Kanchan Devi wife of Shri Bhagwan Sahai Sharma v. Pandit Shri Prem Vallabh Sharma
2017-05-05
JAINENDRA KUMAR RANKA
body2017
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : Mr. Jainendra Kumar Ranka, J. 1. Instant first appeal u/Sec. 96 CPC is directed against the judgment and decree dated 02.11.1998 whereby the suit for partition and injunction filed by the plaintiff-appellant was dismissed upon a preliminary issue which was framed as issue No.3 in a suit which reads as under:- vk;k izfroknh uacj&1 ds thfor jgrs oknuh dk fookfnr laifRr esa dksbZ LoRo o vf/kdkj ugha gS bl dkj.k okfnuh dks mDr lEifRr ckcr foHkktu dk nkok ykus dk vf/kdkj ugha gS \ 2. Learned Trial Court after holding that such issue needs to be decided as a preliminary issue, having heard the parties held that since the plaintiff was daughter of the defendant No.1, was not a coparcener in the suit property and thus not entitled to bring the suit for partition. The Trial Court further opined that for the sake of arguments even, if it is presumed that the suit property was personal property of defendant No.1 plaintiff's daughter, even then the plaintiff had no right in the suit property during the life time of the defendant No.1. Thus, the Trial Court holding that the suit was premature at this stage, dismissed the suit. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the impugned judgment and decree is bad in law deserves to be reversed and set aside for the reason that though number of issues were raised but the Trial Court took up only issue No.3 and held that the appellant had no right in the property of a father. Counsel contends that the father of the appellant though alive, the suit was filed but he expired lateron and plaintiff being his daughter was entitled to inherit the same. 4. Per-contra, ld. counsel for the respondent vehemently contended that the order passed by the Trial Court was just and proper and since the father was alive, therefore, the facts emerging at the time when the suit was taken up and there was no case of the plaintiff-appellant, had rightly been dismissed by the Trial Court. Counsel contends that if the Trial Court is satisfied on a particular issue, the other issues are not required to be considered. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record as well as the impugned judgment and decree in the light of the rival contentions raised at the bar. 6.
Counsel contends that if the Trial Court is satisfied on a particular issue, the other issues are not required to be considered. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have perused the material available on record as well as the impugned judgment and decree in the light of the rival contentions raised at the bar. 6. It would be appropriate to quote para 4 of the plaint which reads as under:- ;g fd okfnuh izfroknh la[;k 1 ,d dh ,d ek= okfjl ,ao mrjkf/kdkfjuh gSA 7. It would also be appropriate to quote a few paragraphs of the written statements filed on behalf of the defendant No.1 “father of the plaintiff” which reads as under :- 1- ;g lgh gS fd eafnj o lEifr esa izfroknh ua- 1 ds iwoZtksa dk foHkktu esa vk/kk Hkkx vk;k Fkk ftldk izfroknh ua- 1 ,d ek= Lokeh o vf/kdkjh gqvkA 3- ;g fd okn i= dk en ua- 3 bl la'kks/ku ds lkFk Lohdkj gS fd eafnj o eq> izfroknh dh lEifr okfnuh dh iSr`d lEifr ugh gSA bl lEifr esa okfnuh dk dksbZ LoRo ;k vf/kdkjh dkuwuu ugha gS vkSj u gks ldrk gSA eq> izfroknh dh lEifr dk feu izfroknh ,d ek= Lokeh o vf/kdkjh gSA okfnuh vFkok vU; fdlh dk eq> izfroknh dh lEifr esa fdlh izdkj dk dksbZ LoRo ;k vf/kdkj drbZ ugha gSA 5- okfnuh dh dksbZ iSr`d lEifr ugha gSA eq> izfroknh ds thoudky esa eq> izfroknh dh lEifr esa okfnuh dk fdlh izdkj dk LoRo ;k vf/kdkj gksus dk loky gh iSnk ugha gksrkA fo'ks”k fooj.k& 1- ;g fd fookfnr lEifr izfroknh ua- 1 dh iSr`d lEifr gSA okfnuh eq> izfroknh dh iq=h gSA izfroknh ua-1 ds thou dky esa okfnuh dk fookfnr lEifr esa fdlh izdkj dk dksbZ LoRo o vf/kdkj ugha gSA 2- ;g fd feu izfroknh us izfroknh ua- 4 ds gd esa c['kh'kukek LosPNk ls mldh lsokvksa ls izlUu gksdj fcuk fdlh ncko ds jkth [kq'kh gksl gokl ,oa izlUufpr ls vius odhy }kjk fy[kokdj okdk;nk fnuakd 12-12-1995 dks jftLV~h djk;k FkkA vr% c['kh'k dh xbZ lEifr dk izfroknh la- 4 ,d ek= Lokeh gSA bl c['kh'kukes esa gLr{ksi djus dk oknh ;k vU; dks dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha gSA 8.
