JUDGMENT : Alok Aradhe, J. In this intra appeal, wherein the appellant has assailed the validity of the judgment dated 03.06.2011 passed by the learned single Judge in SWP No. 2039 of 2007. On admitted facts, pure question of law arises for consideration in this appeal with regard to interpretation of Entry-III of Schedule (Part-1) of Jammu and Kashmir Medical (Gazetted) Services Recruitment Rules, 1970 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Rules'). 2. Facts giving rise to filing of the appeal briefly stated are that the appellant was appointed as an Assistant Surgeon in the year 1997. The appellant has to his credit Post Graduate Diploma in Orthopaedics. The respondent No. 1 invited applications for various posts including the post of B Grade Specialist in Orthopaedics vide advertisement notification dated 24.05,2005. The appellant as well as the respondent No. 4 responded to the aforesaid advertisement notification and appeared for interview. However respondent No.4 was selected under Scheduled Tribe (ST) Category for the post of B Grade Specialist in Orthopaedics, The appellant challenged the appointment of respondent No. 4 mainly on the ground that respondent No. 4 did not satisfy the eligibility criteria laid down in the recruitment rules inasmuch as he did not have four years- experience after completion of Post Graduate Diploma in Orthopaedics in the year 2005 as required under the rules. 3. Learned single Judge vide judgment dated 03.06.2011 inter alia held that period of experience is not linked with the acquisition of Post Graduate Degree/Diploma in concerned discipline and the eligibility criteria requires two years experience as a doctor/ assistant surgeon in a recognised hospital. It was further held that rules do not insist on the requisite experience in particular discipline for the post of B Grade Specialist. Accordingly the writ petition was dismissed. In the aforesaid factual backdrop, the appellant has approached this Court. 4. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the Court has to give effect to the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous, It is further submitted that the experience according to the eligibility criteria prescribed under the rules has to be counted after the date of acquisition of the prescribed qualification and service as diploma/degree holder can only be reckoned after acquisition of degree/diploma. In support of the aforesaid submissions, learned counsel for the appellant has placed reliance on decisions in Union of India and another v. Devki Nandan Aggarwal, AIR 1992 SC 96 ; Indian Airlines Ltd. and others v. S Gopala Krishan, etc. (2000) 8 Supreme 279 : (2000 AIR SCW 4545) and in K.K. Dixit and others v. Rajasthan Housing Board and Anr. (2015) 1 SCC 474 : (2014 AIR SCW 5443). 5. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for respondent No. 1 has pointed out that the learned single Judge has failed to take note of the explanation appended to Entry-III of Schedule (Part-1) of the Rules and the period of four years of experience in a recognised hospital can only be reckoned from the date of acquisition of the degree. In support of the aforesaid submission, leaned senior counsel for respondent No. 1 has referred to decisions of the Supreme Court in the case of Davis v. Sebastian (1999) 6 SCC 604 : ( AIR 1999 SC 3223 ); and Vemareddy Kumaraswamy Reddy v. State of A.P. (2006) 2 SCC 670 : ( AIR 2006 SC 3517 ). Learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that explanation appended to the Entry-III of the Rules is unambiguous and the experience has to be counted as part of the qualifying criteria and has to be reckoned after the Post-graduate qualification which in the instant case is diploma in Orthopaedics. It is further submitted that selection of the candidate as B Grade Specialist in Orthopaedics in the Department of Health should be based on requirement of experience of four years acquired in recognised hospital after the completion of diploma in Orthopaedics. 6. We have considered the respective submissions made by both the sides. In State of Himachal Pradesh v. Kailash Chand Mahajan, AIR 1992 SC 1277 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that intention of the legislature assimilates two aspects, namely, the meaning and the purpose and object. It has further been held that the process of construction therefore combines both literal and purposive approaches. In other words, the legislative intention that is the true or legal meaning of an Act enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object. The aforesaid formulation of rule of construction was termed as Cardinal Principle of Construction. (See. In other words, the legislative intention that is the true or legal meaning of an Act enactment is derived by considering the meaning of the words used in the enactment in the light of any discernible purpose or object. The aforesaid formulation of rule of construction was termed as Cardinal Principle of Construction. (See. UOI v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Co. Ltd., JT 2001 (1) SC 536, p.563; AIR 2001 SC 724 , p.740 : (2001) 4 SCC 139 (Constitution Bench); District Mining Officer v. Tata Iron and Steel Co., AIR 2001 SC 3134 , p. 3152 : (2001) 7 SCC 358 ; Ameer Trading Corporation Ltd. v. Shapoorj Data Processing Ltd., AIR 2004 SC 355 , p.360 : (2004) 1 SCC 702 ; Ruma Aggarwal v. Anupam (2004) 3 SCC 199 , pp.211, 212 : AIR 2004 SC 1418 (pp. 1424-1425); National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Laxmi Narain Dhut (2007) 3 SCC 700 , p.718 : AIR 2007 SC 1563 (pp. 1572-1573). See further, Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Limited (2010) 10 SCC 744 (para 58) : (2010) 10 JT 26 ) : (2010 AIR SCW 6238, para 38). 