JUDGMENT : Navaniti Prasad Singh, J. 1. These writ appeals are preferred by the Railways against the judgments passed by the learned Single Judges of this Court in writ proceedings. W.P.(C) No.7544 of 2017 is a case referred to Division Bench by a learned single Judge differing with the views taken in the earlier judgments. 2. The dispute is with regard to (i) interpretation of Section 15 of the Railways Act, 1989 and (ii) the relief to be granted to the writ petitioners. 3. We have heard the learned Standing Counsel for the Railways and the learned counsel for the writ petitioners and with their consent, we are disposing of these matters at this stage itself. 4. First, we may deal with Section 15 of the Railways Act, 1989, which is quoted hereunder: 15. Payment of amount for damage or loss.- (1) No suit shall lie against a railway administration to recover any amount for any damage or loss caused in the exercise of the powers conferred by any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter; (2) A railway administration shall pay or tender payment for any damage or loss caused in the exercise of the powers conferred by any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter, and in case of a dispute as to the sufficiency of any amount so paid or tendered or as to the persons entitled to receive the amount, it shall immediately refer the dispute for the decision of the District Judge of the district and his decision thereon shall be final: Provided that where the railway administration fails to make a reference within sixty days from the date of commencement of the dispute, the District Judge may, on an application made to him by the person concerned, direct the railway administration to refer the dispute for his decision. (3) The reference under sub-section (2) shall be treated as an appeal under section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5) of 1908 and shall be disputed of accordingly. (4) Where any amount has been paid as required by sub-section (2), the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force, be discharged from all liabilities to any person whatsoever in respect of any amount so paid. 5. (4) Where any amount has been paid as required by sub-section (2), the railway administration shall, notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force, be discharged from all liabilities to any person whatsoever in respect of any amount so paid. 5. The submission of the learned counsel for the Railways is that as there is a dispute with regard to the amount of compensation payable, the party, claiming the compensation, must move the Civil Court and get the dispute resolved. The reference is in relation to this issue. We are unable to accept the submission. The reason is, if we closely read the provisions of Section 15(2) of the Act, it is in different parts: Firstly, the railway administration shall pay or tender payment for damage or loss caused in the exercise of power conferred by any of the foregoing provisions of this Chapter; Secondly, in case of a dispute as to sufficiency of any amount or as to the persons entitled to receive the amount; Thirdly, it shall immediately refer the dispute for the decision of the District Judge whose decision shall be final; and Fourthly, if Railways fails to make reference within 60 days from the commencement of dispute, on an application by the person concerned, the District Judge would direct the Railways to refer the dispute for his decision. 6. If we see this Scheme, two things would be clear. Firstly, it is an obligation cast upon the railways to, either pay or tender payment, by way of compensation and secondly, if there be a dispute, “it” shall immediately refer the dispute for the decision of District Judge. The word “it” as used, in our view, clearly referred to the Railways. This would be clear if we refer to the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 15 of the Act, where it clearly provides that if the railway administration fails to make a reference within sixty days the District Judge could call upon and decide the matter at the instance of the person concerned. Thus, in our view, the Scheme is, whenever and whatever be the dispute, the dispute having arisen, the Railways has to refer the matter to the District Judge. Railways cannot , in our view, take a stand that he who disputes must refer the matter to the District Judge or take the matter to the District Judge. Thus, in our view, the Scheme is, whenever and whatever be the dispute, the dispute having arisen, the Railways has to refer the matter to the District Judge. Railways cannot , in our view, take a stand that he who disputes must refer the matter to the District Judge or take the matter to the District Judge. This would answer the reference as made by the learned single Judge as well. 7. Now we come to the second part. Here it may be necessary to note some facts. It appears that in June, 2007 the Assistant Divisional Engineer, Southern Railways, Thiruvananthapuram issued notices to various persons including the writ petitioners which are Ext.P1 series to the writ petition. These notices clearly state that there were various trees near the railway tracks which were leaning towards the railway tracks. These trees were identified in the said notices. They were required to be cut and removed for the purpose of safety of the Railways. If they were not so done within 10 days by the recipient of the notices, then Railways would do it at the cost of the noticees. Another important aspect was that in the notice itself it was clearly stated that 'compensation at premium rates' would be paid as assessed by the Tahsildar (Railways). 8. It appears that as individually the trees were identified, the writ petitioners who were recipients, immediately arranged for cutting and removal of those trees. The problems commenced thereafter. After great persuasion the Tahsildar individually fixed the compensation that was to be paid and which he was required to determine as per Ext.P1 series of notices. This he did on or about in the second quarter of the year 2011, i.e., almost 4 years thereafter. This is Ext.P2 series to the writ petition. The Railways then prepared a consolidated chart and forwarded it to the Divisional Railway Manager for payment, which is Ext.P3. It appears that nothing was done. Therefore, an information was sought under the Right to Information Act. By Ext.P5, they were informed that steps were being taken for securing clearance was for the money which were to be distributed. This is dated 28.09.2015. Again, when nothing was done, various complaints were made and one of the petitioners, being Baby Thomas, filed a writ petition as W.P.