JUDGMENT : Sandeep Sharma, J. By way of instant petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, read with Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, prayer has been made to transfer HMP No. 69/2017 titled as Raman Kumar versus Smt. Anchal from the Court of learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra to the Court of learned District Judge, Chamba, District Chamba, Himachal Pradesh. 2. Before considering the aforesaid prayer having been made by the petitioner by way of instant petition, it may be noticed that this Court, taking note of averments contained in the petition, issued notice to the respondent on 29.5.2017, returnable on 20.6.2017. However, the fact remains that respondent, who was served through his mother, failed to put in appearance on 24.7.2017, but at that point of time, this Court instead of proceeding in the matter ex-parte, issued court notice returnable for 28.8.2017. Even on 28.8.2017, respondent failed to put in appearance but this Court, taking note of the nature of litigation pending before this Court, issued fresh court notice to the respondent specifically intimating therein that in case he fails to put in appearance on the next date of hearing, case shall be decided on material available on record, in his absence. 3. Today, i.e. 9.10.2017, respondent has not come present despite having received court order. As per report submitted by the process server notice issued by this Court was duly served upon the respondent, but despite that he chose not to come present before this Court, as such, this Court has no other option but to decide the present case on the basis of pleadings adduced on record by the petitioner as well as law on the point. 4. Facts, as emerge from the record are that marriage of the petitioner was solemnized on 2.8.2013 at Mohala Uper Dharang, Tehsil and District Chamba, Himachal Pradesh, as per Hindu rites, customs and ceremonies. Parties resided together as husband and wife till September 2014 and one male child namely Rudu Sharma born out of their wedlock. Perusal of record further suggests that relations between parties remained cordial for one year and thereafter petitioner left the matrimonial house without informing the respondent or his family members. Parties resided together as husband and wife till September 2014 and one male child namely Rudu Sharma born out of their wedlock. Perusal of record further suggests that relations between parties remained cordial for one year and thereafter petitioner left the matrimonial house without informing the respondent or his family members. Since petitioner failed to join the company of the respondent despite his requests, as such, respondent preferred a petition under Section 13(1)(ia)(ib) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, with a prayer to dissolve the marriage between the parties, by a decree of divorce, in the Court of District Judge, Kangra at Dharamshala. In the aforesaid petition, respondent alleged that the petitioner left the matrimonial house of the respondent without any reason and has not been residing with him for more than two years and also not performing her conjugal duties being legally wedded wife of respondent and therefore, a decree for dissolution of marriage be granted/passed. 5. As per the petitioner, petition having been preferred by the respondent is at initial stage as the same was fixed for service of the petitioner on 23.3.2017 , whereafter, same was listed for reply of petitioner in the month of June, 2017. At this stage, learned counsel representing the petitioner stated that service in the case is complete and same is fixed for reply, if any, to the petition. As per the petitioner, she as well as learned Court below repeatedly made attempts to reconcile the matter between the parties but respondent is not ready and willing even to appear in the reconciliation meeting, as fixed by learned Court below, as such, she is finding it difficult to attend the proceedings at Dharamshala, which is more than 100 kms away from her place of residence i.e. Chamba. She has further stated that she is having minor child aged 3 years, who is under the care and custody of the petitioner and it is very difficult for her to attend the Court at Dharamshala on each and every hearing, as such, it would be in the interest of justice, if proceedings initiated at the behest of the respondent under Hindu Marriage Act, are transferred to the Court of learned District Judge, Chamba. Petitioner has further stated that at present she is living with her mother in her parental house, since father of the petitioner has expired and there is nobody to support her widowed mother and it is not possible for her to leave her minor son aged 3 years, back at Chamba, to attend Court at Dharamshala. 6. Apart from above, petitioner has also claimed that she is unable to spend huge amount so as to attend the Court at Dharamshala and to pay fee to the Counsel at Dharamshala. It is further alleged that since respondent is local resident of District Kangra, as and when she visits Dharamshala to attend the Court for hearing, she suffers humiliation and harassment as other persons accompanying the respondent comment upon her conduct. 7. With the aforesaid submissions, which have been further canvassed by Mr. H.S. Rangra, learned counsel representing the petitioner during arguments, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner to transfer the petition pending before learned Additional District Judge-I, Dharamshala to the Court of learned District Judge, Chamba. 8. Mr. H.S. Rangra, learned counsel representing the petitioner, in support of his aforesaid contentions also placed reliance upon the judgment rendered by this Court in Urvashi Rana versus Himanshu Nayyar, (CMPMO No. 177 of 2016) decided on 15.7.2016, reported in Latest HLJ 2016(HP) 925, to demonstrate that convenience of wife is required to be considered over and above the inconvenience of the husband. 9. Aforesaid judgment passed by this Court is based upon law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in various cases, wherein it has observed that wife’s convenience is required to be considered over and above the inconvenience of the husband. 