JUDGMENT Hon’ble Anil Kumar, J.—Heard Sri G.C. Sinha, learned counsel for petitioner, learned State counsel and perused the record. 2. None present on behalf of contesting respondents. 3. Facts as submitted by Sri G.C. Sinha, learned counsel for petitioner, in brief, are that petitioner-plaintiff filed a suit for permanent injunction and possession, registered as Civil Suit No. 494/98 in the Court of Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Tanda, Pratapgarh later on transferred to the Court of 4th Additional Civil Judge, (Jr. Div.), Pratapgarh. 4. Sri G.C. Sinha, learned counsel for petitioner submits that in the present case, after filing of written statement by the defendant, the petitioner moved an application for issue of the commission under Order 26 Rule 9 CPC on which an order was passed, however, the commission was carried out but the commissioner has not submitted his report. 5. Thereafter, on 13.2.1995, the matter was fixed for filing of the commissioner report, however on the said date, 28.2.1995 was fixed for framing of the issues. 6. On 28.2.1995, the date was fixed as 28.3.1995, but the same has been wrongly noted by learned counsel for petitioner-plaintiff as 28.7.1995, so on 28.3.1995 counsel for petitioner-plaintiff, did not appear in the suit, as such the same was dismissed for want of prosecution. When the said facts came to the knowledge of the petitioner-plaintiff, she moved an applciation for recall of the order dated 28.3.1995 under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC. Accordingly, a Misc. Case No. 58 of 1995 arising out of Original Suit No. 494 of 1988 (Smt. Jinnatul-Nisa v. Abdul Aziz) has been registered before 4th Additional Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), Pratapgarh. 7. By an order dated 20.3.1999, the trial Court had rejected the petitioner’s application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC on the ground that there is delay on the part of petitioner for getting commission conducted and she wants to linger the matter on one or other pretext, as such there is no sufficient cause for recall of the order dated 28.3.1995 by which the suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. 8. Order dated 20.3.1999 passed by the trial Court was challenged by the petitioner by filing appeal under Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 CPC, registered as Misc. 8. Order dated 20.3.1999 passed by the trial Court was challenged by the petitioner by filing appeal under Section 104 read with Order 43 Rule 1 CPC, registered as Misc. Civil Appeal No. 40 of 1999 (Smt. Jinnatul-Nisa v. Abdul Aziz) before Appellate Authority/4th Additional District Judge, Pratapgarh, dismissed by order dated 27.1.2001and the order dated 20.3.1999 passed by appellate Court has been confirmed. 9. In view of the said factual background, present writ petition has been filed before this Court challenging the order dated 27.1.2001 (Annexure 1) and 20.3.1999 (Annexure 2) passed by respondent Nos. 1 & 2 respectively. 10. Due to pendency of the present writ petition, Smt. Jinnatul-Nisa/petitioner-plaintiff died, substituted by her legal heirs Ashiq Ali and Guljar Ahmed as petitioner Nos. 1/1 and 1/2. 11. In addition to the said fact, respondent No. 4/Abdul Majeed has also died, substituted by his legal heirs Abdul Hamid alias Babbu and Abdul Wahid as respondent Nos. 4/1 & 4/2. 12. Sri G.C. Sinha, learned counsel for petitioner while pressing the case of the petitioner submits that the observations as made by trial Court while dismissing the petitioner’s application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC that the petitioner was lingering the matter in regard to submission of commissioner report has not been considered is totally incorrect and wrong facts as after passing of the order for appointment of Commissioner, the petitioner-plaintiff has taken appropriate steps for issue of commission, thereafter the commission was also conducted, so it is duty on the part of the Commissioner to submit the Commission report, as such it cannot be said that there is negligence on the part of the petitioner-plaintiff in this regard. 13. He further submits that inadvertently due to some bona fide mistake on 28.2.1995 when the date was fixed for framing of the issue, the next date was fixed as 28.3.1995, the same was noted as 28.7.1995 due to the said fact, on behalf of petitioner-plaintiff no appearance has been put on 28.3.1995. 14. Accordingly, an application under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC has been moved for recall of the order dated 28.3.1995 and there was sufficient cause for non-appearance when the suit was called for hearing, so keeping in view the said facts, the trial Court should recall the order dated 28.3.1995 and hear the matter on merit in the ends of justice. 15. 15. He further submits that the appellate Court while passing the order dated 27.1.2001 also erred in law to dismiss the appeal, the same is in contravention to the provisions of Order 41 Rule 32 CPC. 16. Accordingly, it is submitted by learned counsel for petitioner that in the present case, the ends of justice required that the orders under challenge in the present writ petition may be set aside and the trial Court may be directed to restore the matter and hear the same on merit after giving due opportunities to the parties concerned. 17. I have heard learned counsel for parties and gone through the record, taking into consideration the abvoesaid facts as well as the law as laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425 , where it has been held as under : “”Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is procedure, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a Penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical construction of sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to both sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.” (See. also Kailash v. Nanhku, 2005 (4) SCC 480 and Rani Kusum (Smt.) v. Kanchan Devi (Smt.) and others, 2005 (6) SCC 705 ) 18. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possible, in the light of that principle.” (See. also Kailash v. Nanhku, 2005 (4) SCC 480 and Rani Kusum (Smt.) v. Kanchan Devi (Smt.) and others, 2005 (6) SCC 705 ) 18. And in the case of Shekh Salim Haji Abdul Khayumsab v. Kumar and others, 2006 (1) SCC 46 , Hon’ble the Apex Court after taking into consideration the statement of objects and reasons for enacting the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, as well as amendment made therein, in paragraph Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13 & 14 held as under : “All the rules of procedure are the handmaid of justice. The language employed by the draftsman of processual law may be liberal or stringent, but the fact remains that the object of prescribing procedure is to advance the cause of justice. In an adversarial system, no party should ordinarily be denied the opportunity of participating in the process of justice dispensation. Unless compelled by express and specific language of the Statute, the provisions of the CPC or any other procedural enactment ought not to be construed in a manner which would leave the Court helpless to meet extraordinary situations in the ends of justice. The mortality of justice at the hands of law troubles a Judge’s conscience and points an angry interrogation at the law reformer. The processual law so dominates in certain systems as to overpower substantive rights and substantial justice. The humanist rule that procedure should be the handmaid, not the mistress, of legal justice compels consideration of vesting a residuary power in judges to act ex debito justiciae where the tragic sequel otherwise would be wholly inequitable. - Justice is the goal of jurisprudence - processual, as much as substantive. (See Sushil Kumar Sen v. State of Bihar, 1975 (1) SCC 774 ). No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending, and if, by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered, he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. (See Blyth v. Blyth (1966 (1) All ER 524 (HL). (See Blyth v. Blyth (1966 (1) All ER 524 (HL). A procedural law should not ordinarily be construed as mandatory, the procedural law is always subservient to and is in aid to justice. Any interpretation which eludes or frustrates the recipient of justice is not to be followed. (See. Shreenath and another v. Rajesh and others ( AIR 1998 SC 1827 ) Processual law is not to be a tyrant but a servant, not an obstruction but an aid to justice. Procedural prescriptions are the handmaid and not the mistress, a lubricant, not a resistant in the administration of justice. It is also to be noted that though the power of the Court under the proviso appended to Rule 1 of Order VIII is circumscribed by the words - “shall not be later than ninety days” but the consequences flowing from non-extension of time are not specifically provided though they may be read by necessary implication. Merely, because a provision of law is couched in a negative language implying mandatory character, the same is not without exceptions. The Courts, when called upon to interpret the nature of the provision, may, keeping in view the entire context in which the provision came to be enacted, hold the same to be directory though worded in the negative form.” 19. In view of the abovesaid position of law which has been laid down by Hon’ble the Apex Court is that the procedural laws are made for advancement of justice and a person cannot be denied on technical grounds and further every possible efforts should be made to decide the case on merit rather to shut the doors for a person on technical grounds. 20. Further, the very intention of legislature while enacting Order 9 Rule 9 CPC is that if a suit has been dismissed for non-appearance of a petitioner-plaintiff under Order 9 Rule 8 CPC then he is precluded to bring another suit on the same cause of action but if sufficient cause is being shown for his non-appearance when the suit was called for hearing, the Court should make all endeavours to set aside the dismissal on such terms or cause or otherwise it thinks fit which clearly shows that the procedural is always subservient to and is in aid of justice. 21. 21. The important word under Order 9 Rule 9 CPC for recalling of an ex parte are to “sufficient cause” which is to be shown by a party/petitioner for non-appearance when the suit is called for hearing. 22. The expression “sufficient cause is adequately elastic to enable the Court to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of the justice-that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of Courts. 23. Hon’ble the Apex Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani and others, AIR 1996 SC 1623 , while interpreting the words “sufficient cause” in paragraph No. 9 held as under (relevant portion) : “In G. Ramegowda, Major and others v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, [ (1988) 2 SCC 142 ], it was held that no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its counsel could be laid. The expression “sufficient cause” must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring the appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bona is imputable to the party seeking condonation of delay.” 24. In the case of Baswaraj and others v. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2014 SC 746 , Hon’ble the Apex Court while considering the manner of word “sufficient cause” in paragraph No. 9 held as under (relevant portion) : “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which Defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word “sufficient” is “adequate” or “enough”, inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word “sufficient” embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. In this context, “sufficient cause” means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has “not acted diligently” or “remained inactive”. However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The Court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose.” 25. Thus, in view of the abovesaid fact, the ratio of the law which emerged out is that in each and every case on the basis of the facts it is to be examined that whether sufficient cause exists in favour of the plaintiff or not for recalling of an order. 26. In the instant matter, from the perusal of the record, the position which emerged out is that due to bona fide mistake on the part of the lawyer of the petitioner, the date 28.3.1995 was noted as 28.7.1995, so for the said mistake, the petitioner cannot be penalized, that is to say that petitioner/plaintiff should not be denied for the relief for which the suit has been filed, the ground is a sufficient cause for recalling of the order by which the suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. 27. For the foregoing reasons, writ petition is allowed, order dated 27.1.2001 (Annexure 1) and 20.3.1999 (Annexure 2) passed by respondent Nos. 1 & 2 respectively are set aside and suit No. 494 of 1988 is restored to its original number with a direction to the trial Court to decide the same on merit after giving notice to the parties concerned expeditiously, say, within a period of one and half years from the date of receiving certified copy of this order.