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2017 DIGILAW 1133 (KER)

Baiju v. State of Kerala, Rep. by the Public Prosecutor

2017-08-09

P.R.RAMACHANDRA MENON, P.SOMARAJAN

body2017
JUDGMENT : P. Somarajan, J. 1. These are the two appeals preferred by accused Nos. 1 and 2 respectively against the judgment in S.C. No. 499 of 2006 dated 9.12.2010 rendered by the Additional Sessions Judge II, Thiruvananthapuram. 2. The short facts of the case are as follows: One Kamala Bai, the deceased in the case, met with a sad death in the hands of accused No. 1, who is her son and accused No. 2, who is her grandson, while she was residing along with her another son, PW-4, in Thekkinkara Puthen Veedu, Aruvottukonam, Karikamadakodu desom, Vellarada Village, Thiruvananthapuram. The alleged incident took place on 2.3.2004. On that day, at about 1.30 p.m. accused No. 2 along with his two friends came to the house of the deceased and had some chatting with her. They returned after a short while and on the way they met with accused No. 1. Then again they came back to the house of the deceased and accused Nos. 1 and 2 approached the deceased and had some discussions with her. Accused Nos. 1 & 2 demanded re-assignment of 6 cents of land earlier gifted to accused No. 1 and subsequently revoked by her. It has resulted in the alleged attack on the deceased by accused Nos. 1 and 2. Accused No. 1 hit on the head of the deceased with a cradle stick (MO1) and accused No. 2 caught hold of the throat of the deceased by his hands and fisted on her chest. Hearing the screaming of the deceased, PW-1 rushed to the kitchen and saw the entire incident through the window of kitchen. Thereon, PW-1 went out of the house to call PW-11 Jestus, another son of the deceased. In the meanwhile, accused Nos. 1 and 2 ran away from the house. On the way, accused No. 1 threw the MO1 cradle stick in a rubber estate. The deceased, after the attack, came out of the house, but fell on a nearby earthen road and vomited. PW-11, who came to the spot on getting information, took the deceased in an auto rickshaw and removed her to the hospital at Anappara and from there, as insisted by the doctors, to the Medical College Hospital. The deceased, after the attack, came out of the house, but fell on a nearby earthen road and vomited. PW-11, who came to the spot on getting information, took the deceased in an auto rickshaw and removed her to the hospital at Anappara and from there, as insisted by the doctors, to the Medical College Hospital. On the same day at about 1.20 a.m. (mistakenly written as 1.20 p.m. in the impugned judgment in paragraph 4) she succumbed to the injuries at the Medical College Hospital. On the next day, PW-3, the son of the deceased, went to the Vellarada Police Station and gave Ext.P1 First Information Statement, based on which, PW-13, the Assistant Sub Inspector of Vellarada Police Station, registered Ext.P1(a) First Information Report alleging offence under Sections 449 and 302 read with Section 34 of Indian Penal Code against accused Nos. 1 and 2 and their two friends. Subsequently, the two friends of the accused including PW-2 were deleted from the party array as there was no material to proceed against them in connection with the alleged incident. 3. After completion of investigation, PW-14 laid charge against accused Nos. 1 and 2 before the Judicial Magistrate of the First Class II, Neyyattinkara and it was duly committed by the learned Magistrate to the Sessions Court. After trial, the Sessions Court found accused No. 1 guilty of offence punishable under Sections 302 and 449 IPC and accused No. 2 guilty of offence punishable under Section 304 part II and Section 449 IPC. The first accused was convicted and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302 of IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Section 449 of IPC. The second accused was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of five years for the offence punishable under Section 304 part II of IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years for the offence punishable under Section 449 of IPC by the impugned judgment. 4. The learned Sessions Judge relied mainly on the oral testimony of PW-1, PW-4 and PW-11. PW-4 was aged only 12 years at the time of examination and 4½ years at the time of alleged incident. 4. The learned Sessions Judge relied mainly on the oral testimony of PW-1, PW-4 and PW-11. PW-4 was aged only 12 years at the time of examination and 4½ years at the time of alleged incident. No attempt was made by the learned Sessions Judge to test the veracity of a minor witness, who was aged only 4½ years at the time of alleged incident. Even according to the prosecution, the motive behind the crime is cancellation of a deed of gift given to accused No. 1 by the victim and giving the same property to her another son. This would prima facie show the strained relationship between the children of the deceased victim. PW-11, in whose favour the property was subsequently given, had admitted his strained relationship with the accused Nos. 1 and 2. He had admitted that a civil suit and two criminal cases are pending in between him and accused No. 1. PW-11 is in good terms with PW-3, who is another son of the victim. Both PW-1 and PW-4 are the daughters of PW-3. So, there is every chance for tutoring the above said two witnesses, in view of the strained relationship, and the property transaction alleged to have been taken place in between the victim and one of the accused which was subsequently and unilaterally cancelled. 