10. In Rajani Kishor Pardeshi versus Kishor Babulal Pardeshi, (2005) 12 SCC 237, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that convenience of wife is of prime consideration. 11. 10. In Rajani Kishor Pardeshi versus Kishor Babulal Pardeshi, (2005) 12 SCC 237, Hon'ble Apex Court has held that convenience of wife is of prime consideration. 11. Similarly, Hon'ble Apex Court in Kulwinder Kaur alias Kulwinder Gurcharan Singh versus Kandi Friends Education Trust and others, (2008) 3 SCC 659 , has laid down parameters for transferring the cases i.e. balance of convenience or inconvenience to the plaintiff or the defendant or witnesses; convenience or inconvenience of a particular place of trial having regard to the nature of evidence on the points involved in the suit; issues raised by the parties; reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the court in which the suit is pending; important questions of law involved or a considerable section of public interested in the litigation; “interest of justice” demanding for transfer of suit, appeal or other proceedings, etc. While laying aforesaid broad parameters, Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that these are illustrative in nature and by no means can be taken to be exhaustive. If on the above or other relevant considerations, the Court feels that the plaintiff or the defendant is not likely to have a ‘fair trial’, in the Court from which he seeks to transfer a case, it is not only the power, but the duty of the Court to make such order. The Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: “23. Reading Sections 24 and 25 of the Code together and keeping in view various judicial pronouncements, certain broad propositions as to what may constitute a ground for transfer have been laid down by Courts. They are balance of convenience or inconvenience to the plaintiff or the defendant or witnesses; convenience or inconvenience of a particular place of trial having regard to the nature of evidence on the points involved in the suit; issues raised by the parties; reasonable apprehension in the mind of the litigant that he might not get justice in the court in which the suit is pending; important questions of law involved or a considerable section of public interested in the litigation; “interest of justice” demanding for transfer of suit, appeal or other proceeding, etc. Above are some of the instances which are germane in considering the question of transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding. Above are some of the instances which are germane in considering the question of transfer of a suit, appeal or other proceeding. They are, however, illustrative in nature and by no means be treated as exhaustive. If on the above or other relevant considerations, the Court feels that the plaintiff or the defendant is not likely to have a “fair trial” in the Court from which he seeks to transfer a case, it is not only the power, but the duty of the Court to make such order.” 12. Similarly, Hon'ble Apex Court in Arti Rani alias Pinki Devi and another versus Dharmendra Kumar Gupta, (2008) 9 SCC 353 , while dealing with a petition preferred by wife for transfer of proceedings on the ground that she was having minor child and it was difficult for her to attend the Court at Palamu, Daltonganj, which was in the State of Jharkhand and at a quite distance from Patna, where she was now residing, with her child, ordered transfer of proceedings taking into consideration convenience of wife. 13. In the case at hand, facts, as have been discussed above, which have not been refuted, it clearly emerges that at present, petitioner resides at Chamba, which is definitely more than 100 kms away from Dharamshala i.e. Court, where respondent-husband has filed petition for divorce. Similarly, there appears to be no dispute with regard to petitioner having minor child aged three years and it can be presumed that it is difficult for the petitioner to attend each and every hearing at Dharamshala, leaving her minor child at Chamba. 14. Leaving everything aside, this Court can not lose sight of the fact that petitioner is unnecessarily being made to spend huge sum of money on transportation, as she being respondent in the petition in the court below initiated at the behest of respondent (husband) at Dharamshala, is always under obligation to attend the Court at Dharamshala. 15. During proceedings of the case, attention of this Court was invited to the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in Krishna Veni Nagam versus Harish Nagam, (2017) 4 SCC 150 , wherein Hon'ble Apex Court has held as under: “We are of the view that if orders are to be passed in every individual petition, this causes great hardship to the litigants who have to come to this Court. Moreover in this process, the matrimonial matters which are required to be dealt with expeditiously are delayed. In these circumstances, we are prima facie of the view that we need to consider whether we could pass a general order to the effect that in case where husband files matrimonial proceedings at place where wife does not reside, the court concerned should entertain such petition only on the condition that the husband makes appropriate deposit to bear the expenses of the wife as may be determined by the Court. The Court may also pass orders from time to time for further deposit to ensure that the wife is not handicapped to defend the proceedings. In other cases, the husband may take proceedings before the Court in whose jurisdiction the wife resides which may lessen inconvenience to the parties and avoid delay. Any other option to remedy the situation can also be considered. x x x x x x x x 17. We are thus of the view that it is necessary to issue certain directions which may provide alternative to seeking transfer of proceedings on account of inability of a party to contest proceedings at a place away from their ordinary residence on the ground that if proceedings are not transferred it will result in denial of justice. 