JUDGMENT : Ashwani Kumar Singh, J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioners and learned counsel for the informant. 2. The factual details pertaining to the FIR and registration of police case as well as filing of application by the prosecution under section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr. P.C.') are as under:- (a) On the basis of a written complaint made by Ranvir Jha, Bihpur (Bhawanipur) P.S. Case No. 224 of 2010 was registered at 6:00 p.m. on 20.06.2010 under Sections 143, 341, 323, 337, 338, 504 and 379 of the Indian Penal Code. (b) In the written report, the informant has stated that at about 9:00 a.m., on 20.06.2010, when he came out of his house, he saw Dharampati Jha, Rupam Jha, Pammi Kumari, Gama Kumari, Tapesh Jha, Vipin Jha, Nityanand Jha, Keshav Kumar Jha, Akhilanand Jha and Vigyan Jha removing bricks stored in front of his house on his land. When he forbade them, they started abusing him and on protest Dharampati Jha assaulted him with a piece of brick on his head causing bleeding injury. He also snatched his golden chain. It is further stated that ten days before the alleged incident, accused Dharampati Jha along with others had demanded Rs. 1 lakh from him as rangdari. Since he did not pay them the amount of money, they had committed the alleged offence against him. (c) On completion of investigation, the police submitted charge-sheet, vide Charge-sheet No. 296 of 2010, dated 29.08.2010, under Sections 341, 323, 324, 337, 338, 307, 387, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code against seven accused persons named in the FIR, but the petitioners Pammi Kumari, Gama Kumari and Tapesh Kumar, who were also named in the FIR were found innocent and were not sent up for trial. (d) On receipt of the police report, the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Naugachia, vide order dated 06.06.2011, took cognizance of the offences under Sections 341, 323, 324, 307, 337, 338, 387, 504 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code against the accused persons, who were sent up for trial. (e) After taking cognizance of the offence and after supplying the requisite documents in compliance with section 207 of the Cr. (e) After taking cognizance of the offence and after supplying the requisite documents in compliance with section 207 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 the learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, vide order, dated 06.06.2011, committed the case to the Court of Sessions for trial, as the offence under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code was triable by the Court of Sessions. (f) The trial court framed charges against the accused persons and proceeded with the trial. In course of trial, altogether six witnesses, namely, P.W.-1 Ajay Kumar Jha, P.W.-2 Laxman Mandal, P.W.-3 Usha Jha, P.W.-4 Ranvir Jha, P.W.-5 Koli Sharma and P.W.-6 Dr. Sanjeev Kumar were examined, cross-examined and discharged, whereafter, an application under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 was filed on behalf of the prosecution for summoning the petitioners under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 as additional accused. (g) The application filed on behalf of the prosecution was allowed by the trial court, vide order, dated 04.12.2015 and the petitioners have been summoned to face trial along with the other accused persons already facing trial. The aforesaid order, dated 04.12.2015, is under challenge in the present application. 3. The deposition of witnesses examined, in course of trial, has been brought on record by way of a supplementary affidavit filed on behalf of the petitioners. 4. P.W.-1 Ajay Kumar Jha has stated in his deposition that on 20.06.2010, he was staying at the house of his brother-in-law Ranvir Jha. When he came out of his house, he saw that Dharampati Jha, Vigyan Jha, Bipin Jha, Rupam Devi, Pammi Kumari, Gamma Kumari and Tapesh Jha were abusing Ranvir Jha in filthy language. He has further stated that Dharampati Jha assaulted his brother-in-law with a piece of brick on his forehead causing bleeding injury, as a result of which, he fell down and became unconscious. He has further stated that Dharampati Jha snatched his golden chain. He has further stated that 8-10 days prior to the date of the alleged incident, Dharampati Jha, Vigyan Jha and Bipin Jha had demanded Rs. 1 Lakh as rangdari from his brother-in-law. 5. P.W.-2 Laxman Mandal, driver of the informant Ranvir Jha has stated in his deposition that he saw altercation taking place between Ranvir Jha and Dharampati Jha. He has further stated that 8-10 days prior to the date of the alleged incident, Dharampati Jha, Vigyan Jha and Bipin Jha had demanded Rs. 1 Lakh as rangdari from his brother-in-law. 5. P.W.-2 Laxman Mandal, driver of the informant Ranvir Jha has stated in his deposition that he saw altercation taking place between Ranvir Jha and Dharampati Jha. He has stated that Dharampati Jha and his family members started throwing bricks kept outside the house of Ranvir Jha and in the process, one of the bricks hit the forehead of Ranvir Jha causing bleeding injury. 6. P.W.