5. Further, the veracity of the child witness aged only 4½ years at the time of alleged incident has not been tested in relation to the oral testimony made by her as PW-1, which is a narrative one touching each and every aspect of the alleged incident. She had spoken what actually happened prior to and after the alleged incident and the earlier visit of accused No. 2 along with two of his friends to their house and offering of chairs to them by the victim at that time. It is thereafter, according to PW-4, accused No. 2 came again with his friends accompanied by accused No. 1, but the two friends remained in the “thadam” situated in front of the house. 6. It is thereafter, according to PW-4, accused No. 2 came again with his friends accompanied by accused No. 1, but the two friends remained in the “thadam” situated in front of the house. 6. During cross examination, it was asserted by her that accused No. 2 along with his friends came to the house in and around 1.00 and 1.30 p.m. and that the victim fell down on the “thadam” at about 4.00 p.m. It is seemed to be so strange that a child aged 4½ years was aware of the time at which accused No. 2 along with his two friends came to the house at first and also the time in which the deceased fell down on the “thadam” and according to her, it was in between 1.00 and 1.30 p.m. and 4.00 p.m. respectively. The fact that she was aged only 4½ years and had aware of the exact time in which the alleged incident was happened at her tender age of 4½ years seemed to be so strange and cannot be accepted. A child would not have that much of intelligence or perception at the tender age of 4½ years. This would prima facie show that somebody has supplied her all these time factors. If she was having such an extent of power of perception, she ought to have responded properly at the time of alleged incident either by crying aloud or through other response, if she has actually witnessed the incident. During the cross examination, she had admitted that she did not make any response, though she was standing aside the victim at the time of the alleged incident. Further, during cross examination, she had admitted that she was playing in the courtyard of her house at the time when the accused persons came to the house. She did not have any case that she had accompanied either the victim or the accused to the room wherein the alleged incident was happened or rushed to the room, hearing the hue and cry. So, her presence, as submitted by PW-4, at the place of incident is highly doubtful. She has given a descriptive narration touching each and every aspect of the alleged incident, which was happened at her tender age of 4½ years, which would prima facie show that the version is tainted by tutoring. So, her presence, as submitted by PW-4, at the place of incident is highly doubtful. She has given a descriptive narration touching each and every aspect of the alleged incident, which was happened at her tender age of 4½ years, which would prima facie show that the version is tainted by tutoring. The presence of another person by name Meena Kumari (Meena mami) at the place of incident was spoken by PW-1, Saritha, and, according to her, on seeing the incident Meena mami tried to prevent accused No. 2 and yelled not to kill her elder sister. Though PW-4 admitted the presence of Meena mami, nothing was whispered with respect to her interference in the alleged incident. It is settled that material omission, if any, alone can be looked into, and minor discrepancies would not normally affect the veracity of oral testimony of a witness. The alleged interference of Meena mami is relevant and material, as it was happened during the course of alleged incident, by which she had interfered in the attack and tried to prevent the accused from unleashing further attack on the victim. This would show that the interference alleged to have been made by Meena mami during the course of alleged incident is material and hence cannot be discarded as minor discrepancy. 