ORDER : Arun Bhansali, J. This writ petition was filed by the petitioners inter alia claiming following reliefs: "(i) the writ petition may kindly be allowed with costs. (ii) set aside the notification dated 23.3.89 (Annex.1) issued u/s (1) (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central act) and set aside the award dated 19.6.1989 given u/s 11 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Central Act) passed by the Special Officer, Urban Development and Housing Rajasthan Housing Board, Jaipur. (iii) or in alternative the respondent Housing Board may be directed to implement the award and allot 1 bigha of converted land and market price of remaining land. (iv) or in alternative, the respondent Housing Board be directed to implement the Government circular dated 27.10.2005 and allot 20% of residentially converted land and 5% of commercial land to the petitioners against their claim of compensation in lieu of their land measuring about 12 bighas acquired in pursuance of notification Annex.1." 2. It was inter alia indicated in the writ petition that Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 ('the Act, 1894') was published on 23/3/1989, the land in dispute was purchased by the petitioner vide sale deed dated 21/11/1984 and 24/2/1989 ad measuring 11 bigha 07 biswa comprised in khasra no. 106, 118 and 119 in village Kudi Bhagtasani, Jodhpur. The award was passed by the Land Acquisition Officer on 19/6/1989, though the lands stood transferred to the petitioners, the award was passed in the name of predecessor in interest i.e. Bansi Lal. Where after, a circular dated 27/10/2005 was issued providing that instead of 15% of residentially developed land offered earlier, 20% of residential land and 5% commercial land in lieu of the acquisition would be provided and on account of the dispute regarding the applicability of the circular dated 27/10/2005, the present petition was filed seeking the above quoted reliefs. 3. The respondent Housing Board disputed the averments made in the writ petition by filing their reply. 4. 3. The respondent Housing Board disputed the averments made in the writ petition by filing their reply. 4. During the pendency of the writ petition, an application seeking amendment in the writ petition was filed on account of coming into force of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the Act, 2013') and besides adding facts and grounds in the writ petition, following prayer no.(ii) was inserted: "(ii) the land acquisition proceedings initiated in pursuance to the notification dated 23.3.1989 and the award dated 19.6.1989 deserve to be declared lapsed qua the petitioners in view of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013." The said aspect was also replied to by the Rajasthan Housing Board. 5. Where after, an application I.A. No.1267/2017 was filed by the petitioners inter alia with the averments that the controversy involved in the petition with regard to provision of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 has already been decided by various judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court and, therefore, the proceedings be declared has having lapsed in the present case also. 6. Though, no reply to the said application was filed by the Rajasthan Housing Board, when the application came up for orders before the Court, learned counsel for the parties submitted that the writ petition itself may be finally heard as the issue is now confined to applicability of provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Based on the submissions, the petition itself was finally heard. 7. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the relevant dates are not in dispute wherein the Notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 was issued on 23/3/1989 and the award was passed on 19/6/1989. The possession of the land continues with the petitioners and the compensation remains unpaid and, therefore, the proceedings in terms of the provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 has lapsed. 8. Reliance was placed on the judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Associaton v. State of Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2015) 3 SCC 353 , Karnail Kaur & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2015 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 409 and Narayan Lal & ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 501/2007, decided on 23/2/2017. 9. v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2015 (2) WLC (SC) Civil 409 and Narayan Lal & ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 501/2007, decided on 23/2/2017. 9. Learned counsel for the respondent Housing Board vehemently opposed the submissions. It was submitted that the petitioners have no locus to file the present application/writ petition seeking to get a declaration about the proceedings having lapsed. It was submitted that the transfer deeds have been registered after the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act of 1894 was published and, therefore, the petitioners cannot take advantage of the said transfers in their favour which are by their very nature void. 10. It was further submitted that even if the petitioners anyhow manged not to surrender the possession of their land till date, though they by themselves moved application accepting 15% of the developed land, the proceedings would not lapse and, therefore, the prayer seeking lapsing of the acquisition proceedings under Section 24 (2) of the Act, 2013 deserves rejection. 11. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record. 12. So far as the question of locus standi of the petitioners is concerned, the conduct of the respondent Housing Board in dealing with the petitioners themselves in relation to the land in question is writ large on record and, therefore, in those circumstances, the plea of locus standi raised by the respondent Housing Board, apparently, has no substance. 13. 12. So far as the question of locus standi of the petitioners is concerned, the conduct of the respondent Housing Board in dealing with the petitioners themselves in relation to the land in question is writ large on record and, therefore, in those circumstances, the plea of locus standi raised by the respondent Housing Board, apparently, has no substance. 13. It would be relevant to quote final notice dated 1/9/2008 filed as Annex.11 to the writ petition which clarifies the above state: **jktLFkku vkoklu e.My] t;iqjA dzekad %& i01@4@Hkw0v0@dqM+h Hkxrkluh@tks/kiqj@543 fnukad%& 01-09-2008 vfUre uksfVl Jh 'kEHkwjke iq= txekyjke] Hkaojyky iq= f'kEHkwjke tkV] fuoklh& Hkxr dh dksBh] IykWV uacj 27] tks/kiqjA tfj;s uksfVl lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vkids [kkrs dh Hkwfe ftldk fo'ks"kkf/kdkjh] uxjh; fodkl ,oa vkoklue foHkkx dk okn la[;k 29@86@6 dh Hkwfe dks vkidh le>kSrs ls 15 izfr'kr fodflr Hkw&[k.M nsus gsrq Hkwfe le>kSrk lfefr dh cSBd fnukad 16-09-2005 ds fcUnq la[;k 16 ij fu.kZ; fy;k tkdj jkT; ljdkj dh Lohd`fr fnukad 06-12-2006 dks Lohd`fr iznku dj nh xbZ gSA vkidks i= dzekad i01@4@Hkw0v0@29@86@6@dqM+h Hkxrkluh@tks/kiqj@1512 fnukad 29-01-2008 dks tfj;s uksfVl vuqcU/k i= ,oa vU; nLrkost e.My esa izLrqr djus gsrq 7 fnol dk le; fn;k x;k FkkA fdUrq vki }kjk vuqcU/k i= izLrqr ugha dj izkFkZuk i= izLrqr dj 6 ekg dk le; pkgk x;k gSA pwafd vuqcU/k i= izLrqr djus gsrq vkidks iwoZ esa gh cgqr le; fn;k tk pqdk gSA izdj.k esa jkT; ljdkj }kjk Lohd`fr lu~ 2006 esa nh tk pqdh gSA vr% bl laca/k esa vkidks vafre uksfVl ds tfj;s lwfpr fd;k tkrk gS fd vki vuqcU/k i= ,oa tekcUnh ukekUrdj.k dh izekf.kr izfr i= izkfIr ds 15 fnol esa jktLFkku vkoklu e.My esa is'k dj nsaA uksfVl vof/k lekIr gksus ds i'pkr~ fodflr Hkwfe fn;s tkus ds laca/k esa vkidk dksbZ nkok ekU; ugha gksxkA Hkonh;] ,l0Mh0@& lfpo** 14. So far as the submission about registration of sale deed is concerned, the sale deed of part of the land which was executed on 24/2/1989 i.e. before the notification was registered after the notification under Section 4(1) was issued. It would be relevant to notice the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, which reads as under: "47. So far as the submission about registration of sale deed is concerned, the sale deed of part of the land which was executed on 24/2/1989 i.e. before the notification was registered after the notification under Section 4(1) was issued. It would be relevant to notice the provisions of Section 47 of the Registration Act, 1908, which reads as under: "47. Time from which registered document operates.- A registered document shall operate from the time from which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of its registration." 15. A bare look at the provision clearly reveals that the registered document operates from the date of execution and not from its registration. 16. Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. Ragini Narayan : (2016) 10 SCC 424 after quoting the provisions of Section 47 of the Act of 1908 observed as under: "In view of the above provision of law, we are in agreement with the submission of the learned counsel for Respondent 1 that the document registered on a subsequent date, operates from the date of execution, not from the date of registration." 17. In view of the above, there is no substance in the submission of counsel for the respondent that as the sale deed of part of the land though executed prior to notification under Section 4(1) of the Act, was registered subsequent thereof, the petitioners have no right to allege that the proceedings have lapsed. 18. Besides the above, the provisions of the Act of 2013 inter alia defines 'person interested' under Section 3(x) as all persons claiming an interest in compensation to be made on account of the acquisition of land under the Act. Similar definition has been given of 'person interested' under Section 3(b) of the Act of 1894. In view thereof, the plea raised regarding locus standi of the petitioners has no substance. 19. Provisions of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 read as under: "24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. - (1) ........... (a) .......... (b) .......... In view thereof, the plea raised regarding locus standi of the petitioners has no substance. 19. Provisions of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 read as under: "24. Land acquisition process under Act No.1 of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases. - (1) ........... (a) .......... (b) .......... (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section 91), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, where an award under the said Section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act: Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 20. In the present case, as already noticed, award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 was passed on 19/6/1989 and in view of the specific admissions made by the respondent regarding the petitioners continuing in possession of the land in question, though alleging that they have managed not to surrender their land, the provisions of the Act of 2013 are clearly attracted. 21. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misrimal Solanki & Ors. : (2014) 3 SCC 183 laid down as under: "10. Insofar as sub-section (1) of Section 24 is concerned, it begins with non obstante clause. By this, Parliament has given overriding effect to this provision over all other provisions of 2013 Act. It is provided in clause (a) that where the land acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award under Section 11 is made, then the provisions of 2013 Act shall apply relating to the determination of compensation. By this, Parliament has given overriding effect to this provision over all other provisions of 2013 Act. It is provided in clause (a) that where the land acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the 1894 Act but no award under Section 11 is made, then the provisions of 2013 Act shall apply relating to the determination of compensation. Clause (b) of Section 24(1) makes provision that where land acquisition proceedings have been initiated under the 1894 Act and award has been made under Section 11, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the 1894 Act as if that Act has not been repealed. 11. Section 24(2) also begins with non obstante clause. This provision has overriding effect over Section 24(1). Section 24(2) enacts that in relation to the land acquisition proceedings initiated under 1894 Act, where an award has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of the 2013 Act and either of the two contingencies is satisfied, viz; (i) physical possession of the land has not been taken or (ii) the compensation has not been paid, such acquisition proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed. On the lapse of such acquisition proceedings, if the appropriate government still chooses to acquire the land which was the subject matter of acquisition under the 1894 Act then it has to initiate the proceedings afresh under the 2013 Act. The proviso appended to Section 24(2) deals with a situation where in respect of the acquisition initiated under the 1894 Act an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries then all the beneficiaries specified in Section 4 notification become entitled to compensation under 2013 Act. 17. While enacting Section 24(2), Parliament definitely had in its view Section 31 of the 1894 Act. From that one thing is clear that it did not intend to equate the word "paid" to "offered" or "tendered". But at the same time, we do not think that by use of the word "paid", Parliament intended receipt of compensation by the landowners/persons interested. In our view, it is not appropriate to give a literal construction to the expression "paid" used in this sub-section (sub-section (2) of Section 24). But at the same time, we do not think that by use of the word "paid", Parliament intended receipt of compensation by the landowners/persons interested. In our view, it is not appropriate to give a literal construction to the expression "paid" used in this sub-section (sub-section (2) of Section 24). If a literal construction were to be given, then it would amount to ignoring procedure, mode and manner of deposit provided in Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act in the event of happening of any of the contingencies contemplated therein which may prevent the Collector from making actual payment of compensation. We are of the view, therefore, that for the purposes of Section 24(2), the compensation shall be regarded as "paid" if the compensation has been offered to the person interested and such compensation has been deposited in the court where reference under Section 18 can be made on happening of any of the contingencies contemplated under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act. In other words, the compensation may be said to have been "paid" within the meaning of Section 24(2) when the Collector (or for that matter Land Acquisition Officer) has discharged his obligation and deposited the amount of compensation in court and made that amount available to the interested person to be dealt with as provided in Sections 32 and 33." 22. The said judgment was followed in the case of Sree Balaji Residential Association (supra), wherein, the issue regarding stay of proceedings was considered and it was laid down that period spent before the courts would not be excluded for the purpose of determining the period of five years as indicated in Section 24(2) of the Act. 23. In view of the above, in term of provisions of Section 24(2) of the Act, 2013 the acquisition proceedings initiated by the respondents vide notification dated 23/3/1989 qua the lands in question in the present proceedings stand lapsed and the writ petition filed by the petitioners to the above extent is allowed. It goes without saying that in terms of Section 24 (2) of the Act of 2013 if the respondents so choose, they can initiate proceedings of land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of Act of 2013. No order as to costs.