JUDGMENT : Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J. The common impugned order dated December 08, 2006, which is under challenge in the instant appeals, was passed by the learned Single Judge deciding S.B. Civil Writ Petitions No. 1161/2003, 1197/2003 and 102/2005. 2. The writ petitioners were to collect excess royalty from Salumber, Rajsamand and Kherwada and the contractual period for such collection was April 01, 2001 to March 31, 2003 and April 01, 2003 to March 31, 2005 respectively. The Hon'ble Supreme Court passed an order dated October 30, 2002 pertaining to the Aravali Area and suspended the mining operations in such area. The excess royalty for mineral Bajri being under the interim order of the Hon'ble Apex Court, resulted into losses to the writ petitioners, who sought relaxation on the ground of such collection of excess royalty. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant-State submitted that the terms of the agreement were binding upon the respondents/writ petitioners and since they had accepted the agreement with open eyes, therefore, it was not open for them to challenge the same at this juncture. Learned counsel for the appellant-State also submitted that the condition in the contract is as follows:- ^^Bsdk {ks= ds vUrxZr u;s [kuu iV`s Lohd`r djus] orZeku [kuu iV~Vksa dks [kafnr djus vFkok vO;kfir djus ij vf/kd vf/k'kqYd Bsdk jkf'k ij dksbZ izHkko ugha iM+sxkA** 4. Learned counsel for the appellant-State further submitted that the aforequoted condition created a legal obligation upon the writ petitioners to pay the excess royalty in spite of any kind of impediment in the mining. It is also submitted that as per the terms of the agreement, the writ petitioners were under a lawful obligation to continue to pay the excess royalty without prejudice to the fact that there had been unforeseen stoppage of mining activities. 5. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Division Bench of this Court in Nawal Singh Ratnawat v. State of Rajasthan and Ors. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19947/2013 decided on March 11, 2014), wherein the condition of the agreement as in the present matter was there in the shape of Rule 37(A)(xvi) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 and validity of the same was under challenge. 6. (D.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19947/2013 decided on March 11, 2014), wherein the condition of the agreement as in the present matter was there in the shape of Rule 37(A)(xvi) of the Rajasthan Minor Mineral Concession Rules, 1986 and validity of the same was under challenge. 6. Broader jurisprudence on the factual aspects is same, because in this case also, mining was prohibited for certain period due to the interim order of the National Green Tribunal and the writ petitioners in the writ petition challenged the validity of the Rule on account of such stoppage of mining activities. 7. The Division Bench of this Court in Nawal Singh Ratnawat (supra), has dealt with Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, in which agreement to do an impossible act has been dealt with and has also dealt with the condition prescribed in the agreement, which has the same language, which is there in the present agreement. Except for the proposition of Rule 37(A)(xvi) of the Rules of 1986, the other issues of contractual liability, contractual binding, collection of royalty, the stipulation in the agreement, the stoppage of mining operations due to Court orders and all other facets of the case are same. 8. The relevant portion of the judgment of the Division Bench of this Court rendered in Nawal Singh Ratnawat (supra) is as follows:- "2. Briefly, the essential material facts necessary for adjudication of the controversy are: That the petitioner was granted a royalty collection contract for 'Bajri' (sand) excavated from flow area of Banas river and Nallahs within the revenue boundaries of Tehsil and District Sawaimadhopur, for a period of two years. The terms and conditions of the contract, entered into between the State Government and the petitioners on 23rd March, 2011 and 2nd July, 2011, were reduced to writing. A specific condition 3(xvi) was incorporated in the contract (Annexure-1), to the effect that in the event of cancellation/surrender of leases or sanctioning of new leases/revision of 'dead rent' of existing leases, in the area concerned, shall not have any impact on yearly contract amount. A specific condition 3(xvi) was incorporated in the contract (Annexure-1), to the effect that in the event of cancellation/surrender of leases or sanctioning of new leases/revision of 'dead rent' of existing leases, in the area concerned, shall not have any impact on yearly contract amount. On 30th March, 2012 in D.B. Civil Writ Petition Number 4250 of 2012 (Villagers of Chandgarh, Tehsil Kothadi, District Bhilwara v. State of Rajasthan), an injunction was granted on excavation of Bajri (sand) from the riverbeds of Banas river and the petitioners were directed to stop collection of royalty or permit fee, only for the period with effect from 1st April, 2012 to 18th April, 2012. 