JUDGMENT : Navaniti Prasad Singh, J. 1. This intra court appeal is directed against the judgment dated 22.05.2017 passed by a learned single Judge of this Court in W.P.(C) No.21661 of 2016 whereby, the writ petition filed by the appellant was dismissed. 2. We have heard learned Senior Counsel Sri. P. Ravindran for the appellant and learned Senior Counsel Sri. N. N. Sugunapalan, assisted by Sri. C. S. Dias, learned counsel, for the respondent and with their consent, we are disposing of this appeal at this stage itself. 3. The writ petitioner/appellant is a practicing Advocate, who has about 33 years of standing at the Bar. On 29.08.2014, he gave his consent to be designated as a Senior Advocate. This Court considered the matter of designation of the appellant along with nine other proposals in a Full Court meeting held on 19.08.2015 where thirty two Honourable Judges were present. Upon consideration, the Full Court resolved to designate three advocates other than the appellant as Senior Advocates and consequently, in response to queries made by the appellant, this Court through the Registrar General on 30.09.2015 by Exhibit P3 informed the appellant that he had failed to secure two-third votes of the Honourable Judges present in the said meeting as required under Rule 6 of the Rules framed by this Court under Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 and hence, could not be designated as Senior Advocate by the High Court of Kerala. 4. It may be noted that the appellant had submitted an application to the Court to review the decision, which was considered by the Full Court in its meeting on 21.11.2015 and the Full Court unanimously rejected his request for reconsideration. Thereafter, it appears by his letter dated 14.12.2015 that he requested the Chief Justice to preserve the records in relation to declaration of Senior Advocates in which, he was in consideration, for a period of three months, to enable him to approach the Apex Court. No further requests were received to extend the said period and accordingly, the High Court having taken a decision on the administrative side, destroyed the ballot papers on 09.06.2016 while maintaining the records of the proceedings. The present writ petition was filed only thereafter before this Court on 27.06.2016. No further requests were received to extend the said period and accordingly, the High Court having taken a decision on the administrative side, destroyed the ballot papers on 09.06.2016 while maintaining the records of the proceedings. The present writ petition was filed only thereafter before this Court on 27.06.2016. Let it be recorded that in the meantime, the appellant had initially moved the Apex Court by filing W.P.(C) No.135 of 2016 - M.K.S. Menon and Others v. Kerala High Court, Rep. by Registrar General and others, which was heard and dismissed as withdrawn with liberty to move the High Court for appropriate relief by order dated 08.03.2016, apparently even without notice to the respondents therein, including this Court. As noted above, the present writ petition was filed thereafter only on 27.06.2016. 5. The contentions raised on behalf of the appellant were two-fold. Firstly, it was urged that the Rules framed by this Court being "Rules Regarding Designation as Senior Advocates, 2000" were ultra vires the powers of the High Court in as much as the Advocates Act, 1961 did not authorise the High Court for framing such Rules. The learned single Judge has elaborately dealt with this issue and we see no reason to defer. We may further add that this plea was a self defeating plea in as much as, if the Rules were held to be ultra vires and, therefore, not there, then the matter of designation of Senior Advocates would only be covered by Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act, wherein the only requirement was for an opinion of the High Court that he is deserving of such distinction. This would be the decision of the High Court in the Full Court and admittedly, the Full Court did not consider him deserving enough to be designated as Senior Advocate. His case would be an open and shut case at the very beginning itself. It is faced with this situation, it was secondly and alternatively argued and his case was based upon true interpretation of Rule 6 of the Kerala High Court Rules as framed in the year 2000. On his behalf, the contention would literally be that the Rule should be read as two-third of the Judges "present and voting" instead of "present" as contained in the Rules. On his behalf, the contention would literally be that the Rule should be read as two-third of the Judges "present and voting" instead of "present" as contained in the Rules. The learned single Judge has dealt with this issue rather elaborately and again we see no reason to take a different view of the matter, but we would still deal with the issue as it has been argued afresh at length. 