-3 Usha Jha, wife of Ranvir Jha, has stated that on 20th June, 2010, at 9:00 a.m., she heard hulla at her door. When she came out, she saw accused Vigyan Jha, Dharampati Jha, Rupam Devi, Pammi Kumari, Gama Kumari and Tapesh Jha were abusing Ranvir Jha. She has further stated that Dharampati Jha was throwing bricks towards the field and when her husband asked him not to do so, Vigyan Jha, and Dharampati Jha demanded Rs. 1 lakh as rangdari. When he refused to oblige them, Vigyan Jha ordered to kill him and on his exhortion, Dharmapati Jha picked up a piece of brick and assaulted her husband with it on his forehead causing bleeding injury. Thereafter, she has stated that Dharampati Jha took out a sharp cutting weapon and again hit on the head of her husband Ranvir Jha. She has stated that Rupam Devi, Pammi Kumari, Gamma Kumari and Rupesh Jha also assaulted him with bricks, fists and slaps, as a result of which, he became unconscious. She has stated that the Dharampati Jha took away golden chain of her husband. 7. P.W.-4, the informant, has stated that on 20th June, 2010, at about 9:00 a.m., on hearing hulla, he came out of his house and saw that bricks lying on his land was being thrown by the accused Vigyan Jha, Dharampati Jha, Rupam Devi, Pammi Kumari, Gamma Kumari and Tapesh Jha in a ditch by the side of the road. When he forbade them, they started abusing him and on his exhortion, Vigyan Jha, Dharampati Jha assaulted with a piece of brick on his head causing bleeding injury. Thereafter, he took out a knife from his pocket and assaulted with it on his head, as a result of which, he sustained injuries. When he forbade them, they started abusing him and on his exhortion, Vigyan Jha, Dharampati Jha assaulted with a piece of brick on his head causing bleeding injury. Thereafter, he took out a knife from his pocket and assaulted with it on his head, as a result of which, he sustained injuries. He has stated that Rupam Devi, Pammi Kumari and Gamma Kumari also assaulted him. 8. P.W.-5 Koli Sharma has stated that on hulla, when he went to the place of occurrence, he saw that Dharampati Jha, his two daughters and one son and his wife started assaulting the informant with bricks. He saw that they were throwing the bricks stored outside the house of the informant. He has stated that Dharampati Jha assaulted the informant with brick on his head. He also assaulted him with a knife on his head. 9. P.W.-6, Dr. Sanjeev Kumar, examined the injured on 20.06.2010. He has stated that upon examination, he found following simple injuries on the person of the injured:- (i) One incised wound over frontal region size about 2" x 1/3" x 1/3" (ii) One abrasion over left scapular region size about 2" x 2" (iii) Bleeding from right nostril. 10. Be it noted here that I have not examined the cross-examination part of the evidence of witnesses examined before the court. While testing the legality of the impugned order, I have taken into account only the examination-in-chief part of the witnesses in order to see as to whether or not the discretionary power exercised by the trial court for summoning the petitioners apart from the original accused after commitment of trial was correct. 11. At this stage, I think it apposite to take into consideration the object, ambit and scope of the provisions prescribed under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 in the light of the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in its various decisions. The Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab [ (2014) 3 SCC 92 ] has exhaustively laid down the object and scope of section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 It has also laid down the stage and circumstance for exercise of power. It has also laid down the degree of satisfaction required for invoking the powers under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 It has also laid down the stage and circumstance for exercise of power. It has also laid down the degree of satisfaction required for invoking the powers under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 and the related question as to in what situation this power should be exercised in respect of the person named in the FIR, but not charge-sheeted. 12. The Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh's case answered these questions as under:- "95. At the time of taking cognizance, the court has to see whether a prima facie case is made out to proceed against the accused. Under Section 319 CrPC, though the test of prima facie case is the same, the degree of satisfaction that is required is much stricter. A two-Judge Bench of this Court in Vikas v. State of Rajasthan (2014) 3 SCC 321 , held that on the objection satisfaction of the court a person may be "arrested" or "summoned", as the circumstances of the case may require, if it appears from the evident that any such person not being the accused has committed an offence for which such person could be tried together with the already arraigned accused person." 13. The Constitution Bench has further held that the discretionary power under Section 319 is an extraordinary power and it is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. The Bench has cautioned that such power should not be exercised in a casual and cavalier manner. In this regard, the Bench observed as under:- "105. Power under Section 319 CrPC is a discretionary and an extraordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. 