(C) No.11438 of 2013. By Ext.P5, they were informed that steps were being taken for securing clearance was for the money which were to be distributed. This is dated 28.09.2015. Again, when nothing was done, various complaints were made and one of the petitioners, being Baby Thomas, filed a writ petition as W.P.(C) No.11438 of 2013. The case was disposed of by judgment and order dated 01.09.2014, wherein this Court clearly held that it was of the view that the Railways shall pay the compensation amount fixed by the Tahsildar (Railways) within a period of one month. If there was failure to make the payment, the defaulted payment would attract 12% interest till the actual payment. 9. It is against the above order, W.A. No. 1507 of 2014 has been filed by the Railways. The others then followed the suit and similar orders were passed and hence the appeal by Railways being W.A. No.1118 of 2017. Before this Court for the first time two objections have been raised by the Railways. First of which is that if there were any disputes, all the writ petitioners, nearing 100 in number, should have moved the District Judge. We have held this issue against the Railways. The second concerns the manner in which the Tahsildar (Railways) calculated the compensation of fruit bearing trees. According to the Railways, the compensation assessed was not correct. In this regard, we would first notice that in the notice Ext.P1 itself Railways had clearly stipulated that they would pay compensation as determined by the Tahsildar (Railways). Thus, they had delegated the authority to the Tahsildar (Railways). Once they had delegated the authority to a person, then, in our view, they cannot sit in appeal over the delegatee's functions, because it is well established that the delegatee when exercises the functions he exercises it on behalf of the delegator and it is the delegator himself who is deemed to have passed the order. If we permit the Railways to challenge what was done by the Tahsildar (Railways), it would be allowing the Railways to sit in appeal over its own decision. That cannot be permitted. 10. Secondly, if Railways had any dispute, though they took almost 10 years to come up with the same, it was open to them when the dispute arose, to move the District Judge as contemplated by Section 15(1) of the Act. They did nothing. That cannot be permitted. 10. Secondly, if Railways had any dispute, though they took almost 10 years to come up with the same, it was open to them when the dispute arose, to move the District Judge as contemplated by Section 15(1) of the Act. They did nothing. We must notice that the writ petitioners being small and humble persons had cut and removed the trees in 2007. The calculation of compensation was done only in 2011 and when direction for payment was issued, payment ought to have been made immediately. The petitioners and their like are forced to start litigation, even without payments, which were due in 2007 itself. 11. All we can do is refer to what the Apex Court said in the case of M/s. Hindustan Sugar Mills v. The State of Rajasthan and others [ AIR 1981 SC 1681 ]. We may note that first when the plea of reimbursement of tax liability was raised, the matter was disposed of by the Apex Court holding thus : “It is true and we are aware that there is no legal liability on the Central Government to do so but it must be remembered that we are living in a democratic society governed by the rule of law and every Government which claims to be inspired by ethical and moral values must do what is fair and just to the citizen, regardless of legal technicalities. We hope and trust that the Central Government will not seek to defeat the legitimate claim of the assessee for reimbursement of sales tax on the amount of freight by adopting a legalistic attitude.” It was then brought to the notice of the Court that indeed there was a reimbursement Clause and then their Lordships said thus: “Where there is such a clause, the Central Government is bound to pay the amount of sales tax on the freight component of the price and we hope and trust that the Central Government will honour its legal obligation and not drive the appellant to file a suit for recovery of the amount of such sales tax. We hopefully expect that the Central Government will not try to shirk its legal obligation by resorting to any legal technicalities, for we maintain that in a democratic society governed by the rule of law, it is the duty of the State to do what is fair and just to the citizen, and the State should not seek to defeat the legitimate claim of the citizen by adopting a legalistic attitude but should do what fairness and justice demand.” 12. One thing that run in common is that Government being Government, it cannot be permitted to defeat legitimate claims of citizens by adopting legalistic attitude and should do what is fair and justice demands. That is the command of law. The facts here totally belly the situation. We, thus, will not go into the question as to the correctness of calculation of compensation as that was done by an authority appointed by the Railways themselves as it was done on behalf of the Railways itself. It is not open to the Railways now to turn around and challenge the same and that too after several years of the determination. The internal correspondence including Exts.P3 and P5 would show that it was not disputed at the earlier stage. It was disputed only when the petitioners moved this Court. It was thus only a pretense of a dispute and a pretext to deny legitimate compensation. 13. Thus, we see no reason to interfere with the order of the learned single Judge and we find no merit in these appeals. We would therefore direct that the amount of compensation, which is long overdue, be paid forthwith as per the Chart prepared by the Railways itself which is Ext.P3 and if it is not paid within 45 days, as directed by the learned single Judge, it would bear interest at the rate of 12% from 01.09.2014. We further clarify that even if the Railways now decides to move the District Judge disputing the compensation, the payment of compensation and interest as indicated above would not be kept in abeyance, as these payments in fact were due as far back as in the year 2007. We do not expect that the Railways would take such a decision to deny payment of compensation to the humble citizens when they acted pursuant to the directions of the Railways in cutting down the trees. We do not expect that the Railways would take such a decision to deny payment of compensation to the humble citizens when they acted pursuant to the directions of the Railways in cutting down the trees. The writ appeals are disposed of with the above observations and the writ petition stands allowed on the same terms as above.