigation will become infructuous. In light of the above discussions no further adjournment is hereby granted to the judgment-debtor. Office clerk is directed to issue writ of delivery of possession upon failing of requisites and Nazarat T.A. by decree-holder.” 5. Decree-holder must enjoy the fruit of decree and otherwise entire successive litigation will become infructuous. In light of the above discussions no further adjournment is hereby granted to the judgment-debtor. Office clerk is directed to issue writ of delivery of possession upon failing of requisites and Nazarat T.A. by decree-holder.” 5. The court below has rightly observed that the litigation has been going on for around 16 years and the decree-holder is entitled to enjoy the decree, hence, the court below has directed for issuance of the writ of delivery of possession and also observed that in case if the decree is reversed in the eviction appeal, the petitioner is entitled to put back in possession of the said property in terms of Section 144 C.P.C. It is evident that the petitioner has been repeatedly invoking the writ jurisdiction of this court on one pretext or the other, hence, this court does not find any illegality in the impugned order dated 15.06.2017 (Annexure-7 to this writ application) passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division-I, Jamshedpur, in Execution Case no. 10 of 2016 arising out of Eviction Suit no. 30 of 2001. As contended by the petitioner, even the acquittal of the petitioner under Section 630 of the Companies Act is not relevant for execution proceeding and not even remotely connected to eviction suit. 6. In the result, the present writ petition stands dismissed.