JUDGMENT : Sanjib Banerjee, J. The appellants question their conviction under Sections 498A/302 of the Penal Code, 1860 on the ground that there is no direct evidence against them as to the commission of the offence and the dying declarations on the basis of which they have been convicted are apparently contradictory. 2. Victim Shila Biswas was married to Basudev in the autumn of 2008. On December 4, 2009, she was found ablaze and shouting for help on the verandah just outside her room at the matrimonial house. Two of the neighbours doused the flames. She was taken to nearby Jiaganj Hospital from where she was referred to the bigger Lalbagh Sub-divisional Hospital. The victim succumbed to her burn injuries on December 17, 2009. 3. The formal written complaint was lodged by the victim's father on December 13, 2009, though it recorded that the incident had been earlier verbally reported to the relevant police station. The complaint spoke of the husband and the parents-in-law of the victim pestering her to get money from her father for the husband's business; the victim being subjected to physical and mental torture on her inability to arrange for further funds from her father; and, the father requesting the husband and the parents-in-law to desist from tormenting the victim. Regarding the specific incident, the complainant narrated that "I came to know, over telephone, on 04.12.2009, at about 9.00 a.m., that (1) my son-in-law, Basudev Biswas, (2) the father-in-law of my daughter, Badal Biswas, (3) mother-in-law, of my daughter, Parul Biswas W/o - Badal Biswas, all together set fire upon my daughter, with a view to kill her." 4. In the post-mortem report deep burn injuries were found, including on the face, neck, both upper limbs, many parts of the lower limbs, parts of the back and the abdomen and even on the scalp. The cause of death was recorded to be the septic shock from the infections caused by the burn injuries, where the burning was ante-mortem in nature. The husband and the parents-in-law were all charged under Sections 498A/304B/302/34 of the Penal Code. 5. The father of the victim was called to the witness-box first on behalf of the prosecution. He claimed to be a hawker by profession and he proved his complaint which he said was read over and explained to him upon which he affixed his thumb impression on the document. 5. The father of the victim was called to the witness-box first on behalf of the prosecution. He claimed to be a hawker by profession and he proved his complaint which he said was read over and explained to him upon which he affixed his thumb impression on the document. It was curious that he did not claim in course of his evidence at the trial that his daughter had been subjected to torture at her matrimonial home. In his cross-examination, he claimed that his daughter "never raised any grievance against any of the family members of her matrimonial home." However, such evidence, obviously in response to a suggestion put by the defence, has to be seen in the light of the allegations contained in the complaint which he proved at the trial. But there is no escape from the fact that the father of the victim not only climbed down from the charges that he levelled earlier in his complaint, but he also made a statement to the effect that his daughter did not complain to him against her in-laws. 6. The scribe of the complaint was examined next and he proved the creation of the document. Nothing much comes out of his evidence except that he claimed to have known both the victim and the complainant. In response to a suggestion in the cross-examination, he accepted that he was a supporter of the CPI(M) political party. 7. Three neighbours of the victim's in-laws, including the two persons who doused the flames on her and, possibly, took her to the hospital, were the best persons to describe the circumstances in which they found her and whatever the victim may have said while they tried to rescue her or she was being taken to the hospital. But it appears that such two neighbours who rescued the victim and, possibly, took her to the hospital turned hostile and the prosecution could not extract anything from them. Bidyut Biswas claimed that at about 10 - 10.30 am on the particular day "I heard hue and cry and rushed at PO and found that the wife of Basudeb was burning". He also claimed that "I did not hear anything as to why or how the wife of the accused Basudeb got died in that fire". Bidyut Biswas claimed that at about 10 - 10.30 am on the particular day "I heard hue and cry and rushed at PO and found that the wife of Basudeb was burning". He also claimed that "I did not hear anything as to why or how the wife of the accused Basudeb got died in that fire". He denied a suggestion put by the prosecution that he had told the police that the victim told him that her husband and her in-laws had set her on fire by spraying kerosene. He denied a further suggestion that the victim had told him that she was subjected to physical or mental torture by the three accused persons. Another neighbour, Niva Rani Biswas, announced in her evidence-in-chief that she had come to court with the accused persons on that day when she was being examined. She claimed in her evidence-in-chief that she had heard that Basudev's first wife had committed suicide by taking poison and that his second wife Shila died after she suffered a burn. She could not even say where Shila suffered her burn injuries, though she was one of the persons who accompanied Shila to the hospital. This witness also denied that she had informed the investigating officer that the victim was subjected to torture at her in-laws' or that the victim had confided in such witness in such regard. 8. Another neighbour of the victim's in-laws was called by the prosecution at the trial. Though he was not formally declared hostile, he said that he "cannot say why she preferred to die in that way." The house of such neighbour was at a distance of 50 meter from the house of the appellants, but the witness claimed that he knew nothing of the incident. He also said that Shila had not told him of any torture at her in-laws'. 9. The husbands of two of the victim's sisters or cousins were examined and they claimed that Shila was tortured at her in-laws'. One of them claimed that he had "heard from Shila that the accused persons of this case, put fire on her person." He alleged that Shila had told him so while she was at the Lalbagh Hospital. 9. The husbands of two of the victim's sisters or cousins were examined and they claimed that Shila was tortured at her in-laws'. One of them claimed that he had "heard from Shila that the accused persons of this case, put fire on her person." He alleged that Shila had told him so while she was at the Lalbagh Hospital. In course of his cross-examination, he said that he met the victim on five days while she was at the hospital but prior to then the victim had not spoken to him about the torture she suffered at her matrimonial home. The other brother-in-law disclosed that the victim complained of her misery at her in-laws' when she visited his house. He alleged that the mother-in-law of the victim "put fire on her person after sprinkling kerosene oil and that neighbour Niva Rani took her to hospital" thereafter, but such part of the evidence must be regarded as hearsay. He did not even indicate how he came to know of such matter. 10. An aunt of the victim was called as PW-13. She described the victim as her husband's younger brother's daughter. She claimed to have learnt of the incident of Shila suffering burn injuries from her daughter. She said that she rushed to the Jiaganj Hospital and found Shila in "acute unrest". She claimed that "After reaching there I talked to Shila who disclosed that her in-laws are responsible for her injuries." Such witness proved her signature as a witness to the inquest report. She was resolute in denying the adverse suggestions given to her in her cross-examination. An uncle of the victim was also called as a witness. He claimed to have met the victim at the Lalbagh Hospital when "She was able to talk and she disclosed to me that her in-laws put fire on her person to which she recd. (sic, received) burn injuries on her person." Such witness was also a witness to the inquest report. 11. A cousin of the victim, Baby Halder, was next called as a witness by the prosecution. She testified that at about 9.30 am on the day of the incident, Niva brought Shila "in front of my house with the help of van" and Niva called me and "told that there was a quarrel in between Shila and her in-laws in the night in which Shila recd. She testified that at about 9.30 am on the day of the incident, Niva brought Shila "in front of my house with the help of van" and Niva called me and "told that there was a quarrel in between Shila and her in-laws in the night in which Shila recd. (sic, received) burn injuries." Baby Halder went on to narrate that "Shila also told me that her mother-in-law put fire on her body. Nibha again told me that she can't say what actually happened in the house but she put off the fire and brought Shila at my house." The witness identified the accused in court and claimed that "over the issue of domestic/household work, in laws of Shila used to quarrel with her." In her cross-examination, she claimed to have told the investigating officer whatever she had stated in her evidence at the trial. In her cross-examination, she said that Shila never complained that her husband assaulted her but she used to complain of altercations between Shila and her husband. She also maintained that the accused inflicted torture on Shila. 12. A sister of the victim, Madhabi Halder, was examined at the trial and she claimed to have "talk with my sister at Lalbagh Hospital" when the victim "stated that her mother-in-law set fire on her body and fled away through window..." In her cross-examination she claimed that she went to the hospital everyday that her sister remained alive and said that the victim would talk to her everyday. 13. Before referring to the evidence of the five key formal witnesses, it may do well to notice the two dying declarations and discern therefrom whether there is any apparent or serious contradiction therein. The first dying declaration in point of time was recorded at 12.40 pm on December 5, 2009 in the bed-head ticket: "As per statement of the patient herself, on 04/12/09 around 9 A.M. her mother-in-law, father-in-law & husband forcefully poured kerosene oil over her at her in-law house and they set fire on her." Below such recording, the medical officer who recorded such statement penned his observation that the patient suffered 90 per cent mixed burn injuries. He also wrote down his observation of foul smell of kerosene coming from her body. He prescribed some treatment and put his signature at the foot of the page. He also wrote down his observation of foul smell of kerosene coming from her body. He prescribed some treatment and put his signature at the foot of the page. To the left of the statement attributed to the victim, the signature of a staff nurse also appears below the endorsement "Witness". Such signature appears to have been put at 12.50 pm on the same day. 14. The second dying declaration is said to have been recorded on December 13, 2009 at 7 pm. In the initial part, such statement refers to the torture suffered by the victim at the hands of her mother-in-law. As to the specific incident, the declaration records as follows: "On the date of occurrence, my mother-in-law and father-in-law, with common intention, poured Kerosene oil upon my person and set fire on that and fled away through the window. I somehow managed to open the door and came out. On hearing my shout some neighborus poured water and extinguished fire. My husband comes to the hospital, everyday and cries. My father in law and mother in law fled away. My husband went outside for his job, on the date of occurrence." Such declaration bears the victim's thumb impression. It also bears the signature of a medial officer. A staff nurse at the hospital also appended her signature to the declaration as a witness. Though the two statements above should be regarded as the only dying declarations, there is third statement which is attributed to the victim. Such statement was allegedly obtained by the investigating officer on December 13, 2009 under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 though the exact time of obtaining the statement is not evident from the relevant document. It may be remembered in such context that the written complaint was lodged with the police by the victim's father also on December 13, 2009. The statement of the victim said to have been recorded by the police appears to be so similar to the second dying declaration given by the victim that it is tempting to perceive such statement to have been prepared on the basis of the dying declaration made by the victim on the same day instead of the same being seen to be another statement issued by the victim to the investigating officer. As to the specific incident of December 4, 2009, the victim is alleged to have informed the police that: "On the date of occurrence, my father-in-law and mother-in-law, with common intention, poured kerosene oil over my person and set fire on that, and fled away. On hearing my cry some neighbours rushed in and poured water upon my person and extinguished fire. They took me to the hospital. My husband was not present there at the time of such incident. He then came to the hospital to see me, and he used to come daily and cried to see my condition. His parents in-law (sic) never come to see me. I have heard that they fled away." The investigating officer put his signature at the foot of the document upon endorsing that the statement had been recorded by him. No witness signed such statement, though it must be remembered that it was claimed to be a recording under Section 161 of the Code of 1973. Equally, it must not be lost sight of that Section 162 of the Code of 1973 carves out an exception to the general bar thereunder in respect of any statement falling under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872. 