JUDGMENT : K.M. THAKER, J. Heard Mr. Songara, learned advocate for the petitioners, and Mr. Jani, learned AGP for the respondents. 2. In this group of six petitions, common facts and common issues are involved. The subject matter is also identical and separate but identical awards are challenged by the petitioners on identical grounds. The submissions against the decision win the awards and respondent's submission to support and justify separate awards are also similar. Therefore, captioned petitions are decided by this common decision. 3. In this group of petitions, the petitioners have challenged awards dated 10.7.2012 passed in Reference (LCP) Nos. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 whereby the learned Labour Court rejected the reference cases preferred by present petitions. Common ground on which the learned Labour Court rejected the reference cases is res-judicata. The petitioners are aggrieved by the said order. 4. So far as factual background is concerned, it has emerged from the record and submissions by learned advocate for the petitioners and learned AGP for the respondents that according to the petitioners - workmen, the office of Dy. Executive Engineer, where they were working since many years, terminated their service in 1991. 4.1 Feeling aggrieved by the termination of their services, the petitioners [hereinafter referred to as “the claimants”] raised industrial dispute. 4.2 The said dispute, in respect of each claimant, was referred by appropriate government for adjudication to learned Labour Court. The said dispute culminated into reference (LCP) Nos. 1204 of 1992 (new No. 331 of 1996), 1207 of 1992 (new No. 314 of 1996), 1208 of 1992 (new No. 315 of 1996), 157 of 1992 (new No. 368 of 1996), 1166 of 1992 (new No. 311 of 1996) and 1205 of 1992 (new No. 312 of 1996). 4.3 It is also submitted by the claimants that during pendency of the said reference cases, the opponent employer i.e. office of Executive Engineer reinstated the claimants. 4.4 It appears that though the claimants came to be reinstated, they did not withdraw the reference proceedings and the said reference cases remained pending before the learned Labour Court. 4.5 However, since the claimants were already reinstated, it appears that they had lost interest in prosecuting the reference cases on merits. For whatever reason, they were not attending the proceedings. 4.5 However, since the claimants were already reinstated, it appears that they had lost interest in prosecuting the reference cases on merits. For whatever reason, they were not attending the proceedings. 4.6 In this background, learned Labour Court continued the proceedings for almost 7 years, however, since the claimants never attended the hearing, ultimately, learned Labour Court dismissed the said reference cases in March 1999. 4.7 It appears that though the claimants, according to their own case, were already reinstated on their original post (i.e. as daily wager), the claimants preferred Misc. Applications with request that the order dismissing the reference cases on the ground of non-prosecution may be recalled and the said reference cases may be restored. 4.8 The learned Labour Court, after considering various aspects involved in the case, rejected said Misc. Applications vide identical order dated 27.2.2001 4.9 The said order dated 27.2.2001 has attained finality because the claimants never challenged the awards passed in March 1999 dismissing the reference cases on the ground of non-prosecution and/or the order passed in February 2001 whereby the learned Labour Court rejected Misc. Applications. 4.10 In this manner, the proceedings related to reference (LCP) Nos. 1204 of 1992 and allied matters came to end. 5. Now, there is another stream of litigation instituted by the claimants. 5.1 It has emerged from the submissions by learned counsel for the claimants and learned AGP that after the claimants were reinstated during pendency of reference (LCP) Nos. 1204 of 1992 and allied matters, somewhere in 1994, the claimants had filed petition being Special Civil Application No. 1643 of 1994 wherein the claimants demanded benefit of regularization of service and benefit under GR dated 17.10.1988 5.2 It is claimed that the said petition came to be disposed of on 4.9.1997 by this Court whereby the Court directed the government to consider the case of the claimants for regularization and for benefit under GR dated 17.10.1988 5.3 Learned counsel for the claimants submitted that the government considered the demand by the claimants and rejected the representation somewhere 1998. 5.4 Therefore, the claimants filed another petition being Special Civil Application No. 2493 of 1998. 5.5 In the said petition, the claimants again prayed for similar relief i.e. regularization and benefit under GR dated 17.10.1988 5.6 This Court dismissed the said Special Civil Application No. 2493 of 1998 vide order dated 24.8.1999. 5.4 Therefore, the claimants filed another petition being Special Civil Application No. 2493 of 1998. 