JUDGMENT Hon’ble Manoj Misra, J.—Heard Sri Manoj Kumar Sharma for the petitioners; Sri Kshitij Shailendra for the respondents; and perused the record. 2. This is a defendants’ petition against the judgment and decree dated 18.2.2015 passed by the Civil Judge (Jr. Div.), J.P. Nagar in S.C.C. Suit No. 05 of 2008 and the order dated 10.4.2017 passed by the Additional District Judge/Special Judge (S.C./S.T. Act), Amroha in S.C.C. Revision No. 03 of 2015. 3. S.C.C. Suit No. 5 of 2008 was instituted by plaintiff-respondent against the defendant-petitioners for arrears of rent and eviction in respect of a shop. The plaintiff respondent claimed itself to be a registered Waqf and owner/landlord of the disputed shop. Waqf being owner of the disputed shop it was claimed that U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was not applicable. It was claimed that the defendants were tenant on a monthly rent of Rs. 15 per month; that they have been in arrears of rent since 1.11.1994; and that by a notice dated 16.7.2008 arrears of rent, with effect from 1.11.1994 up to 30.6.2008, was demanded and the tenancy was terminated; and that despite service of notice, the defendants neither vacated the premises nor paid the rent, hence were liable to be evicted. It was also alleged that the defendants had made material alterations in the accommodation in dispute and had thereby damaged the accommodation. 4. The defendants contested the suit by claiming that the notice terminating tenancy was invalid because it sought to terminate the tenancy on false grounds. It was claimed that on the first day of hearing, the entire arrears were deposited and therefore the defendants-tenants were entitled to the benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. In addition thereto, it was claimed that the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were applicable. 5. The trial Court formulated as many as four issues for consideration. The first was whether U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 was applicable on the shop in question; the second was whether there was valid termination of tenancy by the notice; the third was whether the defendants were entitled to the benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act; and the fourth was as to what relief the plaintiff was entitled to. 6. 6. On the first issue, the Court found that there was no dispute that the shop in dispute was a Waqf property accordingly, by virtue of amendment in the U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972, it fell out of the purview of the Act. On the issue as regards termination of tenancy by the notice, the Court below found that the tenancy was a month to month tenancy and there was a clear statement in the notice that the landlord did not wish to continue with the tenancy and that the tenant must handover peaceful and vacant possession upon expiry of one month from the date of service of notice. The service of notice was not disputed. In fact a reply was sent therefore the trial Court found that not only the notice was valid but it was also duly served. The Court below observed that since the defendant-petitioners were joint-tenants, therefore service of notice on any one of the joint tenants was sufficient to terminate the tenancy of all. In respect of benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act, the trial Court held that it was not a case of forfeiture of tenancy for violation of any of the terms and conditions of the lease, therefore, the provisions of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act were not attracted. Accordingly, the trial Court having found that there was valid termination of tenancy and the premises in dispute was a Waqf property, to which the provisions of U.P. Act No. 13 of 1972 were not applicable, decreed the plaintiff’s suit. 7. The revision preferred against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was dismissed by affirming the findings returned by the trial Court. Learned counsel for the petitioners has assailed the judgment and decree passed by the Court below on the following grounds : (a) That the shop in dispute being admittedly of the Waqf, the suit could not have been instituted in the Court of Judge Small Causes inasmuch as under Section 85 of the Waqf Act, no suit or other legal proceeding would lie in any Civil Court, revenue Court and any other authority in respect of any dispute, question or other matter relating to any waqf, waqf property or other matter which is required by or under the Act to be determined by a Tribunal. It has been submitted that earlier the question relating to eviction of a tenant or determination of rights and obligation of the lessor and lessee of such property were not within the purview of the Waqf Tribunal but, by Act No. 27 of 2013, with effect from 1.11.2013, even the question or matter relating to eviction of a tenant from a Waqf property came within the purview of the Waqf Tribunal and since a Waqf Tribunal has been notified for the area, the Court of Judge Small Causes did not have jurisdiction to proceed with the suit and as such the decree passed by the Court of Judge Small Causes is null and void; (b) That an ‘Izazatnama’ (permission letter) was written by the erstwhile Mutawalli in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the defendant-petitioners which permitted raising of constructions/repairs at the expense of the defendants and since the defendants had made repairs/constructions at their own expense, on the written permission granted by the landlord, their tenancy had become permanent. (c) That the notice terminating tenancy was defective inasmuch as the reasons disclosed in the notice that the defendants had been defaulter in payment of rent and had made material alteration in the shop without obtaining permission were both found to be false and therefore, once the ground on which the tenancy was terminated was found to be non-existent, there was no valid determination of tenancy. 