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2017 DIGILAW 1152 (KAR)

Mayyadi, S/o. Late Abdul Khader v. P. K. Shivananda, S/o. Kunhi Raman

2017-08-18

JOHN MICHAEL CUNHA

body2017
ORDER : 1. This revision petition is by the accused, who is convicted for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘the N.I. Act’) and sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for three months and to pay a compensation of 1,50,000/- to the complainant within a period of three months from the date of the order and in default, to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 20 days. 2. The material contention urged in the revision petition is that the cheque in question stands in the name of one “B.K.Shivananda” whereas the complainant namely the respondent herein is one “P.K.Shivananda”. The notice of demand was issued to “P.K.Shivananda”. Under the said circumstance, the complainant was not entitled to present the said cheque for encashment nor was he entitled to maintain a petition under Section 138 of the N.I.Act. Further, it is contended that even with regard to the imposition of sentence, the Courts below have failed to apply their mind in as much as no fine has been levied, instead a heavy compensation has been ordered, which calls for interference by this Court in exercise of the revisional jurisdiction under Section 397 of the Cr.P.C. Further, it is contended that even though several contentions were urged before the Appellate Court based on facts as well as on law, the Appellate Court failed to frame specific points for consideration, as a result, the impugned order of the Appellate Court is vitiated and needs to be interfered with by this Court. 3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned counsel for the respondents and have perused the records of the lower Court as well as the grounds urged in the petition. 4. The proceedings under section 138 of N.I. Act are seen to have been initiated on the specific allegation that the petitioner herein/accused issued the cheque in question which came to be dishonoured for ‘insufficient funds’. This cheque is marked in evidence as Ex.P1. The name of the payee/drawee in the said cheque is mentioned as “B.K.Shivananda”. It is not in dispute that the name of the complainant is “P.K.Shivananda”. This cheque is marked in evidence as Ex.P1. The name of the payee/drawee in the said cheque is mentioned as “B.K.Shivananda”. It is not in dispute that the name of the complainant is “P.K.Shivananda”. It is also a matter of record that the said cheque was presented for encashment by the complainant and the bank has issued a memo of dishonour, for the reason “Funds insufficient” as per Ex.P2 and not on the ground of misdescription of the drawee. Therefore, the only question that arises for consideration is: “Whether the misdescription of the payee renders the prosecution of the accused under Section138 of the N.I. Act illegal?” 5. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 provides that where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both. 6. In the instant case, there is no dispute as to the fact that the cheque in question was drawn by the accused. In his evidence, the accused, who has been examined as DW1 has unequivocally admitted that Ex.P1 was his cheque. He has not disputed the fact that the said cheque was relating to an account maintained by him with the Banker namely Union Bank of India. In his evidence, he has stated that the said cheque was issued by him to the complainant as security, which implies that the cheque was not only drawn by the accused on an account maintained by him, but was also issued by him to the complainant, though as security as stated by him. In his evidence, he has stated that the said cheque was issued by him to the complainant as security, which implies that the cheque was not only drawn by the accused on an account maintained by him, but was also issued by him to the complainant, though as security as stated by him. The accused has also admitted that the consideration in respect of the said cheque has been received by him from the complainant. From the above, it stands established that Ex.P1 was issued to the complainant by the accused and that this cheque has been returned dishonoured for insufficiency of funds in the account maintained by the accused. 7. It is not the case of the accused that he intended to issue the cheque Ex.P1 to some other person by name “B.K.Shivananda”. On the other hand, the facts discussed above clearly indicate that the accused intended to repay the amount only to the complainant and accordingly issued the aforesaid cheque Ex.P1 to the complainant. Under the said circumstances, merely because the name of the complainant has been written as “B.K.Shivananda” instead of “P.K.Shivananda”, in my view, the accused cannot escape from the consequence that would arise on account of the dishonour of the said cheque. More over, it has come in evidence that the name of the payee as well as the amount of the cheque in Ex.P1 was written by the accused himself in his own handwriting. Therefore, the accused cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own mistake. The complainant having convincingly proved that the cheque in question was issued by the accused towards the repayment of the amount due and payable by the accused and the said cheque having been dishonoured for insufficient funds, in my view, all the ingredients of section 138 of the N.I. Act have been duly established thereby rendering the accused liable for conviction for the said offence. As a result, I do not find any error or infirmity in the findings recorded by the courts below in this regard. 8. As a result, I do not find any error or infirmity in the findings recorded by the courts below in this regard. 8. With regard to the contention urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the Appellate Court has not framed the necessary points for consideration is concerned, suffice it to note that even though the points for consideration have not been specifically framed by the Appellate Court, yet the perusal of the impugned judgment reveals that the Appellate Court has considered all the contentions raised in the appeal in the light of the material produced by the parties and therefore, no injustice or prejudice having been caused to the petitioner by nonframing the points for consideration, the impugned judgment cannot be interfered with on that score. 9. Lastly, with regard to the imposition of the substantive sentence is concerned, if the courts below have found it appropriate not to levy any fine on the accused, this court in exercise of the jurisdiction under section 397 of Cr.P.C., cannot interfere with the discretion exercised by the Courts below. The section itself provides that the offence under section 138 of N.I. Act could be punished either with the imprisonment or fine. The Courts below having found it appropriate to levy only substantive sentence of imprisonment in addition to the compensation, I do not find that the course adopted by the Courts below in imposing the sentence warrants any interference by this Court. Hence, even this contention is rejected. Consequently, the revision petition is dismissed as devoid of merits.