ORDER : D.N. Patel, J. 1. This Letters Patent Appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order delivered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 905 of 2014 dated 7th October, 2015, whereby, the petition preferred by respondent no.1 (original petitioner) for getting compassionate appointment was allowed and, hence, original respondent no.2 has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 2. FACTUAL MATRIX: The father of respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was working with the appellant and during course of his employment, he expired on 9th December, 2004. The widow of the deceased employee viz. Kumari Bai applied for compassionate appointment on 4th May, 2005. Upon medical examination, her age was found to be 37- ½ years as on 7th December, 2006. She was offered monetary compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment vide letter dated 13th April, 2007. This monetary compensation was not accepted by the widow of the deceased employee. The widow of the deceased employee expired on 1st November, 2007. Now, respondent No.1 (original petitioner), who is claiming himself to be a son of the deceased employee, had applied for compassionate appointment on 3rd July, 2010, whose application was rejected on 24th August, 2010. By challenging the aforesaid rejection of the application by the appellant, W.P.(C) No. 905 of 2014 was preferred for getting Gratuity with interest, Life Cover Scheme, Benevolent Fund with interest, Provident Fund and arrears of Family Pension with interest and compassionate appointment, which was decided by the learned Single Judge vide judgment and order dated 7th October, 2015. Being aggrieved and feeling dissatisfied by the aforesaid judgment and order, original respondent no.2 has preferred the present Letters Patent Appeal. 3. Arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for the appellant (original respondent no.2): Learned counsel appearing for the appellant submitted that respondent no.1 (original petitioner) is claiming himself to be a son of the deceased employee, but, his name is not mentioned in the service book at all nor it is mentioned in the M.T.C. Form-A, Forms-PS-3 and P.S.4 and, hence, he cannot claim compassionate appointment. After the death of Shiv Dayal Gorh, who expired on 9th December, 2004, his widow viz. Kumari Bai had applied for compassionate appointment on 4th May, 2005. She was already offered monetary compensation on 13th April, 2007. Monetary compensation is always offered in lieu of compassionate appointment. She expired on 1st November, 2007. After the death of Shiv Dayal Gorh, who expired on 9th December, 2004, his widow viz. Kumari Bai had applied for compassionate appointment on 4th May, 2005. She was already offered monetary compensation on 13th April, 2007. Monetary compensation is always offered in lieu of compassionate appointment. She expired on 1st November, 2007. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that once the widow of the deceased employee was offered monetary compensation and if she dies, further chain of compassionate appointment cannot be extended to other legal heirs. The legal obligation of this appellant comes to an end, no sooner did, one of the legal heirs of the deceased employee is offered either monetary compensation or compassionate appointment. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that assuming without admitting that respondent no.1 (original petitioner) is claiming his right of compassionate appointment, independent of the death of Kumari Bai, then also after six long years, no compassionate appointment can be given to respondent no.1 (original petitioner). It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that assuming without admitting that respondent no.1 is so called son of the deceased employee, then also as per declaration of Kumari Bai on affidavit dated 16th March, 2005 respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was of 10 years of age during the year 2005. These facts have been stated in paragraph 28 of the counter affidavit filed by the appellant in W.P.(C) No. 905 of 2014. In view of the aforesaid affidavit filed by Kumari Bai, who is widow of the deceased employee, even if respondent no.1 (original petitioner) is presumed to be son of the deceased employee, then also his age was approximately 9 years or less than 10 years as on date of death of Shiv Dayal Gorh and as per National Coal Wage Agreement, his name cannot be kept in live roster as mentioned in paragraph 30 of the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that as stated in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the counter affidavit, the name of respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was never mentioned in the service book nor in other documents pertaining to service record of the deceased employee. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that as stated in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the counter affidavit, the name of respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was never mentioned in the service book nor in other documents pertaining to service record of the deceased employee. Learned counsel for the appellant has relied upon several decisions rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court as well as by this Court and has submitted that very purpose of compassionate appointment has already come to an end because employee viz. Shiv Dayal Gorh has expired on 9th December, 2004 and more than one dozen years' period have been lapsed. Compassionate appointment is not a matter of right at all. Compassionate appointment is an exception to Article 14 to be read with Article 16 of the Constitution of India. Even respondent no.1 has survived for all these years after the year 2004, no compassionate appointment can be given to him. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, the judgment and order passed in W.P.(C) No. 905 of 2014 dated 7th October, 2015 deserves to be quashed and set aside. 4. Arguments canvassed by the learned counsel for respondent no.1 (original petitioner): Learned counsel for respondent no.1 (original petitioner) submitted that as per Clause 9.5.0. of National Coal Wage Agreement, the name of respondent no.1 (original petitioner) ought to have been kept in live roster. This aspect of the matter has been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for respondent no.1 (original petitioner) that as on date of death of father of respondent no.1 i.e. on 9th December, 2004, the original petitioner was more than 12 years of age and, therefore, as and when the original petitioner attained the age of majority, he ought to have been given compassionate appointment. This aspect of the matter has also been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 (original petitioner) further submitted that service book and other forms were filled up by the deceased employee prior to birth of this respondent no.1, except PS-3 and PS-4. This aspect of the matter has also been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 (original petitioner) further submitted that service book and other forms were filled up by the deceased employee prior to birth of this respondent no.1, except PS-3 and PS-4. This aspect of the matter has also been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 (original petitioner) has relied upon the decision rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in (2007) 8 SCC 549 : 2007 (4) JCR 146 (SC). On the basis of the aforesaid decision, it is submitted by the learned counsel for respondent no.1 that the name of respondent no.1 ought to have been kept in live roster. As and when respondent no.1 attained the age of majority, he should be given compassionate appointment. All these aspects of the matter have been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, this Letters Patent Appeal may not be entertained by this Court. It is further submitted by learned counsel for respondent no.1 (original petitioner) that till today respondent no.1 has not got Gratuity or retirement dues nor family pension. Learned counsel for respondent no.1 (original petitioner) has also relied upon Annexure12 of the rejoinder affidavit filed in the writ petition. On the basis of the aforesaid document, it is submitted by the learned counsel for respondent no.1 that the age of respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was 12 years as on date of death of his father and, hence, his name ought to have been kept in live roster as per Clause 9.5.0. of National Coal Wage Agreement. REASONS: 5. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, we hereby quash and set aside the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 905 of 2014 dated 7th October, 2015 mainly for the following facts and reasons: (i) The employee of this appellant viz. Shiv Dayal Gorh expired on 9th December, 2004 and his widow viz. Kumari Bai applied for compassionate appointment on 4th May, 2005. (ii) Looking to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the counter affidavit filed by the appellant in the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 905 of 2014, it appears that looking to her age, she was not given compassionate appointment. Monetary compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment was offered on 13th April, 2007. (ii) Looking to paragraphs 11 and 12 of the counter affidavit filed by the appellant in the writ petition being W.P.(C) No. 905 of 2014, it appears that looking to her age, she was not given compassionate appointment. Monetary compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment was offered on 13th April, 2007. A copy of the said letter was annexed at Annexure-C to the counter affidavit filed in the writ petition. (iv) It further appears from the facts of the case that the widow of the deceased employee expired on 1st November, 2007. (v) Respondent no.1 (original petitioner) had preferred an application for compassionate appointment on 3rd July, 2010. (vi) It also appears that as per this appellant, the name of respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was never mentioned in service book as son of the deceased employee, as stated in paragraphs 26 and 27 of the counter affidavit. Never such information was given by the deceased employee nor even in the nomination forms for the retirement dues, which are statutory forms, PS-3 and PS-4. The name of respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was never mentioned by the deceased employee as his son and, hence, the very basis of compassionate appointment has been disputed viz. that the original petitioner is the son of deceased employee and, hence, application for compassionate appointment was rejected. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition preferred by respondent no.1. (iii) It further appears from the facts of the case that she had not accepted the monetary compensation and she was expecting compassionate appointment. (vii) Much has been argued out by the learned counsel for respondent no.1 (original petitioner) that as per Clause 9.5.0. of National Coal Wage Agreement, the name of respondent no.1 ought to have been kept in live roster so that as and when respondent no.1 attains the age of majority, he can be offered compassionate appointment. This contention is not accepted by this Court mainly for the reasons that: (a) Looking to the service book as well as nomination forms, PS-3 and PS-4, nowhere the name of respondent no.1 was mentioned by the deceased employee as his son. The deceased employee should have given the name of his son which could have been entered in the service book or in the nomination forms. The deceased employee should have given the name of his son which could have been entered in the service book or in the nomination forms. (b) When the claim of the mother was scrutinized for compassionate appointment, at that time also, nothing was agitated about so called son-original petitioner, so that his name may be kept in live roster. (c) The legal obligation of this appellant comes to an end, no sooner did, one of the legal heirs of the deceased employee is offered, either compassionate appointment or monetary compensation. In the facts of the present case, monetary compensation was already offered, to the widow of the deceased employee viz. Kumari Bai on 13th April, 2007. Monetary compensation is always in lieu of compassionate appointment. (d) Monetary compensation as well as compassionate appointment, both cannot be offered-much less monetary compensation to one legal heir and compassionate appointment to another legal heir. Monetary compensation was not accepted by the widow of the deceased employee as she was insisting for getting compassionate appointment. The widow of the deceased employee had never challenged the offer of monetary compensation vide letter dated 13th April, 2007 nor the so called son of the deceased employee, who is original petitioner, has challenged the offer of the monetary compensation vide letter dated 13th April, 2007 in the writ petition. (e) Thus, the legal obligation of this appellant comes to an end, no sooner did the widow of the deceased employee was offered monetary compensation. (f) Looking to the affidavit filed by the widow of the deceased employee as mentioned in paragraph 28 of the counter affidavit filed by this appellant in the writ petition, it appears that the original petitioner was aged about 10 years during the year 2005 and, hence, in the year 2004, the year in which, the employee had expired, the age of the original petitioner was less than 10 years and, hence, as stated in paragraph 30 of the counter affidavit filed by this appellant (original respondent no.2), his name cannot be kept in live roster because to keep the name in live roster the age must be 12+ and less than the age of majority. (g) Learned counsel appearing for respondent no.1 (original petitioner) has relied upon Annexure-12 to the rejoinder affidavit filed in the writ petition to prove his age of more than 12 years as on date of death of his father. This contention is not accepted by this Court because in service book, the name of respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was not there nor in the nomination papers-PS-3 and PS-4, the name of respondent no.1 (original petitioner) was mentioned by the deceased employee at the relevant time looking to the affidavit filed by the widow of the deceased employee as mentioned in paragraph 28 of the counter affidavit. Even otherwise also, this will be highly disputed question of fact whether respondent no.1 (original petitioner) is son of the deceased employee or not as well as whether he was less than 10 years of age as on date of death of his father. (viii) It further appears from the facts of the case that there is no legal right vested in the legal heirs of the deceased employee to get compassionate appointment. Compassionate appointment is an exception to Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India. The very purpose of compassionate appointment has been frustrated by now because more than one dozen years have been lapsed from the date of death of the employee i.e. from 9th December, 2004. (ix) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana and others, reported in (1994) 4 SCC 138 in paragraphs 2 to 6, which read as under: “2. The question relates to the considerations which should guide while giving appointment in public services on compassionate ground. It appears that there has been a good deal of obfuscation on the issue. As a rule, appointments in the public services should be made strictly on the basis of open invitation of applications and merit. No other mode of appointment nor any other consideration is permissible. Neither the Governments nor the public authorities are at liberty to follow any other procedure or relax the qualifications laid down by the rules for the post. However, to this general rule which is to be followed strictly in every case, there are some exceptions carved out in the interests of justice and to meet certain contingencies. Neither the Governments nor the public authorities are at liberty to follow any other procedure or relax the qualifications laid down by the rules for the post. However, to this general rule which is to be followed strictly in every case, there are some exceptions carved out in the interests of justice and to meet certain contingencies. One such exception is in favour of the dependants of an employee dying in harness and leaving his family in penury and without any means of livelihood. In