7. It is equally well settled legal proposition that primarily the language employed in the statute is the determinative factor of the legislative intention which is the first and primary rule of construction. The explanation is at times appended to a section to explain the meaning of words contained in the section and the same becomes part and parcel of the enactment. (See S. Sundram Pillai v. Pattabhi-raman (1985) 1 SCC 591 : ( AIR 1985 SC 582 ) and Dipak Chander Ruhidas v. Chandan Kumar Sarkar (2003) 7 SCC 66 ) : (AIR 2003 SC 3701). 8. (See S. Sundram Pillai v. Pattabhi-raman (1985) 1 SCC 591 : ( AIR 1985 SC 582 ) and Dipak Chander Ruhidas v. Chandan Kumar Sarkar (2003) 7 SCC 66 ) : (AIR 2003 SC 3701). 8. In S. Sundram Pillai ( AIR 1985 SC 582 ) (supra), the objects of an to a statutory provision were culled out by the Supreme Court which read as under: (a) to explain the meaning and intendment of the Act itself; (b) where there is any obscurity or vagueness in the main enactment, to clarify the same so as to make it consistent with the dominant object which it seems to subserve, (c) to provide an additional support to the dominant object of the Act in order to make it meaningful and purposeful; (d) an Explanation cannot in anyway interfere with or change the enactment or any part thereof but where gap is left which is relevant for the purpose of the Explanation, in order to suppress the mischief and advance the object of the Act it can help or assist the, Court in interpreting the true purport and intendment of the enactment; and (e) it cannot, however, take away a statutory right with which any person, under a statute has been clothed or set at naught the working of an Act by becoming an hindrance in the interpretation of the same. 9. In the backdrop of the aforesaid well settled legal principles with regard to interpretation of statutes, we may advert to the facts of the case in hand. Admittedly, the appellant has acquired post graduate diploma in Orthopaedics in the year 2001, whereas the respondent No. 4 has acquired the same in the year 2005. Before proceeding further, it is apposite to take note of the Entry-III of the Rules. (Tabullar Matter Is Omitted......Ed) 10. From perusal of Entry-III of the Rules, it is evident that possession of Post Graduate Degree qualification mentioned for the concerned subject in Part-A of the annexure to the Schedule with two years experience in the recognised hospital or possession of Post Graduate Diploma mentioned for the concerned subject in Part-B of annexure to this Schedule with four years experience in a recognised hospital is the qualification which is prescribed for appointment on the post of B Grade Specialist. The explanation appended to Entry-III of the Rules provides that experience in recognised hospital means the experience acquired after post graduation qualification as Lecturer/ Tutor/ Registrar/ Senior Resident/ Junior Resident/ . Demonstrator/Assistant Surgeon/Medical Officer in any Government Hospital, Public Health Center, Dispensary, Medical Unit or Institute recognised by the Government. Thus the explanation which is part and parcel of Entry-III of the Rules clarifies the meaning of the expression experience. The explanation leaves iota of doubt that experience has to be obtained after post graduation qualification is obtained. 11. In the instant case, the learned single Judge has failed to take note of the explanation which has a material bearing on the controversy involved in this case. Admittedly the respondent No. 4 does not have four years of experience in a recognised hospital after acquisition of post graduate Diploma qualification i.e. D. Ortho; therefore we find force with the submissions made on behalf of appellant that respondent No. 4 did not have the requisite experience prescribed for the post of B Grade Specialist in Orthopaedics. 12. In view of preceding analysis, the impugned judgment dated 03.06.2011 passed by the learned single Judge in SWP No. 2039 of 2007 cannot sustain in the eye of law. In the result, the impugned judgment as well as order of appointment of respondent No. 4 on the post of B Grade Specialist (Orthopaedics) under the ST category dated 07.11.2007 is also hereby quashed. The official respondents are directed to consider the case of the appellant for appointment on the post of B Grade Specialist in Orthopaedics as he holds the requisite criteria and in case the appellant is found to be the most meritorious candidate, to issue order of appointment in his favour within a period of one month from today. With the aforesaid directions, the appeal is allowed. MP accordingly disposed of.