ORDER : 1. This writ petition is directed against the judgment dated 20.7.1996 passed by the SDO, Ratangarh (Churu), judgment dated 23.9.1999 passed by the Revenue Appellate Authority, Bikaner (‘RAA’) and judgment dated 27.12.1999 passed by Board of Revenue, Ajmer (‘the Board’), whereby the suit filed by the petitioners has been rejected; cross suit filed by the respondents No.5 & 6 has been decreed; appeal and second appeal filed by the petitioners have been rejected respectively. 2. The petitioners filed suit No.10/1991 for ejectment of respondents No.5 & 6 from land comprised in khasra No.145min ad measuring 3 Bigha 5 Biswa. The respondents No.5 & 6 filed a cross suit No.11/1991 for declaration and permanent injunction. 3. After written statements were filed in both the suits and issues were framed, the suits were consolidated and parties led their evidence. 4. The S.D.O. by its judgment dated 20.7.1996, recorded findings on the issues raised in both the suits and the suit filed by the petitioners for ejectment and possession was dismissed. The suit filed by the respondents No.5 & 6 for declaration and injunction was decreed. A decree dated 20.7.1996 was framed by the S.D.O. indicating the numbers of both the suits and the result thereof. 5. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners filed appeal No.64/1998 before the RAA. 6. An objections were raised by the respondents No.5 & 6 that two suits filed by the petitioners and respondents respectively were decided on 20.7.1996, however, only one appeal has been filed and therefore, the said appeal was liable to be dismissed on this count alone. The RAA came to the conclusion that as only one appeal against one decree was filed and the other decree has not been challenged, which has become final and would operate as res judicata and therefore, the appeal was not maintainable and dismissed the same. 7. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners filed second appeal. 8. The Board by its impugned judgment dated 27.12.1999 dismissed the second appeal and concluded as under :- “The learned counsel for the appellant could not show any law on this subject that when the trial court had decided two suits, though by a single order then how his one appeal was maintainable before the appellate authority. 8. The Board by its impugned judgment dated 27.12.1999 dismissed the second appeal and concluded as under :- “The learned counsel for the appellant could not show any law on this subject that when the trial court had decided two suits, though by a single order then how his one appeal was maintainable before the appellate authority. The argument raised by him that the counsel in the lower court has informed him that they are now filing an appeal against the second suit No.11/91, Kesara Ram Vs. Jethu Singh’s judgment dated 20.7.96 before the Appellate Authority, that cannot cure the lacunae which has crept into this appeal. We are in agreement with the decision arrived at by the Settlement Officer-cum-Revenue Appellate Authority, Bikaner and do not find any substance in this second appeal. Consequently, the second appeal is rejected in limine.” 9. It is submitted by learned counsel for the petitioners that the RAA as well as the Board committed grave error in dismissing the appeals filed by the petitioners as barred by res judicata by concluding that as the petitioners had only challenged decree passed in suit filed by them, the decree passed in favour of the respondents No.5 & 6 remained unchallenged, became final and would therefore, operate as res judicata. 10. It is submitted that only one decree was framed by the SDO after the suits were consolidated and a common judgment dated 20.7.1996 was delivered and therefore, a single appeal was maintainable and as such, the RAA and the Board fell in error in dismissing the appeal/second appeal filed by the petitioners. 11. Further submissions were made based on judgment in Sukh Lal & Ors. v. Deep Chand & Ors. : ILR (1954) 4 Raj. 17 that as there is one common judgment passed in two suits, there is no previous trial or formal judgment and therefore, provisions of Section 11 CPC in terms cannot apply. 12. Further reliance was placed judgment in Jai Kishan v. Bajranglal : ILR (1961) 11 Raj. 1173 that it was not necessary for the petitioners to file two separate appeals. It was prayed that the judgment passed by the RAA and the Board be set-aside and the matter be remanded back to the RAA to hear and decide the appeal on merits. 13. 1173 that it was not necessary for the petitioners to file two separate appeals. It was prayed that the judgment passed by the RAA and the Board be set-aside and the matter be remanded back to the RAA to hear and decide the appeal on merits. 13. Vehemently opposing the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that though the suits were consolidated and were decided by a common judgment, essentially two decrees were passed by the SDO, whereby the suit filed by the petitioners was dismissed and the suit filed by the respondents was decreed and when the petitioners filed only one appeal, for lack of challenge to other decree, which was based on the same facts and decision, the same would operate as res judicata and therefore, the RAA and the Board were justified in dismissing the appeal filed by the petitioners. 14. It was submitted that the judgment in Sukh Lal (supra) stands impliedly overruled by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gangai Vinayagar Temple v. Meenakshi Ammal : (2015) 3 SCC 624 . Further reliance was placed on Ram Prakash v. Smt. Charan Kaur & Anr. : (1997) 9 SCC 543 ; Harbans Singh & Ors. V. Sant Hari Singh & Ors. : (2009) 2 SCC 526 . 