15. As to the apparent contradictions between the first two statements, it is evident that the husband was named as one of the perpetrators of the crime in the first declaration, but he was said not to have been present at the time of the incident in the second statement. The second statement is more detailed in respect of the commission of the offence by the parents-in-law and how they "fled away through the window" and the victim "managed to open the door" and come out. The third statement, if it is given any credence, matches with the second dying declaration, though the manner in which the parents-in-law escaped after allegedly setting the victim on fire is not mentioned. 16. It is here that the evidence of the five key witnesses must be noticed. Before seeing their evidence it needs to be recorded that all such witnesses were unrelated to the victim and her in-laws and that all such witnesses came into contact with the victim only in course of discharge of their official duties. 16. It is here that the evidence of the five key witnesses must be noticed. Before seeing their evidence it needs to be recorded that all such witnesses were unrelated to the victim and her in-laws and that all such witnesses came into contact with the victim only in course of discharge of their official duties. Doctor Ujjalendu Biswas, as PW-17, testified that he was posted at the Lalbagh Sub-divisional Hospital as a medical officer at the time that the victim was treated there. He claimed to have examined and treated the victim from December 4 to December 17, 2009. He asserted that at 12.40 pm on December 5, 2009 "Dr. Bibhas Mukherjee examined the patient and prepared a note to the effect that patient was conscious and co-operative as per statement of the patient herself." He claimed to be acquainted with the handwriting and the signature of Dr. Mukherjee. He referred to Exhibit-9, which was the relevant statement, and observed that it was recorded in the presence of nurse Rupalisha Ghosh and prepared in course of official duty. He further testified that "On 13.12.2009 at 7 p.m. the patient made dying declaration before me (with) full consciousness and at her will in presence of witnesses (sic) Aloka Bhattachariya (Ward sister). Dying declaration was taken as per request of S.D.O. The patient put L.T.I on the dying declaration sheet in my presence." He repeated the essential parts of the dying declaration of December 13, 2009. In his cross-examination he admitted that he had not issued "any separate fit certificate regarding her fitness to make dying declaration" on December 13, 2009 and added that "I made an endorsement on the dying declaration sheet to the effect that her statement was taken with full consciousness and at her will." 17. Staff nurse Aloka Bhatacharjee testified that on December 13, 2009 she was posted at the Lalbagh Sub-divisional Hospital. She proved her signature on the relevant document and asserted that "one burn patient named Shila made a dying declaration before doctor Ujjalendu Biswas in my presence." She repeated the essential parts of the dying declaration. In course of her cross-examination, she could not remember whether the relevant doctor checked the heart-beat, pulse or blood pressure of the victim before recording the dying declaration. In course of her cross-examination, she could not remember whether the relevant doctor checked the heart-beat, pulse or blood pressure of the victim before recording the dying declaration. She also claimed that she attended to the victim on all other days except the day when the dying declaration was recorded on December 13, 2009. 18. Dr. Bibhas Mukherjee, PW-20, testified that he was a medical officer at the Lalbagh Sub-divisional Hospital and was posted in such capacity during the time the victim remain admitted there. He clarified that the victim was not admitted under his care, "but I examined her on call." He reiterated the statement of the patient that he recorded on December 5, 2009. He testified that the victim was conscious and cooperative at that time. He corroborated his observation of the foul smell of kerosene oil emanating from the body of the victim. He proved his signature on the relevant page of the bed-head ticket and said that the version of the patient as recorded by him who also witnessed by a staff nurse on duty, Rupalisha Ghosh. No suggestions were given to him by the defence as to the state of the health of the victim or of any anomaly in his recording the statement of the victim. 19. Staff nurse Rupalisha Ghosh confirmed in her evidence that "on 5.12.2009 at about 12.40 pm one burn patient named Shila Biswas made a dying declaration before doctor Bibhas Chandra Mukherjee in my presence." No suggestion was put to such witness by the defence as to her motive or of any anomaly in the recording of the statement attributed to the victim. 20. The investigating officer was examined as PW-24. He reported that he had collected a container of kerosene oil from the place of occurrence. He also claimed to have recorded a statement of the victim in the hospital. The relevant statement was exhibited. 21. The only other things of note are the statements of the appellants herein under Section 313 of the Code of 1973. Both the appellants claimed that they were not present in the house at the time of the incident, though neither volunteered where else they may have been at that time. No alibi was attempted to be set up on behalf of the appellants herein by way of suggestions given to the prosecution witnesses at the trial. Both the appellants claimed that they were not present in the house at the time of the incident, though neither volunteered where else they may have been at that time. No alibi was attempted to be set up on behalf of the appellants herein by way of suggestions given to the prosecution witnesses at the trial. No witness was called on their behalf. 22. While appreciating the evidence, it must be recorded at the outset that no one saw how the victim was set on fire or caught fire and there is no evidence that either appellant was seen by any person at the place of occurrence or running away therefrom. The oral evidence of the relatives of the victim, both insofar as they speak of the victim being tortured at her in-laws' and of the incident of December 4, 2009, would have to be seen first from the defence's perspective. The father of the victim merely proved his complaint but made out no case of torture in his evidence and admitted, in his cross-examination, that the victim did not make any grievance against her in-laws. As to the case attempted to be made out by the defence, a common suggestion appears to have been put to most of the victim's relatives that they were driven by their relationship with the victim to testify against the accused. Implicit in such suggestion was that the relatives of the victim may have had some common angst against the victim's in-laws. If, indeed, the relatives of the victim harboured any grouse against the victim's in-laws, that would have been on the basis of their perception that the victim was subjected to harsh treatment at her in-laws'. Such perception must have had a basis and it is not unlikely that they accepted the victim's version of her ill-treatment at her in-laws'. The common suggestion given by the defence to almost all of the victim's relatives who were called as prosecution witnesses, only gives credence to the motive attributed to the appellants for the commission of the offence. Further, to repeat, no evidence was led by the defence to demonstrate the whereabouts of the parents-in-law at the time of the incident and no suggestion on such aspect was given to any of the witnesses, not even to the two key witnesses who first came to the rescue of the victim but later turned hostile. 23. Further, to repeat, no evidence was led by the defence to demonstrate the whereabouts of the parents-in-law at the time of the incident and no suggestion on such aspect was given to any of the witnesses, not even to the two key witnesses who first came to the rescue of the victim but later turned hostile. 23. In the state of the evidence, it is apparent that it was only after the victim managed to come out of her room and onto the verandah that her cries and her pitiable condition drew the attention of at least two neighbours. On the way to the victim being taken to the hospital, the victim's cousin Baby Halder was called to join in. Neither Bidyut Biswas nor Niva Rani Biswas asserted that the victim was unconscious at the time that such persons may have doused her flames or even when they were taking her to the hospital. Suggestions were put to them that they were aware of the torture inflicted by the in-laws on the victim and that the victim had accused her in-laws in their presence. They denied such suggestions but did not claim that the victim was unconscious or unable to speak. 24. If the victim did not set herself on fire - and there is no evidence of the incident being suicidal in nature - it is inconceivable that the victim would not say anything even in her delirious state as to who had perpetrated the crime. The over-zealousness on the part of Niva Rani to protect the victim's in-laws is evident from her denying the place where she found the victim to have suffered her burn injuries. It appears, on any reasonable reading of the evidence, that these two neighbours of the victim's in-laws may have been won over by the appellants and the third neighbour was also reluctant to testify against the accused. 25. Merely because it was the relatives of the victim who claimed that the victim implicated her in-laws in the crime would not make their testimonies untrustworthy. It is evident that such relatives of the victim were aware that the victim was treated unkindly at her in-laws'. 