JUDGMENT : 1. The contentions raised in both the above writ petitions are similar. In W.P.(C) No.17494/2017, the rejection of a consent by the Chief Town Planner, produced at Ext.P8, is impugned, while in W.P.(C) No.23944/2017, the rejection of a Fire NOC by the Divisional Officer, Fire and Rescue Services, Palakkad, produced at Ext.P5, is impugned. Both the orders are on the ground that there is only an access of 5 metres width to the petitioner's property. The petitioner relies on Vidya Devi v. State of Kerala (W.P.(C) No.5866/2013) and Biji Francis v. State of Kerala (W.P.(C) No.20667/2016). 2. The brief facts to be noticed are that the petitioner's property lies abutting a Municipal road, which has only 5 metre width. The location sketch is produced at Ext.P2. The property of the petitioner is the one seen abutting the Municipal road, almost rectangular in shape. The petitioner has obtained easementary rights on an alleged pathway of 12 metres from the adjacent property owner, which, the petitioner claims, is the access to the property for satisfaction of Sub Rule (4) of Rule 59 of the Kerala Municipality Building Rules, 1999 ('Building Rules' for short). By Ext.P2, what is attempted to be demonstrated is that there is 12 metre pathway across the entire eastern and northern boundary of the petitioner's property. The Rule, hence, stands satisfied for Group-I(2) occupancy, is the contention raised. 3. Vidya Devi (supra) was a case in which the subject property had to be accessed from the Panchayat road by a street. The street had 7 metre width. However, the Panchayat road did not have that width. On a reading sub-rule (4) of Rule 61 of the Kerala Panchayat Building Rules, 2011 (which is in para materia with the provision under the Building Rules); a learned Single Judge of this Court found that what is stipulated in the provision is the width of the street providing access to the plot from the main street and there is no specification of the width of the main street from which the access starts. 4. With all the respect at my command, I am unable to agree with the said proposition since the provision for 7 metre width for Group -I(2) occupancy is primarily for carrying out rescue operations in the event of a fire or other mishap; the possibility of which is more in the case of an hazardous activity. 4. With all the respect at my command, I am unable to agree with the said proposition since the provision for 7 metre width for Group -I(2) occupancy is primarily for carrying out rescue operations in the event of a fire or other mishap; the possibility of which is more in the case of an hazardous activity. The petitioner intends to start an LPG godown in the property, which is prone to such mishaps. If there is no width for the main street, it is quite impossible for a fire engine to reach the property in which the hazardous occupancy is carried on. This would seriously hamper rescue operations and the chances of the fire spreading is also more. This Court, normally, would have referred the matter to a Division Bench, but the facts, as found in the aforesaid petition, does not commend such a reference. 5. As was indicated earlier, Ext.P2 produced in W.P.(C) No.17494/2017 shows the lie of the property and its access. The access is from the Municipal road and not from the 12 metre pathway provided on the northern and eastern boundary of the property. In fact, the access to both the alleged 12 metre pathway and the subject property is from the Municipal road, which only has a 5 metre width. It cannot be said that the 12 metre width pathway provides any sort of access to the subject property without it being accessed through the Municipal road. The petitioner, having purchased the right to use an extent of property on her two boundaries, cannot contend that it is the access to her property. The contention of easementary right having been purchased is also perilous in so far as the property of the petitioner having a clear access through the Municipal road. 6. The further reliance is placed on Biji Francis (supra), wherein there was a private street giving access to more than one plot having width of 3.5 to 3.9 metres. There, the petitioner's contention was that she had taken on lease a land, which has frontage all along the length of the pathway and together with the land, there would be the required width. The Government having declined the same, myself, rejected the writ petition. It is submitted that there was an appeal from the aforesaid judgment and the judgment in the writ petition was set aside. The Government having declined the same, myself, rejected the writ petition. It is submitted that there was an appeal from the aforesaid judgment and the judgment in the writ petition was set aside. It is argued that a lease would also entitle satisfaction of the width, as provided in the Rules. 7. The Division Bench has found so in the judgment dated 02.03.2017 in W.A. No. 367 of 2017 Biji Francis v. State of Kerala “5. There is no dispute with regard to the Rule which stipulates that the pathway leading to the property should be having a width of 7 meters'. The stipulation in this regard is very vital, in so far as the item to be stored in the premises is 'LPG cylinders', which involves a high security risk. The main purpose of providing pathway of adequate width, is to ensure that in case of any emergency, the Fire and Rescue Authorities could rush in with all necessary infrastructure to deal with the situation, meeting the need of the hour. It is not for mere access to the vehicles carrying the cylinders coming in and going out or for the convenience of the customers. The pathway leading to the property should be kept clear always, without causing any vehicle to be parked or blocking the access. The entire access of 7 meters should be thrown open at all times and as such, even if the nearby property is taken on lease it has to be ensured that the purpose is served at all times. Scrutiny has to be made in the said background. 