ORDER : RAGHVENDRA S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. All these writ petitions arise out of similar factual matrix, and raise identical legal issues. Therefore, they are being decided by this common order. 2. The facts of the case are being taken from P. D. Nanaiah and Others v. Vijaya Bank and Others W.P. Nos. 17234-267/2014. Although this case has a checkered history, it is imperative to narrate the same in order to understand the eventual legal issue which would arise in these set of writ petitions, namely in case an employee has completed the qualifying service, whether his/her resignation should be treated as voluntary retirement or not? Whether an employee who has resigned from the service, under different Bank Regulations, would be entitled to receive the benefit of pension, or not? 3. The petitioners joined the services of different banks (referred to as the "respondent Bank") between 1969 to 1985 either as officers, or clerks, or sub-staff. During the tenure of their service, dispute arose between the Bank employees and the Management of fifty-eight banks with regard to the introduction of pension scheme as a second retrial benefit in lieu of the Contributory Provident Fund. Eventually on 29.10.1993, a Settlement was reached between the Bank employees and the Managements of the fifty-eight banks. The said Settlement was to come into effect from 01.11.1993. According to Clause 5 of the said Settlement, those employees who have voluntarily retired after a qualifying service of twenty years would be entitled to receive proportionate pension. 4. But before the petitioners and others could get a chance to opt for the pension, on 04.11.1995, the Vijaya Bank notified the Vijaya Bank (Employees') Pension Regulations, 1995 ("the Regulations", for short). According to Regulation 22 of the Regulations, if a Bank employee were to participate in a strike, his entire past service would be forfeited. Since the petitioners, and other employees, were aggrieved by Regulation 22 of the Regulations, they did not exercise their option for pension. Instead, the employees protested against Regulation 22 of the Regulations through their trade unions. On 11.11.1997, the Management agreed to delete Regulation 22 of the Regulations. Eventually on 24.12.1997, the Government also agreed to delete Regulation 22 of the Regulations, and to inform the Indian Bank Association accordingly. 5. During the period 2007-2010, none of the banks had introduced the Voluntary Retirement Scheme ("VRS", for short). On 11.11.1997, the Management agreed to delete Regulation 22 of the Regulations. Eventually on 24.12.1997, the Government also agreed to delete Regulation 22 of the Regulations, and to inform the Indian Bank Association accordingly. 5. During the period 2007-2010, none of the banks had introduced the Voluntary Retirement Scheme ("VRS", for short). But wanting to exit from their Bank, the petitioners signed from their service during this period. 6. During this period of 2007-2010, the Bank employees demanded that another opportunity should be given to them for opting for the pension scheme under the Regulations. Consequently, on 27.04.2010, the Bank employees and the Management concluded a Settlement on the said issue under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. A Joint Note was duly signed between the parties. 7. Purporting to act under the Settlement and the Joint Note dated 27.04.2010, on 07.09.2010, the respondent Bank issued a Circular. According to the said Circular, another option to join the pension was granted to the bank employees who were either serving, or had retired, or had opted for voluntary retirement under the VRS. However, according to the Circular, those who had resigned from the service were not entitled to receive the benefit of pension, as they could not opt for pension under the Regulations. According to Clause VII, "this option to join the pension scheme shall not be extended to those employees (Officers and Award staff) who ceased to be in the service of the bank in any manner other than the categories mentioned here-in-above". Thus, the option to join the pension scheme was not available to those who had resigned from their service. 8. Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in Clause VII of the Circular, a few employees submitted their option for seeking the benefit of pension under the Regulations. However, their request was turned down by the respondent Bank on 02.11.2010, inter alia on the ground that Clause VII of the Circular did not grant them the right to opt for the pension scheme. 9. Since these employees were aggrieved by the rejection of their request, they filed writ petitions before this court, namely W.P. Nos. 24158-160/2011. By order dated 18.04.2012, a learned Single Judge quashed Clause VII of the Circular, and opined that the petitioners therein are entitled to receive pension as per the Regulations. 10. 9. Since these employees were aggrieved by the rejection of their request, they filed writ petitions before this court, namely W.P. Nos. 24158-160/2011. By order dated 18.04.2012, a learned Single Judge quashed Clause VII of the Circular, and opined that the petitioners therein are entitled to receive pension as per the Regulations. 10. Since the respondent Bank was aggrieved by the said order, it filed a Writ Appeal, namely W.A. Nos. 2956-2977/2012, before a learned Division Bench of this Court. However, by judgment dated 30.07.2012, the learned Division Bench dismissed the appeal, and upheld the order dated 18.04.2012. 11. Meanwhile, other employees who had also resigned from their service with the Bank, also filed a writ petition before this court, namely W.P. No. 7245/2011. By order dated 30.08.2012, a learned Single Judge allowed the said writ petition in view of the decision of the learned Division Bench mentioned here-in-above. 