7. The learned Sessions Judge had considered the competency of PW-4 to stand as a witness by relying on the decisions drawn in Nivrutti Pandurang Kokate and Others vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2008 SC 1460 and in Dattu Ramrao Sakhare vs. State of Maharashtra, 1997 (5) SC 341 and also discussed the application of Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, that any person can be testified unless the Court considered that the witness is prevented from understanding the questions put on him/her or giving rational answers to the questions because of the tender age. There is lot of difference in between the expression “competency to stand as a witness” and “reliability of the evidence adduced.” The “reliability” of the oral evidence tendered would be a different one and it should be ascertained at the time of final argument with the attending circumstances. It is not at all permissible to substitute “competency of witness” in the place of “reliability of evidence” adduced. It is not at all permissible to substitute “competency of witness” in the place of “reliability of evidence” adduced. The expression “reliability” stands for the probative value of the evidence adduced and whether it can be applied as piece of evidence in the matter in dispute came up for adjudication. A witness, especially a child witness, may be competent to give oral evidence or to stand as a witness. The competency to stand as a witness will not by itself make the testimony as reliable. Nothing was discussed by the learned Sessions Judge with respect to the “reliability” of the oral evidence tendered by a minor witness with respect to what was happened or transpired at her tender age of 4½ years. The oral evidence tendered by PW-1, another minor witness, has not been properly considered, whether it is tutored or tainted by ill will on account of enmity between the accused and PWs. 3 and 11. Both the witnesses, PWs. 1 & 4, being the daughters of PW-11, their oral testimony has to be tested so as to rule out the possibility of tutoring, especially when the presence of PW-4 within the room, wherein the alleged incident took place, as spoken by PW-1, is under the shadow of doubt. As discussed earlier, PW-4 had admitted that she was playing in the courtyard of the house at the time when the accused persons came to the house and she did not have any case that she had accompanied the victim or the accused to the room wherein the alleged incident was happened. But PW-1 asserted that PW-4 was in the room at the time of alleged incident. That contradiction has not been properly explained by the prosecution either in the re-examination or otherwise. 8. At this juncture, the non-examination of Meena Kumari, who was present at the place of incident and witnessed the entire episode and accompanied the victim to the hospital, and non inclusion of her name as a charge witness would be relevant and it is fatal to the prosecution case, especially when the entire prosecution version stood on the oral evidence tendered by two minor witnesses. None else was present at the place of incident other than PW-1, PW-4 and the said Meena mami. None else was present at the place of incident other than PW-1, PW-4 and the said Meena mami. The non-examination of the said material witness is fatal to the prosecution case, especially when what was actually happened to the victim during the interregnum in which PW-1 went out of the house so as to summon PW-3 till she came back to the house, is fully resting on the oral testimony of PW-4. By that time the victim came out of the house and fell down on the “thadam” for which the prosecution relying only on the oral evidence tendered by PW-4, a minor witness having aged 4½ years as on the date of alleged incident. The non-examination and non-inclusion of Meena Kumari (Meena mami) as a charge witness would cause considerable doubt on the prosecution case. 9. The oral evidence tendered by PW-11 cannot be relied on simply on the reason that he himself has admitted that there are several criminal cases pending in between himself and accused No. 1 besides the civil cases. He himself has admitted that a civil case is pending before the Court at Neyyattinkara in which he is the plaintiff and accused No. 1 is the defendant. He had also admitted pendency of a criminal case against him in C.C. No. 1580 of 2004 before the Magistrate Court, Neyyattinkara. It is also admitted by him that another case is pending against him in C.C. No. 1104 of 2004, in which accused No. 1 is the defacto complainant. So, no reliance can be placed on the oral evidence tendered by PW-11. Further, he is not an eye witness to the alleged incident. What is spoken by him is the information given to him by PW-1 on the alleged day. It cannot be brought under Section 6 of the Indian Evidence Act, especially when he is an interested witness having enmity towards accused Nos.1 and 2. 10. In so far as recovery of MO1 cradle stick is concerned, it should be shown that MO1 is an incriminating object. Otherwise, the alleged recovery, if any, would not bring within the sweep of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Admittedly, MO1 has not been sent for any chemical analysis so as to detect any presence of human blood or tissue on it. Otherwise, the alleged recovery, if any, would not bring within the sweep of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Admittedly, MO1 has not been sent for any chemical analysis so as to detect any presence of human blood or tissue on it. In fact, there cannot be any tissue or blood stain on MO1 because of the reason that what is alleged to have been caused is only a contusion over the head by hitting with MO1. It is true that MO1 was identified by PW-1 and PW-4. As discussed above, the oral evidence tendered by PW-4 is not reliable. It is also not probable for a child, having the age of 4½ years, to notice whether accused No. 1 left the place of incident by carrying MO1 cradle stick. Further, the alleged recovery from a nearby rubber plantation cannot be brought under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, unless the same lying concealed. Admittedly, it was not lying concealed and it could be possible to detect the same on a search in the nearby places, the rubber plantation. 