15. I have considered the submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have have perused the material available on record. 16. A bare look at the judgment dated 20.7.1996 passed by the SDO reveals that while deciding the issue of relief, it was decided as under :- ^^vuqrks"k okn la[;k 10@91] 113@91] 24@95 esa oknhx.k 5 = 13 ch?kk fookfnr jdck dk dCtk izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh ugha gSA okn la[;k 11@91] 114@91 ds oknhx.k fookfnr jdcs dh [kkrsnkjh ?kks"k.kk djokus vkSj LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gSA** 17. The decree-sheet reveals that numbers of both the suits have been indicated separately and the decree as passed has been inscribed therein. The petitioners have placed on record the copy of memo of appeal filed by the RAA; in the said memo, it is only indicated that the appeal was against the judgment and decree dated 20.7.1996 and after raising grounds, a one line prayer has been made that appeal of the appellants be accepted and judgment & decree of the lower court be set-aside. 18. 18. From perusal of the above and the fact that two suits, first by the petitioners and then by the respondents being cross in nature i.e. while the petitioners seeking ejectment and possession, the respondents seeking declaration and injunction were filed and came to be decided after consolidation by deciding separate issues framed in each case by a common judgment, resulting in two separate decrees, one dismissing the suit filed by the petitioners and other decreeing the suit filed by the respondents. 19. The Division Bench of this Court in the case of Sukh Lal (supra) by coming to the conclusion that once two suits are decided after consolidation, there is no previous trial or former judgment and therefore, provisions of Section 11 CPC does not apply. 20. The Hon’ble Supreme court in Premier Tyres Limited v. Kerala State Road Transport Corporation : 1993 Supp(2) SCC 146 after specifically posing the question about the effect of non-filing of appeal in the connected suit tried together with common issues laid down as under :- 3. The validity of this finding has been assailed by Shri Raja Ram Aggarwal, the learned Sr. Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant. It is urged that Section 11 of the Civil Procedure Code does not apply as such. According to him since both the suits were connected and decided by a common order the issue in neither suit can be said to have been decided in a former suit. Therefore, the basic ingredient of Section 11 of the C.P.C. was not satisfied. The submission derives some support from observations in Narhari v. Shanker, that, 'even when there are two suits it has been held that decision given simultaneously cannot be a decision in the former suit'. But this decision was distinguished in Sheodan Singh v. Smt. Daryao Kunwar 1966 SC 1332, as it related to only one suit, therefore, the observations extracted above were not relevant in a case where more than one suit were decided by a common order. But this decision was distinguished in Sheodan Singh v. Smt. Daryao Kunwar 1966 SC 1332, as it related to only one suit, therefore, the observations extracted above were not relevant in a case where more than one suit were decided by a common order. The Court further held that where more than one suit were filed together and main issues were common and appeals were filed against the judgment and decree in all the suits and one appeal was dismissed either as barred by time or abated then the order operated as res judicata in other appeals, 'In the present case there were different suits from which different appeals had to be filed. The High Court's decision in the two appeals arising from suits Nos. 77 and 91 was undoubtedly earlier and therefore the condition that there should have been a decision in a former suit to give rise to res judicata in a subsequent suit was satisfied in the present case. The contention that there was no former suit in the present case must therefore fail'. In Shri Ramagya Prasad Gupta v. Sri Murli Prasad, an effort was made to get the decision in Sheodan Singh (supra) reconsidered. But the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the matter as the subject matter of two suits being different one of the necessary ingredients for applicability of Section 11 of the C.P.C. were found missing. 4. Although none of these decisions were concerned with a situation where no appeal was filed against the decision in connected suit but it appears that where an appeal arising out of connected suits is dismissed on merits the other cannot be heard, and has to be dismissed. The question is what happens where no appeal is filed, as in this case from the decree in connected suit. Effect of non filing of appeal against a judgment or decree is that it become final. This finality can be taken away only in accordance with law. Same consequences follows when a judgment or decree in a connected suit is not appealed from. 5. Mention may be made of a Constitution bench decision in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh. In an election petition filed by the respondent a declaration was sought to declare the election of appellant as invalid and to declare the respondent as the elected candidate. The tribunal granted first relief only. 5. Mention may be made of a Constitution bench decision in Badri Narayan Singh