25. Merely because it was the relatives of the victim who claimed that the victim implicated her in-laws in the crime would not make their testimonies untrustworthy. It is evident that such relatives of the victim were aware that the victim was treated unkindly at her in-laws'. While it is true that just because the in-laws may not have been favourably disposed towards the victim, it would not follow that they would or did murder her; the statements of cousin Baby Halder, the aunt and the sister of the victim carry a ring of truth. The statements attributed to Shila at the time that she was in the hospital covered both aspects of her being ill-treated at her in-laws' and of her parents-in-law having committed the heinous act of setting her on fire. 26. The statements attributed to the victim in course of the evidence of her relatives at the trial are corroborated by the second dying declaration obtained on December 13, 2009. Both dying declarations of December 5, 2009 and December 13, 2009 were proved and the appellants have not been able to detract therefrom, save the inclusion of the husband's name in the first and its exclusion in the second. The husband was given the benefit of the doubt by the trial court and was not convicted. There is nothing contradictory qua the mother-in-law or the father-in-law of the victim in the two dying declarations. Both statements referred to, inter alia, the mother-in-law and the father-in-law pouring kerosene oil on the victim and setting her on fire. That the second dying declaration went on to add that the parents-in-law fled away through the window cannot be regarded as a contradiction. If at all, it was a detail that was added in the second statement. In the natural course of things, a person's statement may not be the exact repetition of a previous statement and it is normal human conduct that would prompt minor differences or even discrepancies, particularly in the details. Even if the third statement attributed to the victim by the investigating officer is not taken into account, it may be of no consequence. On the other hand, if such statement is taken into account only for the purpose of considering whether the appellants should be given the benefit of any contradiction therein, no contradiction can be discovered therefrom. Even if the third statement attributed to the victim by the investigating officer is not taken into account, it may be of no consequence. On the other hand, if such statement is taken into account only for the purpose of considering whether the appellants should be given the benefit of any contradiction therein, no contradiction can be discovered therefrom. Though the statement under Section 161 of the Code of 1973 did not refer to how the parents-in-law "fled away", it did record that they fled away. The manner in which the parents-in-law may have fled is corroborated by the evidence of the victim's sister Madhabi that the victim told her at the hospital that "her mother-in-law set fire on her body and fled away through window ..." 27. The falsity of the testimonies of the two hostile witnesses is further evident from Exhibit-16/1, which is the injury report prepared at the Jiaganj Hospital upon the victim being taken there at or about 10 am on December 4, 2009. Contrary to the evidence of Bidyut Biswas that he "shifted her to hospital", it appears from the injury report that it was "Niva Biswas (neighbour) & Baby Halder (Sister)" who got the victim admitted to the Jiaganj Hospital. It is also possible that Bidyut had accompanied them but did not have his name recorded. It is also evident that Bidyut's perception of the time of the incident "at about 10/10.30 am" was flawed and Baby Halder's estimation that Niva arrived with Shila "at about 9.30 am" was more accurate since the injury report was prepared in the Jiaganj Hospital at 10 am on December 4, 2009. It is preposterous that Niva Rani Biswas attempted to deceive the court to such extent that she denied the place where Shila suffered her burn injuries, though the evidence of Baby Halder comes out as completely true on such aspect. It only begs the question as to what may have prompted Bidyut Biswas and Niva Rani Biswas to lie in court. 28. Evidence is not read or appreciated by spotting the is that have not been dotted or the that may not have been crossed. The substance and the sense that the substance conveys has to be gleaned by sifting the essential from the details and the descriptive from the essence. 28. Evidence is not read or appreciated by spotting the is that have not been dotted or the that may not have been crossed. The substance and the sense that the substance conveys has to be gleaned by sifting the essential from the details and the descriptive from the essence. No motive has been attributed to the doctors or the nurses involved in recording the dying declarations. Their evidence that the victim was conscious, able to speak and make herself understood corroborates the statements attributed by the relatives of the victim to the victim while she was at the hospital. If Shila was in a position to make the statements that were recorded on December 5, 2009 and December 13, 2009, it is only expected that her near and dear ones would have asked her how she suffered the injuries and she would have given the same reply to them as in her statements recorded by the doctors. There does not appear to be the slightest sliver of a doubt, in the state of the evidence, as to the commission of the offence by the appellants. Even the rough sketch-map prepared by the investigating officer, possibly, indicated the windows in Shila's room and the adjoining room. There was no suggestion put to Madhabi or to the investigating officer by the defence that the windows were such that would not allow any adult to pass through. 29. Several judgments have been brought by the parties to bear on when a dying declaration should be accepted and when contradictions in multiple dying declarations would prompt the court to discard all or most of them. It would do well to begin with a Constitution Bench judgment reported at (2002) 6 SCC 710 (Laxman v. State of Maharashtra) on the question whether it is imperative that a doctor should endorse that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement attributed to the victim in a dying declaration. The ratio decidendi and the law declared by the Constitution Bench was that if the doctor says that the patient was conscious but there is no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind, it would not render the statement faulty; particularly if the magistrate recording the declaration was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind. 30. 30. A three-Judge Bench in a judgment reported at (1996) 8 SCC 217 (State of Rajasthan v. Kishore) considered whether a declaration recorded by a magistrate in the absence of a doctor, who did not turn up despite requests, rendered it unreliable. The further question considered was if the failure of the magistrate to record that the statement was read over to the deceased was also a serious flaw. The court held that neither omission was fatal and accepted the dying declaration. In the judgment reported at (2006) 13 SCC 130 (Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab) the accusations against the brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law and father-in-law in the two dying declarations were inconsistent. The court, however, did not throw out the entirety of such dying declarations. To the extent that both dying declarations were consistent as to the role of the mother-in-law in setting the victim on fire was accepted and the conviction founded thereupon. In the decision reported at (2006) 12 SCC 283 (Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab), the second appellant was not named in the first dying declaration, but the culpability of the first appellant was specifically disclosed in both the declarations. Further, the doctor who recorded the first declaration admitted that the thumb impression or signature was not obtained on the statement since the doctor feared that the victim was about to die. The second dying declaration contained the signature of the deceased, but it was evident that it was made with great difficulty. The court held that, in the circumstances, it would not regard the first statement as not being voluntary or tutored. However, in view of one of the dying declarations not naming the second appellant, such appellant was given the benefit of the doubt. 31. In the judgment reported at (2012) 7 SCC 569 (Shudhakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh), there were three dying declarations. The first, in which the husband was absolved, did not appear to the court to be voluntary. But the second and third dying declarations implicating the appellant husband were authentic, voluntary and duly corroborated by other prosecution witnesses including the medical evidence. The second and third dying declarations were accepted. The first, in which the husband was absolved, did not appear to the court to be voluntary. But the second and third dying declarations implicating the appellant husband were authentic, voluntary and duly corroborated by other prosecution witnesses including the medical evidence. The second and third dying declarations were accepted. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court was that where multiple dying declarations are either contradictory or at variance with each other to a large extent, the test of common prudence would be to first examine which dying declaration is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. Further, the attending circumstances, the condition of the deceased at the time of making each statement, the medical evidence, the voluntariness and genuineness of the statement made by the deceased, the physical and mental fitness of the deceased and the possibility of the deceased being tutored are some of the factors which should guide the exercise of judicial discretion. 32. In the judgment reported at (2009) 12 SCC 498 (Kanti Lal v. State of Rajasthan), which has been placed by the appellants, it was held that the court must always be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement before accepting a dying declaration. The judgment instructs that if the capacity of the victim to narrate the facts is found to be impaired, the dying declaration should be rejected. The appellants have also carried a judgment reported at (2003) 1 SCC 112 (Chacko v. State of Kerala) where a 70-year-old victim with 80 per cent burn injuries apparently gave a detailed dying declaration indicating the minutest particulars as to the motive and the manner in which she suffered the injuries. The declaration was disbelieved. An additional ground for rejecting the statement was the absence of any certificate by any competent doctor as to the mental and physical condition of the victim. In the last of the cases cited by the appellants, a decision reported at (2007) 11 SCC 269 (Shaikh Bakshu v. State of Maharashtra), there was no mention in the dying declaration that it was read over and explained to the deceased. Such position was held to be unacceptable by the court, but the court also held that the dying declaration was otherwise unreliable. 33. There is no statutory manner or form for recording a dying declaration. Such position was held to be unacceptable by the court, but the court also held that the dying declaration was otherwise unreliable. 33. There is no statutory manner or form for recording a dying declaration. There are precedents that instruct that the best manner of recording a dying declaration would be by putting questions to the patient and obtaining the answers in the language of the patient; by having such recording in the presence of an executive magistrate and a doctor upon the doctor certifying the fitness of the patient to make the statement; and, having the answers read over and explained to the patient by the magistrate and the magistrate making an endorsement to such effect in the document. But that is only the ideal situation. In the context of a dying declaration, Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 mandates that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead are themselves relevant facts when the statements are made by the person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. The evidentiary value of, and the sanctity attached to, a dying declaration is not robbed of its credibility by a careless doctor or a lazy magistrate. The essence of the judicial pronouncements in such regard is that if the court has no doubt as to the veracity of a dying declaration in the sense that it recorded the statement of the victim who subsequently died and the contents thereof are not contrary to the evidence on record, it should inspire sufficient confidence for the court to accept it. 34. In the present case the veracity of either dying declaration of December 5, 2009 and December 13, 2009 is beyond question. The statement of the victim apparently recorded by the investigating officer on December 13, 2009 does not appeal. But such statement is noticed, if only to consider whether it detracts, in essence, from the other two dying declarations for the appellants herein to gain any benefit therefrom. On a careful scrutiny of all the three statements, it does not appear that there is any contradiction therein from which the appellants can gain anything. But such statement is noticed, if only to consider whether it detracts, in essence, from the other two dying declarations for the appellants herein to gain any benefit therefrom. On a careful scrutiny of all the three statements, it does not appear that there is any contradiction therein from which the appellants can gain anything. The victim implicated both the appellants herein in all the three dying declarations and such part of the victim's statement is corroborated by the evidence of several witnesses who had met her at the hospital. The manner in which the parents-in-law may have escaped after the victim was set on fire cannot be regarded as an essential part of the victim's statement, though their escape through the window is partly corroborated by Madhabi. Though it may not be of much significance, but it is also apparent that the appellants herein did not visit the victim at the hospital and both the formal dying declaration of December 13, 2009 and the statement made by the victim to the police on the same day refer to the appellants herein having "fled away". The records reveal that the second appellant was arrested in February, 2010 and the first appellant gave himself up several months later. 