11. The antemortem injuries found in the body of deceased as per Exhibit P10 post-mortem examination certificate are five in numbers, which are extracted below for reference. “1. Crescentic abrasions 1.5 x 0.2 cm and 0.5 x 0.2 cm, 0.5 cm apart, on the front of root of neck, overlying the inner end of right collar bone. Flap dissection of neck done under bloodless field revealed normal and intact neck structures. 2. Contusion 10 x 7 x 3.5 cm on the front of middle of chest 1.5cm below root of neck. 3. Contusion 3.5 x 1.5 x 0.5 cm on the back of right wrist. 4. Contusion 2 x 0.5 cm on the back of left forearm 8 cm below elbow. Infiltration of blood over an area 5.4 x 2 x 0.3 cm and 2.5 x 2 x 0.3 cm 2 cm apart on the neck of right hand, just above the root of index and ring finger. 5. Contusion 4 x 2 x 0.5 cm on the left side of top of head 9cm above the ear.” 12. It is also reported in the post-mortem examination certificate that arteries at the base of brain showed atherosclerotic changes. 5. Contusion 4 x 2 x 0.5 cm on the left side of top of head 9cm above the ear.” 12. It is also reported in the post-mortem examination certificate that arteries at the base of brain showed atherosclerotic changes. Haematoma 11 x 8 x 7 cm involving the left fronto- parieto temporal regions of the left cerebral hemisphere with softening of surrounding brain tissues is also reported. Blood was also seen on the ventricles of brain and in the subarachnoid space at the base of the brain. Haemorrhages also seen in the softened basal ganglia, thalamus and internal capsule. The cause of death is stated to be due to bleeding into the brain. It is also opined that trauma could have accelerated or precipitated death. The doctor who issued Exhibit P10 post-mortem examination certificate was examined as PW-12. 13. To bring home the guilt of accused, especially in a case of homicide, there should be a clear nexus between the cause of death and the injuries alleged to have been sustained by the deceased from the hands of accused. The cause of death in the post-mortem examination certificate is stated to be due to the bleeding into the brain and that trauma could have accelerated or precipitated death. Exhibit P10 postmortem examination certificate is totally silent about what actually is the reason for the bleeding into the brain. On the other hand, during the examination of PW-12, the Doctor who conducted autopsy on the body of deceased and prepared Exhibit P10 post-mortem examination certificate, it has come out in evidence that there can be at least two possibilities for the bleeding into the brain. 14. Among the five antemortem injuries, injury No. 5 was taken as the reason for the bleeding into the brain by the prosecution. Injury No. 5 is a contusion 4 x 2 x 0.5 cm on the left side of top of head 9 cm above the ear. No bone injury or fracture to any bone of skull either in the left side of fronto-parieto temporal region or anywhere in the head is reported. Only a contusion, that too, having a measurement of 4 x 2 x 0.5 cm on the left side of top of head 9 cm above the ear alone is reported as a head injury. Only a contusion, that too, having a measurement of 4 x 2 x 0.5 cm on the left side of top of head 9 cm above the ear alone is reported as a head injury. To a specific court question that what was the actual cause for the bleeding and whether it was due to degenerative changes seen in the blood vessels or trauma caused by the injuries, PW-12 Doctor had given an answer in the following lines. “By virtue of the fact that there is a physical injury seen externally with correspondingly haematoma (blood clotting) in the brain just beneath producing an effect of softening the surrounding brain tissue with evidence of raised intra traicranial tension thereby indicating that the deceased had survived till the effects of the physical trauma had set in probability of death could be attributed more to trauma caused by physical injuries mentioned in Exhibit P10, than an isolated degenerative component alone causing death.” 15. The above said opinion of PW-12, doctor, is highly speculative regarding the real cause of death. It is so vague in nature without touching what actually the reason for the bleeding in the brain, though he had deposed with respect to probability of death attributed more to trauma caused by physical injuries noted in Exhibit P10 than an isolated degenerative component alone causing death. In Exhibit P10, he did not have any such case that the death was caused mainly due to trauma caused by physical injuries. What is stated in Exhibit P10 is really a different version that death was due to bleeding in the brain and the trauma could have accelerated or precipitated death. The said version given in Exhibit P10 suffered a material deviation at the time of examination of PW-12. During the cross examination, he had given a different version that the probability of death could be attributed more to trauma caused by physical injuries mentioned in Exhibit P10 than an isolated degenerative component alone causing death, thereby he had given up the earlier stand taken by him in Exhibit P10. It is also not spoken by him, how and in what manner trauma caused by physical injuries causes bleeding in the brain. 