such cases, out of pure humanitarian consideration taking into consideration the fact that unless some source of livelihood is provided, the family would not be able to make both ends meet, a provision is made in the rules to provide gainful employment to one of the dependants of the deceased who may be eligible for such employment. The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for post held by the deceased. What is further, mere death of an employee in harness does not entitle his family to such source of livelihood. The Government or the public authority concerned has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased, and it is only if it is satisfied, that but for the provision of employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. The posts in Classes III and IV are the lowest posts in non-manual and manual categories and hence they alone can be offered on compassionate grounds, the object being to relieve the family, of the financial destitution and to help it get over the emergency. The provision of employment in such lowest posts by making an exception to the rule is justifiable and valid since it is not discriminatory. The favourable treatment given to such dependant of the deceased employee in such posts has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., relief against destitution. No other posts are expected or required to be given by the public authorities for the purpose. The favourable treatment given to such dependant of the deceased employee in such posts has a rational nexus with the object sought to be achieved, viz., relief against destitution. No other posts are expected or required to be given by the public authorities for the purpose. It must be remembered in this connection that as against the destitute family of the deceased there are millions of other families which are equally, if not more destitute. The exception to the rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate expectations, and the change in the status and affairs, of the family engendered by the erstwhile employment which are suddenly upturned. 3. Unmindful of this legal position, some Governments and public authorities have been offering compassionate employment sometimes as a matter of course irrespective of the financial condition of the family of the deceased and sometimes even in posts above Classes III and IV. That is legally impermissible. 4. It is for these reasons that we have not been in a position to appreciate judgments of some of the High Courts which have justified and even directed compassionate employment either as a matter of course or in posts above Classes III and IV. We are also dismayed to find that the decision of this Court in Sushma Gosain v. Union of India has been misinterpreted to the point of distortion. The decision does not justify compassionate employment either as a matter of course or in employment in posts above Classes III and IV. In the present case, the High Court has rightly pointed out that the State Government's instructions in question did not justify compassionate employment in Class II posts. However, it appears from the judgment that the State Government had made at least one exception and provided compassionate employment in Class II post on the specious ground that the person concerned had technical qualifications such as M.B.B.S., B.E., B.Tech. etc. Such exception, as pointed out above, is illegal, since it is contrary to the object of making exception to the general rule. The only ground which can justify compassionate employment is the penurious condition of the deceased's family. Neither the qualifications of his dependant nor the post which he held is relevant. etc. Such exception, as pointed out above, is illegal, since it is contrary to the object of making exception to the general rule. The only ground which can justify compassionate employment is the penurious condition of the deceased's family. Neither the qualifications of his dependant nor the post which he held is relevant. It is for this reason that we are unable to understand the following observations of the High Court in the impugned judgment: “We are of the view that the extraordinary situations require extraordinary remedies and it is open to the Government in real hard cases to deviate from the letter and spirit of the instructions and to provide relief in cases where it is so warranted. To hold as a matter of law that the Government cannot deviate even minutely from the policy of providing appointment only against Class III and Class IV posts, would be to ignore the reality of life these days. It would be ridiculous to expect that a dependant of a deceased Class I Officer, should be offered appointment against a Class III or IV post. While we leave it to the Government to exercise its discretion judiciously in making appointments to Class I or II posts on compassionate grounds, yet a word of caution needs to be struck. It is to be noted that such appointments should be ordered in the rarest of rare cases, and in very exceptional circumstances. As a matter of fact, we would recommend that the Government should frame a policy even for such appointments.” 5. It is obvious from the above observations that the High Court endorses the policy of the State Government to make compassionate appointment in posts equivalent to the posts held by the deceased employees and above Classes III and IV. It is unnecessary to reiterate that these observations are contrary to law. If the dependant of the deceased employee finds it below his dignity to accept the post offered, he is free not to do so. The post is not offered to cater to his status but to see the family through the economic calamity. 