35. There can be no doubt that there are some minor discrepancies in the statements of some of the prosecution witnesses, particularly as to the time of the occurrence. But such discrepancies are not so glaring that they would not be considered within the permissible ambit of the imperfect recollection of a situation by several human minds. The substance of a statement cannot be discarded merely because an error of an hour or two is made therein. Bidyut Biswas, Niva Rani Biswas and Baby Halder were the key immediate post occurrence witnesses. Upon Bidyut and Niva Rani turning hostile, Baby Halder's evidence called for greater scrutiny since she claimed that the victim told her that the victim's mother-in-law had set the victim on fire. Though Niva Rani denied that she was aware of even the place where the incident occurred, her testimony is falsified by the fact that she was recorded, along with Baby Halder, to be one of the persons who brought the victim to the hospital. That Baby Halder got some time to interact with the victim immediately after the occurrence stands established. That Baby Halder got some time to interact with the victim immediately after the occurrence stands established. The statement attributed by Baby Halder to the victim is substantially corroborated by the credible dying declarations of December 5, 2009 and December 13, 2009. It is also not apparent why the relatives of the victim would gun for the appellants unless they heard from the victim of the appellants' involvement in the commission of the offence and both believed the victim and sympathised with her. 36. There appears to be no ground to interfere with the order of conviction and the consequent sentence. 37. I have read the extremely thorough discussion of the evidence in the draft judgment prepared by learned brother Chattopadhyay. Regrettably, I have not been able to persuade myself that there is any doubt that the prosecution case has thrown up for the appellants herein to be given any benefit thereunder. A 22- year-old woman married for about a year went up in flames. She did not self combust, nor does the evidence reveal her having attempted to commit suicide. This was murder most horrific and gruesome and the victim's statements that her parents-in-law were responsible for it rings true in the evidence that has come to light. I respectfully disagree with the view taken by my learned brother and uphold the conviction and sentence rightly ordered by the trial court. (Sanjib Banerjee, J.) Siddhartha Chattopadhyay, J. - I had the privilege to have a cursory glance over the finding and judgment of my learned brother as recorded in the draft copy. I also got opportunities to hear the erudite submissions of the learned Counsels appearing on behalf of the appellants and State of West Bengal. 39. At the very outset, I cannot help mentioning the following findings of my learned brother recorded in Para 5, wherein my learned brother held "never raised any grievance against any of the family members of her matrimonial home. However, such evidence, obviously in response to a suggestion put by the defence, has to be seen in the light of the allegations contained in the complaint which he proved at the trial." In my view that the said question was not at all a suggestion rather a direct question. In response to that he admitted that he never raised any grievance. In response to that he admitted that he never raised any grievance. The de fact complainant further added that his daughter did not make any allegation against her in-laws. It is perhaps needless to say that the F.I.R. is always subjected to extract omission and contradiction. Therefore, it is a serious contradiction. The benefit should go in favour of the defence. I am unable to espouse the said finding. 40. In para 12, my learned brother quoted "A sister of the victim, Madhabi Halder, was examined at the trial and she claimed to have "talked with my sister at Lalbagh Hospital" when the victim "stated that her mother-in-law set fire on her body and fled away through window..." In her cross-examination she claimed that she went to the hospital every day that her sister remained alive and said that the victim would talk to her every day." First dying declaration was recorded on 4.12.2009 and the second one on December 13, 2009 at 7:00 pm. In the second dying declaration (December 13, 2009) the victim had taken a somersault and this time she had exonerated her husband and also made out a new story that her parents-in-law fled away through the window. In the second dying declarations it is recorded that her husband came to the hospital during her stay and on the date of occurrence her husband went outside. There is a time gap of about 9 days. During this period her husband regularly met her. Then chance of being tutored cannot be ruled out. 41. In para 14, my learned brother translated the third dying declaration which was also recorded on December 13, 2009. In the last line of the dying declaration, it is stated that her parents-in-law never came to see her. She heard that they fled away. Such part of her dying declaration further strengthened scope of being tutored. 42. In para 16, my learned brother mainly relied on the deposition of 'five key witnesses', who are public servants. They have proved the dying declarations. They did not say that the patient was always kept in a secluded manner, so that nobody could meet her. On the contrary third dying declaration was also recorded by one of those five key witnesses which speaks that she heard that her in-laws fled away. This certainly indicates that somebody met the victim and tutored her. 43. They did not say that the patient was always kept in a secluded manner, so that nobody could meet her. On the contrary third dying declaration was also recorded by one of those five key witnesses which speaks that she heard that her in-laws fled away. This certainly indicates that somebody met the victim and tutored her. 43. Now, I want to go into the details of the prosecution case, evidences of the witnesses and the directions of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the test of validity and authenticity of multiple dying declarations. 44. The appellants call in question the correctness of the judgment and order of conviction dated 22.09.2015 and 23.09.2015 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge Fast Track 1st Court, Lalbagh in S.T No. 2(5)2013 arising out of S.Sl. Case No. 134/11. By filing this appeal the convict/appellants ventilate their grievances that the learned Trial Court failed to consider the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in its proper perspectives. According to the appellants, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses are self-contradictory in nature and there are multiple dying declarations which had not been considered by the learned Trial Court properly. The appellants further contended that the learned Trial Court passed the judgment and order of conviction mainly on presumptions and failed to take into account about the faulty investigation conducted by the Investigating Officer. According to him, the appeal ought to be allowed and the judgment and order of conviction should be set aside. 45. As against this learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State contended that the learned Trial Court has taken care of all the material aspects and it does not warrant any interference. 46. The factual scenario which emerges from a cumulative reading and scrutiny of the materials available as is follows: The marriage between the victim and the appellant Basudev was held nearly after one year back from the date of the fateful incident. At the time of marriage gold ornaments, cash etc. were given along with cot, bedding etc. But after the said marriage the victim was subjected to physical and mental torture. The victim informed this incident to her father and the father went to her matrimonial home and requested the appellants not to inflict torture upon her. His such request received a cold reception. Rather the degree of torture was increased. But after the said marriage the victim was subjected to physical and mental torture. The victim informed this incident to her father and the father went to her matrimonial home and requested the appellants not to inflict torture upon her. His such request received a cold reception. Rather the degree of torture was increased. On 04.12.2009 over a telephonic communication, he came to know that the appellants set fire upon the victim with a view to killing her. The victim was taken to Jiaganj Rural Hospital and thereafter to Lalbagh SD Hospital. After nine days, the F.I.R was lodged. In this way the law was set into motion. 47. The defence case as it appears from the trend of cross-examination and examination of the accused/appellants under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is their innocence and that they have been falsely implicated. After the registration of the F.I.R. the investigating agency came into operation. In course of investigation, the Investigating Officer had recorded the statement of the witnesses, took photographs of the place of occurrence, collected inquest report, collected post mortem report and thereafter charge-sheet has been submitted. 48. To come to a conclusion I should have a look upon the evidences of the prosecution witnesses. Since the conviction is based mainly on dying declarations and in such circumstances, I am of the view that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be scrutinized meticulously so that the veracity of the prosecution case as a whole can be ascertained. 49. The P.W. 1 is the father of the victim. It appears from his deposition sheet that he resides within the jurisdiction of Bhagwangola Police Station, District-Murshidabad. In his examination-in-chief he never stated about any kind of torture allegedly perpetrated upon the victim. On the fateful day he got an information that the victim sustained burn injuries. If I compare with his such statement with the F.I.R., I would find that there are many contradictory statements in the F.I.R. This P.W. 1 (de facto complainant) categorically mentioned in the F.I.R. about the physical and mental torture perpetrated upon the victim by the accused persons. The F.I.R. also speaks that his daughter informed her about her torture and thereafter he went to the house of the accused and requested them not to put any torture upon her. Even after his such request the degree of torture was increased. The F.I.R. also speaks that his daughter informed her about her torture and thereafter he went to the house of the accused and requested them not to put any torture upon her. Even after his such request the degree of torture was increased. But in his cross-examination, he failed to recollect about the contents of F.I.R. He is an unlettered rustic person. In his cross-examination, he candidly stated that his daughter was all along led a peaceful conjugal life at her matrimonial home. He also specifically stated in cross-examination that the victim never raised any grievance against any of the family members of her matrimonial home. If I consider, his such evidence with the F.I.R. then the logical conclusion would be that there is significant discrepancies in the prosecution story. The story of torture as alleged in the F.I.R. has been demolished by his own admission in his cross-examination that the victim was all along happy in her matrimonial home. As per F.I.R. he had been to the house of the accused persons after getting information from his daughter and thereafter degree of torture was increased. But in his examination-in-chief, he had not uttered any single word regarding the torture or at least misbehaviour of the accused persons. Therefore, his such contradictory statement certainly goes in favour of the defence. JUDGMENT : Sanjib Banerjee, J. The appellants question their conviction under Sections 498A/302 of the Penal Code, 1860 on the ground that there is no direct evidence against them as to the commission of the offence and the dying declarations on the basis of which they have been convicted are apparently contradictory. 