5.5 In the said petition, the claimants again prayed for similar relief i.e. regularization and benefit under GR dated 17.10.1988 5.6 This Court dismissed the said Special Civil Application No. 2493 of 1998 vide order dated 24.8.1999. The said order dated 24.8.1999 read thus:— “Heard learned counsel for the parties. This is a second petition by the petitioners in this court. It is the case of the petitioner that they are working as casual workers on daily wages with the respondent for more than 15 years. Earlier, they have come up before this court in the matter of their absorption and regularization of their services as per the Government Resolution dated 17/10/1988. This writ petition was decided by the court on 4/9/1997. The operative part of the same reads as under: In the result, this special civil application succeeds and the same is allowed. The respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner and other employees whose names have been mentioned in para-2 thereof for giving them the benefits in accordance with the resolution dated 17th October, 1988. This exercise has to be undertaken within a period of two months from the date of receipt of certified copy of this order. In case the petitioners are found suitable for benefits as conferred under the resolution dated 17th October, 1988 then all the consequential benefits should be given to them within a period of two months next. In case the petitioner or other employees named in para No. 2 of the petition are not found eligible for benefits to be given under the resolution dated 17th October, 1988 then a reasoned order may be passed and copy of which may be sent to the petitioner and other daily wage employees by registered post A.D Liberty is granted for revival of this special civil application in case of any difficulty. The special civil application and rule stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.” In pursuance of this order the case of the petitioners as per I the Government Resolution dated 17/10/1988 was considered. The special civil application and rule stand disposed of in the aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.” In pursuance of this order the case of the petitioners as per I the Government Resolution dated 17/10/1988 was considered. However, as the petitioners were not having to their credit 240 days working in a year for 5 years, their case is not covered by the resolution aforesaid and as a result thereof the respondents have taken the action to terminate their services under the notice dated 10th March, 1998. Enclose to the reply aforesaid a detailed chart is giving, therein details regarding working days of the petitioners are detailed. I find that the petitioner No 1 had only in one year worked for 240 days. The petitioner No. 2 had also worked in one year for more than 240 days. The petitioner No. 3 had worked also in one year for more than 240 days. The petitioner No. 4 worked in two years for more than 240 days. Similar the petitioner No. 5 worked in 3 years for more than 240 days. The petitioner No. 6 worked in one year for more than 240 days. So none of the petitioner worked for 240 days in a year for 5 years and their case do not cover under the Government resolution dated 17/10/1988. The petitioners could not be continued as daily wagers thereafter. The one time programme has been made out by the Government to regularize the services of the daily wagers but subject to certain conditions. The petitioners do not fulfil the conditions as laid down under resolution for regularization of their daily wages services and the respondent has not committed any error in dispensing with their services. In the result, the special civil application fails and the same is dismissed. Notice discharged. Interim relief, if any, granted by this court stands vacated. No order as to costs.” 5.7 Feeling aggrieved by the said order dated 24.8.1999 in Special Civil Application No. 2493 of 1998, the claimants filed Letters Patent Appeal No. 1288 of 1999 and cognate appeals. 5.8 The said appeals came to be dismissed vide order dated 18.9.2000 5.9 It appears that after the learned Single Judge dismissed the Special Civil Application No. 2493 of 1998 vide order dated 24.8.1999, within period of about 4 days, office of Executive Engineer again terminated service of the claimants. 5.8 The said appeals came to be dismissed vide order dated 18.9.2000 5.9 It appears that after the learned Single Judge dismissed the Special Civil Application No. 2493 of 1998 vide order dated 24.8.1999, within period of about 4 days, office of Executive Engineer again terminated service of the claimants. 5.10 The said action of the respondent Executive Engineer/Dy. Executive Engineer i.e. terminating service of present claimants on 28.8.1999 is the crucial point and vital event so far as the dispute raised by the petitioners in this group of petitions is concerned. 5.11 Feeling aggrieved by termination of their service dated 28.8.1999, the claimants raised another/fresh industrial dispute wherein the claimants made grievance against their termination of service on 28.8.1999 with the allegation that the opponent employer has illegally terminated their service (on 28.8.1999), the claimants demanded reinstatement with all benefits. 5.12 The appropriate government considered the said dispute and referred the claim for adjudication vide reference Nos. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002. 