18. We, therefore, direct that in matrimonial or custody matters or in proceedings between parties to a marriage or arising out of disputes between parties to a marriage, wherever the defendants/respondents are located outside the jurisdiction of the court, the court where proceedings are instituted, may examine whether it is in the interest of justice to incorporate any safeguards for ensuring that summoning of defendant/respondent does not result in denial of justice. Order incorporating such safeguards may be sent along with the summons. The safeguards can be:- (i) Availability of video conferencing facility. (ii) Availability of legal aid service. (iii) Deposit of cost for travel, lodging and boarding in terms of Order XXV CPC. (iv) E-mail address/phone number, if any, at which litigant from out station may communicate.” 16. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1278 of 2016, titled Santhini versus Vijaya Venketesh, has overruled the judgment passed in Krishna Veni Nagam versus Harish Nagam, (2017) 4 SCC 150 (Supra). Relevant paras of aforesaid latest judgment are reproduced below: “51. (iv) E-mail address/phone number, if any, at which litigant from out station may communicate.” 16. Recently, the Hon'ble Apex Court in Transfer Petition (Civil) No. 1278 of 2016, titled Santhini versus Vijaya Venketesh, has overruled the judgment passed in Krishna Veni Nagam versus Harish Nagam, (2017) 4 SCC 150 (Supra). Relevant paras of aforesaid latest judgment are reproduced below: “51. In this context, we may refer to the fundamental principle of necessity of doing justice and trial in camera. The nine-Judge Bench in Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar and Ors v. State of Maharashtra and Anr., after enunciating the universally accepted proposition in favour of open trials, expressed:- “While emphasising the importance of public trial, we cannot overlook the fact that the primary function of the Judiciary is to do justice between the parties who bring their causes before it. If a Judge trying a cause is satisfied that the very purpose of finding truth in the case would be retarded, or even defeated if witnesses are required to give evidence subject to public gaze, is it or is it not open to him in exercise of his inherent power to hold the trial in camera either partly or fully? If the primary function of the court is to do justice in causes brought before it, then on principle, it is difficult to accede to the proposition that there can be no exception to the rule that all causes must be tried in open court. If the principle that all trials before courts must be held in public was treated as inflexible and universal and it is held that it admits of no exceptions whatever, cases may arise where by following the principle, justice itself may be defeated. That is why we feel no hesitation in holding that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera if the ends of justice clearly and necessarily require the adoption of such a course. That is why we feel no hesitation in holding that the High Court has inherent jurisdiction to hold a trial in camera if the ends of justice clearly and necessarily require the adoption of such a course. It is hardly necessary to emphasise that this inherent power must be exercised with great caution and it is only if the court is satisfied beyond a doubt that the ends of justice themselves would be defeated if a case is tried in open court that it can pass an order to hold the trial in camera; but to deny the existence of such inherent power to the court would be to ignore the primary object of adjudication itself. The principle underlying the insistence on hearing causes in open court is to protect and assist fair, impartial and objective administration of justice; but if the requirement of justice itself sometimes dictates the necessity of trying the case in camera, it cannot be said that the said requirement should be sacrificed because of the principle that every trial must be held in open court.” 52. The principle of exception that the larger Bench enunciated is founded on the centripodal necessity of doing justice to the cause and not to defeat it. In matrimonial disputes that are covered under Section 7 of the 1984 Act where the Family Court exercises its jurisdiction, there is a statutory protection to both the parties and conferment of power on the court with a duty to persuade the parties to reconcile. If the proceedings are directed to be conducted through videoconferencing, the command of the Section as well as the spirit of the 1984 Act will be in peril and further the cause of justice would be defeated. 53. A cogent reflection is also needed as regards the perception when both the parties concur to have the proceedings to be held through videoconferencing. In this context, the thought and the perception are to be viewed through the lens of the textual context, legislative intent and schematic canvas. The principle may had to be tested on the bedrock that courts must have progressive outlook and broader interpretation with the existing employed language in the statute so as to expand the horizon and the connotative expanse and not adopt a pedantic approach. 54. We have already discussed at length with regard to the complexity and the sensitive nature of the controversies. 