16. It is also not spoken by him, how and in what manner trauma caused by physical injuries causes bleeding in the brain. 16. The further version made by PW-12 doctor, regarding the cause of bleeding in the brain based on the corresponding haematoma (blood clotting) in the brain just beneath injury No. 5 and evidence of raised intra traicranial (intra cranial) tension is not specific. Exhibit P10 post-mortem examination report reveals that blood was also detected on the ventricles of the brain and in the subarachnoid space at the base of the brain besides haemorrhages in the softened basal ganglia, thalamus and internal capsule. There is no corresponding external injury with respect to the bleeding and haemorrhages found in subarachnoid space at the base of brain, basal ganglia, thalamus and internal capsule. It is also not explained the reasons for the said bleeding, in the absence of corresponding external injuries. In short, the exact reason for the bleeding in the other parts of brain is not ascertained by PW-12 doctor. Further opinion rendered by him, that if the contusions on the head and chest are taken alone they can cause concussion on heart and brain which are likely to cause death, cannot be accepted as it is a new version connecting injury on the chest as a cause of death. No such case was set up either in Exhibit P10 post-mortem examination report or at the time of chief examination of PW-12 doctor. 17. Yet another hypothesis also comes out as to the cause of bleeding in the brain and, according to PW-12, the Doctor, a fall of a patient having uncontrolled hypertension may rupture the blood vessels in the brain and it is generally possible. It is admitted by the prosecution that after the alleged attack on the victim, she came out of the house and fell down on the courtyard “Thadam” 26 meters away from her house. It is admitted by PW-5 that deceased was undergoing treatment for hypertension and she is a hypertensive patient. PW-1 and PW-4 are in agreement with the said version of PW-5. It is admitted by PW-11, one of her sons, that she is a hypertensive patient undergoing treatment for the last 14 years. It is admitted by PW-5 that deceased was undergoing treatment for hypertension and she is a hypertensive patient. PW-1 and PW-4 are in agreement with the said version of PW-5. It is admitted by PW-11, one of her sons, that she is a hypertensive patient undergoing treatment for the last 14 years. The possibility of causing rupture of blood vessels due to fall on a “Thadam” near to the house by the victim, who was suffering from hypertension, has not been ruled out by the prosecution. It was submitted that the possibility spoken by the doctor is with respect to fall on a “floor” and not on a “thadam” which stands for an earthen road. A fall of a patient having uncontrolled blood pressure either on a floor or on an earthen road may not have much difference as it basically rests on the nature of fall and the body weight of the person who fell down. So, there cannot be much difference in the question whether she had fallen on a floor or on an earthen way. The further clarification made by PW-12 that the injuries sustained by the victim are not consistent with an ordinary fall, relates to the question whether such injuries are possible either by an ordinary fall or otherwise. It has nothing to do with the opinion given by PW-12 as to the possibility of rupture of blood vessels in brain on a fall by a patient with uncontrolled blood pressure. In short, going by the medical evidence adduced, there are two possibilities for the alleged bleeding in the brain. One of the possibilities is the combined effect of haematoma just beneath the injury No. 5 producing an effect of softening the surrounding brain tissue with evidence of raised intra cranial tension (mistakenly stated as intra-traicranial) and “trauma” caused by physical injuries mentioned in Exhibit P10 than an isolated degenerative component alone causing death and the other possibility is resting on the ailment of deceased, namely hypertension and fall of the victim on earthen way 26 meters away from the house causing rupture of blood vessel due to hypertension. The absence of corresponding external injuries, regarding bleeding and hemorrhages found in subarachnoid space at the base of brain, basal ganglia, thalamus and internal capsule are suggestive of rupture blood vessels either due to fall of hypertensive victim on a floor, or due to combined effect of “trauma” caused and the haematoma found on brain just beneath