5.13 The said reference case Nos. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 have been dismissed by the learned Labour Court vide separate but identical awards dated 10.7.2002 which are challenged in this group of petitions. 6. Mr. Songara, learned counsel for Mr. Rathod, learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that the learned Labour Court has dismissed the reference cases on the ground that the dispute is barred by res-judicata. Learned advocate for the petitioners would submit that the said decision by learned Labour Court is erroneous and contrary to the principle of res-judicata as well as arbitrary. He submitted that the claimants are aggrieved by the action taken by the respondents in August 1999 whereby their services have been terminated. The said termination has given rise to fresh cause of action and that therefore, the reference case Nos. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 could not have been dismissed on the ground of res-judicata. Learned advocate for the petitioners submitted that the said award deserves to be set aside and the learned Labour Court should be directed to adjudicate and decide the reference cases No. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 on merits. 7. Mr. Jani, learned AGP, opposed the submissions. Mr. Jani, learned AGP submitted that the learned Labour Court has not committed any error. He submitted that in view of the fact that in the reference (LCP) Nos. 7. Mr. Jani, learned AGP, opposed the submissions. Mr. Jani, learned AGP submitted that the learned Labour Court has not committed any error. He submitted that in view of the fact that in the reference (LCP) Nos. 1204 of 1992 and allied matters, the claimants had challenged their termination and prayed for similar relief to the relief which are prayed for in reference case Nos. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 and that therefore, the learned Labour Court is right and justified in rejecting the reference cases on the ground of res-judicata. 8. I have considered the rival submissions and I have also considered material available on record. 9. The relevant facts are not in dispute. 9.1 The fact that service of present claimants were terminated in 1991, is not in dispute. 9.2 Likewise, the fact that upon feeling aggrieved by said termination, the claimants had raised industrial dispute which was referred for adjudication in 1992, is not in dispute. 9.3 Similarly, the fact that the claimants filed Misc. Application for recall of the order passed in March, 1999 and for restoration of cases came to be rejected vide order dated 27.2.2001, is also not in dispute. 9.4 The fact that the award passed in March, 1999 in Reference (LCP) Nos. 1204 of 1992 and allied matters on the ground of non-prosecution and the order passed in 27.2.2001 rejecting Misc. Application filed has attained finality, is also not in dispute. 9.5 On the other hand, the fact that during pendency of reference cases instituted in 1992 i.e. Reference (LCP) Nos. 1204 of 1992 and allied matters, the claimants were reinstated, is also not in dispute. 9.6 At the same time, the fact that the respondents i.e. Office of Executive Engineer, again terminated services of the claimant in August, 1999, is not in dispute. 9.7 It is also not in dispute that in the subsequent reference case i.e. in reference case Nos. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 the claimants challenged the termination of their services in August, 1999, is also not in dispute. 10. Above mentioned undisputed facts bring out and establish that (i) initially service of the claimants were terminated in 1992; (ii) against the termination effected in 1992, claimants raised industrial dispute which were registered as reference case Nos. 10. Above mentioned undisputed facts bring out and establish that (i) initially service of the claimants were terminated in 1992; (ii) against the termination effected in 1992, claimants raised industrial dispute which were registered as reference case Nos. 1207 of 1992 and connected matter; (iii) during pendency of the said reference cases, the claimants were reinstated (iv) the employer Executive Engineer again terminated the services of the claimant in August, 1999 and; (v) in subsequent reference cases i.e. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002, the subject matter is second termination i.e. termination effected in August, 1999. 10.1 The subject matter of the reference case No. 1207 of 1992 and cognate reference cases and the subject matter of reference cases No. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 are different, separate and distinct. In this view of the matter, reference case Nos. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 deserve to be decided on merits. 11. The dividing line between the said two sets of reference cases is the fact that the claimants were reinstated during pendency of the reference cases filed in 1992 and their services came to be again terminated in August, 1999. 11.1 Thus, it cannot be said that the subject matter of the reference cases filed in 2002, are same and therefore, the subsequent/second reference cases barred by res-judicata. At the same time, it can also not be overlooked that the reference cases filed in 1992 were not adjudicated and decided on merits. The said cases came to be dismissed on the ground of non-prosecution. 