6. There is a clause in Ext.P7 lease deed, that although it is executed for a period of 15 years, it is possible to be terminated by either side, on issuing one month's notice. It was in the said circumstance, that the Government observed in Ext.P13, that it could not be treated as a valid and acceptable document to grant 'layout approval' which stand has been upheld by the learned Single Judge. We do not find anything wrong in this regard. 7. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submits that steps are being taken to modify the relevant clause, which now stands adverse to the interest of the petitioner/appellant and that a minimum tenure will be caused to be incorporated therein, so as to safeguard the interest of all concerned. 7. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant, submits that steps are being taken to modify the relevant clause, which now stands adverse to the interest of the petitioner/appellant and that a minimum tenure will be caused to be incorporated therein, so as to safeguard the interest of all concerned. It is also stated that the appellant will confine the relief only to the said extent, adding that appropriate provision could be incorporated in the approval to be given and that it could be added in the license to be issued (based on such approval) as part of the conditions to be complied with. 8. In the above circumstances, the appeal is disposed of without prejudice to the rights and liberty of the appellant to have a proper lease deed executed, satisfying the above requirements in accordance with law and to have it presented before the second respondent for fresh consideration. On submission of the relevant proceedings in this regard, the matter shall be considered afresh by the second respondent in accordance with law, after affording an opportunity of being heard to the appellant and others concerned, if any. The proceedings shall be finalised at the earliest, at any rate, within 'one month' from the date of production of the relevant deed as above. Ext.P10 and Ext.P13 will stand modified to the said extent. The appellant shall also produce a copy of the judgment along with a copy of the appeal containing a full text of the proceedings before the second respondent for further steps.” 8. The Division Bench also noticed the purpose behind the stipulation and emphasised the need to keep the access always clear and thrown open at all times. The decision, in fact, works against the facts herein. The petitioner herein, as has been found, has merely attempted to concoct an access to merely satisfy the statutory stipulation and the projected pathway actually is not the access to her property. 9. The petitioner's Counsel argues that in that case, the width of the main street was never questioned and the provision only needs an access of a minimum width, which is provided. Foremost, the width of the main street was never an issue therein and for all we know it may have the required width. 9. The petitioner's Counsel argues that in that case, the width of the main street was never questioned and the provision only needs an access of a minimum width, which is provided. Foremost, the width of the main street was never an issue therein and for all we know it may have the required width. Merely for reason of there being no discussion of the width of the main road, it cannot be assumed that it had lesser width. Yet again, here, the alleged pathway of 12 metres is not an independent access to the petitioner's property. The same is a pathway now provided on the strength of Ext.P1, which also is not a registered document for the purpose of satisfaction of the Rule, which deals with access and not clearance on the sides. The alleged 12 metre pathway, at best, gives a clearance on the sides of the petitioner's property and does not provide any access into the property; which is through the Municipal road. 10. The Municipal road, admittedly, being of 5 metres; the contention of the petitioner is that she could do pretty little to expand the width of that road. True, the petitioner cannot thus provide an access of 7 metre width, and in such circumstance, the petitioner would be dis-entitled from carrying on a Group-I(2) occupancy in the said property for reason of the stipulation in the Building Rules. The Fire NOC has also been declined for the very same reason. But that does not in any manner restrict her rights of enjoyment of the property. The stipulation of minimum width for access into a hazardous occupancy is also in public interest and the petitioner has to necessarily concede to it. 11. The petitioner also has a contention that in the petitioner's case, the consideration ought to have been made by the District Town Planner who has been conferred with the jurisdiction and not the Chief Town Planner, based on Rule 59(1) of the Building Rules. The said objection need not be considered since the petitioner's property does not satisfy the minimum requirement of access, as provided in the Building Rules. In such circumstance, the writ petitions are devoid of merit and stand dismissed. No Costs.