8. Per contra, Sri Kshitij Shailendra, learned counsel for the landlord-respondents, submitted that the suit was instituted in the year 2008. At that time, Section 83 of the Waqf Act did not confer any jurisdiction on the Tribunal to determine disputes concerning eviction of tenants and therefore the suit in respect of eviction of a tenant was maintainable in the Court of Judge Small Causes and as such the decree passed by the Court of Judge Small Causes cannot be said to be without jurisdiction. It has further been submitted that under Section 85 of the Waqf Act, a suit instituted before the commencement of the Act was not liable to be transferred to the Tribunal. Accordingly, suits of such nature, as is in the present petition, if had been instituted before the amendment, that is before 1.11.2013, were not liable to be transferred to the Tribunal under Section 85 of the Waqf Act. Accordingly, suits of such nature, as is in the present petition, if had been instituted before the amendment, that is before 1.11.2013, were not liable to be transferred to the Tribunal under Section 85 of the Waqf Act. It has been submitted that the Apex Court in Ramesh Gobindram v. Sugra Humayun Mirza Waqf, (2010) 8 SCC 726 , interpreting the law as it existed prior to amendment brought by Act No. 27 of 2013 has held that in absence of any provision in the Waqf Act for any proceeding before Tribunal for determining disputes concerning eviction of tenant in occupation of waqf property, eviction suit against such tenants would be maintainable only before Civil Court and not before the Tribunal. It has been submitted that since the suit had been instituted prior to the amendment in Section 83 of the Waqf Act, the suit was rightly instituted in a Small Cause Court and since there is no provision for transfer of proceeding pending in a Civil Court to a Waqf Tibunal, the Court of Judge Small Causes continued to have jurisdiction to decide the suit and as such the decree passed by the Judge Small Causes is not void. A decision of this Court in Yashpal Lala Shiv Narain v. Allatala Tala Malik Waqf Ajakhan Mus, 2006 AIR (All) 115, has also been cited in support of the above submission. 9. In respect of the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the tenancy was in the form of a permanent tenancy in view of the ‘Izazatnama’ (permission letter), the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the said ‘Izazatnama’ (permission letter) was not part of the record of the lower Court and it was also not accepted by way of additional evidence and, in any case, the said ‘Izazatnama’ (permission letter) was only a mere permission to make repairs and it would not confer any permanent tenancy right. 10. 10. In respect of the third submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners that the notice was invalid because it gave incorrect statement as regards arrears of rent and raising of construction without permission, the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the tenancy was admittedly a month to month tenancy and it was not governed by any written lease and the said tenancy was terminated by a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act which clearly indicated that, upon expiry of one month from the date of service of notice, the tenant would have to handover vacant possession of the premises to the landlord, therefore the tenancy stood determined under Section 111(h) read with Section 106 of T.P. Act. It was submitted that the notice clearly disclosed the intention to terminate the tenancy and since one month time was provided to vacate the premises and the termination of tenancy was not dependant on any forfeiture clause contained in any lease deed, the tenant was rightly denied the benefit of Section 114 of the Transfer of Property Act. 11. I have considered the rival submissions of the learned counsel for the parties. 12. The admitted position is that the disputed shop is waqf property. The suit for eviction was instituted in the year 2008. On the date of institution of the suit, there was no provision in the Waqf Act conferring jurisdiction on a Waqf Tribunal to deal with disputes between the landlord and tenant such as eviction of tenants after determination of tenancy. Under the circumstances, keeping in mind the decision of the Apex Court in Ramesh Gobindram’s case (supra) as also of this Court in Yashpal Lala Shiv Narain’s case (supra) the suit on the date of its institution was not cognizable by a Waqf Tribunal and accordingly the J.S.C.C. Court had jurisdiction to proceed with the suit in accordance with the provisions of Section 15 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887, as applicable in the State of U.P. In Mohammad Mukhtar Ahmad v. Ghulam Abdul Qadir