ORDER : 1. As common legal question is found in relating to Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.1315 of 2017, Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 1326 of 2017, Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 1836 of 2017, Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 1577 of 2017 and Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 1686 of 2017 hence, taken up conjointly, and in likewise manner, are being disposed of. 2. These appeals have already been admitted. During intermediary event, a prayer for bail has been made on behalf of respective appellant by way of suspending sentence till pendency of these appeals as provided under Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C. Heard learned counsel for the respective appellant as well as learned counsel representing the Union of India (DRI) as well as learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 3. Learned counsel for the respective appellant has submitted that there happens to be no barrier in exercising power by the appellate court vested in terms of Section 389(1) of the Cr.P.C. to release the appellant on bail by way of suspending sentence till pendency of respective appeal. 4. The learned counsel representing the Union of India (DRI) as well as learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that in terms of Section 32A of the NDPS Act respective appellant would not be released on bail on account of prohibition prescribed thereunder by way of forbidding the appellate court to sterile the sentence during pendency of the appeal. 5. Section 32A of the NDPS Act reads as follows: “32A. No suspension, remission or commutation in any sentence awarded under this Act.-Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) or any other law for the time being in force but subject to the provisions of section 33, no sentence awarded under this Act (other than section 27) shall be suspended or remitted or commuted.” 6. First of all the aforesaid issue came up for consideration before the Hon’ble Apex Court in Maktool Singh v. State of Punjab reported in 1999 CRI.L.J 1825 wherein after discussing the relevant provisions as well as earlier judicial pronouncement of different High Courts, it has been concluded under para-24 as follows: “24. The upshot of the above discussion is that Section 32A of the Act has taken away the powers of the court to suspend a sentence passed on persons convicted of offences under the Act (except Section 27) either during pendency of any appeal or otherwise. The upshot of the above discussion is that Section 32A of the Act has taken away the powers of the court to suspend a sentence passed on persons convicted of offences under the Act (except Section 27) either during pendency of any appeal or otherwise. Similarly, the power of the Government under Section 432, 433 and 434 of the Criminal Procedure Code have also been taken away. Section 32A would have an overriding effect with regard to the powers of suspension, commutation and remission provided under the Criminal Procedure Code.” 7. The aforesaid judgment came up for consideration by the three Judges Bench in Dadu alias Tulsidas etc. v. State of Maharashtra reported in 2000 CRI.L.J. 4619 wherein the matter has been considered in detail and part of prohibition having prescribed under Section 32A of the Act relating to remission to be allowed by the executive was held to be intra-virus while prohibition, in exercise of appellate powers has been declared ultra-virus subject to rigor so prescribed under Section 37 of the Act. For better appreciation the relevant para is quoted below: “25. Judged from any angle, the section insofar as it completely debars the appellate courts from the power to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act cannot stand the test of constitutionality. Thus Section 32-A insofar as it ousts the jurisdiction of the court to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act is unconstitutional. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the Allahabad High Court in Ram Charan case (Supra) has correctly interpreted the law relating to the constitutional validity of the section and the judgment of the Gujarat High Court in Ishwar Sinh M. Rajput case cannot be held to be good law. 26. Despite holding that Section 32-A is unconstitutional to the extent it affects the functioning of the criminal courts in the country, we are not declaring the whole of the section as unconstitutional in view of our finding that the section, insofar as it takes away the right of the executive to suspend, remit and commute the sentence, is valid and intra vires of the Constitution. The declaration of Section 32-A to be unconstitutional, insofar as it affects the functioning of the courts in the country, would not render the whole of the section invalid, the restriction imposed by the offending section being distinct and severable. 27. The declaration of Section 32-A to be unconstitutional, insofar as it affects the functioning of the courts in the country, would not render the whole of the section invalid, the restriction imposed by the offending section being distinct and severable. 27. Holding Section 32-A as void insofar as it takes away the right of the courts to suspend the sentence awarded to a convict under the Act, would neither entitle such convicts to ask for suspension of the sentence as a matter of right in all cases nor would it absolve the courts of their legal obligations to exercise the power of suspension of sentence within the parameters prescribed under Section 37 of the Act. Section 37 of the Act provides: “37. Offences to be cognizable and non-bailable.— (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973— (a) every offence punishable under this Act shall be cognizable; (b) no person accused of an offence punishable for a term of imprisonment of five years or more under this Act shall be released on bail or on his own bond unless— (i) the Public Prosecutor has been given an opportunity to oppose the application for such release, and (ii) where the Public Prosecutor opposes the application, the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for believing that he is not guilty of such offence and that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail. (2) The limitations on granting of bail specified in clause (b) of sub-section (1) are in addition to the limitations under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 or any other law for the time being in force on granting of bail.” 28. This Court in Union of India v. Ram Samujh held that the jurisdiction of the court to grant bail is circumscribed by the aforesaid section of the Act. The bail can be granted and sentence suspended in a case where there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of the offence for which he is convicted and he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail and during period of suspension of the sentence. The Court further held: (SCC pp. 431-32, paras 6-8) “6. The Court