2. Victim Shila Biswas was married to Basudev in the autumn of 2008. On December 4, 2009, she was found ablaze and shouting for help on the verandah just outside her room at the matrimonial house. Two of the neighbours doused the flames. She was taken to nearby Jiaganj Hospital from where she was referred to the bigger Lalbagh Sub-divisional Hospital. The victim succumbed to her burn injuries on December 17, 2009. 3. The formal written complaint was lodged by the victim's father on December 13, 2009, though it recorded that the incident had been earlier verbally reported to the relevant police station. She was taken to nearby Jiaganj Hospital from where she was referred to the bigger Lalbagh Sub-divisional Hospital. The victim succumbed to her burn injuries on December 17, 2009. 3. The formal written complaint was lodged by the victim's father on December 13, 2009, though it recorded that the incident had been earlier verbally reported to the relevant police station. The complaint spoke of the husband and the parents-in-law of the victim pestering her to get money from her father for the husband's business; the victim being subjected to physical and mental torture on her inability to arrange for further funds from her father; and, the father requesting the husband and the parents-in-law to desist from tormenting the victim. Regarding the specific incident, the complainant narrated that "I came to know, over telephone, on 04.12.2009, at about 9.00 a.m., that (1) my son-in-law, Basudev Biswas, (2) the father-in-law of my daughter, Badal Biswas, (3) mother-in-law, of my daughter, Parul Biswas W/o - Badal Biswas, all together set fire upon my daughter, with a view to kill her." 4. In the post-mortem report deep burn injuries were found, including on the face, neck, both upper limbs, many parts of the lower limbs, parts of the back and the abdomen and even on the scalp. The cause of death was recorded to be the septic shock from the infections caused by the burn injuries, where the burning was ante-mortem in nature. The husband and the parents-in-law were all charged under Sections 498A/304B/302/34 of the Penal Code. 5. The father of the victim was called to the witness-box first on behalf of the prosecution. He claimed to be a hawker by profession and he proved his complaint which he said was read over and explained to him upon which he affixed his thumb impression on the document. It was curious that he did not claim in course of his evidence at the trial that his daughter had been subjected to torture at her matrimonial home. In his cross-examination, he claimed that his daughter "never raised any grievance against any of the family members of her matrimonial home." However, such evidence, obviously in response to a suggestion put by the defence, has to be seen in the light of the allegations contained in the complaint which he proved at the trial. In his cross-examination, he claimed that his daughter "never raised any grievance against any of the family members of her matrimonial home." However, such evidence, obviously in response to a suggestion put by the defence, has to be seen in the light of the allegations contained in the complaint which he proved at the trial. But there is no escape from the fact that the father of the victim not only climbed down from the charges that he levelled earlier in his complaint, but he also made a statement to the effect that his daughter did not complain to him against her in-laws. 6. The scribe of the complaint was examined next and he proved the creation of the document. Nothing much comes out of his evidence except that he claimed to have known both the victim and the complainant. In response to a suggestion in the cross-examination, he accepted that he was a supporter of the CPI(M) political party. 7. Three neighbours of the victim's in-laws, including the two persons who doused the flames on her and, possibly, took her to the hospital, were the best persons to describe the circumstances in which they found her and whatever the victim may have said while they tried to rescue her or she was being taken to the hospital. But it appears that such two neighbours who rescued the victim and, possibly, took her to the hospital turned hostile and the prosecution could not extract anything from them. Bidyut Biswas claimed that at about 10 - 10.30 am on the particular day "I heard hue and cry and rushed at PO and found that the wife of Basudeb was burning". He also claimed that "I did not hear anything as to why or how the wife of the accused Basudeb got died in that fire". He denied a suggestion put by the prosecution that he had told the police that the victim told him that her husband and her in-laws had set her on fire by spraying kerosene. He denied a further suggestion that the victim had told him that she was subjected to physical or mental torture by the three accused persons. Another neighbour, Niva Rani Biswas, announced in her evidence-in-chief that she had come to court with the accused persons on that day when she was being examined. He denied a further suggestion that the victim had told him that she was subjected to physical or mental torture by the three accused persons. Another neighbour, Niva Rani Biswas, announced in her evidence-in-chief that she had come to court with the accused persons on that day when she was being examined. She claimed in her evidence-in-chief that she had heard that Basudev's first wife had committed suicide by taking poison and that his second wife Shila died after she suffered a burn. She could not even say where Shila suffered her burn injuries, though she was one of the persons who accompanied Shila to the hospital. This witness also denied that she had informed the investigating officer that the victim was subjected to torture at her in-laws' or that the victim had confided in such witness in such regard. 8. Another neighbour of the victim's in-laws was called by the prosecution at the trial. Though he was not formally declared hostile, he said that he "cannot say why she preferred to die in that way." The house of such neighbour was at a distance of 50 meter from the house of the appellants, but the witness claimed that he knew nothing of the incident. He also said that Shila had not told him of any torture at her in-laws'. 9. The husbands of two of the victim's sisters or cousins were examined and they claimed that Shila was tortured at her in-laws'. One of them claimed that he had "heard from Shila that the accused persons of this case, put fire on her person." He alleged that Shila had told him so while she was at the Lalbagh Hospital. In course of his cross-examination, he said that he met the victim on five days while she was at the hospital but prior to then the victim had not spoken to him about the torture she suffered at her matrimonial home. The other brother-in-law disclosed that the victim complained of her misery at her in-laws' when she visited his house. He alleged that the mother-in-law of the victim "put fire on her person after sprinkling kerosene oil and that neighbour Niva Rani took her to hospital" thereafter, but such part of the evidence must be regarded as hearsay. He did not even indicate how he came to know of such matter. 10. He alleged that the mother-in-law of the victim "put fire on her person after sprinkling kerosene oil and that neighbour Niva Rani took her to hospital" thereafter, but such part of the evidence must be regarded as hearsay. He did not even indicate how he came to know of such matter. 10. An aunt of the victim was called as PW-13. She described the victim as her husband's younger brother's daughter. She claimed to have learnt of the incident of Shila suffering burn injuries from her daughter. She said that she rushed to the Jiaganj Hospital and found Shila in "acute unrest". She claimed that "After reaching there I talked to Shila who disclosed that her in-laws are responsible for her injuries." Such witness proved her signature as a witness to the inquest report. She was resolute in denying the adverse suggestions given to her in her cross-examination. An uncle of the victim was also called as a witness. He claimed to have met the victim at the Lalbagh Hospital when "She was able to talk and she disclosed to me that her in-laws put fire on her person to which she recd. (sic, received) burn injuries on her person." Such witness was also a witness to the inquest report. 11. A cousin of the victim, Baby Halder, was next called as a witness by the prosecution. She testified that at about 9.30 am on the day of the incident, Niva brought Shila "in front of my house with the help of van" and Niva called me and "told that there was a quarrel in between Shila and her in-laws in the night in which Shila recd. (sic, received) burn injuries." Baby Halder went on to narrate that "Shila also told me that her mother-in-law put fire on her body. Nibha again told me that she can't say what actually happened in the house but she put off the fire and brought Shila at my house." The witness identified the accused in court and claimed that "over the issue of domestic/household work, in laws of Shila used to quarrel with her." In her cross-examination, she claimed to have told the investigating officer whatever she had stated in her evidence at the trial. In her cross-examination, she said that Shila never complained that her husband assaulted her but she used to complain of altercations between Shila and her husband. In her cross-examination, she said that Shila never complained that her husband assaulted her but she used to complain of altercations between Shila and her husband. She also maintained that the accused inflicted torture on Shila. 12. A sister of the victim, Madhabi Halder, was examined at the trial and she claimed to have "talk with my sister at Lalbagh Hospital" when the victim "stated that her mother-in-law set fire on her body and fled away through window..." In her cross-examination she claimed that she went to the hospital everyday that her sister remained alive and said that the victim would talk to her everyday. 13. Before referring to the evidence of the five key formal witnesses, it may do well to notice the two dying declarations and discern therefrom whether there is any apparent or serious contradiction therein. The first dying declaration in point of time was recorded at 12.40 pm on December 5, 2009 in the bed-head ticket: "As per statement of the patient herself, on 04/12/09 around 9 A.M. her mother-in-law, father-in-law & husband forcefully poured kerosene oil over her at her in-law house and they set fire on her." Below such recording, the medical officer who recorded such statement penned his observation that the patient suffered 90 per cent mixed burn injuries. He also wrote down his observation of foul smell of kerosene coming from her body. He prescribed some treatment and put his signature at the foot of the page. To the left of the statement attributed to the victim, the signature of a staff nurse also appears below the endorsement "Witness". Such signature appears to have been put at 12.50 pm on the same day. 14. The second dying declaration is said to have been recorded on December 13, 2009 at 7 pm. In the initial part, such statement refers to the torture suffered by the victim at the hands of her mother-in-law. As to the specific incident, the declaration records as follows: "On the date of occurrence, my mother-in-law and father-in-law, with common intention, poured Kerosene oil upon my person and set fire on that and fled away through the window. I somehow managed to open the door and came out. On hearing my shout some neighborus poured water and extinguished fire. My husband comes to the hospital, everyday and cries. My father in law and mother in law fled away. I somehow managed to open the door and came out. On hearing my shout some neighborus poured water and extinguished fire. My husband comes to the hospital, everyday and cries. My father in law and mother in law fled away. My husband went outside for his job, on the date of occurrence." Such declaration bears the victim's thumb impression. It also bears the signature of a medial officer. A staff nurse at the hospital also appended her signature to the declaration as a witness. Though the two statements above should be regarded as the only dying declarations, there is third statement which is attributed to the victim. Such statement was allegedly obtained by the investigating officer on December 13, 2009 under section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 though the exact time of obtaining the statement is not evident from the relevant document. It may be remembered in such context that the written complaint was lodged with the police by the victim's father also on December 13, 2009. The statement of the victim said to have been recorded by the police appears to be so similar to the second dying declaration given by the victim that it is tempting to perceive such statement to have been prepared on the basis of the dying declaration made by the victim on the same day instead of the same being seen to be another statement issued by the victim to the investigating officer. As to the specific incident of December 4, 2009, the victim is alleged to have informed the police that: "On the date of occurrence, my father-in-law and mother-in-law, with common intention, poured kerosene oil over my person and set fire on that, and fled away. On hearing my cry some neighbours rushed in and poured water upon my person and extinguished fire. They took me to the hospital. My husband was not present there at the time of such incident. He then came to the hospital to see me, and he used to come daily and cried to see my condition. His parents in-law (sic) never come to see me. I have heard that they fled away." The investigating officer put his signature at the foot of the document upon endorsing that the statement had been recorded by him. He then came to the hospital to see me, and he used to come daily and cried to see my condition. His parents in-law (sic) never come to see me. I have heard that they fled away." The investigating officer put his signature at the foot of the document upon endorsing that the statement had been recorded by him. No witness signed such statement, though it must be remembered that it was claimed to be a recording under Section 161 of the Code of 1973. Equally, it must not be lost sight of that Section 162 of the Code of 1973 carves out an exception to the general bar thereunder in respect of any statement falling under Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act, 1872. 