3. The petitioners are aggrieved of the demand notices dated 8th March, 2013 and 31st March, 2013, calling upon the petitioners to deposit the due amount for the period of 18 days i.e., with effect from 1st of April, 2012 to 18th April, 2012. The demand is sustained in view of Rule 37(A)(xvi) of the Rules of 1986 as well as in view of Condition 3(xvi) incorporated in the contract entered into between the State Government and the petitioner (Annexure-1). 4. The learned Senior Counsel urged that Rule 63(3) of the Rules of 1986, dealing with grant of short-term permit, provides for a totally different procedure for excavation of Bajri (sand). The State Government in exercise of power of relaxation under Rule 65 of the Rules of 1986, has provided the procedure for grant of mineral concession for Bajri (sand) vide circular dated 10th December, 1986. The circular was further modified by a policy dated 12th September, 1988 and thereafter, by policy circular dated 3rd October, 1988 (Annexure- 18, 19 and 20, respectively). The learned Senior Counsel further submitted that no mining lease or quarry licenses are in existence for the mineral Bajri (sand) in the entire State of Rajasthan. 5. Anybody, desiring to excavate mineral Bajri (sand) may do so and make a payment while passing through Naka or Government Check-post. No application for short-term permit is required. Therefore, the procedure provided for excavation of mineral Bajri (sand) by the State is totally different from one adopted for other minerals and hence, the provisions of Rule 37(A)(xvi) as well as condition stipulated under Clause-3(xvi) of the agreement have no application. No application for short-term permit is required. Therefore, the procedure provided for excavation of mineral Bajri (sand) by the State is totally different from one adopted for other minerals and hence, the provisions of Rule 37(A)(xvi) as well as condition stipulated under Clause-3(xvi) of the agreement have no application. Thus, Rule 37(A)(xvi) is ultra-vires of Article 14, 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India as well as Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 6. The learned Senior Counsel also emphasized that in the event of closure of excavation or removal of the mineral Bajri (sand) for the relevant period, the petitioners could not have been saddled with the liability for payment of 'royalty' or 'permit fee', and therefore, the demand raised by the Government amounts to fulfilment of a condition, which was impossible and hence, void. Moreover, when the petitioner entered into contract with the State Government, there was no such closure contemplated by the petitioner. Since the closure was after the contract was entered into, the petitioner cannot be held liable and called upon to fulfil a condition impossible. Hence, the demand raised by the State respondents for the period, when the excavation of the mineral Bajri (sand) was completely stopped, cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and carefully perused the materials available on record. 8. At this juncture, it will be gainful to consider the text of Rule 3(x), (xvi) and (xxi) of the Rules of 1986, which read thus:- "3. Definitions- (i) ..... (x) "Dead rent" means the minimum guaranteed amount of royalty per year payable as per rules of agreement under a mining lease. (xvi) "Forms" means forms appended to these rules. 8. At this juncture, it will be gainful to consider the text of Rule 3(x), (xvi) and (xxi) of the Rules of 1986, which read thus:- "3. Definitions- (i) ..... (x) "Dead rent" means the minimum guaranteed amount of royalty per year payable as per rules of agreement under a mining lease. (xvi) "Forms" means forms appended to these rules. (xxi) "Royalty Collection Contract" means a contract for the specified mineral or minerals given to collect royalty [with or without fee, as the case may be] on behalf of the Government from the quarry licensee and short term permit holders who excavate minor minerals from the land specified under the contract where under the contractor undertakes to pay fixed amount annually to the Government save as exempted under rule 58." Rule 37(A)(xvi) of the Rules of 1986, read thus:- "Rule 37(A)(xvi)-Cancellation/surrender of lease/quarry licenses or temporary/ permanent closure of leases/quarry licenses by Government/court or due to any other reason in the area concerned shall not have any impact on yearly contract amount." 9. Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 read thus:- "56. Agreement to do impossible act - An agreement to do an act impossible in itself is void. Contract to do act afterwards becoming impossible or unlawful: A contract to do an act which, after the contract is made, becomes impossible or, by reason of some event which the promisor could not prevent, unlawful, becomes void when the act becomes impossible or unlawful. Compensation for loss through non-performance of act known to be impossible or unlawful: Where one person has promised to be something which he knew or, with reasonable diligence, might have known, and which the promisee did not know to be impossible or unlawful, such promisor must make compensation to such promise for any loss which such promisee sustains through the nonperformance of the promise." 