v. Kamdeo Prasad Singh. In an election petition filed by the respondent a declaration was sought to declare the election of appellant as invalid and to declare the respondent as the elected candidate. The tribunal granted first relief only. Both appellant and respondent filed appeals in the High Court. The appellant's appeal was dismissed but that of respondent was allowed. The appellant challenged the order passed in favour of respondent in his appeal. It was dismissed and preliminary objection of the respondent was upheld. The Court observed, 'We are therefore of opinion that so long as the order in the appellant's appeal No. 7 confirming the order setting aside his election on the ground that he was a holder of an office of profit under the Bihar Government and therefore could not have been a properly nominated candidate stands, he cannot question the finding about his holding an office of profit, in the present appeal, which is founded on the contention that that finding is incorrect. 6. Thus the finality of finding recorded in the connected suit, due to non filing appeal, precluded the Court from proceeding with appeal in other suit. In any view of the matter the order of the High Court is not liable to interference.” 21. From the above decision, it would be seen that the ratio of the judgment in the case of Sukh Lal (supra) regarding there being no former suit and non-applicability of provisions of Section 11 CPC was specifically dealt with and not accepted and it was laid down that finality of finding recorded in the connected suit due to non-filing of appeal precluded the Court from proceeding with appeal in other suit. 22. In the case of Ram Prakash (supra), it was laid down that where two connected suits have been tried together and findings recorded in one of the suit have become final in absence of appeal, the appeal preferred against the findings recorded in other suit would definitely be barred by the principles of res judicata. 23. In the case of Harbans Singh (supra), again the Hon’ble Supreme Court relying on judgment in the case of Premier Tyres Limited (supra) laid down as under :- “13. Both the suits, as noticed hereinbefore, were consolidated. They were heard together. 23. In the case of Harbans Singh (supra), again the Hon’ble Supreme Court relying on judgment in the case of Premier Tyres Limited (supra) laid down as under :- “13. Both the suits, as noticed hereinbefore, were consolidated. They were heard together. The disputes between the parties to both the suits were common. The issues raised therein also were common. The Managing Committee filed a suit for declaration that it was in management and control of the said Gurudwara Sahib and was entitled thereto as also a declaration that the respondent was not a Mohtmim of the said Gurudwara and, thus, not entitled to manage its affairs. As the said decree had attained finality, it is binding on the appellants also. Appellants, therefore, in law, were required to prefer another Second Appeal against the judgment and decree passed in the said suit. The principle of res judicata in the aforementioned fact situation, in our opinion, has rightly been applied by the High Court.” 24. Finally, in the recent judgment in the case of Gangai Vinayagar Temple (supra), again referring to the judgment in the case of Premier Tyres (supra) and various other judgments on the issue, it was laid down as under:- “20. On the issue of applicability of res judicata in cases where two or more suits have been disposed of by one common judgment but separate decrees, and where the decree in one suit has been appealed against but not against the others, various High Courts have given divergent and conflicting opinions and decisions. The High Court of Madras and erstwhile High Courts of Lahore, Nagpur and Oudh have held that there could be no res judicata in such cases whereas the High Courts of Allahabad, Calcutta, Patna, Orissa and erstwhile High Court of Rangoon have taken contrary views. It should also be noted that there are instances of conflicting judgments within the same High Court as well. The decision of Tek Chand, J. in Full Bench Judgment of the Lahore High Court in Lachhmi vs. Bhulli [AIR (1927) Lah 289] and Full Bench Judgment of the Madras High Court in Panchanda Velan vs. Vaithinatha Sastrial [ILR (1906) 29 Mad 333] and of the Oudh High Court in B. Shanker Sahai v. B. Bhagwat Sahai [AIR 1946 Oudh 33 (FB)] appear to be the leading decisions against the applicability of res judicata. Without adverting to the details of those cases, it is sufficient to note that the hesitancy or reluctance to the applicability of the rigorous of res judicata flowed from the notion that Section 11 of the Code refers only to “suits” and as such does not include “appeals” within its ambit; that since the decisions arrived in the connected suits were articulated simultaneously, there could be no “former suit” as stipulated by the said section; that substance, issues and finding being common or substantially similar in the connected suits tried together, non-filing of an appeal against one or more of those suits ought not to preclude the consideration of other appeals on merits; and that the principle of res judicata would be applicable to the judgment, which is common, and not to the decrees drawn on the basis of that common judgment. 