6. For these very reasons, the compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable period which must be specified in the rules. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. 6. For these very reasons, the compassionate employment cannot be granted after a lapse of a reasonable period which must be specified in the rules. The consideration for such employment is not a vested right which can be exercised at any time in future. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis which it faces at the time of the death of the sole breadwinner, the compassionate employment cannot be claimed and offered whatever the lapse of time and after the crisis is over.” (emphasis supplied) (x) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjay Kumar v. State of Bihar and others, reported in (2000) 7 SCC 192 in paragraph 3, which reads as under: “3. We are unable to agree with the submissions of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. This Court has held in a number of cases that compassionate appointment is intended to enable the family of the deceased employee to tide over sudden crisis resulting due to death of the bread-earner who had left the family in penury and without any means of livelihood. In fact such a view has been expressed in the very decision cited by the petitioner in Director of Education v. Pushpendra Kumar. It is also significant to notice that on the date when the first application was made by the petitioner on 2-6-1988, the petitioner was a minor and was not eligible for appointment. This is conceded by the petitioner. There cannot be reservation of a vacancy till such time as the petitioner becomes a major after a number of years, unless there are some specific provisions. The very basis of compassionate appointment is to see that the family gets immediate relief.” (emphasis supplied) (xi) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Santosh Kumar Dubey v. State of Uttar Pradesh and others, reported in (2009) 6 SCC 481 in paragraphs 10 to 13, which read as under: “10. Admittedly, the father of the appellant was untraceable from 1981. Admittedly, the father of the appellant was untraceable from 1981. Without entering into and deciding the issue as to whether employment on compassionate grounds could be asked for in a case of deemed death under Section 108 of the Evidence Act, even if we assume for the sake of argument that it can be so demanded and asked for, such a right should and could have been exercised in the year 1988 and computing the period of five years therefrom the period of limitation for making an application for employment in the case of the appellant expired in the year 1993. 11. The very concept of giving a compassionate appointment is to tide over the financial difficulties that are faced by the family of the deceased due to the death of the earning member of the family. There is immediate loss of earning for which the family suffers financial hardship. The benefit is given so that the family can tide over such financial constraints. 12. The request for appointment on compassionate grounds should be reasonable and proximate to the time of the death of the bread earner of the family, inasmuch as the very purpose of giving such benefit is to make financial help available to the family to overcome sudden economic crisis occurring in the family of the deceased who has died in harness. But this, however, cannot be another source of recruitment. This also cannot be treated as a bonanza and also as a right to get an appointment in government service. 13. In the present case, the father of the appellant became untraceable in the year 1981 and for about 18 years, the family could survive and successfully faced and overcame the financial difficulties that they faced on missing of the earning member. That being the position, in our considered opinion, this is not a fit case for exercise of our jurisdiction. This is also not a case where any direction could be issued for giving the appellant a compassionate appointment as the prevalent rules governing the subject do not permit us for issuing any such directions. The appeal, therefore, has no merit and is dismissed.” (emphasis supplied) (xii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh, reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583 in paragraphs 6 to 9, which read as under: “6. The appeal, therefore, has no merit and is dismissed.” (emphasis supplied) (xii) It has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of MGB Gramin Bank v. Chakrawarti Singh, reported in (2014) 13 SCC 583 in paragraphs 6 to 9, which read as under: “6. Every appointment to public office must be made by strictly adhering to the mandatory requirements of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. An exception by providing employment on compassionate grounds has been carved out in order to remove the financial constraints on the bereaved family, which has lost its bread-earner. Mere death of a government employee in harness does not entitle the family to claim compassionate employment. The competent authority has to examine the financial condition of the family of the deceased employee and it is only if it is satisfied that without providing employment, the family will not be able to meet the crisis, that a job is to be offered to the eligible member of the family. More so, the person claiming such appointment must possess required eligibility for the post. The consistent view that has been taken by the Court is that compassionate employment cannot be claimed as a matter of right, as it is not a vested right. The Court should not stretch the provision by liberal interpretation beyond permissible limits on humanitarian grounds. Such appointment should, therefore, be provided immediately to redeem the family in distress. It is improper to keep such a case pending for years. 