12. Since the respondent Bank was aggrieved by the judgment dated 30.07.2012, passed by the learned Division Bench, it filed a review petition, namely R.P. No. 68/2013 before this Court. However, by order dated 25.10.2013, the learned Division Bench dismissed the review petition. 13. Since the respondent Bank was aggrieved both by the judgment dated 30.07.2012, and the order dated 25.10.2013, passed by the learned Division Bench, it filed a Special Leave Petition ("SLP", for short) before the Hon'ble Supreme Court, namely C.C. Nos. 20811-32/2013. But, by order dated 06.12.2013, the Apex Court dismissed the Special Leave Petition. However, the Apex Court kept the question of law open. 14. On 04.04.2014, some of the petitioners filed their representations for being brought under the umbrella of the Regulations, and for being given the option to chose the pension scheme. Since Clause VII of the Circular dated 07.09.2010 had been struck down by this Court, since on an earlier occasion the petitioners, in the above mentioned writ petitions, had won their cases all the way up to the Apex Court, the petitioners herein were hopeful that their representations would be accepted by the respondent Banks. However, by orders dated 07.04.2014, the respondent Bank has rejected the representation filed by some of the petitioners. Hence, the present set of writ petitions before this Court. 15. Mr. However, by orders dated 07.04.2014, the respondent Bank has rejected the representation filed by some of the petitioners. Hence, the present set of writ petitions before this Court. 15. Mr. M. Nagaprasanna, the learned counsel for petitioners, has raised the following contentions before this Court :- Firstly, the case of the petitioners herein is on identical footing as the case of the petitioners who had approached this court in W.P. Nos. 24158-160/2011. By order dated 18.04.2012, while striking down Clause VII of the Circular dated 07.09.2010, this Court had directed that the petitioners therein would be entitled to the pension scheme under the Regulations. Moreover, the direction issued by the learned Single Judge were upheld by the learned Division Bench, and by the Apex Court. Therefore, the benefit of such a direction cannot be denied to the present petitioners. After all, this court is bound by the decision of the learned Division Bench dated 30.07.2012. Secondly, relying heavily on the case of Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India AIR 2015 SC 2434 : (2014) 16 SCC 260 and on the case of Asgar Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (2015) SCC Online SC 937, the learned counsel has vigorously argued that in case an employee completes his qualifying service for pension, and then resigns from the service, in such circumstances, the resignation should be treated as a voluntary retirement. Therefore, the petitioners' "resignation" should be equated with "voluntary retirement" from the service. Hence, they are entitled to give their option for being included in the pension scheme under the Regulations. Lastly, if the petitioners are not granted the benefit of the pension scheme under the Regulations, a highly anomalous situation would emerge: for, while some employees who had equally resigned have been given the benefit of the pension scheme under the Regulation due to the decision of this court, and the Hon'ble Supreme Court as mentioned above, the present employees would be denied the benefit of the same pension scheme under the Regulation by the respondent Bank. Therefore, by denying the petitioners the right to opt for the pension scheme the respondent Bank is violating the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution of India. 16. On the other hand, Mr. Therefore, by denying the petitioners the right to opt for the pension scheme the respondent Bank is violating the fundamental rights of the petitioners under Article 14, 16, and 21 of the Constitution of India. 16. On the other hand, Mr. Pradeep S. Sawkar, the learned counsel for the respondent-Bank, has raised the following counter-arguments before this court:- Firstly, even while dismissing the SLP filed by the respondent Bank, by order dated 06.12.2013, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had kept the question of law open. Therefore, this court would have to decide the questions of law mentioned here-in-above. Secondly, the present set of writ petitions are highly belated as the Settlement was reached on 27.04.2010, the Circular was issued on 07.09.2010, yet the present set of writ petitions have been filed in 2014. Thus, there is an inordinate delay of four years. Thirdly, in case the petitioners were, indeed, aggrieved by Clause VII of the Circular dated 07.09.2010, like their other colleagues, the petitioners too should have immediately approached this court, and challenged the said Clause. Those who wait and watch on the sidelines to see the outcome of a litigation, they do not deserve the benefit of a judgment which may be passed granting relief to others who are similarly placed. Therefore, the petitioners, who have waited on the sidelines, should not be given the benefit of the judgment passed by the learned Division Bench of this Court, and the Hon'ble Apex Court. In order to support his plea, the learned counsel has relied upon the State of U.P. and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others (2015) 1 SCC 347 . Fourthly, relying on the case of M.R. Prabhakar and Others v. Canara Bank and Others (2012) 9 SCC 671 , the learned counsel has strenuously argued that there is a clear-cut distinction between a "resignation" and a "voluntary retirement" from the service. Therefore, these