12. In the impugned awards dated 10.7.2012, learned Labour Court appears to have been influenced by fact that feeling aggrieved by their termination, the claimants had raised industrial dispute in 1992 and the said reference cases were decided vide order 26.3.1999 and the Misc. Application also came to be dismissed vide order dated 27.2.2001 and, therefore, the claimants are not justified in challenging their termination in 2002. 12.1 In this context, learned Labour Court lost sight of the fact that in reference case filed in 2002 the claimants have challenged subsequent and second/different action of the employer i.e. terminating their services in August, 1999. Even otherwise, the order dismissing the reference cases of 1992 on the ground of non-prosecution would not act as res-judicata. 12.1 In this context, learned Labour Court lost sight of the fact that in reference case filed in 2002 the claimants have challenged subsequent and second/different action of the employer i.e. terminating their services in August, 1999. Even otherwise, the order dismissing the reference cases of 1992 on the ground of non-prosecution would not act as res-judicata. Since by the award dated 26.3.1999, the Court did not decide any lis or dispute or rights of the parties. 13. From the award it appears that learned Labour Court seems to have been influenced also by the orders passed by High Court in Special Civil Application No. 1643 of 1994 and Special Civil Application No. 2493 of 1998. However, learned Labour Court, on this count also appears to have lost sight of the fact that the subject matter in the said petitions, was altogether different inasmuch as in the said reference cases, the claimants demanded benefit of regularisation and benefit flowing from G.R Dated 17.10.1988 In none of the petitions, the claimants had raised any dispute or demand in connection with their grievance against termination of their service. 14. On reading the order passed by learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 2493 of 1998 at first blush one may tend to think and hold that when this Court has already found that the claimants had not worked for 240 days in preceding year, there would not be any fruitful purpose in prosecuting the reference cases against termination August, 1999. However, one cannot overlook the fact that the said observation with regard to attendance of 240 days came to be made by this Court in light of the claim of the petitioners for regularisation in service and for benefits of G.R Dated 17.10.1998 and not with reference to termination of service, much less with reference to breach of Section 25F and/or Section 25G and/or 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act. 15. From the reference cases No. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 it comes out that the claimants have, in the said reference cases, challenged the termination of their service on the ground that their services came to be terminated in breach of Principle of natural justice and in breach of provisions under Industrial Disputes Act. 16. 15. From the reference cases No. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 it comes out that the claimants have, in the said reference cases, challenged the termination of their service on the ground that their services came to be terminated in breach of Principle of natural justice and in breach of provisions under Industrial Disputes Act. 16. Therefore, it was necessary for the learned Labour Court to independently decide the said allegations and contentions and to find out as to whether the respondent employer committed breach of said provision when the respondent terminated service of the claimants in August, 1999. 17. Unfortunately, without addressing and answering the said grievance of the claimants, learned Labour Court rejected the reference cases merely on the ground that the Court has already dismissed the reference cases of 1992 and petitions filed by the claimants have been rejected. However, learned Labour Court failed to appreciate that in the reference case of 1992 as well as in writ petition the subject matter of the cases were altogether different from the subject matter of reference cases No. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 17.1 Since, impugned orders have been passed without appreciating the said distinction and on erroneous application of principle of res-judicata, the impugned awards do not deserve to be sustained. 18. For above mentioned reasons, impugned awards deserves to be set aside. Consequently, the awards are set aside and reference cases No. 49 of 2002 to 54 of 2002 are remanded to learned Labour Court for fresh hearing and adjudication after granting opportunity of hearing to both sides. Learned Labour Court shall decide the reference cases afresh by keeping in focus above discussion and after granting opportunity of hearing to both sides and after deciding the contention raised by the contesting parties. 19. With aforesaid clarification and direction, the petitions are partly allowed. Rule is made absolute to the aforesaid extent.