54. We have already discussed at length with regard to the complexity and the sensitive nature of the controversies. The statement of law made in Krishna Veni Nagam (supra) that if either of the parties gives consent, the case can be transferred, is absolutely unacceptable. However, an exception can be carved out to the same. We may repeat at the cost of repetition that though the principle does not flow from statutory silence, yet as we find from the scheme of the Act, the Family Court has been given ample power to modulate its procedure. The Evidence Act is not strictly applicable. Affidavits of formal witnesses are acceptable. It will be permissible for the other party to cross-examine the deponent. We are absolutely conscious that the enactment gives emphasis on speedy settlement. As has been held in Bhuwan Mohan Singh (supra), the concept of speedy settlement does not allow room for lingering the proceedings. A genuine endeavour has to be made by the Family Court Judge, but in the name of efforts to bring in a settlement or to arrive at a solution of the lis, the Family Court should not be chained by the tentacles by either parties. Perhaps, one of the parties may be interested in procrastinating the litigation. Therefore, we are disposed to think that once a settlement fails and if both the parties give consent that a witness can be examined in video conferencing, that can be allowed. That apart, when they give consent that it is necessary in a specific factual matrix having regard to the convenience of the parties, the Family Court may allow the prayer for videoconferencing. That much of discretion, we are inclined to think can be conferred on the Family Court. Such a limited discretion will not run counter to the legislative intention that permeates the 1984 Act. However, we would like to add a safeguard. A joint application should be filed before the Family Court Judge, who shall take a decision. However, we make it clear that in a transfer petition, no direction can be issued for video conferencing. We reiterate that the discretion has to rest with the Family Court to be exercised after the court arrives at a definite conclusion that the settlement is not possible and both parties file a joint application or each party filing his/her consent memorandum seeking hearing by videoconferencing. 55. We reiterate that the discretion has to rest with the Family Court to be exercised after the court arrives at a definite conclusion that the settlement is not possible and both parties file a joint application or each party filing his/her consent memorandum seeking hearing by videoconferencing. 55. Be it noted, sometimes, transfer petitions are filed seeking transfer of cases instituted under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and cases registered under the IPC. As the cases under the said Act and the IPC have not been adverted to in Krishna Veni Nagam (supra) or in the order of reference in these cases, we do intend to advert to the same. 56. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we sum up our conclusion as follows :- (i) In view of the scheme of the 1984 Act and in particular Section 11, the hearing of matrimonial disputes may have to be conducted in camera. (ii) After the settlement fails and when a joint application is filed or both the parties file their respective consent memorandum for hearing of the case through videoconferencing before the concerned Family Court, it may exercise the discretion to allow the said prayer. (iii) After the settlement fails, if the Family Court feels it appropriate having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case that videoconferencing will sub-serve the cause of justice, it may so direct. (iv) In a transfer petition, video conferencing cannot be directed. (v) Our directions shall apply prospectively. (vi) The decision in Krishna Veni Nagam (supra) is overruled to the aforesaid extent” 17. Accordingly, perusal of aforesaid judgment clearly suggests that in a transfer petition, video conferencing cannot be directed and hearing of matrimonial disputes is required to be conducted in camera. In the aforesaid judgment, Hon'ble Apex Court has further held that after the settlement fails and when a joint application is filed or both the parties file their respective consent memorandum for hearing of the case through videoconferencing before the concerned Family Court, it may exercise the discretion to allow the said prayer, but in transfer petition, video conferencing can not be directed. 18. 18. Though this Court, after having taking note of the aforesaid grounds raised in the instant petition coupled with the law on the point, as has been laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court as well as this Court, sees no impediment in transferring the proceedings pending before learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala to Chamba, but even otherwise, as has been informed by the learned counsel representing the petitioner, another petition under Section 125 CrPC initiated at the behest of present petitioner is also pending before the leaned Chief Judicial Magistrate Chamba and in that case, respondent(husband) is already appearing. Since petition under Section 125 CrPC is also pending at Chamba against the present respondent and in that case he has been also appearing before the Court concerned, no prejudice shall be caused to the respondent, in case proceedings under Hindu Marriage Act, pending at Dharamshala, are transferred to the Court at Chamba. 19. After having carefully considered the material available on record, as well as submissions having been made by the learned counsel representing the petitioner, and law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court, this court deems it fit to transfer HMP No. 69/2017 titled as Raman Kumar versus Smt. Anchal from the Court of learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala, District Kangra to the Court of learned District Judge, Chamba, District Chamba, Himachal Pradesh. Learned counsel for the petitioner undertakes to cause appearance of the petitioner before learned District Judge, Chamba on 10.11.2017, on which date, learned District Judge, Chamba shall issue notice to the respondent, to put in appearance on the date to be fixed by him/her. Learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala shall transfer the aforesaid petition to the Court of District Judge, Chamba, forthwith, to enable learned District Judge, Chamba, to do the needful, as ordered vide this judgment. 20. Registry to send copy of instant judgment to the learned Additional District Judge-I, Kangra at Dharamshala as well as learned District Judge, Chamba, forthwith, to enable them to do the needful well within stipulated time. 21. In view of above, the present petition is disposed of, alongwith pending applications, if any.