two categories cannot be confused. Moreover, in the case of M.R. Prabhakar and Others v. Canara Bank and Others (supra), the Apex Court had clearly pointed out that the benefit of pension granted under the Scheme promulgated by the Insurance Company, the same benefit cannot be given to the Bank employees as the provisions of the Regulations in the Insurance Company are different from the Regulations in the Banking Sector. Therefore, the petitioners' reliance on the case of Asgar Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra) is misplaced. Fifthly, the case of Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India (supra) is distinguishable from the present set of petitions on factual matrix. The case of Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India (supra) was decided on the peculiar facts of the said case. Therefore, the case of Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India (supra) does not support the case of petitioners. Lastly, the Regulations require the employees to surrender their contribution made to the Contributory Provident Fund for the creation of the pension fund. Thus, the pension fund has a limited corpus. Therefore, the employees are required to give their option for seeking pension within a limited time frame. In case the option is not exercised within the limited time frame, then the employee cannot be granted the benefit of pension under the Regulations. In order to buttress this plea, the learned counsel has relied upon the cases of B.V. Narayana Murthy v. Deputy General Manager, Punjab National Bank and Others W.P. No. 12372/2011 decided on 14.07.2015 and Vasudeva Sheena Karkera v. Bank of Baroda and Others W.P. No. 11446/2014 decided on 07.07.2017. 17. Heard the learned counsel for parties, perused the impugned endorsement, and considered the record. 18. Admittedly, the issue with regard to the legality of Clause VII of the Circular had travelled from this court to the Apex Court. The judgment passed by this court striking down Clause VII of the Circular was not interfered by the Apex Court. In fact, the Apex Court had kept the question of law open. Thus, the present cases would have to be decided on the basis of the questions of law mentioned here-in-above. Therefore, the petitioners are unjustified in seeking the benefit of the earlier decisions of this court on Clause VII of the Circular. 19. While dealing with the case of fence-sitters, in the case of State of U.P. and Others v. Arvind Kumar Srivastava and Others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has opined as under: (i) The normal rule is that when a particular set of employees is given relief by the court, all other identically situated persons need to be treated alike by extending that benefit. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Not doing so would amount to discrimination and would be violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. This principle needs to be applied in service matters more emphatically as the service jurisprudence evolved by the Supreme Court from time to time postulates that all similarly situated persons should be treated similarly. Therefore, the normal rule should be that merely because other similarly situated persons did not approach the court earlier, they are not to be treated differently. (ii) However, this principle is subject to well-recognised exceptions in the form of laches and delays as well as acquiescence. Those persons who did not challenge the wrongful action in their cases and acquiesced into the same and woke up after long delay only because of the reason that their counterparts who had approached the court earlier in time succeeded in their efforts, then such employees cannot claim that the benefit of the judgment rendered in the case of similarly situated persons be extended to them. They would be treated as fence-sitters and laches and delays, and/or the acquiescence, would be a valid ground to dismiss their claim. 20. Undoubtedly, the respondent Bank published the Circular on 07.09.2010. According to Clause VII of the Circular those who had resigned from service were precluded from seeking the benefit of the pension scheme. In case, the petitioners were aggrieved by Clause VII of the Circular, they too should have immediately rushed to this court like their other colleagues. However, the petitioners chose to wait and watch the outcome of series of litigation pending between their other colleagues and the respondent Bank. Therefore, the learned counsel for petitioners is unjustified in claiming that the benefit of order dated 18.04.2012, passed in W.P. Nos. 24158-160/ 2011, upheld by the learned Division Bench by judgment dated 30.07.2012, should be given to the present petitioners. Hence, the first contention raised by the learned counsel for petitioners is clearly unacceptable. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioners is equally unjustified in claiming that merely because the petitioners have completing their qualifying services for pension, therefore, their "resignation" should be treated as "voluntary retirement" from the service. For, there are three different modes which are available to an employee for exiting from his service, firstly, resignation; secondly, seeking voluntary retirement; thirdly, reaching the age of superannuation. The law makes a clear distinction between a "resignation" and "voluntary retirement". For, there are three different modes which are available to an employee for exiting from his service, firstly, resignation; secondly, seeking voluntary retirement; thirdly, reaching the age of superannuation. The law makes a clear distinction between a "resignation" and "voluntary retirement". The said distinction has been pointed out