106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than more probability of his complicity. 106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court, not necessarily tested on the anvil of cross-examination, it requires much stronger evidence than more probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes un-rebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 CrPC. In Section 319 CrPC the purpose of providing if "it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence" is clear from the words "for which such person could be tried together with the accused". The words used are not "for which such person could be convicted". There is, therefore, no scope for the court acting under Section 319 CrPC to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused." (emphasis mine) 14. In Michael Machado and Another v. Central Bureau of Investigation and Another [ (2000) 3 SCC 262 ], the Supreme Court on extensive consideration of the provision in Section 319 stated as under:- "11. The basic requirements for invoking the above section is that it should appear to the court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, has committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is not enough that the court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused. 12. But even then, what is conferred on the court is only discretion as could be discerned from the words "the court may proceed against such person". The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused. 12. But even then, what is conferred on the court is only discretion as could be discerned from the words "the court may proceed against such person". The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. It is not that the court should turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the court had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty on the court to proceed against other persons. 14. The court while deciding whether to invoke the power under Section 319 of the Code, must address itself about the other constraints imposed by the first limb of sub-section (4), that proceedings in respect of newly-added persons shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re-examined. The whole proceedings must be recommenced from the beginning of the trial, summon the witnesses once again and examine them and cross-examine them in order to reach the stage where it had reached earlier. If the witnesses already examined are quite large in number the court must seriously consider whether the objects sought to be achieved by such exercise are worth wasting the whole labour already undertaken. Unless the court is hopeful that there is a reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly-brought accused ending in being convicted of the offence concerned we would say that the court should refrain from adopting such a course of action." (emphasis mine) 15. In Krishnappa v. State of Karnataka [ (2004) 7 SCC 792 ], the Supreme Court observed as under:- "9. In Michael Machado v. Central Bureau of Investigation (2000) 3 SCC 262 , construing the words "the court may proceed against such person" in Section 319 Cr. PC, this Court held that the power is discretionary and should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice and that the court should not turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. PC, this Court held that the power is discretionary and should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice and that the court should not turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that other person also with the offence. This Court further held that a judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has already proceeded and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the court had spent for collecting such evidence. The court, while examining an application under Section 319 Cr. PC, has also to bear in mind that there is no compelling duty on the court to proceed against other persons. In a nutshell, it means that for exercise of discretion under Section 319 Cr. PC, all relevant factor, including the one noticed above, have to be kept in view and an order is not required to be made mechanically merely on the ground that some evidence had come on record implicating the person sought to be added as an accused." (emphasis mine) 16. In Palanisamy Gounder and Another v. State represented by Inspector of Police [ (2005) 12 SCC 327 ], the Supreme Court referred to the decisions in Michael Machado (supra) and Krishnappa (supra) and observed that power under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 cannot be exercised so as to conduct fishy inquiry. 