15. As to the apparent contradictions between the first two statements, it is evident that the husband was named as one of the perpetrators of the crime in the first declaration, but he was said not to have been present at the time of the incident in the second statement. The second statement is more detailed in respect of the commission of the offence by the parents-in-law and how they "fled away through the window" and the victim "managed to open the door" and come out. The third statement, if it is given any credence, matches with the second dying declaration, though the manner in which the parents-in-law escaped after allegedly setting the victim on fire is not mentioned. 16. It is here that the evidence of the five key witnesses must be noticed. Before seeing their evidence it needs to be recorded that all such witnesses were unrelated to the victim and her in-laws and that all such witnesses came into contact with the victim only in course of discharge of their official duties. Doctor Ujjalendu Biswas, as PW-17, testified that he was posted at the Lalbagh Sub-divisional Hospital as a medical officer at the time that the victim was treated there. He claimed to have examined and treated the victim from December 4 to December 17, 2009. He asserted that at 12.40 pm on December 5, 2009 "Dr. Bibhas Mukherjee examined the patient and prepared a note to the effect that patient was conscious and co-operative as per statement of the patient herself." He claimed to be acquainted with the handwriting and the signature of Dr. Mukherjee. He asserted that at 12.40 pm on December 5, 2009 "Dr. Bibhas Mukherjee examined the patient and prepared a note to the effect that patient was conscious and co-operative as per statement of the patient herself." He claimed to be acquainted with the handwriting and the signature of Dr. Mukherjee. He referred to Exhibit-9, which was the relevant statement, and observed that it was recorded in the presence of nurse Rupalisha Ghosh and prepared in course of official duty. He further testified that "On 13.12.2009 at 7 p.m. the patient made dying declaration before me (with) full consciousness and at her will in presence of witnesses (sic) Aloka Bhattachariya (Ward sister). Dying declaration was taken as per request of S.D.O. The patient put L.T.I on the dying declaration sheet in my presence." He repeated the essential parts of the dying declaration of December 13, 2009. In his cross-examination he admitted that he had not issued "any separate fit certificate regarding her fitness to make dying declaration" on December 13, 2009 and added that "I made an endorsement on the dying declaration sheet to the effect that her statement was taken with full consciousness and at her will." 17. Staff nurse Aloka Bhatacharjee testified that on December 13, 2009 she was posted at the Lalbagh Sub-divisional Hospital. She proved her signature on the relevant document and asserted that "one burn patient named Shila made a dying declaration before doctor Ujjalendu Biswas in my presence." She repeated the essential parts of the dying declaration. In course of her cross-examination, she could not remember whether the relevant doctor checked the heart-beat, pulse or blood pressure of the victim before recording the dying declaration. She also claimed that she attended to the victim on all other days except the day when the dying declaration was recorded on December 13, 2009. 18. Dr. Bibhas Mukherjee, PW-20, testified that he was a medical officer at the Lalbagh Sub-divisional Hospital and was posted in such capacity during the time the victim remain admitted there. He clarified that the victim was not admitted under his care, "but I examined her on call." He reiterated the statement of the patient that he recorded on December 5, 2009. He testified that the victim was conscious and cooperative at that time. He corroborated his observation of the foul smell of kerosene oil emanating from the body of the victim. He testified that the victim was conscious and cooperative at that time. He corroborated his observation of the foul smell of kerosene oil emanating from the body of the victim. He proved his signature on the relevant page of the bed-head ticket and said that the version of the patient as recorded by him who also witnessed by a staff nurse on duty, Rupalisha Ghosh. No suggestions were given to him by the defence as to the state of the health of the victim or of any anomaly in his recording the statement of the victim. 19. Staff nurse Rupalisha Ghosh confirmed in her evidence that "on 5.12.2009 at about 12.40 pm one burn patient named Shila Biswas made a dying declaration before doctor Bibhas Chandra Mukherjee in my presence." No suggestion was put to such witness by the defence as to her motive or of any anomaly in the recording of the statement attributed to the victim. 20. The investigating officer was examined as PW-24. He reported that he had collected a container of kerosene oil from the place of occurrence. He also claimed to have recorded a statement of the victim in the hospital. The relevant statement was exhibited. 21. The only other things of note are the statements of the appellants herein under Section 313 of the Code of 1973. Both the appellants claimed that they were not present in the house at the time of the incident, though neither volunteered where else they may have been at that time. No alibi was attempted to be set up on behalf of the appellants herein by way of suggestions given to the prosecution witnesses at the trial. No witness was called on their behalf. 22. While appreciating the evidence, it must be recorded at the outset that no one saw how the victim was set on fire or caught fire and there is no evidence that either appellant was seen by any person at the place of occurrence or running away therefrom. The oral evidence of the relatives of the victim, both insofar as they speak of the victim being tortured at her in-laws' and of the incident of December 4, 2009, would have to be seen first from the defence's perspective. The oral evidence of the relatives of the victim, both insofar as they speak of the victim being tortured at her in-laws' and of the incident of December 4, 2009, would have to be seen first from the defence's perspective. The father of the victim merely proved his complaint but made out no case of torture in his evidence and admitted, in his cross-examination, that the victim did not make any grievance against her in-laws. As to the case attempted to be made out by the defence, a common suggestion appears to have been put to most of the victim's relatives that they were driven by their relationship with the victim to testify against the accused. Implicit in such suggestion was that the relatives of the victim may have had some common angst against the victim's in-laws. If, indeed, the relatives of the victim harboured any grouse against the victim's in-laws, that would have been on the basis of their perception that the victim was subjected to harsh treatment at her in-laws'. Such perception must have had a basis and it is not unlikely that they accepted the victim's version of her ill-treatment at her in-laws'. The common suggestion given by the defence to almost all of the victim's relatives who were called as prosecution witnesses, only gives credence to the motive attributed to the appellants for the commission of the offence. Further, to repeat, no evidence was led by the defence to demonstrate the whereabouts of the parents-in-law at the time of the incident and no suggestion on such aspect was given to any of the witnesses, not even to the two key witnesses who first came to the rescue of the victim but later turned hostile. 23. In the state of the evidence, it is apparent that it was only after the victim managed to come out of her room and onto the verandah that her cries and her pitiable condition drew the attention of at least two neighbours. On the way to the victim being taken to the hospital, the victim's cousin Baby Halder was called to join in. Neither Bidyut Biswas nor Niva Rani Biswas asserted that the victim was unconscious at the time that such persons may have doused her flames or even when they were taking her to the hospital. On the way to the victim being taken to the hospital, the victim's cousin Baby Halder was called to join in. Neither Bidyut Biswas nor Niva Rani Biswas asserted that the victim was unconscious at the time that such persons may have doused her flames or even when they were taking her to the hospital. Suggestions were put to them that they were aware of the torture inflicted by the in-laws on the victim and that the victim had accused her in-laws in their presence. They denied such suggestions but did not claim that the victim was unconscious or unable to speak. 24. If the victim did not set herself on fire - and there is no evidence of the incident being suicidal in nature - it is inconceivable that the victim would not say anything even in her delirious state as to who had perpetrated the crime. The over-zealousness on the part of Niva Rani to protect the victim's in-laws is evident from her denying the place where she found the victim to have suffered her burn injuries. It appears, on any reasonable reading of the evidence, that these two neighbours of the victim's in-laws may have been won over by the appellants and the third neighbour was also reluctant to testify against the accused. 25. Merely because it was the relatives of the victim who claimed that the victim implicated her in-laws in the crime would not make their testimonies untrustworthy. It is evident that such relatives of the victim were aware that the victim was treated unkindly at her in-laws'. While it is true that just because the in-laws may not have been favourably disposed towards the victim, it would not follow that they would or did murder her; the statements of cousin Baby Halder, the aunt and the sister of the victim carry a ring of truth. The statements attributed to Shila at the time that she was in the hospital covered both aspects of her being ill-treated at her in-laws' and of her parents-in-law having committed the heinous act of setting her on fire. 26. The statements attributed to the victim in course of the evidence of her relatives at the trial are corroborated by the second dying declaration obtained on December 13, 2009. 