10. The learned Senior Counsel submits that the petitioner's right to collect the royalty or permit fee on behalf of the State Government was temporarily withheld during the period in dispute and therefore, the demand raised, is absolutely illegal as the performance of the contract was impossible on account of closure of excavation of mineral Bajri (sand), in view of the order passed by the Court on 30th March, 2013. The learned Senior Counsel also assailed the action of the State respondents in rejecting his representation for grant of rebate without any application of mind. 11. Mr. K.K. Sharma, learned Senior Counsel, at the very outset, has restricted his arguments only to the extent of challenge to the vires of Rule 37(A)(xvi) of the Rules of 1986 and therefore, we are confining the scrutiny of the subject matter, in the writ petitions, only to the extent of the challenge to vires of the Rule aforesaid. 12. It is an admitted case of the petitioners that they did enter into an agreement for collection of the royalty in the prescribed form (Annexure-1), which also contained a clause 3(xvi), which reads thus:- "3(xvi). Cancellation/surrender of leases or sanctioning of new leases/revision of dead rent of existing leases in the area concerned shall not have any impact on yearly contract amount." 13. It is also not disputed that the petitioners entered into a contract with the State Government and the contract was reduced to writing, with the terms and conditions stipulated therein, for the purpose of collection of the royalty, which specifically stipulated that there shall be no impact on yearly contract amount in the event of cancellation/surrender of leases or sanction of new leases including permanent/ temporary closure by Government/Court. 14. Rule 37(A)(xvi) of the Rules of 1986 has not been assailed as ultra-vires, on either of the grounds, viz., (i) lack of legislative competence; or (ii) violation of any of the fundamental rights guaranteed under Part-III of the Constitution of India or for any other constitutional provision. By a catena of judgments, it is settled law that there are only two grounds to strike down the law made by a legislative body, as aforesaid, and there is no third ground. It is also not open to strike down an enactment on the ground of arbitrariness or unreasonableness or even if, in the opinion of the court, the enactment may be unjustified. 15. From the materials available on record, the grievance of the petitioners, while assailing the vires, legality and validity of Rule 37(A) (xvi) in the face of Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, cannot be sustained for the reason that in such a situation alternative, efficacious and speedy remedy under the law is available to the petitioners. 15. 15. From the materials available on record, the grievance of the petitioners, while assailing the vires, legality and validity of Rule 37(A) (xvi) in the face of Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, cannot be sustained for the reason that in such a situation alternative, efficacious and speedy remedy under the law is available to the petitioners. 15. The grievance raised pleading the grounds is really one of unreasonableness and for those reasons, in our opinion, the challenge to the legality and validity of Rule 37(A)(xvi) being ultra-vires of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, cannot be sustained. Further, it is an admitted case of the petitioners that the State-respondents modified the procedure by a policy dated 10th December, 1986 and 12th September, 1988 and thereafter, by policy circular dated 3rd October, 1988. 16. A mere fact of refusal of the State-respondents to grant rebate to the petitioners for the period in dispute i.e. 1st April, 2013 to 18th April, 2013; when the excavation of Bajri (sand) was completely stopped, cannot, by any stretch of imagination, be a ground to assail the vires of Rule 37(A)(xvi) of the Rules of 1986. 16. From the admitted facts and materials available on record, it is evident that the petitioners entered into agreements with the State Government, reduced to writing on 23rd March, 2011 and 2nd July, 2011, respectively. The agreements stipulated terms and conditions including one under Clause 3(xvi) wherein it has been specifically provided that there shall be no impact on yearly contract amount of dead rent, for the existing leases in the area concerned. Thus, the petitioners were conscious of the terms and conditions of the contract, state of facts as well as the law applicable. Be that as it may, in the event of subsequent developments, the petitioners were at liberty either to rescind the contract or to seek restitution or to affirm the contract reserving their right to seek damages by way of restitution for the loss. The very fact that the petitioners resorted to collection of royalty in terms of the contract/agreement clearly indicates their affirmation. The petitioners neither rescinded the contract nor reserved their right to seek restitution by way of damages and proceeded further, is also indicative of the full knowledge of the facts to the petitioners. The very fact that the petitioners resorted to collection of royalty in terms of the contract/agreement clearly indicates their affirmation. The petitioners neither rescinded the contract nor reserved their right to seek restitution by way of damages and proceeded further, is also indicative of the full knowledge of the facts to the petitioners. In these attending facts and circumstances, it can safely be concluded that the petitioners in spite of having acquired complete knowledge of the true facts proceeded with the collection of royalty in terms of the agreements. Thus, the petitioners took a conscious decision to elect to stand by the agreements. 