by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Prabhakar and Others v. Canara Bank and Others (supra). Relying on the case of UCO Bank and Others v. Sanwar Mai AIR 2004 SC 2135 : (2004) 4 SCC 412 , the Apex Court has opined as under: "9. The words "resignation" and "retirement" carry different meanings in common parlance. An employee can resign at any point of time, even on the second day of his appointment, but in the case of retirement he retires only after attaining the age of superannuation or in the case of voluntary retirement on completion of qualifying service. The effect of resignation and retirement to the extent that there is severance of employment, but in service jurisprudence both the expressions are understood differently. Under the Regulations, the expressions 'resignation' and 'retirement' have been employed for different purpose and carry different meanings. The pension scheme herein is based on actuarial calculation; it is a self-financing scheme, which does not depend upon budgetary support and consequently it constitutes a complete code by itself. The scheme essentially covers retirees as the credit balance to their provident fund account is larger as compared to employees who resigned from service. Moreover, resignation brings about complete cessation of master-and-servant relationship whereas voluntary retirement maintains the relationship for the purpose of grant of retrial benefits, in view of the past service. Similarly, acceptance of resignation is dependent upon discretion of the employer whereas retirement is completion of service in terms of regulations/rale framed by the bank. Resignation can be tendered irrespective of the length of service whereas in the case of voluntary retirement, the employee has to complete qualifying service for retrial benefits." 22. Thus, law distinguishes between a 'resignation', and 'voluntary retirement'. Hence, 'resignation', and 'voluntary retirement' form two distinct and separate classes. Therefore, those who have resigned from their service cannot claim that their "resignation" should be treated as "voluntary retirement". For, such an argument blurs the distinction between a "resignation", and "voluntary retirement". Thus, law distinguishes between a 'resignation', and 'voluntary retirement'. Hence, 'resignation', and 'voluntary retirement' form two distinct and separate classes. Therefore, those who have resigned from their service cannot claim that their "resignation" should be treated as "voluntary retirement". For, such an argument blurs the distinction between a "resignation", and "voluntary retirement". Moreover, the law does not permit the blurring of the difference between the two on the ground that if an employee has completed the qualifying service for the purpose of pension, then his resignation would be deemed to be a "voluntary retirement". Hence, the argument of the learned counsel for petitioners is clearly unsustainable. 23. Although the learned counsel for petitioners has relied on the case of Asgar Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra), but in the case of M.R. Prabhakar and Others v. Canara Bank and Others (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has clearly opined that the provisions of the pension scheme of the Insurance Companies and the pension scheme prevalent in the Banks are not pari materia. For, while in the Insurance Pension Regulations, no distinction is made between a "resignation" and a "voluntary retirement", in the Bank Pension Regulations, such a distinction has been clearly made. Therefore, the case of Asgar Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (supra), which dealt with the Insurance Pension Regulation, does not come to the rescue of the petitioners. 24. Of course, the learned counsel for petitioners has heavily relied on the case of Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India (supra). However, the said case is distinguishable on the factual matrix itself. Therefore, even the case of Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India (supra), does not buttress the petitioners' case. 25. A bare perusal of the Regulations clearly reveal that the pension fund is created by surrender of the Contributory Provident Fund by the employee. Therefore, the option for seeking the pension has to be exercised within a limited time frame. After the time period is over, those employees who have not exercised the option, they cannot be permitted to opt for pension. Therefore, the option for seeking the pension has to be exercised within a limited time frame. After the time period is over, those employees who have not exercised the option, they cannot be permitted to opt for pension. In the case of B.V. Narayana Murthy v. Deputy General Manager, Punjab National Bank and Others (supra) and Vasudeva Sheena Karkera v. Bank of Baroda and Others (supra), the issue that arose before this court was whether those employees, who have not opted for the pension scheme within the stipulated period, can be permitted to opt for the pension scheme after the period for such an option has expired, or not ? This court has categorically held that once the period is over for opting for the pension scheme, the employees cannot be permitted to exercise their option for the said scheme. The present set of petitions are squarely covered by the decision of this court in the aforementioned cases. Therefore, the respondent Bank is legally justified in disallowing the petitioners from exercising their option for the pension scheme. Hence, the orders dated 07.04.2014, rejecting the representations filed by some of the petitioners, are legally valid. 26. For the reasons stated above, this court does not find any merit in these writ petitions. They are, therefore, dismissed. No order as to costs.