26. The statements attributed to the victim in course of the evidence of her relatives at the trial are corroborated by the second dying declaration obtained on December 13, 2009. Both dying declarations of December 5, 2009 and December 13, 2009 were proved and the appellants have not been able to detract therefrom, save the inclusion of the husband's name in the first and its exclusion in the second. The husband was given the benefit of the doubt by the trial court and was not convicted. There is nothing contradictory qua the mother-in-law or the father-in-law of the victim in the two dying declarations. Both statements referred to, inter alia, the mother-in-law and the father-in-law pouring kerosene oil on the victim and setting her on fire. That the second dying declaration went on to add that the parents-in-law fled away through the window cannot be regarded as a contradiction. If at all, it was a detail that was added in the second statement. In the natural course of things, a person's statement may not be the exact repetition of a previous statement and it is normal human conduct that would prompt minor differences or even discrepancies, particularly in the details. Even if the third statement attributed to the victim by the investigating officer is not taken into account, it may be of no consequence. On the other hand, if such statement is taken into account only for the purpose of considering whether the appellants should be given the benefit of any contradiction therein, no contradiction can be discovered therefrom. Though the statement under Section 161 of the Code of 1973 did not refer to how the parents-in-law "fled away", it did record that they fled away. The manner in which the parents-in-law may have fled is corroborated by the evidence of the victim's sister Madhabi that the victim told her at the hospital that "her mother-in-law set fire on her body and fled away through window ..." 27. The falsity of the testimonies of the two hostile witnesses is further evident from Exhibit-16/1, which is the injury report prepared at the Jiaganj Hospital upon the victim being taken there at or about 10 am on December 4, 2009. The falsity of the testimonies of the two hostile witnesses is further evident from Exhibit-16/1, which is the injury report prepared at the Jiaganj Hospital upon the victim being taken there at or about 10 am on December 4, 2009. Contrary to the evidence of Bidyut Biswas that he "shifted her to hospital", it appears from the injury report that it was "Niva Biswas (neighbour) & Baby Halder (Sister)" who got the victim admitted to the Jiaganj Hospital. It is also possible that Bidyut had accompanied them but did not have his name recorded. It is also evident that Bidyut's perception of the time of the incident "at about 10/10.30 am" was flawed and Baby Halder's estimation that Niva arrived with Shila "at about 9.30 am" was more accurate since the injury report was prepared in the Jiaganj Hospital at 10 am on December 4, 2009. It is preposterous that Niva Rani Biswas attempted to deceive the court to such extent that she denied the place where Shila suffered her burn injuries, though the evidence of Baby Halder comes out as completely true on such aspect. It only begs the question as to what may have prompted Bidyut Biswas and Niva Rani Biswas to lie in court. 28. Evidence is not read or appreciated by spotting the is that have not been dotted or the that may not have been crossed. The substance and the sense that the substance conveys has to be gleaned by sifting the essential from the details and the descriptive from the essence. No motive has been attributed to the doctors or the nurses involved in recording the dying declarations. Their evidence that the victim was conscious, able to speak and make herself understood corroborates the statements attributed by the relatives of the victim to the victim while she was at the hospital. If Shila was in a position to make the statements that were recorded on December 5, 2009 and December 13, 2009, it is only expected that her near and dear ones would have asked her how she suffered the injuries and she would have given the same reply to them as in her statements recorded by the doctors. There does not appear to be the slightest sliver of a doubt, in the state of the evidence, as to the commission of the offence by the appellants. There does not appear to be the slightest sliver of a doubt, in the state of the evidence, as to the commission of the offence by the appellants. Even the rough sketch-map prepared by the investigating officer, possibly, indicated the windows in Shila's room and the adjoining room. There was no suggestion put to Madhabi or to the investigating officer by the defence that the windows were such that would not allow any adult to pass through. 29. Several judgments have been brought by the parties to bear on when a dying declaration should be accepted and when contradictions in multiple dying declarations would prompt the court to discard all or most of them. It would do well to begin with a Constitution Bench judgment reported at (2002) 6 SCC 710 (Laxman v. State of Maharashtra) on the question whether it is imperative that a doctor should endorse that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement attributed to the victim in a dying declaration. The ratio decidendi and the law declared by the Constitution Bench was that if the doctor says that the patient was conscious but there is no certification that the patient was in a fit state of mind, it would not render the statement faulty; particularly if the magistrate recording the declaration was satisfied that the patient was in a fit state of mind. 30. A three-Judge Bench in a judgment reported at (1996) 8 SCC 217 (State of Rajasthan v. Kishore) considered whether a declaration recorded by a magistrate in the absence of a doctor, who did not turn up despite requests, rendered it unreliable. The further question considered was if the failure of the magistrate to record that the statement was read over to the deceased was also a serious flaw. The court held that neither omission was fatal and accepted the dying declaration. In the judgment reported at (2006) 13 SCC 130 (Ranjit Singh v. State of Punjab) the accusations against the brothers-in-law, sisters-in-law and father-in-law in the two dying declarations were inconsistent. The court, however, did not throw out the entirety of such dying declarations. To the extent that both dying declarations were consistent as to the role of the mother-in-law in setting the victim on fire was accepted and the conviction founded thereupon. The court, however, did not throw out the entirety of such dying declarations. To the extent that both dying declarations were consistent as to the role of the mother-in-law in setting the victim on fire was accepted and the conviction founded thereupon. In the decision reported at (2006) 12 SCC 283 (Balbir Singh v. State of Punjab), the second appellant was not named in the first dying declaration, but the culpability of the first appellant was specifically disclosed in both the declarations. Further, the doctor who recorded the first declaration admitted that the thumb impression or signature was not obtained on the statement since the doctor feared that the victim was about to die. The second dying declaration contained the signature of the deceased, but it was evident that it was made with great difficulty. The court held that, in the circumstances, it would not regard the first statement as not being voluntary or tutored. However, in view of one of the dying declarations not naming the second appellant, such appellant was given the benefit of the doubt. 31. In the judgment reported at (2012) 7 SCC 569 (Shudhakar v. State of Madhya Pradesh), there were three dying declarations. The first, in which the husband was absolved, did not appear to the court to be voluntary. But the second and third dying declarations implicating the appellant husband were authentic, voluntary and duly corroborated by other prosecution witnesses including the medical evidence. The second and third dying declarations were accepted. The principle enunciated by the Supreme Court was that where multiple dying declarations are either contradictory or at variance with each other to a large extent, the test of common prudence would be to first examine which dying declaration is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. Further, the attending circumstances, the condition of the deceased at the time of making each statement, the medical evidence, the voluntariness and genuineness of the statement made by the deceased, the physical and mental fitness of the deceased and the possibility of the deceased being tutored are some of the factors which should guide the exercise of judicial discretion. 32. Further, the attending circumstances, the condition of the deceased at the time of making each statement, the medical evidence, the voluntariness and genuineness of the statement made by the deceased, the physical and mental fitness of the deceased and the possibility of the deceased being tutored are some of the factors which should guide the exercise of judicial discretion. 32. In the judgment reported at (2009) 12 SCC 498 (Kanti Lal v. State of Rajasthan), which has been placed by the appellants, it was held that the court must always be satisfied that the deceased was in a fit state of mind to make the statement before accepting a dying declaration. The judgment instructs that if the capacity of the victim to narrate the facts is found to be impaired, the dying declaration should be rejected. The appellants have also carried a judgment reported at (2003) 1 SCC 112 (Chacko v. State of Kerala) where a 70-year-old victim with 80 per cent burn injuries apparently gave a detailed dying declaration indicating the minutest particulars as to the motive and the manner in which she suffered the injuries. The declaration was disbelieved. An additional ground for rejecting the statement was the absence of any certificate by any competent doctor as to the mental and physical condition of the victim. In the last of the cases cited by the appellants, a decision reported at (2007) 11 SCC 269 (Shaikh Bakshu v. State of Maharashtra), there was no mention in the dying declaration that it was read over and explained to the deceased. Such position was held to be unacceptable by the court, but the court also held that the dying declaration was otherwise unreliable. 33. There is no statutory manner or form for recording a dying declaration. There are precedents that instruct that the best manner of recording a dying declaration would be by putting questions to the patient and obtaining the answers in the language of the patient; by having such recording in the presence of an executive magistrate and a doctor upon the doctor certifying the fitness of the patient to make the statement; and, having the answers read over and explained to the patient by the magistrate and the magistrate making an endorsement to such effect in the document. But that is only the ideal situation. But that is only the ideal situation. In the context of a dying declaration, Section 32 of the Evidence Act, 1872 mandates that statements, written or verbal, of relevant facts made by a person who is dead are themselves relevant facts when the statements are made by the person as to the cause of his death, or as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted in his death, in cases in which the cause of that person's death comes into question. The evidentiary value of, and the sanctity attached to, a dying declaration is not robbed of its credibility by a careless doctor or a lazy magistrate. The essence of the judicial pronouncements in such regard is that if the court has no doubt as to the veracity of a dying declaration in the sense that it recorded the statement of the victim who subsequently died and the contents thereof are not contrary to the evidence on record, it should inspire sufficient confidence for the court to accept it. 34. In the present case the veracity of either dying declaration of December 5, 2009 and December 13, 2009 is beyond question. The statement of the victim apparently recorded by the investigating officer on December 13, 2009 does not appeal. But such statement is noticed, if only to consider whether it detracts, in essence, from the other two dying declarations for the appellants herein to gain any benefit therefrom. On a careful scrutiny of all the three statements, it does not appear that there is any contradiction therein from which the appellants can gain anything. The victim implicated both the appellants herein in all the three dying declarations and such part of the victim's statement is corroborated by the evidence of several witnesses who had met her at the hospital. The manner in which the parents-in-law may have escaped after the victim was set on fire cannot be regarded as an essential part of the victim's statement, though their escape through the window is partly corroborated by Madhabi. Though it may not be of much significance, but it is also apparent that the appellants herein did not visit the victim at the hospital and both the formal dying declaration of December 13, 2009 and the statement made by the victim to the police on the same day refer to the appellants herein having "fled away". Though it may not be of much significance, but it is also apparent that the appellants herein did not visit the victim at the hospital and both the formal dying declaration of December 13, 2009 and the statement made by the victim to the police on the same day refer to the appellants herein having "fled away". The records reveal that the second appellant was arrested in February, 2010 and the first appellant gave himself up several months later. 