6. Firstly, we would notice short facts relevant for this issue. Out of about 37 Honourable Judges of this Court at that time, 32 were present at the Full Court meeting on 19.08.2015. Only 19 Judges expressed opinion supporting the request for senior designation of the appellant, which undisputedly was far less than two-third, which number would be 21. It is neither pleaded nor available in contemporaneous records, as to what was the view of remaining 13 Honourable Judges present at the meeting of the Full Court, except that, they did not express affirmative opinion in support of the appellant's designation as Senior Advocate, as by the time the writ petition was filed, the ballot papers had been destroyed. To us, in the absence of facts available to grant the relief of recounting and consequently, reconsider the decision of declaring designation, the writ petition itself became only of academic interest. No writ could have been issued. Yet, for the purpose of interpretation of Rule 6 of the High Court Rules, 2000, the learned single Judge in the writ petition and this Bench in the intra court appeal would consider the argument. 7. In order to appreciate the legal position, it would be appropriate to refer to the statutory provisions as far as they are relevant. Section 16 (1) and (2) of the Advocates Act, 1961 reads as under: "16. Senior and other advocates.-(1) There shall be two classes of advocates, namely, senior advocates and other advocates. (2) An advocate may, with his consent, be designated as senior advocate if the Supreme Court or a High Court is of opinion that by virtue of his ability standing at the Bar or special knowledge or experience in law he is deserving of such distinction." Rule 6 of the Rules of Kerala High Court Regarding Designation as Senior Advocates, 2000 reads as under: "6. The proposal for designation, shall be considered at a meeting of the Honourable the chief Justice and the other Judges of the High Court. Such proposal shall be considered as accepted only if not less than two-thirds of the total number of Judges present at such meeting decide in favour of accepting the application, by secret ballot." 8. The first question that would arise is whether an Advocate can consider it to be his right to be declared as a Senior Advocate or can he claim as a matter of right to be declared as a Senior Advocate? The answer would clearly be in the negative, if we closely read the provisions of Section 16(2) of the Advocates Act. This Section clearly emphasis, firstly, that it is a distinction conferred and not something that comes about automatically upon achieving known or predetermined standards. It is a privilege based upon the opinion of the Court considering ability, standing at the Bar or special knowledge or experience in law. Thus, it is a subjective decision though based on objective considerations. It is in view of this, we consider it appropriate to hold that such a claim cannot be made as a matter of right. 9. Then the question arises as to how this opinion for such a distinguished position of distinction has to be arrived at? For this purpose, with the aid of Section 34(1) of the Advocates Act, different High Courts have framed different Rules. As has been noticed by the learned single Judge, with reference to different Rules framed by different High Courts for this purpose, the High Courts have adopted different standards and there is no consistent practice. Therefore, we must deal with the Rules framed by this High Court as such. 10. Various options were available. But, this High Court framed the Rules differently from the others. The difference will be apparent if we read Rule 6 quoted above carefully. Firstly, it talks of the proposal "shall be" considered "as accepted". This clearly denotes a positive affirmative decision, if we keep in mind the later expression "decide in favour of accepting the application". Therefore, what is of essence is the affirmative votes, not the nature of other votes and then the stipulation of not less than two-third of the total number of Judges present at such meeting. This clearly denotes a positive affirmative decision, if we keep in mind the later expression "decide in favour of accepting the application". Therefore, what is of essence is the affirmative votes, not the nature of other votes and then the stipulation of not less than two-third of the total number of Judges present at such meeting. While framing the Rules, the Court made a conscious departure and even though there were practices of using the expression "present and voting", it was departed from and the expression used was only "present". If these two are taken into consideration, then the only conclusion would be that what is material for designation to be carried through is an affirmative vote of not less than two-third Judges present at the meeting. The rest is irrelevant. 11. Here, it is undisputed that it is only 19 out of 32 Honourable Judges who expressed their views in affirmative. This number was admittedly, far less than two-third of the Honourable Judges present. 12. As noted above, we do not know what the remaining 13 Judges did nor can it be now asserted. But, one thing is sure that the remaining 13 did not express affirmative views in support of the designation. That being the situation, we are of the view that the decision of the Full Court cannot be faulted, especially when, the Full Court unanimously thereafter on 21.11.2015 refused to reconsider its earlier decision dated 19.08.2015. In the above view of the matter, we are unable to interfere. This appeal is accordingly dismissed.