Alvi, 2014(9) ADJ 193 , this Court, after examining a number of judicial pronouncements interpreted the provisions of Section 85 of the Waqf Act so as to hold that the phrase “no suit or other legal proceeding shall lie” would mean that no such suit would henceforth lie. Meaning thereby that any suit which has been lawfully instituted before applicability of the bar imposed by Section 85 read with Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995 would not be hit by Section 85 of the Waqf Act. A Fortiori a suit instituted for eviction of a tenant in a Civil Court or the Court of Judge Small Causes prior to the amendment carried out in Section 83 of the Waqf Act by Act No. 27 of 2013, would have to be dealt with by the said Court, keeping in mind that there is no provision for transfer of proceeding from a Civil Court to Waqf Tribunal. In Sardar Khan v. Syed Najmul Hasan (Seth), (2007) 10 SCC 727 , the Apex Court while dealing with exclusivity of jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunal in respect of waqf property, held that Section 85 of the Waqf Act would not apply to pending proceeding. Accordingly, since the suit in question was instituted prior to the amendment carried out in Section 83 by Act No. 27 of 2013, and before the amendment the Waqf Tribunal had no jurisdiction to deal with matters relating to eviction of tenant from the Waqf property, the continuance of the proceeding in the Court of Judge Small Causes was lawful and well within its jurisdiction. Under the circumstances, the decree passed by the Small Causes Court is not void. 13. The contention that the tenancy became permanent on account of permission granted to make repairs cannot be accepted because there is no such condition in the ‘Izazatnama’ (permission letter) which has been brought to the notice of the Court. Accordingly, the second submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners also fails. 14. In respect of the third contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners that since the claim relating to tenant being a defaulter as also of making material alterations without permission of the landlord was found to be false, there was no valid termination of tenancy because the foundation of notice had gone, suffice to say that it was not a case of forfeiture of tenancy under the terms and conditions of lease agreement between the parties. The tenancy was terminated in exercise of right under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice terminating tenancy clearly terminated tenancy of the defendants by giving one month time to vacate the premises. The tenancy was terminated in exercise of right under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The notice terminating tenancy clearly terminated tenancy of the defendants by giving one month time to vacate the premises. Such termination of tenancy was not by way of forfeiture for violation of any of the terms of lease agreement but was a case of termination simplicitor under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and, therefore, the notice terminating tenancy was not invalid and the decree of eviction on the basis of such notice would not be rendered illegal. 15. In view of the discussion made herein above, this Court finds that there is no legal error in the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below. Accordingly, the prayer of the petitioners to set aside the impugned orders is rejected. 16. At this stage, learned counsel for the petitioners prayed that some reasonable time may be allowed to vacate the premises. Considering the facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that the interest of justice would be served if the petitioner is allowed time up to 31st August, 2017 to vacate the premises and handover possession to the landlord-respondent by then. 17. This petition is therefore disposed of by holding that no good ground has been shown to set aside the judgment and order passed by the Courts below accordingly the prayer to set aside the impugned orders is rejected. However,it is provided that the petitioners shall not be evicted from the premises in dispute pursuant to the eviction decree till 31st August, 2017 provided the petitioners, by 31st May, 2017, furnish an undertaking alongwith an affidavit in the trial Court that they shall handover vacant and peaceful possession of the premises in question to the landlord-respondent on 01st September, 2017. In addition to that they shall deposit the entire decretal amount if any, after adjusting the amount already deposited as also the rent/damages at the rate payable for the period up to 31st August, 2017, by 31st May, 2017, failing which the decree shall become executable forthwith. 18. It is made clear that if by 31st May, 2017 the aforesaid conditions are not complied with, then the decree shall become executable forthwith. 18. It is made clear that if by 31st May, 2017 the aforesaid conditions are not complied with, then the decree shall become executable forthwith. It is also made clear that if by 01st September, 2017 the petitioners fail to handover vacant and peaceful possession of the premises in question to the landlord-respondent despite undertaking, it would not only be open to the landlord-respondent to execute the decree but the landlord may also initiate proceeding against the petitioners for contempt of Court.