the injury No. 5 or due to combined effect of both. 18. It was submitted by the prosecution that when there is inconsistency between the medical evidence and ocular evidence, unless the oral evidence available is totally irreconcilable within the medical evidence, the oral evidence would have primacy, relying on the decisions rendered by the Apex Court in State of U.P. vs. Hari, 2009 (13) SCC 542 , Bhajan Singh @ Harbhajan Singh and Others vs. State of Haryana, 2011 (7) SCC 421 and Darbara Singh vs. State of Punjab, 2012 KHC 4498. In the present case, as discussed in earlier paragraphs, the medical evidence suggests two possibilities regarding the cause of death. It is not ascertainable whether it is solely due to the injury alleged to have been sustained, noted as ante-mortem injury No. 5 and the effect of trauma caused thereby or due to fall of the victim due to hypertension, causing rupture of blood vessels in the brain. 19. When the medical evidence postulates and suggests two or three possibilities for the cause of death, the one which is exculpating has to be accepted giving benefit of doubt to the accused. Further, in a case of homicide, the prosecution has to rule out all other possibilities, than the one resting on the guilt of accused as to the cause of death. 20. The question of accelerating or precipitating death due to the effect of “trauma” caused by injuries 1 to 5 or attributing to death by its effect would be relevant, if the accused had the knowledge that such “trauma” would be sufficient to cause death or to accelerate or precipitate the same on account of the ailment of the victim, who is a hypertensive patient. In other words, it should be known to the accused that the victim is a hypertensive patient and their alleged act would result in either causing death or accelerating or precipitating the death, so as to bring the same within the second limb of Section 299 IPC for which the knowledge to the accused, that the victim is a hypertensive patient, is material. No evidence is adduced by the prosecution on that behalf, though they have a case that on an earlier occasion the victim used to reside along with accused No. 1 for a short period. Further, mere knowledge that the victim is a hypertensive patient alone is not sufficient; and what is material is that the knowledge that the “trauma” created would likely by such act to cause death, on account of ailment of the victim. The matter will not come within the sweep of either the first limb or the second limb of Section 299 IPC. Since there is no use of dangerous weapon, the offence, if any, proved would at the most come under the purview of Section 323 IPC. 21. Section 149 of IPC would come into play only when there is an unlawful assembly, which requires an assembly of five or more persons to accomplish any of the common object as made mentioned under Section 141 IPC. In the absence of involvement of five or more persons, no offence under Section 149 IPC would stand as attracted. 22. From the above said discussion, no offence under Section 302 IPC or Section 304 Part II IPC or Section 149 IPC is brought against accused Nos. 1 & 2. As such, they are entitled to an order of acquittal and we do so. 23. No charge has been framed against accused Nos. 1 and 2 for the offence under Section 323 IPC. But, being a minor offence, both under Sections 302 and 304 IPC, no separate charge is necessary. The presence of accused Nos. 1 & 2 in the place of occurrence was spoken by PWs. 1 and 4 and the injury alleged to have been sustained by the victim made mentioned in Exhibit P10 post-mortem examination certificate as antemortem injuries are consistent with the alleged act of accused Nos. 1 and 2 and hence the offence under Section 323 IPC stood as attracted. The accused Nos. 1 and 4 and the injury alleged to have been sustained by the victim made mentioned in Exhibit P10 post-mortem examination certificate as antemortem injuries are consistent with the alleged act of accused Nos. 1 and 2 and hence the offence under Section 323 IPC stood as attracted. The accused Nos. 1 & 2 are found guilty of the offence punishable under Section 323 IPC and convicted thereunder. It is submitted, across the bar, that accused Nos. 1 and 2 have already undergone a substantial period of sentence and hence it is fit and proper to set off the same towards the sentence for the offence under Section 323 read with Section 34 IPC and we do so. 24. In the result, both these appeals are allowed in part. The conviction and sentence awarded under Sections 302 and 149 IPC against accused No. 1 and the conviction and sentence under Section 304 Part II and Section 149 IPC against the accused No. 2 are hereby set aside. Accused Nos.1 and 2 are found guilty of offence under Section 323 IPC and convicted thereunder. In view of the sentence already undergone by accused Nos.1 and 2, the same is hereby set off towards the sentence for the offence under Section 323 IPC. Accused Nos. 1 and 2 shall be released forthwith by the concerned jail authorities, if they are still in jail and their detention is not required in connection with any other case.