The Trial Court in exercise of power conferred under Order 7, Rule 7 along with Order 14, Rule 2 of CPC proceeded to decide the issue No.3 on facts admitted by the plaintiff-appellant in the plaint and the Trial Court held as under:- Þizfroknh dk dFku gS fd Lo;a okni= ds vuqlkj lEifr okfn;k ds iwoZtksa dh iqLrSuh tk;nkn gS vkSj okfn;k D;ksafd dksikZluj ugha gks ldrh gS vkSj fookfnr lEifr esa vius firk izsecYyHk ds thoudky esa mldk dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha gSA rdZ ds fy;s izsecYyHk dh futh lEifr Hkh eku fy;k tk; rc Hkh okfn;k dk mldk thoudky esa lEifr ij dksbZ vf/kdkj ugha gSAÞ 9. It is clear on perusal of the above that the suit was instituted by the plaintiff in the year 1996 and at that relevant time, the plaintiff being a daughter was not a coparcener as per Hindu law. This fact has been noted by the ld. Trial Court and had categorically observed that the suit was premature at that relevant time. 10. The plaintiff-appellant admits and claimed that she is the only heir being a daughter of defendant No.1 father of the plaintiff. It is clear on facts admitted in the plaint that the property upon partition had come into the share of the defendant No.1 and since he had no son, he held the property as his self acquired individual property and since the plaintiff being daughter of the defendant No.1, was not coparcener in the family of defendant No.1. Hence could not have claimed any right in the property or its partition. 11. In my view, when the plaintiff herself claims that she is the only issue of defendant No.1 (Para-4 of the plaint quoted herein above) and hence in the absence of any male issue, the property acquired by him (father) in partition of ancestral property would be the separate property. The plaintiff therefore cannot claim “partition of the said property” which was the separate property of a father during his life time. 12. The defendant No.1 has admittedly executed the Registered gift deed dated 12.02.1995 of portion of the property received by him in partition. It has been fully supported by him to have been executed by him and defendant No.1 also filed a written statement admitting the said facts quoted supra.
12. The defendant No.1 has admittedly executed the Registered gift deed dated 12.02.1995 of portion of the property received by him in partition. It has been fully supported by him to have been executed by him and defendant No.1 also filed a written statement admitting the said facts quoted supra. Thus, the property being a separate property, therefore, he was fully competent to execute the gift deed in favour of the respondent No.4. 13. In my view, the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Prakash & Others v. Phoolvati & Others (2016) 2 SCC 36 is prospective in nature and would apply in a case where both the male coparcener and the daughter were living as on 09.09.2005. it would be appropriate to quote para 23 of the said judgment which reads as under:- “Accordingly, we hold that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 09.09.2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. Disposition or alienation including partitions which may have taken place before 20.12.2004 as per law applicable prior to the said date will remain unaffected. Any transaction of partition effected thereafter will be governed by the Explanation.” 14. Admittedly, Pandit Prem Vallabh @ Manohar defendant No.1 was alive when the suit was filed and he died on 18.11.2004 during the pendency of the appeal before this Court. Thus, on the day when the 2005 amendment Act under Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 came into force on 09.09.2005, the defendant No.1 Pandit Prem Vallabh Sharma @ Mahohar was not alive and the said amendment of 2005 is not applicable in the present case. 15. In view of what has been observed herein above, the present appeal being devoid of merit, is hereby dismissed with no order as to cost.