JUDGMENT : KISHORE KUMAR MANDAL, J. Heard Mr. U.N. Singh for the appellant and Mr. A.K. Sinha, APP for the State. 2. The appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction dated 24.02.2010 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge 2nd, Siwan in S.T. No. 413 of 1996 convicting the sole appellant under Sections 302/34 and 307/34 IPC and sentenced to him to suffer R.I. for life with fine having default clause under Section 302/34 and RI for 10 years under Section 307/ 34 with fine having default clause. 3. The background of the case leading to trial, in brief, is that P.W. 3 lodged an FIR on 23.09.1995 alleging that while he along with deceased and other family members were sitting at the Darwaja, the co-accuseds arrived there. There was a hot tiff between the deceased and the accused persons whereafter co-accused Sunil Choubey, returned with a licensee gun whereas the appellant arrived with lathi. The accused persons started abusing them. The deceased asked co-accused Anil Choubey, not to abuse them whereafter co-accused Sunil Choubey, is said to have fired which was averted by P.W. 1. Co-accused Sunil Choubey again fired causing injury to Ashok Kumar (P.W. 1). The deceased was then chased and fired twice by the co-accused Sunil Choubey which resulted in his death. 4. In order to prove the charge the prosecution examined seven witnesses. The Trial Court relied on the ocular description of the case given by P.W 1, P.W 2, and P.W 3 (informant) and held the appellant guilty of the charge. Aggrieved thereby the present appeal has been filed. 5. While the appeal was pending I.A. No. 1328 of 2016 was filed claiming the juvenility of the sole appellant on the date of occurrence i.e., 23.09.1995. Vide order dated 26.07.2016 the matter was referred to the Juvenile Justice Board, Siwan (hereinafter referred to as “the J.J. Board”) for making enquiry and submission of the report on such claim of sole appellant. The report dated 28.03.2017 furnished by the J.J. Board is placed on record. The appellant has also enclosed the entire order sheet including the findings of the J.J. Board, by filing a supplementary affidavit rendered in Cr. Misc. No. 01 of 2016. The report dated 28.03.2017 furnished by the J.J. Board is placed on record. The appellant has also enclosed the entire order sheet including the findings of the J.J. Board, by filing a supplementary affidavit rendered in Cr. Misc. No. 01 of 2016. Profitably, we extract the relevant findings of the Board hereunder : ^^fpfdRlh; ifj"kn }kjk fcuksn pkSCks dh vk;q fnukad 15-02-2017 dks 35&36 o"kZ ds chp vkdyu fd;k x;k gSA /kVuk fnukad 22-09-1995 dh gSA bl izdkj ?kVuk esfMdy tk¡p dh frfFk ls 21 o"kZ 04 eghuk 23 fnu igys dh gSA fd'kksj dh fd'kksjrk dk ykHk iznku djus gsrq fpfdRlh; ifj"kn }kjk vafdr U;qure mez dks vk/kkj ysrs gq;s x.kuk ds i'pkr~ ?kVuk dh frfFk fnukad 22-09-1995 dks 14 o"kZ 04 eghuk 23 fnu gksrk gS] ijUrq esfMdy tk¡p izfrosnu ds vk/kkj ij fofufnZ"V #i ls fnu rFkk rkjh[k vo/kkfjr fd;k tkuk ;qfDr;qDr izrhr ugha gksrk gSA vr% buds mez dk vkdyu 14&15 o"kZ ds chp fd;k tkrk gSA ;g vk;q ?kVuk dh frfFk dks 18 o"kZ ls dke gksrk gSA vr% fd'kksj U;k; ifj"kn ds lHkh lnL;ksa dh lgefr ls esfMdy tk¡p izfrosnu eas vkdfyr vk;q ds vk/kkj ij ?kVuk dh frfFk ij fcuksn pkSCks dks ip#[kh Fkkuk dk.M la[;k & 119@1995 esa fd'kksj ?kksf"kr fd;k tkrk gSA^^ 6. In the light of the findings of the J.J. Board the sole appellant is treated as juvenile in conflict with law. 7. Before us Mr. Udit Narayan Singh, the counsel for the appellant, has not argued the appeal on merit. It has been submitted that once such a declaration of the status of the appellant is made by the J.J. Board, the matter shall now be required to be sent to the jurisdictional J.J. Board for appropriate sentence to be awarded on him in accordance with the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (hereinafter referred to as the “Act”). It is also pointed out before us that a cognate appeal is also pending in respect of other convicts. 8. We have carefully gone through the relevant evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the charge. The counsel for the appellant states that instead of pressing the appeal on merit the appellant would prefer to avail the privileges conferred under the Act on the juvenile in conflict with law. 8. We have carefully gone through the relevant evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove the charge. The counsel for the appellant states that instead of pressing the appeal on merit the appellant would prefer to avail the privileges conferred under the Act on the juvenile in conflict with law. As the counsel for the appellant has not pressed the appeal on merit we refrain from recording our reasons on the guilt of the appellant. 9. What the Court in such circumstance shall do is clarified by the judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The appellant has relied on the case of Jitendra Singh v. State of U.P. reported in 2013 (11) SCC 1993. 