17. For the reasons and discussions herein above, we find it difficulty to accept the proposition of the learned Senior Counsel, on those grounds, to declare Rule 37(A) (xvi) of the Rules of 1986 ultra-vires of Article 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India or Section 56 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. 18. In the result, the challenge fails. Rule 37(A)(xvi) of the Rules of 1986 is absolutely intra-vires legal and valid. 19. Since we have not put to scrutiny the matter on merits but for challenge to the vires of Rule 37(A)(xvi) of the Rules of 1986; it will open for the petitioners to avail of the remedies available under the law. 20. In view of the final adjudication on the writ petitions, the stay application stands closed. 21. No costs. 9. Learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on the precedent law in the judgment reported as (2000) 4 SCC 342 : Mohammed Gazi v. State of M.P. and Ors., whereby the doctrine of actus curiae neminem gravabit, which is pertaining to an act of the court not to prejudice any person in any manner being applicable has been discussed. 10. The relevant para 7 of the judgment in Mohammed Gazi v. State of M.P. and Ors. (supra) is as follows: "7. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the maxim of equity, namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit - an act of the court shall prejudice no man, shall be applicable. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The other maxim, lex non cogit ad impossibilia - the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform. This maxim is founded upon justice and good sense which serves a safe and certain guide for the administration of law. The other maxim, lex non cogit ad impossibilia - the law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform. The law itself and its administration is understood to disclaim as it does in its general aphorisms, all intention of compelling impossibilities, and the administration of law must adopt that general exception in the consideration of particular cases. The applicability of the aforesaid maxims has been approved by this Court in Raj Kumar Dey v. Tarapada Dey and Gursharan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee." 11. Learned counsel for the appellants have further relied upon the precedent law in the judgment reported as (2006) 1 SCC 751 : Dresser Rand S.A. v. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. and Anr., whereby certain conditions in letters of intent were held to be of no consequence, in light of the negative contractual intention, which shall not be binding upon the parties. 12. The relevant paras 39 and 40 of the judgment rendered in Dresser Rand S.A. v. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. and Anr. (supra) are as follows:- "39. It is now well settled that a letter of intent merely indicates a party's intention to enter into a contract with the other party in future. A letter of intent is not intended to bind either party ultimately to enter into any contract. This Court while considering the nature of a letter of intent, observed thus in Rajasthan Coop. Dairy Federation Ltd. v. Maha Laxmi Mingrate Marketing Service (P) Ltd.: (SCC p.408, para 7) "The letter of intent merely expressed an intention to enter into a contract . . . . .There was no binding legal relationship between the appellant and Respondent 1 at this stage and the appellant was entitled to look at the totality of circumstances in deciding whether to enter into a binding contract with Respondent 1 or not." 40. It is no doubt true that a letter of intent may be construed as a letter of acceptance if such intention is evident from its terms. It is no doubt true that a letter of intent may be construed as a letter of acceptance if such intention is evident from its terms. It is not uncommon in contracts involving detailed procedure, in order to save time, to issue a letter of intent communicating the acceptance of the offer and asking the contractor to start the work with a stipulation that the detailed contract would be drawn up later. If such a letter is issued to the contractor, though it may be termed as a letter of intent, it may amount to acceptance of the offer resulting in a concluded contract between the parties. But the question whether the letter of intent is merely an expression of an intention to place an order in future or whether it is a final acceptance of the offer thereby leading to a contract, is a matter that has to be decided with reference to the terms of the letter. Chitty on Contracts (para 2.115 in Vol.1, 28th Edn.) observes that where parties to a transaction exchanged letters of intent, the terms of such letters may, of course, negative contractual intention; but, on the other hand, where the language does not negative contractual intention, it is open to the courts to hold that the parties are bound by the document; and the courts will, in particular, be inclined to do so where the parties have acted on the document for a long period of time or have expended considerable sums of money in reliance on it. Be that as it may." 13. Learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the operations were closed under the orders of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, and therefore, was beyond their control and thus, they cannot be held responsible for the losses caused on that count. 