7. In Umesh Kumar Nagpal v. State of Haryana this Court has considered the nature of the right which a dependant can claim while seeking employment on compassionate ground. The Court observed as under: (SCC pp. 14041, paras 2, 4 & 6) “2. … The whole object of granting compassionate employment is thus to enable the family to tide over the sudden crisis. The object is not to give a member of such family a post much less a post for the post held by the deceased. … The exception to the rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate expectations, and the change in the status and affairs, of the family engendered by the erstwhile employment which are suddenly upturned. 4. … The exception to the rule made in favour of the family of the deceased employee is in consideration of the services rendered by him and the legitimate expectations, and the change in the status and affairs, of the family engendered by the erstwhile employment which are suddenly upturned. 4. … The only ground which can justify compassionate employment is the penurious condition of the deceased’s family. *** 6. … The consideration for such employment is not a vested right…. The object being to enable the family to get over the financial crisis .............” 8. An “ameliorating relief” should not be taken as opening an alternative mode of recruitment to public employment. Furthermore, an application made at a belated stage cannot be entertained for the reason that by lapse of time, the purpose of making such appointment stands evaporated. 9. The courts and the tribunals cannot confer benediction impelled by sympathetic considerations to make appointments on compassionate grounds when the regulation framed in respect thereof did not cover and contemplate such appointments.” (emphasis supplied) In view of the aforesaid decisions as the very purpose of compassionate appointment has been frustrated by now, the original petitioner cannot be given compassionate appointment. This aspect of the matter has not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge and, hence, the judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 905 of 2014 dated 7th October, 2015 deserves to be quashed and set aside. (xii) Learned counsel for respondent no.1 (original petitioner) has relied upon the decision rendered by Hon'ble the Supreme Court reported in (2007) 8 SCC 549 . The ratio decidendi propounded by Hon'ble the Supreme Court is not applicable in the facts of the present case mainly for the reasons that: (a) Looking to paragraphs 25 and 26 of the counter affidavit filed by this appellant in the writ petition, it is highly disputed question of fact whether the original petitioner is son of the deceased employee or not. (b) The widow of the deceased employee was already offered monetary compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment on 13th April, 2007. Now, another legal heir cannot be offered compassionate appointment especially when the communication dated 13th April, 2007 was never challenged by the widow of the deceased employee or by the so called son of the deceased employee original petitioner. (b) The widow of the deceased employee was already offered monetary compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment on 13th April, 2007. Now, another legal heir cannot be offered compassionate appointment especially when the communication dated 13th April, 2007 was never challenged by the widow of the deceased employee or by the so called son of the deceased employee original petitioner. (c) Looking to the affidavit filed by the widow of the deceased employee, as stated in paragraphs 28 and 30 of the counter affidavit filed by this appellant in the writ petition, the age of original petitioner was less than 10 years when his father had expired and, hence, as per National Coal Wage Agreement, the name of the original petitioner cannot be kept in live roster. To keep the name in live roster, the age of legal heir of the deceased employee ought to have been more than 12 years and less than 18 years. The aforesaid facts, peculiar to the present case, make the present case different from the facts of the reported decision, upon which, reliance is placed by respondent no.1 (original petitioner) and, hence, the ratio decidendi propounded in the aforesaid decision is of no help to respondent no.1 (original petitioner). 6. As a cumulative effect of the aforesaid facts, reasons and judicial pronouncements, respondent no.1 (original petitioner) cannot be given compassionate appointment. These aspects of the matter have not been properly appreciated by the learned Single Judge while deciding W.P.(C) No. 905 of 2014 vide judgment and order dated 7th October, 2015 and, hence, the same is, hereby, quashed and set aside. So far as payment of retirement dues is concerned, the same reasons will be applicable that unless and until original petitioner establishes that he is a son of the deceased employee, no retirement dues can be paid to the original petitioner. 7. Accordingly, this Letters Patent Appeal is allowed and disposed of.