further held: (SCC pp. 431-32, paras 6-8) “6. The aforesaid section is incorporated to achieve the object as mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons for introducing Bill No. 125 of 1988 thus: “Even though the major offences are non-bailable by virtue of the level of punishments, on technical grounds, drug offenders were being released on bail. In the light of certain difficulties faced in the enforcement of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985, the need to amend the law to further strengthen it, has been felt.? (emphasis supplied) 7. It is to be borne in mind that the aforesaid legislative mandate is required to be adhered to and followed. It should be borne in mind that in a murder case, the accused commits murder of one or two persons, while those persons who are dealing in narcotic drugs are instrumental in causing death or in inflicting death-blow to a number of innocent young victims, who are vulnerable; it causes deleterious effects and a deadly impact on the society; they are a hazard to the society; even if they are released temporarily, in all probability, they would continue their nefarious activities of trafficking and/or dealing in intoxicants clandestinely. Reason may be large stake and illegal profit involved. This Court, dealing with the contention with regard to punishment under the NDPS Act, has succinctly observed about the adverse effect of such activities in Durand Didier v. Chief Secy., Union Territory of Goa as under: (SCC p. 104, para 24) “24. With deep concern, we may point out that the organised activities of the underworld and the clandestine smuggling of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances into this country and illegal trafficking in such drugs and substances have led to drug addiction among a sizeable section of the public, particularly the adolescents and students of both sexes and the menace has assumed serious and alarming proportions in the recent years. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society as a whole, Parliament in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing this Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine.? 8. Therefore, in order to effectively control and eradicate this proliferating and booming devastating menace, causing deleterious effects and deadly impact on the society as a whole, Parliament in its wisdom, has made effective provisions by introducing this Act 81 of 1985 specifying mandatory minimum imprisonment and fine.? 8. To check the menace of dangerous drugs flooding the market, Parliament has provided that the person accused of offences under the NDPS Act should not be released on bail during trial unless the mandatory conditions provided in Section 37, namely, (i) there are reasonable grounds for believing that the accused is not guilty of such offence; and (ii) that he is not likely to commit any offence while on bail are satisfied.” 29. Under the circumstances the writ petitions are disposed of by holding that: (1) Section 32-A does not in any way affect the powers of the authorities to grant parole. (2) It is unconstitutional to the extent it takes away the right of the court to suspend the sentence of a convict under the Act. (3) Nevertheless, a sentence awarded under the Act can be suspended by the appellate court only and strictly subject to the conditions spelt out in Section 37 of the Act, as dealt with in this judgment.” 8. In Noor Aga v. State of Punjab & Anr. reported in (2008) 16 SCC 417 it has been held: “25. Section 39 provides for the power of the court to release certain offenders on probation. We may notice that the restrictions on the power of the court to suspend the sentence as envisaged in Section 39 (sic Section 32- A) of the Act have been held to be unconstitutional in Dadu v. State of Maharashtra, 2000(8) SCC 437 , subject, of course, to the restrictions for grant of bail as contained in Section 37 of the Act.” 9. In Ratan Kumar Vishwas v. State of U.P. & Anr. reported in 2009(1) PLJR 115 (SC) it has been held: “14. It is to be noted that in Dadu v. State of Maharashtra (2000) 8 SCC 437 it was held that Section 32-A was ultra vires to the extent it took away the powers relatable to Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (in short “the Code”). In Dadu case( 2000(8) SCC 437 it was held as follows: (SCC p. 456, para 29) “29. In Dadu case( 2000(8) SCC 437 it was held as follows: (SCC p. 456, para 29) “29. Under the circumstances the writ petitions are disposed of by holding that: (1) Section 32-A does not in any way affect the powers of the authorities to grant parole. (2) It is unconstitutional to the extent it takes away the right of the court to suspend the sentence of a convict under the Act. (3) Nevertheless, a sentence awarded under the Act can be suspended by the appellate court only and strictly subject to the conditions spelt out in Section 37 of the Act, as dealt with in this judgment.” 10. That being so, it has become crystal clear that appellate court has been held empower to exercise its power subject to limitation so prescribed under Section 37 of the Act. 11. Now coming to facts of individual appeals, it is evident that appellant of Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.1315 of 2017 as well as Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.1326 of 2017 were arrested while carrying 54 kg. of charas through truck bearing registration no.UP78BD 3149. It happens to be more than commercial quantity and on account thereof, their prayer for bail is rejected. 12. So far appellant of Criminal Appeal (SJ) No.1836 of 2017, namely, Vikash Kumar Sinha is concerned, he has been found in possession of 5 kg. of Ganja which happens to be more than small quantity but lesser than commercial quantity. In likewise manner appellant of Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 1577 of 2017, namely, Mahesh Sharma is concerned he has been found in possession of 1.400 gm. Ganja which also happens to be more than small quantity but lesser than commercial quantity and on account thereof, their prayer for bail are rejected at present with a condition that if appeal is not taken up for hearing within one and half year then, in that event, they will be at liberty to renew their prayer for bail. 13. Ganja which also happens to be more than small quantity but lesser than commercial quantity and on account thereof, their prayer for bail are rejected at present with a condition that if appeal is not taken up for hearing within one and half year then, in that event, they will be at liberty to renew their prayer for bail. 13. So far appellant of Criminal Appeal (SJ) No. 1686 of 2017 is concerned, he was found in possession of 20 gm of heroine, again more than small quantity but lesser than commercial quantity whereupon, prayer for bail at the present moment is rejected subject to condition that in case appeal is not taken up for hearing within one and half year then in that circumstance, appellant will be at liberty to renew his prayer for bail.