10. In Jintendra Singh (supra) the Hon’ble Apex Court citing the judgment rendered by it in Kalu vs. State of Haryana (2012 (8) SCC 24) with approval in paragraphs 83 and 85 held as under : “83. In Kalu case, the plea of juvenility was raised before this Court for the first time as is the position in the present case also. This Court while dealing with the options available noticed the absence of plea on the ground of juvenility and held that even if such a plea had been raised before the High Court, the High Court would have had to record its finding that Kalu alias Amit was guilty, confirm his conviction, set aside the sentence and forward the case to the Board for passing an order under Section 15 of the Juvenile Act. The Court observed: (SCC p. 42, para 24) “24. The instant offence took place on 7-4-1999. As we have already noted Kalu alias Amit was a juvenile on that date. He was convicted by the trial court on 7-9-2000. The Juvenile Act came into force on 1-4-2001. The appeal of Kalu alias Amit was decided by the High Court on 11-7-2006. Had the defence of juvenility been raised before the High Court and the fact that Kalu alias Amit was a juvenile at the time of commission of the offence has come to light the High Court would have had to record its finding that Kalu alias Amit was guilty, confirm his conviction, set aside the sentence and forward the case to the Board and the Board would have passed any appropriate order permissible under Section 15 of the Juvenile Act (see Hari Ram).” 85. In the totality of the above circumstances, there is no reason why the conviction of the appellant should be interfered with, simply because he is under the 2000 Act a juvenile entitled to the benefit of being referred to the Board for an order under Section 15 of the said Act. There is no gainsaying that even if the appellant had been less than sixteen years of age, on the date of the occurrence, he would have been referred for trial to the Juvenile Court in terms of Section 8 of the 1986 Act. The Juvenile Court would then hold a trial and record a conviction or acquittal depending upon the evidence adduced before it. In an ideal situation a case filed before an ordinary Criminal Court when referred to the Board or Juvenile Court may culminate in a conviction at the hands of the Board also. But law does not countenance a situation where a full-fledged trial and even an appeal ends in a conviction of the accused but the same is set aside without providing for a trial by the Board.” 10. We may note that the occurrence in the present case was committed on 22.09.1995 when the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 was in force. 11. In Jitendra Singh (supra) the legal conundrum has been explained in paragraph 80 which reads as under : “80. The settled legal position, therefore, is that in all such cases where the accused was above 16 years but below 18 years of age on the date of occurrence, the proceedings pending in the Court concerned will continue and be taken to their logical end except that the Court upon finding the juvenile guilty would not pass an order of sentence against him. Instead he shall be referred to the Board for appropriate orders under the 2000 Act. Applying that proposition to the case at hand the trial Court and the High Court could and indeed were legally required to record a finding as to the guilt or otherwise of the appellant. All that the Courts could not have done was to pass an order of sentence, for which purpose, they ought to have referred the case to the Juvenile Justice Board.” 12. The counsel for the appellant has also relied on the case of Mumtaz vs. State of U.P. (Now Uttarakhand) reported in 2016 (3) PLJR SC 297. All that the Courts could not have done was to pass an order of sentence, for which purpose, they ought to have referred the case to the Juvenile Justice Board.” 12. The counsel for the appellant has also relied on the case of Mumtaz vs. State of U.P. (Now Uttarakhand) reported in 2016 (3) PLJR SC 297. In the said case also the Hon’ble Supreme Court notes proposition of law enunciated in Kalu (supra) and disposed of the appeal in the terms stated in paragraph 27 thereof. 13. Considering the submissions made by the counsel for the appellant and the law clarified on this point, this Court while holding the appellant as juvenile in conflict with law in terms of 2000 Act as found by the J.J. Board hold him guilty of the offence for which he was tried, but sets aside the sentence imposed on him by the learned trial Court and remit the matter to the J.J. Board for determining the appropriate quantum of sentence/fine that may be imposed on the appellant. In case the Board finds that adequate fine should be imposed on the appellant it shall be open to the J.J. Board to direct for payment of fine to the family of the deceased. The appellant shall appear before the Board within four weeks whereafter he shall stand discharged of his liabilities of bail bonds. 14. The Appeal is disposed of with the aforesaid observations and directions. 15. Let the relevant records of the appeal be transmitted to the J.J. Board.