35. There can be no doubt that there are some minor discrepancies in the statements of some of the prosecution witnesses, particularly as to the time of the occurrence. But such discrepancies are not so glaring that they would not be considered within the permissible ambit of the imperfect recollection of a situation by several human minds. The substance of a statement cannot be discarded merely because an error of an hour or two is made therein. Bidyut Biswas, Niva Rani Biswas and Baby Halder were the key immediate post occurrence witnesses. Upon Bidyut and Niva Rani turning hostile, Baby Halder's evidence called for greater scrutiny since she claimed that the victim told her that the victim's mother-in-law had set the victim on fire. Though Niva Rani denied that she was aware of even the place where the incident occurred, her testimony is falsified by the fact that she was recorded, along with Baby Halder, to be one of the persons who brought the victim to the hospital. That Baby Halder got some time to interact with the victim immediately after the occurrence stands established. The statement attributed by Baby Halder to the victim is substantially corroborated by the credible dying declarations of December 5, 2009 and December 13, 2009. It is also not apparent why the relatives of the victim would gun for the appellants unless they heard from the victim of the appellants' involvement in the commission of the offence and both believed the victim and sympathised with her. 36. There appears to be no ground to interfere with the order of conviction and the consequent sentence. 37. I have read the extremely thorough discussion of the evidence in the draft judgment prepared by learned brother Chattopadhyay. Regrettably, I have not been able to persuade myself that there is any doubt that the prosecution case has thrown up for the appellants herein to be given any benefit thereunder. 37. I have read the extremely thorough discussion of the evidence in the draft judgment prepared by learned brother Chattopadhyay. Regrettably, I have not been able to persuade myself that there is any doubt that the prosecution case has thrown up for the appellants herein to be given any benefit thereunder. A 22- year-old woman married for about a year went up in flames. She did not self combust, nor does the evidence reveal her having attempted to commit suicide. This was murder most horrific and gruesome and the victim's statements that her parents-in-law were responsible for it rings true in the evidence that has come to light. I respectfully disagree with the view taken by my learned brother and uphold the conviction and sentence rightly ordered by the trial court. (Sanjib Banerjee, J.) Siddhartha Chattopadhyay, J. - I had the privilege to have a cursory glance over the finding and judgment of my learned brother as recorded in the draft copy. I also got opportunities to hear the erudite submissions of the learned Counsels appearing on behalf of the appellants and State of West Bengal. 39. At the very outset, I cannot help mentioning the following findings of my learned brother recorded in Para 5, wherein my learned brother held "never raised any grievance against any of the family members of her matrimonial home. However, such evidence, obviously in response to a suggestion put by the defence, has to be seen in the light of the allegations contained in the complaint which he proved at the trial." In my view that the said question was not at all a suggestion rather a direct question. In response to that he admitted that he never raised any grievance. The de fact complainant further added that his daughter did not make any allegation against her in-laws. It is perhaps needless to say that the F.I.R. is always subjected to extract omission and contradiction. Therefore, it is a serious contradiction. The benefit should go in favour of the defence. I am unable to espouse the said finding. 40. The de fact complainant further added that his daughter did not make any allegation against her in-laws. It is perhaps needless to say that the F.I.R. is always subjected to extract omission and contradiction. Therefore, it is a serious contradiction. The benefit should go in favour of the defence. I am unable to espouse the said finding. 40. In para 12, my learned brother quoted "A sister of the victim, Madhabi Halder, was examined at the trial and she claimed to have "talked with my sister at Lalbagh Hospital" when the victim "stated that her mother-in-law set fire on her body and fled away through window..." In her cross-examination she claimed that she went to the hospital every day that her sister remained alive and said that the victim would talk to her every day." First dying declaration was recorded on 4.12.2009 and the second one on December 13, 2009 at 7:00 pm. In the second dying declaration (December 13, 2009) the victim had taken a somersault and this time she had exonerated her husband and also made out a new story that her parents-in-law fled away through the window. In the second dying declarations it is recorded that her husband came to the hospital during her stay and on the date of occurrence her husband went outside. There is a time gap of about 9 days. During this period her husband regularly met her. Then chance of being tutored cannot be ruled out. 41. In para 14, my learned brother translated the third dying declaration which was also recorded on December 13, 2009. In the last line of the dying declaration, it is stated that her parents-in-law never came to see her. She heard that they fled away. Such part of her dying declaration further strengthened scope of being tutored. 42. In para 16, my learned brother mainly relied on the deposition of 'five key witnesses', who are public servants. They have proved the dying declarations. They did not say that the patient was always kept in a secluded manner, so that nobody could meet her. On the contrary third dying declaration was also recorded by one of those five key witnesses which speaks that she heard that her in-laws fled away. This certainly indicates that somebody met the victim and tutored her. 43. They did not say that the patient was always kept in a secluded manner, so that nobody could meet her. On the contrary third dying declaration was also recorded by one of those five key witnesses which speaks that she heard that her in-laws fled away. This certainly indicates that somebody met the victim and tutored her. 43. Now, I want to go into the details of the prosecution case, evidences of the witnesses and the directions of the Hon'ble Apex Court regarding the test of validity and authenticity of multiple dying declarations. 44. The appellants call in question the correctness of the judgment and order of conviction dated 22.09.2015 and 23.09.2015 passed by the Additional District & Sessions Judge Fast Track 1st Court, Lalbagh in S.T No. 2(5)2013 arising out of S.Sl. Case No. 134/11. By filing this appeal the convict/appellants ventilate their grievances that the learned Trial Court failed to consider the evidence of the prosecution witnesses in its proper perspectives. According to the appellants, the evidence of the prosecution witnesses are self-contradictory in nature and there are multiple dying declarations which had not been considered by the learned Trial Court properly. The appellants further contended that the learned Trial Court passed the judgment and order of conviction mainly on presumptions and failed to take into account about the faulty investigation conducted by the Investigating Officer. According to him, the appeal ought to be allowed and the judgment and order of conviction should be set aside. 45. As against this learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the State contended that the learned Trial Court has taken care of all the material aspects and it does not warrant any interference. 46. The factual scenario which emerges from a cumulative reading and scrutiny of the materials available as is follows: The marriage between the victim and the appellant Basudev was held nearly after one year back from the date of the fateful incident. At the time of marriage gold ornaments, cash etc. were given along with cot, bedding etc. But after the said marriage the victim was subjected to physical and mental torture. The victim informed this incident to her father and the father went to her matrimonial home and requested the appellants not to inflict torture upon her. His such request received a cold reception. Rather the degree of torture was increased. But after the said marriage the victim was subjected to physical and mental torture. The victim informed this incident to her father and the father went to her matrimonial home and requested the appellants not to inflict torture upon her. His such request received a cold reception. Rather the degree of torture was increased. On 04.12.2009 over a telephonic communication, he came to know that the appellants set fire upon the victim with a view to killing her. The victim was taken to Jiaganj Rural Hospital and thereafter to Lalbagh SD Hospital. After nine days, the F.I.R was lodged. In this way the law was set into motion. 47. The defence case as it appears from the trend of cross-examination and examination of the accused/appellants under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. is their innocence and that they have been falsely implicated. After the registration of the F.I.R. the investigating agency came into operation. In course of investigation, the Investigating Officer had recorded the statement of the witnesses, took photographs of the place of occurrence, collected inquest report, collected post mortem report and thereafter charge-sheet has been submitted. 48. To come to a conclusion I should have a look upon the evidences of the prosecution witnesses. Since the conviction is based mainly on dying declarations and in such circumstances, I am of the view that the evidence of the prosecution witnesses has to be scrutinized meticulously so that the veracity of the prosecution case as a whole can be ascertained. 49. The P.W. 1 is the father of the victim. It appears from his deposition sheet that he resides within the jurisdiction of Bhagwangola Police Station, District-Murshidabad. In his examination-in-chief he never stated about any kind of torture allegedly perpetrated upon the victim. On the fateful day he got an information that the victim sustained burn injuries. If I compare with his such statement with the F.I.R., I would find that there are many contradictory statements in the F.I.R. This P.W. 1 (de facto complainant) categorically mentioned in the F.I.R. about the physical and mental torture perpetrated upon the victim by the accused persons. The F.I.R. also speaks that his daughter informed her about her torture and thereafter he went to the house of the accused and requested them not to put any torture upon her. Even after his such request the degree of torture was increased. The F.I.R. also speaks that his daughter informed her about her torture and thereafter he went to the house of the accused and requested them not to put any torture upon her. Even after his such request the degree of torture was increased. But in his cross-examination, he failed to recollect about the contents of F.I.R. He is an unlettered rustic person. In his cross-examination, he candidly stated that his daughter was all along led a peaceful conjugal life at her matrimonial home. He also specifically stated in cross-examination that the victim never raised any grievance against any of the family members of her matrimonial home. If I consider, his such evidence with the F.I.R. then the logical conclusion would be that there is significant discrepancies in the prosecution story. The story of torture as alleged in the F.I.R. has been demolished by his own admission in his cross-examination that the victim was all along happy in her matrimonial home. As per F.I.R. he had been to the house of the accused persons after getting information from his daughter and thereafter degree of torture was increased. But in his examination-in-chief, he had not uttered any single word regarding the torture or at least misbehaviour of the accused persons. Therefore, his such contradictory statement certainly goes in favour of the defence.