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2017 DIGILAW 1135 (ALL)

KALIKA PRASAD v. STATE OF U. P.

2017-04-28

P.K.S.BAGHEL

body2017
JUDGMENT Hon’ble P.K.S. Baghel, J.—All the three petitioners are Constables in Civil Police and are posted at Police Lines, Meerut. They are aggrieved by the respective orders of the disciplinary authority dated 14th January, 2015, whereby they have been awarded punishment of censure entry, and the orders of the appellate authority dated 29th February, 2016 rejecting their appeals against the order of punishment. 2. The petitioners were posted at Police Lines, Meerut. They were placed under suspension vide an order dated 06th October, 2014 passed by the third respondent. In the suspension order the allegation made against the petitioners was that they have physically assaulted one Mahesh Chandra Yadav, the brother of a contractor Dinesh Chandra. The petitioners were subjected to disciplinary proceedings. The suspension order was revoked on 27th October, 2014. From the record it transpires that a preliminary enquiry was conducted in the matter and a Circle Officer was nominated as Enquiry Officer to conduct the same. In the preliminary enquiry the Enquiry Officer has recorded the statement of seven police personnel, including several constables posted in the police station as mounted police, and the complainant. The petitioners were given liberty to cross-examine the witnesses. In the enquiry report the petitioners were found guilty of misbehaviour with the brother of contractor and for the negligence and indiscipline as reported in the newspapers ‘Amar Ujala’ and ‘Dainik Jagran’ in their edition dated 06th October, 2014. 3. The said enquiry report dated 24th November, 2014 was submitted to the disciplinary authority, the Senior Superintendent of Police, who issued a show-cause notice on 04th January, 2015 to the petitioners. The disciplinary authority after considering the reply submitted by the petitioners to the show-cause notice has awarded minor punishment of censure entry to the petitioners in terms of Rule 5 of the Uttar Pradesh Police Officers of the Subordinate Ranks (Punishment and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (for short, the “Rules, 1991”) vide orders dated 14th January, 2015. Aggrieved by the orders of the disciplinary authority, the petitioners filed their respective appeals before the appellate authority, which also came to be dismissed vide orders dated 29th February, 2016. 4. Sri Alok Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the orders awarding censure entry are based on no evidence and suffer from perversity. Aggrieved by the orders of the disciplinary authority, the petitioners filed their respective appeals before the appellate authority, which also came to be dismissed vide orders dated 29th February, 2016. 4. Sri Alok Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioners, submits that the orders awarding censure entry are based on no evidence and suffer from perversity. He has taken the Court to the statement of Khajan Singh, who is a Sub-Inspector of Police and the main witness of the department. A perusal of his statement clearly indicates that he has not found any indiscipline on the part of the petitioners and he has also stated that the brother of the contractor, namely, Mahesh Chandra was inebriated and he did not find that the petitioners had taken alcohol. Learned counsel for the petitioners has also taken the Court to the evidence of other witnesses also. The Enquiry Officer has, after recording the statement of the witnesses and without considering them in proper perspective, has recorded a conclusion in few lines and held that the petitioners are guilty. The report of the Enquiry Officer clearly indicates that it is heavily relied on the newspaper reports of Amar Ujala and Dainik Jagaran dated 06th October, 2014. The Enquiry Officer has not considered the statement of Khajan Singh, S.I., and Kamlesh Kumar, Constable. The Enquiry Officer has also recorded the statement of Mahesh Chandra Sharma and Jaswant Singh, Constables. In the statement of both the witnesses there is no allegation against the petitioners and a simple reading of the statement of Khajan Singh and other witnesses clearly indicate that they have blamed Mahesh Chandra Yadav and not the petitioners. The Enquiry Officer has not appreciated the said statements and the findings recorded by the Enquiry Officer about the guilt of the petitioners are skeletal in nature. The orders of the disciplinary authority are without any reason. He has recorded only conclusion that the petitioners are guilty. The disciplinary authority has not considered even the reply of the petitioners to the show-cause. Thus, the conclusion of the disciplinary authority is not supported by any reason. 5. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in the show-cause notice itself the punishment has been mentioned about the censure entry. 6. Learned Standing Counsel tried to defend the impugned orders. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel and perused the record. 5. Lastly, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that in the show-cause notice itself the punishment has been mentioned about the censure entry. 6. Learned Standing Counsel tried to defend the impugned orders. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned Standing Counsel and perused the record. 8. Ordinarily, the Courts do not interfere in the matter of the disciplinary proceedings unless there is violation of the principles of natural justice or the relevant rules. However, if the order of the disciplinary authority and the report of the Enquiry Officer are completely bereft of reasons and perverse then the Courts can interfere. Reference may be made to the judgments of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463 , wherein the Supreme Court has set aside the order of the disciplinary authority on the ground of perversity. Paragraph-34 of the judgment is extracted below: “34. In such a situation, unless the Court/tribunal opines in its secondary role, that the administrator was, on the material before him, irrational according to Wednesbury (Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd. v. Wednesbury Corpn., (1948) 1 KB 223 : (1947) 2 All ER 680) or CCSU (Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for Civil Service, 1985 AC 374 : (1984) 3 All ER 935) norms, the punishment cannot be quashed. Even then, the matter has to be remitted back to the appropriate authority for reconsideration. It is only in very rare cases as pointed out in B.C. Chaturvedi case (B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 80 : (1996) 32 ATC 44) that the Court might — to shorten litigation — think of substituting its own view as to the quantum of punishment in the place of the punishment awarded by the competent authority. (In B.C. Chaturvedi and other cases referred to therein it has however been made clear that the power of this Court under Article 136 is different.) For the reasons given above, the case cited for the respondent, namely, State of Maharashtra v. M.H. Mazumdar, (1988) 2 SCC 52 : 1988 SCC (L&S) 436 : (1988) 6 ATC 876, cannot be of any help.” The Supreme Court in its earlier judgment in State of Andhra Pradesh and others v. S. Sree Rama Rao, AIR 1963 SC 1723 , has held that if a reasonable person do not reach to the conclusion which the disciplinary authority or the Enquiry Officer has reached, the order can be said to be perverse. In the present case, the Enquiry Officer has not considered the statement of the main witness Khajan Singh, who has clearly stated that the petitioners were not under the influence of alcohol and he found that the brother of the contrator Dinesh Chandra was inebriated and he indulged in physical assault with the petitioners. In view of the above, I am of the view that the orders of the disciplinary authority and the report of the Enquiry Officer are perverse. 9. In addition to above, the disciplinary authority has not recorded any reason in support of his conclusion that the petitioners are guilty. It is well-settled law that the disciplinary proceedings are quasi-criminal proceedings. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act are not applicable to it and the findings can be based on preponderance of probability, yet some evidence must be on record to establish the charges. In the present case, there is no such evidence against the petitioners. That apart, the order of the disciplinary authority is completely bereft of reasons. A Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in the case of S.N. Mukherjee v. Union of India, AIR 1990 SC 1984 , has held that the thin line of distinction between the administrative order, quasi judicial order and the judicial order is almost obliterated. Even the administrative officer is required to furnish at least minimum reason in support of his conclusion. In the present case, the disciplinary authority has recorded only his satisfaction which is without any reason. Even the administrative officer is required to furnish at least minimum reason in support of his conclusion. In the present case, the disciplinary authority has recorded only his satisfaction which is without any reason. In another Constitution Bench decision in Union of India v. Mohan Lal Capoor and others, (1973) 2 SCC 836 , the Supreme Court has held that if a conclusion is not supported by reasons, the order becomes arbitrary. Same view has been taken in Kranti Associates Private Limited v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, and Raj Kishore Jha v. State of Bihar, (2003) 11 SCC 519 , also, wherein the Supreme Court has held that the reasons are heartbeat of an order and in case there is no reason, the order becomes arbitrary and illegal. 10. In view of the above, I find that the orders of the disciplinary authority are liable to be set aside on this ground alone. 11. As regards the orders of the appellate authority, if the order of the disciplinary authority is without any reason, the appellate authority cannot supply the reasons. The order of the appellate authority has become more vulnerable. Reference may be made to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Union of India and others v. R. Reddappa and another, (1993) 4 SCC 269 . 12. For the reasons mentioned above, I find that the impugned orders dated 14th January, 2015 passed by the disciplinary authority and dated 29th February, 2016 of the appellate authority are liable to be set aside being perverse and arbitrary and accordingly, they are set aside. 13. No order as to costs.