21. On the other hand, the verdict of Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Zaharia vs. Debia ILR (1911) 33 All 51 and decisions of the Calcutta High Court in Isup Ali vs. Gour Chandra Deb 37 Cal LJ 184: AIR 1923 Cal 496 and of the Patna High Court in Mrs. Getrude Oastes vs. Mrs Millicent D’Silva ILR 12 Pat 139 : AIR 1933 Pat 78 are of the contrary persuasion. Getrude Oastes vs. Mrs Millicent D’Silva ILR 12 Pat 139 : AIR 1933 Pat 78 are of the contrary persuasion. These decisions largely proceeded on the predication that the phraseology “suit” is not limited to the Court of First Instance or Trial Court but encompasses within its domain proceedings before the Appellate Courts; that non-applicability of res judicata may lead to inconsistent decrees and conflicting decrees, not only due to multiplicity of decrees but also due to multiplicity of the parties, and thereby creating confusion as to which decree has to be given effect to in execution; that a decree is valid unless it is a nullity and the same cannot be overruled or interfered with in appellate proceedings initiated against another decree; that the issue of res judicata has to be decided with reference to the decrees, which are appealable under Section 96 of the CPC and not with reference to the judgment (which has been defined differently), but with respect to decrees in the CPC; that non-confirmation of a decree in appellate proceedings has no consequence as far as it reaching finality upon elapsing of the limitation period is concerned in view of the Explanation II of Section 11, that provides that the competence of a Court shall be determined irrespective of any provisions as to right of appeal from the decision of such Court; and that Section 11 of the CPC is not exhaustive of the doctrine of res judicata, which springs up from the general principles of law and public policy. 22. Procedural norms, technicalities and processal law evolve after years of empirical experience, and to ignore them or give them short shrift inevitably defeats justice. Where a common judgment has been delivered in cases in which consolidation orders have specifically been passed, we think it irresistible that the filing of a single appeal leads to the entire dispute becoming sub judice once again. Consolidation orders are passed by virtue of the bestowal of inherent powers on the Courts by Section 151 of the CPC, as clarified by this Court in Chitivalasa Jute Mills vs. Jaypee Rewa Cement (2004) 3 SCC 85 . In the instance of suits in which common Issues have been framed and a common Trial has been conducted, the losing party must file appeals in respect of all adverse decrees founded even on partially adverse or contrary speaking judgments. In the instance of suits in which common Issues have been framed and a common Trial has been conducted, the losing party must file appeals in respect of all adverse decrees founded even on partially adverse or contrary speaking judgments. While so opining we do not intend to whittle down the principle that appeals are not expected to be filed against every inconvenient or disagreeable or unpropitious or unfavourable finding or observation contained in a judgment, but that this can be done by way of cross-objections if the occasion arises. The decree not assailed thereupon metamorphoses into the character of a “former suit”. If this is not to be so viewed, it would be possible to set at naught a decree passed in Suit A by only challenging the decree in Suit B. Law considers it an anathema to allow a party to achieve a result indirectly when it has deliberately or negligently failed to directly initiate proceedings towards this purpose. Laws of procedure have picturesquely been referred to as handmaidens to justice, but this does not mean that they can be wantonly ignored because, if so done, a miscarriage of justice inevitably and inexorably ensues. Statutory law and processal law are two sides of the judicial drachma, each being the obverse of the other. In the case in hand, had the Tenant diligently filed an appeal against the decree at least in respect of O.S. 5/78, the legal conundrum that has manifested itself and exhausted so much judicial time, would not have arisen at all.” 25. In view of the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Premier Tyres (supra) and in the case of Gangai Vinayagar Temple (supra), it is apparent that in suits in which common issues have been framed and common trial has been conducted, the losing party must file appeals in respect of all adverse decrees founded even on partially adverse or contrary speaking judgments and the decree not assailed thereupon metamorphoses into the character of a “former suit” and consequently, operates as res judicata. 26. 26. In view of above categoric law repeatedly laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, the failure on part of the petitioners to file two separate appeals against the judgment dated 20.7.1996, whereby two cross suits, one file by the petitioners and other filed by the respondents No.5 & 6 were decided, the finding in other suit would operate as res judicata and consequently, the single appeal filed by the petitioners was not maintainable. 27. A feeble prayer in the end was made by learned counsel for the petitioners that the petitioners may be permitted now to file another appeal. The prayer made is too late in the day as it was open for the petitioners to file the appeal as soon as the objection regarding maintainability was raised before the RAA, which the petitioners chose to ignore and therefore, the prayer in this regard cannot now be countenanced. 28. In view of above discussion, there is no substance in the writ petition, the same is, therefore, dismissed.