17. When I apply the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in decisions noted above to the facts of this case, I find that the trial court has acted in a casual and cavalier manner in passing the summoning orders against the petitioner. The petitioners were named in the FIR. Investigation was carried out by the police. On the basis of materials collected during investigation, the Investigating Officer had found these petitioners to be innocent. The learned Magistrate did not differ with the police report and no cognizance was taken against the petitioners. Even, at the stage of Section 193 Cr. P.C., 1973 the Court of Session did not summon the petitioners. On the basis of materials collected during investigation, the Investigating Officer had found these petitioners to be innocent. The learned Magistrate did not differ with the police report and no cognizance was taken against the petitioners. Even, at the stage of Section 193 Cr. P.C., 1973 the Court of Session did not summon the petitioners. The summoning order passed by the learned Judge reads as under:- "In the Court of A.D.J IVth, Naugachia S.T- 604/11 ljdkj cuke /keZifr >k cxSjg 04-12-2015 vfHk;kstu dh gktjh nh xbZA dqy lkr vfHk;qDrksa dh vkSj ls odkyr gktjh nh x;h ftls vkt ds fy, Lohdkj fd;k x;kA vfHk;kstu dh vkSj ls nkf[ky 319 na0iz0la0 ds laca/k esa vfHkys[k dk voyksdu fd;k ckn esa izLrqr xokgksa }kjk 1 iEeh dqekjh 2 xkek dqekjh ,oa 3 ris'k >k dk uke cksyk x;k gS rFkk bu yksxksa dh ?kVuk esa lafyIr gksus dh iqf"V xokgksa }kjk dh xbZ gSA bu lHkh rF;ksa rFkk xokgksa ds c;ku dks /;ku esa j[krs gq, bl okn esa mijksDr rhuksa dk uke tksM+uk U;k;fgr esa mfpr izrhr gksrk gSA vr% vfHk;qDr iEeh dqekjh] xkek dqekjh ,oa ris'k >k dk uke vfHk;qDr ds :i esa tksM+k tkrk gSA fnuakd 16-12-2015 ckLrs mifLFkfr dk;kZy; vfHk;qDrksa ds fo:) uksfVl fuxZr djsaA g0 vLi"V 18. It would be manifest from the reading of the summoning order passed by the learned Judge that he has summoned the petitioners only because the name of the petitioners was disclosed by the witnesses in their deposition. He has recorded that adding the name of the petitioners as accused seems to be appropriate. 19. I am of the opinion that the order passed by the learned Additional Session Judge is not in consonance with the provisions under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 Mere naming a person during trial by the witnesses cannot justify the impleadment of the accused in exercise of power under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 It requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test to be applied should be more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge. 20. P.C., 1973 It requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test to be applied should be more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge. 20. I have already recorded the contents of the FIR and deposition of witnesses in their examination-in-chief here-in-above, I find that in the FIR the informant, who is also the injured victim has named the petitioners along with others, but has not attributed any overt act against them. He has simply stated that they also abused him. The specific allegation of causing injury to the informant is against the accused Dharampati Jha, who happens to be the father of the three petitioners. P.W.-1 Ajay Kumar Jha, who also claims to be an eye-witness, has made specific allegation of assault against Dharampati Jha alone. So far as the petitioners are concerned, only their presence has been stated by him and he has stated that they also abused the informant. P.W.-2 Laxman Mandal has also not made any allegation against the petitioners. P.W.-3 Usha Jha and P.W.-4 Ranveer Jha have alleged that the petitioners also assaulted with bricks, but the doctor (P.W.-6), who examined the informant, has found only two injuries on the person of the informant out of which, one is incised wound and the other is abrasion, which are attributed specifically to Dharampati Jha. It is also apparent from the evidence that the petitioners are next door neighbours of the informant and thus the presence of the petitioners at the place of occurrence was quite natural. 21. Thus, taking into consideration the nature of evidence adduced at the trial, I am of the considered view that neither cogent nor strong evidence transpired against petitioners during trial warranting their summoning under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 The trial court has failed to consider the essential aspects before invoking his power under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 A perusal of the impugned order would show that it has summoned the petitioners only because it came across some evidence against them. It also failed to appreciate that there was no compelling duty on the court to proceed against persons other than those who were facing trial. A fishing enquiry is not permissible under section 319 of the Cr. It also failed to appreciate that there was no compelling duty on the court to proceed against persons other than those who were facing trial. A fishing enquiry is not permissible under section 319 of the Cr. P.C., 1973 only because some doubt is created in the mind of the court regarding involvement of other persons during trial. 22. In view of the discussions made above, the application is allowed. The impugned order, dated 04.12.2015, passed by the learned Additional District Judge-IV, Naugachia, in S.Tr. No. 604 of 2011, arising out of Bihpur (Bhawanipur) P.S. Case No. 224 of 2010 is, set aside.