14. Learned counsel for the respondents also submitted that the collection of royalty was totally dependent upon the mining operations and if the mining operations itself was closed and the mine owners were not able to collector the mineral, then the State ought to have given relaxation for the period when the excavation of the mineral could not take place due to the aforementioned interim orders. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the suffer-age on account of the orders of the Court should not prejudice them in any manner. 15. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted that the suffer-age on account of the orders of the Court should not prejudice them in any manner. It is also submitted that the agreement was entered into with a belief that the mining operations shall continue and any imposition of such condition in the contract was void ab initio, as the same amounted to derailing the process of collection of the royalty. 16. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties as well as perusing the record of the case, this Court is of the opinion that the learned Single Judge has erred in law to quantify the losses extending equities in favour of the respondents/writ petitioners and proportionately reducing the total liability of the respondents. 17. The precedent law in the judgment rendered in Mohammed Gazi v. State of M.P. and Ors. (supra) cited by learned counsel for the appellants shall not apply to the facts of the present case, as the same was pertaining to performance of a particular act in a contract and the consequences thereof. Whereas in the present case, the contract pertains to recovery of certain amount as royalty collection, and thus, it is not about an act itself, but is about the collection of the royalty on behalf of the Government in respect of quarry licenses and the short term permit holders, who excavate the minor mineral from the specified mines. 18. Also, the precedent law in the judgment rendered in Dresser Rand S.A. v. Bindal Agro Chem Ltd. and Anr. (supra) cited by learned counsel for the appellants shall not apply in the present case, as that case pertains to a contract of recovery of the royalty on behalf of the State, from the persons conducting mining operations, and with open eyes, the respondents/writ petitioners had accepted the terms and conditions, which were very clear that any kind of stoppage of mining operations shall not have any bearing or impact upon the recovery of the royalty. 19. The terms in the contract, which prohibited any impact upon the royalty, contractual appointment upon the new mining leases being granted or the present mining leases being terminated, is a very broader proposition and has a comprehensive impact upon the mining leases. 19. The terms in the contract, which prohibited any impact upon the royalty, contractual appointment upon the new mining leases being granted or the present mining leases being terminated, is a very broader proposition and has a comprehensive impact upon the mining leases. It is an admitted position in this case that the writ petitioners had entered into an agreement for collection of royalty, which contains the aforesaid language of absolute liability irrespective of the status of the mining operations. The contract between the parties was in writing and the terms and conditions were absolutely stipulated therein, including the collection of royalty, and such stipulation was categorical in nature. 20. In view of the above, it is apparent that the respondents/writ petitioners had entered into the contract with complete consciousness of the specific language therein in the agreement that they shall be paying the collected royalty of a particular area irrespective of the status of the mining operations, and hence, no relief could have been granted to them. Thus, the law of equity, without any basis, cannot override the specific conditions in the contract in the matter of collection of royalty, and therefore, the impugned order deserves to be set aside, so far it relates to the State. 21. In light of the aforesaid discussion, D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ) No. 212/2007 filed by the State is allowed and the impugned order dated December 08, 2006, so far as it pertains to the same is quashed and set aside. However, D.B. Civil Special Appeals (Writ) No. 925/2006, 48/2007 and 49/2007 are dismissed. Appeal of State Allowed - Order of Single Judge Set Aside.